Billy Jackson Coffelt was convicted in 1983 of assault with intent to commit first-degree murder and assault with intent to commit robbery, receiving a life sentence for the former and a sentence of 10 to 21 years for the latter. He did not pursue a direct appeal. After 17 years, the post-conviction court granted him a delayed appeal but denied other claims for post-conviction relief. Coffelt subsequently filed separate appeals, which this court consolidated. The main issue in the delayed appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. In his post-conviction appeal, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The court affirmed the convictions due to sufficient evidence but reversed the denial of post-conviction relief, finding that Coffelt was denied effective assistance of counsel. Consequently, his convictions were vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial. The opinion was delivered by Judge Gary R. Wade, with Judges Witt and Wedemeyer concurring.
The petitioner was unaware of the final judgment denying his Post-Conviction Petition and consequently, the petition was denied without a hearing. On appeal, the court determined it was an error to dismiss the petition summarily without an evidentiary hearing and remanded the case for a hearing. Following remand, counsel was appointed, an amended petition was filed, and an evidentiary hearing occurred twenty-four years after the original crimes. The post-conviction court granted the petitioner a delayed appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-118, but denied the remaining claims for post-conviction relief. The petitioner filed notices of appeal for both the delayed direct appeal and the denial of other claims. Previous case law established that remaining post-conviction allegations should be dismissed without prejudice during a delayed appeal process, allowing for a subsequent petition after the direct appeal concludes without procedural concerns. In 2002, amendments to Rule 28 of the Supreme Court Rules clarified that if a petitioner is deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court must follow the procedures in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113. The court noted that while the amendment allowed for simultaneous granting of a delayed appeal and denial of post-conviction relief, it lacked a stay provision for post-conviction proceedings.
The court is reviewing a delayed direct appeal alongside an appeal of post-conviction relief, focusing on the sufficiency of evidence supporting the convictions. The petitioner argues that the evidence, mainly reliant on the testimony of accomplice Cathy Campbell, is insufficient. The state counters that the evidence is adequate, emphasizing that it is entitled to the strongest legitimate view and all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. The jury, as the trier of fact, is responsible for assessing witness credibility, the weight of their testimony, and resolving any conflicts in the evidence. The standard for evaluating sufficiency requires determining if a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence favorably for the state. The burden of proving legal insufficiency rests with the defendant, as a guilty verdict presumes guilt.
The statutes relevant to the convictions include penalties for assault with intent to commit first-degree murder and assault with intent to commit robbery, both of which were in effect in 1980 when the crimes occurred. Testimony from the victim, Bernard Tefteller, indicated that he was approached by Campbell at a lounge, after which they left together and subsequently encountered a robbery attempt where he was shot in the arm.
The victim suffered a broken bone and a torn muscle from a shooting involving a .45 automatic firearm. He clearly saw both the driver and passenger of the assailant's vehicle during the incident. After the shooting, despite interference from co-defendant Ms. Campbell, who attempted to prevent his escape, the victim managed to drive to a nearby Ryder Truck Rental, where he received assistance from employees who called the police and an ambulance. He identified the petitioner as the shooter and Ms. Campbell as the passenger in the dark green vehicle involved in the crime.
Two weeks after the police returned his vehicle, the victim and a coworker discovered a bullet fragment inside the car, which he later turned over to the police. Ms. Campbell, married to the co-defendant at the time, testified that she was with both the petitioner and the co-defendant on the night of the offense. She recounted a plan initiated by the petitioner to lure a victim for robbery, involving her taking a man from the V.I.P. Lounge to a secluded location with the intent to rob him at gunpoint using a .45 caliber handgun she had stolen from her father.
During her testimony, Ms. Campbell claimed she initiated a conversation with the victim and directed him to a designated area, where the petitioner appeared and shot the victim after announcing "Vice squad." Although she heard the gunshot, she denied seeing the co-defendant in the vehicle during the shooting. Initially, she misled police by naming another individual as the perpetrator to protect the petitioner. Under cross-examination, she admitted to consuming Valium and alcohol that night and acknowledged that the charges against her were dropped in exchange for her testimony.
