State of Tennessee v. Bobby Wayne Jenkins and Tareaun D. Griffin

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2005-00593-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; March 12, 2006; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of State of Tennessee v. Bobby W. Jenkins and Tareaun D. Griffin, both defendants were convicted following a jury trial for their roles in a December 2002 armed robbery of a Nashville tobacco store. Tareaun D. Griffin was found guilty of especially aggravated robbery and attempted second degree murder, receiving a combined effective sentence of thirty-one years, while Bobby W. Jenkins was convicted of especially aggravated robbery with a sentence of twenty years. 

On appeal, Griffin raised issues regarding the trial court's failure to provide jury instructions on self-defense and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Jenkins contested the exclusion of expert testimony regarding his mental capacity and the failure to impose a mitigated sentence. The court affirmed the trial court's judgments.

The robbery involved both defendants threatening a store clerk with handguns and stealing cash and cigarettes. During their escape, Griffin shot the clerk in the arm. The clerk provided a description of the assailants, leading to their quick apprehension. A pre-trial ruling excluded the expert testimony for Jenkins, which the court found irrelevant to the charges. The trial included testimony from the store owner, detailing the events leading up to the robbery.

Mr. Al-Zayadi testified that he was threatened at gunpoint by two defendants, who forced him to open two cash registers during a robbery at his store. Defendant Jenkins took cash from the first register and several cartons of Newport cigarettes, while Defendant Griffin took cash from the second register. After initially leaving, Defendant Griffin returned to demand more money from the second register, during which Mr. Al-Zayadi activated a silent alarm. Griffin shot at Mr. Al-Zayadi, narrowly missing him, and when Mr. Al-Zayadi reached for his own handgun, Griffin shot him in the arm. Despite being injured, Mr. Al-Zayadi fired once, hitting the ceiling. Griffin continued to shoot at him as the robbers fled in a red Nissan Maxima. A bystander called 911, and police arrived within five minutes. Mr. Al-Zayadi provided a description of the robbers and later identified them during a police show-up at the hospital with certainty. He noted he was only four to five feet away from Griffin when the first shot was fired and discovered additional bullets in his store a month later. Officer Donald Barnes testified about responding to the scene, where he found shell casings and issued a BOLO for the suspects' vehicle. Officer Vincent Archuleta later spotted a vehicle matching the description, initiated a traffic stop, and found handguns, cigarettes, and cash inside, leading to the arrest of the suspects. Detective Norris Tarkington noted that Mr. Al-Zayadi was alert and coherent when he spoke to him at the hospital.

Detective Tarkington conducted a show-up identification shortly after a robbery, presenting the two suspects to the victim, who identified them without hesitation. During the investigation, Defendant Griffin admitted to firing the first shot. Evidence collected included photographs of the crime scene, latent fingerprints, and firearms. Officer Earl Hunter recovered two handguns, cartons of cigarettes, and cash from the defendants’ vehicle. Firearm expert Officer Michael Pyburn confirmed that the 9mm and .25 caliber handguns found were functional, linking the shell casings and projectiles to these weapons. Identity Analyst Officer Sally Sherman matched fingerprints from the scene to Defendant Jenkins. Griffin testified that he and Jenkins intended to rob the store, armed with a 9mm handgun, and claimed he did not want to harm anyone, stating he ducked and ran when the store clerk began firing. Despite initially lying to detectives about shooting the victim, he maintained that the clerk shot first and denied abandoning the robbery. Defendant Jenkins did not testify. Both defendants were convicted: Griffin of especially aggravated robbery and attempted second-degree murder, and Jenkins of especially aggravated robbery. During sentencing, Griffin's mother described his troubled childhood and psychiatric care but emphasized he was never violent.

Defendant Griffin acknowledged making mistakes due to associating with the wrong crowd and expressed a desire to apologize to the victim, claiming he shot out of fear. During cross-examination, he admitted to committing multiple robberies, assaults, and burglaries, which he confessed to detectives on the night of his arrest. In contrast, Defendant Jenkins’ mother testified about his traumatic childhood, marked by severe abuse from age two, leading to behavioral issues and violence in his teenage years. Counsel for Jenkins submitted extensive records detailing his troubled upbringing, including documentation from various counselors and the Department of Children’s Services. Dr. James Walker, a court-certified expert, assessed Jenkins' mental state and noted significant difficulties in social understanding and a lack of appreciation for the seriousness of his charges, concluding Jenkins exhibited intellectual capacity near that of a borderline level and emotional functioning akin to a preschooler.