Officer Jerry Moore of the Metro Police Department confirmed that six weeks after the incident, the victim provided what he believed to be a spent .45 caliber bullet. The victim later selected the petitioner from a photographic lineup as the shooter. Officer Preston Perkinson also participated in the investigation, noting that Ms. Campbell had purchased .45 caliber ammunition, although the purchase date was ambiguous. He conducted a second photographic lineup, in which the victim positively identified the petitioner as the shooter, unaware that the victim had previously been shown a different lineup by Officer Moore.
Phillip Denning testified that he hosted an annual cook-out on July 11, 1980, attended by the petitioner, who managed collections for food and music. The event began around noon and continued until the early morning hours, with both the petitioner and the co-defendant present. Denning acknowledged he could not independently recall the date but referenced a 1980 calendar confirming it. Robert Hutchison and James Paul Estes corroborated Denning’s testimony, stating they also saw the petitioner at the cook-out throughout the night but could not independently verify the date.
The victim identified the petitioner as the shooter in an incident that required multiple surgeries for his arm injury. Cathy Campbell testified to planning the robbery with the petitioner and co-defendant, being present during the shooting. Despite the petitioner questioning Campbell's credibility, the jury ultimately determined credibility issues. Witnesses for the state indicated that the shooting occurred early on July 11, 1980, before the cook-out began, supporting the jury's verdict of assault with intent to commit first-degree murder and robbery.
In his post-conviction relief petition, the petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, citing failures to preserve a speedy trial right, investigate the case, file a motion to suppress pretrial identification, object to certain evidence, request a continuance, and file a Notice of Alibi. He also alleged a conflict of interest due to his counsel representing the co-defendant. At an evidentiary hearing 17 years later, the petitioner’s sister testified about the romantic relationship between the petitioner and Campbell at the time of the offenses.
Ms. Poole reported that she lived with Ms. Campbell, who was married to the co-defendant, for about six months, and that the petitioner and Ms. Campbell had ended their relationship by the trial's start. The petitioner stated he paid trial counsel $15,000 to represent both himself and the co-defendant, who was romantically involved with the petitioner's sister, and expected reimbursement from the co-defendant, which never occurred. Payment was secured via a lien on the petitioner's father's house, which he was to inherit. Trial counsel created a contract stipulating the fee with an additional 10% interest annually for unpaid balances and also drafted the elder's will, ensuring the petitioner inherited the residence.
The petitioner alleged that trial counsel was ineffective, particularly for failing to perfect a direct appeal, a claim later resolved by the court granting a delayed appeal. He asserted that trial counsel sold property for $24,000 ten years after the offense without adequate representation. The petitioner claimed he only met with trial counsel once after being charged and that he did not see him again until trial. He argued that trial counsel did not protect his right to a speedy trial, as the indictment occurred two years after the offense, and claimed the case was initially dismissed due to lack of prosecution.
The petitioner criticized trial counsel for not investigating his case adequately, stating he could have provided alibi witnesses whose testimonies were not pursued. He attempted to bring these witnesses to court himself but contended that trial counsel failed to argue an alibi defense. The petitioner maintained that had trial counsel investigated properly, he would have established the offense date as July 10 instead of July 11. He noted he was at work on July 10 and had witnesses who could confirm his alibi, both of whom had since died. Additionally, he claimed trial counsel was unprepared for trial, receiving discovery just three days prior without conducting any witness interviews.
The petitioner alleged that trial counsel neglected to investigate whether the gun used in the robbery was stolen, as claimed by witness Cathy Campbell, and failed to adequately cross-examine her regarding this issue during the trial. He contended that counsel should have filed a motion to suppress the victim's pretrial identification, asserting that the victim initially could not identify him and made a positive identification only when shown a second photographic array that included the same image from the first lineup.
Additionally, the petitioner argued that trial counsel should have contested the admissibility of a bullet found in the victim's car due to insufficient chain of custody. He maintained that trial counsel inadequately cross-examined Ms. Campbell, particularly regarding her initial police statement where she implicated co-defendant Hurston Kelly in the crime. The petitioner claimed he had met Kelly in prison, where Kelly disclosed that Ms. Campbell was attempting to blame him for the crime after their romantic relationship ended.
The petitioner expressed that trial counsel failed to pursue relevant impeachment opportunities, such as Ms. Campbell's inconsistent statements about how she arrived at the V.I.P. Lounge. He noted that after Ms. Campbell denied seeing the co-defendant in the passenger seat of the car, trial counsel did not press her further. The petitioner felt that trial counsel's lack of aggressive cross-examination contributed to his defense's weakness. During cross-examination, the petitioner conceded that trial counsel had represented him in multiple cases prior to this trial and acknowledged his awareness of the circumstances surrounding the case from a conversation with Ms. Campbell on July 11, 1980, prior to a social event. He confirmed that the incident related to the charges had occurred before this date and that the indictment only specified July 1980. Trial counsel, who testified for the state, confirmed his representation of the petitioner at that time.
There was no established practice of filing a motion for discovery, as trial counsel indicated that the norm was to meet with the District Attorney to obtain necessary information. Trial counsel did not recall specific details about the trial due to the passage of time and was uncertain whether he represented both the petitioner and the co-defendant, noting that dual representation was permitted at that time. He asserted that attorneys were not required to file a motion to withdraw before resigning after a motion for a new trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted a delayed appeal but denied claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding that trial counsel adequately investigated the case and that the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice from any alleged deficiencies. The court ruled that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to file a Notice of Alibi and noted the petitioner's confusion regarding the offense date. The petitioner was also not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to challenge the victim's pretrial identification or the chain of custody for a bullet found in the victim's car. The court acknowledged its obligation to follow an appellate opinion regarding the co-defendant's case, which influenced its ruling on dual representation. In his appeal, the petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for various reasons, including insufficient investigation and failure to preserve rights. The state countered that trial counsel performed adequately, maintained that discovery was received prior to trial, and argued that the petitioner was not denied a speedy trial or subjected to suggestive pretrial identification. Although the state admitted a conflict of interest existed, it asserted that the petitioner did not prove any resulting prejudice. Under Tennessee law, the petitioner must prove his post-conviction claims by clear and convincing evidence.
The Post-Conviction Procedure Act, effective at the time of the petition's filing, required the petitioner to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Findings of fact by the trial court are conclusive unless the evidence strongly contradicts them, placing the burden on the petitioner to demonstrate such a preponderance. In claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show that the attorney's performance fell below the acceptable standard of competence and that such deficiencies adversely affected the defense, rendering the outcome unreliable. A failure to establish either requirement negates the claim for relief. Courts do not need to address both components if the petitioner fails to prove one. Additionally, petitioners cannot benefit from hindsight, criticize sound trial strategies, or question tactical decisions made with adequate preparation. Claims of ineffective assistance are treated as mixed questions of law and fact, with de novo review applied to legal conclusions without presumption of correctness for the post-conviction court's conclusions. The petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for not thoroughly investigating the case, asserting that proper investigation would have revealed the timeline of the offense, allowing witnesses to confirm his whereabouts on the correct dates. However, due to a lengthy delay in proceedings, both potential witnesses have since died.
The petitioner claims that trial counsel neglected to investigate Cathy Campbell's assertion about stealing the weapon used in the robbery, failed to locate and interview potential witnesses, and did not request discovery. Trial counsel acknowledged a lack of specific recollection about the case and mentioned that discovery requests were not commonly filed during that period. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel did conduct an investigation and called witnesses, supported by the trial transcript. It noted that trial counsel had a longstanding relationship with the petitioner, which may have included discussions about related cases. The court ruled that the petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice from any alleged deficiencies in trial counsel's investigation. However, the summary suggests that the record does not substantiate the court's finding regarding an investigation. Trial counsel's testimony indicated no recollection of having conducted an investigation or interviewed witnesses, and the defense witnesses were brought to court by the petitioner's sister, not by trial counsel. The petitioner had requested subpoenas for these witnesses, who were crucial for an alibi defense. Additionally, the petitioner appeared confused about the timing of the offense, which did not align with any discrepancies in the trial testimony. There was no evidence of relevant information concerning the theft of the weapon that could have been presented at trial. The petitioner also acknowledged that the witnesses he desired to call had already testified during the trial. Furthermore, he argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a Notice of Alibi, which he believed deprived him of a defense.