At the sentencing hearing, Griffin received a total effective sentence of thirty-one years for his convictions, while Jenkins was sentenced to twenty years for his robbery conviction. Both defendants filed motions for a new trial, which were denied, and subsequently filed notices of appeal. On appeal, Griffin contended that the trial court erred by not providing jury instructions on self-defense, arguing that he was entitled to such instructions since he believed the robbery had ended when he shot the victim. He referenced an 1884 case to support his claim. Jenkins asserted a violation of due process due to the exclusion of expert testimony on diminished capacity and challenged his sentencing classification. The court found both defendants' claims unpersuasive, affirming the trial court's judgments.

Trial courts must evaluate whether evidence raises an issue without determining its truth or relevance. The State contends that Defendant Griffin instigated the situation by robbing the victim at gunpoint and did not provide evidence of abandoning the robbery or communicating intent to cease before shooting the victim. This failure precludes him from asserting a self-defense claim. Under Tennessee law, self-defense is justified when a person reasonably believes that force is necessary to protect against imminent unlawful force. The belief must be based on real or honestly perceived threats of death or serious injury, and there is no duty to retreat. However, self-defense is not justified if the person provoked the other, unless they abandon the encounter and communicate this intent, and the other party continues to use unlawful force.

Trial courts have the obligation to provide comprehensive jury instructions on applicable law, including self-defense if it is substantiated by evidence. The evidence must be viewed favorably to the defendant to determine if reasonable minds could accept it as supporting the defense. The determination of whether an individual acted in self-defense is ultimately a factual question for the jury. However, a defense is only presented to the jury if it is sufficiently supported by evidence, with the defendant bearing the burden of introducing admissible evidence for its applicability. The initial aggressor rule, codified in Tennessee law, asserts that an aggressor cannot invoke self-defense unless they have withdrawn from the conflict and communicated this to the adversary. A jury charge must accurately reflect the legal issues raised by the evidence; failure to do so constitutes error only if it misleads the jury.

In Gann v. State, the court determined that Defendant Griffin, as the initial aggressor in an armed robbery, could not claim self-defense since he provoked the victim's response. Self-defense is typically unavailable to a defendant who instigates aggression, as established in State v. Inlow. For self-defense to be considered, there must be evidence that the defendant abandoned the confrontation or clearly communicated an intent to do so, as per Tenn. Code Ann. 39-11-611 (d)(1). The trial court did not instruct the jury on self-defense, concluding there was insufficient evidence of abandonment. Testimony indicated that Griffin was only a few feet from the victim during the shooting, contradicting his claim that he was exiting the store and had been shot at first. Griffin's own admission during trial that he did not abandon the robbery further supported the trial court's decision. The court found no basis to conclude that Griffin was free from fault in creating the need for force or that he had abandoned his intent to harm, affirming that the trial court's refusal to instruct on self-defense was appropriate.

Regarding Defendant Jenkins, he contested the exclusion of expert testimony on his diminished mental capacity, arguing that this evidence was relevant to his ability to form the necessary mental state for the crime. Jenkins claimed that the exclusion violated his due process rights and right to a jury trial. The State countered that the expert testimony was irrelevant, as it did not establish that Jenkins' mental impairments prevented him from acting intentionally or knowingly. The admissibility and relevance of expert testimony are generally at the discretion of the trial court, as recognized in State v. Ballard.