Trial counsel's failure to request a continuance regarding a discrepancy in the offense's timeline is contested. The victim testified he was at the V.I.P. Lounge from 10:00 p.m. to 11:45 p.m. on July 10, 1980, with the shooting occurring just after midnight on July 11, 1980. Three witnesses confirmed the petitioner attended a barbecue on July 11, but trial counsel did not request an alibi instruction or file a Notice of Alibi prior to trial. The post-conviction court determined there was no confusion about the dates and that the petitioner had the opportunity to present alibi evidence, which the jury could have considered despite the absence of an instruction. The petitioner acknowledged awareness that the offense occurred before the cookout, thus undermining his claim of confusion. Additionally, he conceded that his defense witnesses were called at his request and not by trial counsel, and crucial potential alibi witnesses had died before the evidentiary hearing, with no indication they would have provided favorable testimony. The burden of proving prejudice lies with the petitioner, who failed to demonstrate any.
The petitioner also claimed ineffective assistance regarding his right to a speedy trial. Indicted in September 1982 and tried in October 1983, the thirteen-month delay did not meet the threshold for presumptive prejudice, which is typically one to two years. None of the Barker v. Wingo factors favored the petitioner, leading to the conclusion that he did not prove he was prejudiced by trial counsel's inaction regarding a speedy trial motion.
The petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress a pretrial identification made by the victim, which he claims was unduly suggestive. He testified that after the offenses, the victim viewed a photographic lineup that included his photo but did not identify him positively. Weeks later, in a second lineup containing the same photo, the victim made a positive identification. The post-conviction court determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice from his counsel's alleged deficiency regarding the identification.
In assessing pretrial identifications, the United States Supreme Court's ruling in *Neil v. Biggers* establishes a two-part analysis: first, to determine if the identification procedure was unduly suggestive; and second, if so, to evaluate the reliability of the identification under the totality of the circumstances. Factors for consideration include the witness's opportunity to view the suspect, attention during the crime, accuracy of prior descriptions, certainty during the confrontation, and the time elapsed between the crime and the identification.
In this case, the trial transcript showed that the victim participated in two photographic lineups weeks apart, both including the petitioner's photo. The first officer testified that the victim selected two photos resembling the shooter, and the second officer conducted the second lineup without knowledge of the first. The victim, having seen the gunman closely, positively identified the petitioner at trial with high certainty. The court found that the factors from *Neil* supported the identification's admission, concluding that no prejudice resulted from trial counsel's failure to challenge it, thus denying the petitioner relief.
Additionally, the petitioner claims ineffective assistance due to his trial counsel not objecting to the admission of a bullet allegedly found in the victim’s car and a receipt for .45 caliber ammunition signed by Ms. Campbell.
The petitioner argues that trial counsel should have objected to the admission of a bullet into evidence due to an inadequate chain of custody and claims that a receipt was inadmissible hearsay. The post-conviction court found that the bullet's admission did not hinge on chain of custody issues, as the police could not account for it but the jury was aware of this. The court concluded the petitioner was not prejudiced by the lack of objection since the bullet's recovery was presented to the jury. Regarding the receipt, the court ruled it was not admitted into evidence, thus no prejudice resulted from the trial counsel's failure to object.
Additionally, the petitioner contends trial counsel was ineffective for jointly representing him and his co-defendant, creating a conflict of interest. He argues that trial counsel did not impeach a witness, Ms. Campbell, regarding her inconsistent statements and romantic relationship with the co-defendant. While the post-conviction court recognized that trial counsel's dual representation had previously been deemed ineffective for the co-defendant, it concluded that the petitioner did not suffer prejudice from this representation. The court erroneously applied a previous ruling regarding the co-defendant's case as binding for the petitioner, which the petitioner contests, referencing the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as outlined in Massengill v. Scott.
Collateral estoppel, an extension of res judicata, applies only when an issue has been previously litigated between the same parties, even if based on a different cause of action, provided that the issue was necessary for the prior judgment. Res judicata prevents a second suit between the same parties regarding the same cause of action, covering all issues that were or could have been litigated. For res judicata to apply, the prior judgment must be final and must involve the same cause of action. Collateral estoppel requires proof that the issue was both litigated and necessary to the prior judgment.