Discretion exercised by trial courts is not absolute and can only be overturned if arbitrarily applied. Diminished capacity is not a defense to a crime but aims to prove a defendant's inability to form the requisite intent, thereby establishing innocence. The Tennessee Supreme Court has clarified that diminished capacity involves presenting expert psychiatric evidence to negate the necessary culpable mental state, functioning as a rule of evidence rather than an outright defense. Relevant evidence under Tennessee law is generally admissible unless its probative value is significantly outweighed by prejudicial effects, with relevance defined as evidence making a consequential fact more or less probable. Expert testimony must substantially assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. The Tennessee Supreme Court has upheld that psychiatric evidence demonstrating a defendant's lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect is admissible if it meets general relevancy and expert testimony standards. Evidence should not be labeled as "diminished capacity" but presented as relevant to negating culpable mental state. The distinction between "mental disease or defect" and "emotional state or mental condition" is critical; the psychiatric testimony must show that the inability to form the requisite mental state arises from a mental disease or defect. In the case of Defendant Jenkins, the trial court ruled Dr. Walker's testimony inadmissible during the guilt phase because it did not establish Jenkins's incapacity to act intentionally or knowingly due to a mental disease or defect.

Dr. Walker's testimony regarding Defendant Jenkins' diminished mental capacity was deemed insufficient for establishing that Jenkins lacked the intent to act knowingly or intentionally due to a mental disease or defect, failing to meet the criteria set forth in Hall for relevant diminished capacity evidence. Consequently, the trial court's decision to exclude Dr. Walker's testimony from the guilt phase of the trial was upheld as correct.

Both Defendants, Griffin and Jenkins, raised sentencing issues on appeal. Griffin contended that the trial court improperly ordered his sentences to run consecutively, arguing he was wrongly denied a self-defense instruction, which he claimed contributed to his conviction for attempted second-degree murder. Jenkins argued that the trial court failed to appropriately weigh several mitigating factors in his sentencing. The court disagreed with both claims, emphasizing that prior to sentencing, the court must consider multiple factors, including trial evidence, presentence reports, and mitigating and enhancement factors as outlined in Tennessee law.

The trial court is required to document its rationale for the specific sentence imposed, identifying and evaluating mitigating and enhancement factors. The appellate court conducts a de novo review of the sentence with a presumption of correctness, contingent on the trial court’s adherence to statutory sentencing procedures and adequate support for its findings. The burden of proof for demonstrating an improper sentence lies with the appealing party. The appellate court would uphold the trial court's sentence if it aligns with the 1989 Sentencing Act and is supported by the record.

Defendant Griffin contends that if the jury had determined he acted in self-defense, the trial court's subsequent findings would not justify classifying him as a dangerous offender, thus negating consecutive sentencing. His argument is dismissed for three main reasons: the trial court properly denied self-defense jury instructions, correctly classified him as a dangerous offender, and imposed consecutive sentences based on additional criteria. The trial court has discretion in deciding to impose consecutive versus concurrent sentences, guided by Tennessee law, which allows consecutive sentencing when at least one of the specified criteria is met by a preponderance of the evidence. 

In this case, the court identified two valid criteria for consecutive sentencing: Griffin's extensive criminal history and his classification as a dangerous offender, both of which indicate a significant disregard for human life and a propensity for high-risk crimes. The trial court cited seventeen admitted offenses, primarily robberies, including incidents involving violent behavior and illegal drug use. This extensive criminal record justified consecutive sentences based on the criterion of extensive criminal activity.

Moreover, the trial court found Griffin to be a dangerous offender, which necessitates that the imposed sentence is proportionate to the severity of the crimes and necessary for public protection. The trial court concluded that a thirty-one-year sentence was suitable and aligned with the seriousness of the offenses, emphasizing the fortunate outcome that no victims were killed during his criminal acts.

The court affirmed the trial court's decision regarding Defendant Griffin, emphasizing the need for public protection due to his violent criminal history. The court noted that Griffin’s crimes were increasingly dangerous, justifying a lengthy sentence and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. 

In the case of Defendant Jenkins, the trial court recognized him as a mitigated offender but determined that his behavior negated the weight of the mitigating factors. Jenkins contended that the court improperly disregarded mitigating evidence and failed to assign it appropriate weight, arguing for a mitigated sentence of thirteen and one-half years. The trial court, while acknowledging Jenkins’ youth and mental defect as mitigating factors, concluded that these were outweighed by his actions. The court stated that the discretion to weigh mitigating factors lies with the trial court. Despite finding no enhancement factors, the trial court sentenced Jenkins to twenty years, which aligns with the midpoint for his Class A felony. 

The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in Jenkins' sentence and concluded that both defendants’ issues on appeal were without merit. The judgments of the trial court were affirmed.