Privity in res judicata refers to the relationship concerning the subject matter of the litigation. Defendants invoking these doctrines must demonstrate that the previous judgment was final and that both cases involve the same parties, cause of action, or identical issues. In this case, res judicata does not apply, as the prior litigation did not involve the same parties or cause of action, and collateral estoppel is also inapplicable since the petitioner was not a party to the prior case, and their mention was not necessary to the judgment. Furthermore, the state has not established that the petitioner is a privy of the co-defendant.
Consequently, the ruling in Campbell is not binding in the petitioner’s case. Unpublished opinions can be controlling authority between the parties if relevant under doctrines such as res judicata or collateral estoppel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest is evaluated under a different standard than traditional ineffectiveness claims. The Supreme Court held in Cuyler v. Sullivan that prejudice is presumed when counsel has an actual conflict of interest, which breaches the duty of loyalty and complicates the assessment of the defense's effect.
The obligation of legal counsel to avoid conflicts of interest is paramount within the criminal justice system, which upholds a strict rule of presumed prejudice in such situations. Prejudice is not automatically assumed with multiple representations; it arises only when a defendant shows that counsel "actively represented conflicting interests" and that this conflict adversely impacted the lawyer's performance. An "actual conflict of interest" occurs when an attorney cannot exercise independent professional judgment due to divided loyalties. In instances of multiple employment, a conflict exists if continued representation would likely involve the attorney in representing differing interests. The focus should be on whether the conflict affected counsel's actions, as the right to counsel demands complete dedication to the defendant's interests. An attorney representing conflicting co-defendants cannot provide the necessary legal assistance as required by the Sixth Amendment. The role of defense counsel encompasses a duty to serve as an advocate for the accused, ensuring thorough investigation, effective representation, and the pursuit of the client's interests. A failure to provide zealous representation due to conflicting interests constitutes a breach of the right to effective counsel. Professional Responsibility Rules indicate that loyalty to a client is compromised when a lawyer's other obligations hinder their ability to recommend or pursue appropriate actions for the client. Divided loyalties between co-defendants inherently compromise the defense, leading to a presumption of prejudice.
In Caban v. United States, the court established that a breach of loyalty due to an actual conflict of interest leads to a presumption of prejudice. However, if a defendant does not object to multiple representation during trial, he must prove that an actual conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance, as mere possibility of prejudice is insufficient for relief. A defendant only needs to show that the conflict impacted representation if he demonstrates that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests.
In the case at hand, the petitioner’s trial counsel represented both him and the co-defendant, initially hired as a favor due to personal connections. The petitioner argued that after a witness, Ms. Campbell, offered testimony favorable to the co-defendant, trial counsel inadequately cross-examined her and failed to impeach her despite prior inconsistent statements. The trial transcript supports the petitioner’s claims, showing that trial counsel did not question Ms. Campbell about their past relationship or her statements regarding the weapon used in the incident, focusing instead on her drug use.
The court noted a strong likelihood of conflict when an attorney represents multiple co-defendants, particularly given the disparity in their positions in this case, where Ms. Campbell's testimony implicated the petitioner while attempting to exonerate the co-defendant. This situation created an actual conflict of interest, which should have prompted trial counsel to withdraw from representing both parties, as outlined in the Tennessee Supreme Court's Code of Professional Responsibility.
Counsel failed to challenge the credibility of Ms. Campbell and highlight inconsistencies in her statements, which was critical for the petitioner's defense. Ms. Campbell's exculpatory testimony for the co-defendant created a conflict of interest for counsel, mirroring the scenario in Holloway v. Arkansas where the Supreme Court emphasized the detrimental effects of joint representation on an advocate's actions. The case also parallels Glasser v. United States, where an actual conflict of interest led to a new trial due to counsel's failure to cross-examine a witness vital to the defendant's defense. Here, a thorough cross-examination of Ms. Campbell was necessary, as her testimony was pivotal for elements of the charges against the petitioner, including the intent to rob and premeditation for first-degree murder. The court highlighted the difficulty in demonstrating the impact of dual representation on defense outcomes, reiterating that once an actual conflict is proven, prejudice is presumed. Consequently, the court ruled that the petitioner was prejudiced by this conflict, reversing the post-conviction court's judgment, vacating the convictions, and granting a new trial.
