Clyde Lee Blackmon v. State of Tennessee

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2005-02570-CCA-R3-PC

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; October 13, 2006; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Clyde Lee Blackmon appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition regarding his 2004 second-degree murder conviction, for which he is serving a 25-year sentence as a Range I violent offender. Blackmon claims ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his guilty plea involuntary. The court affirms the trial court's judgment, finding no error. 

During the plea hearing, Blackmon admitted to killing a security guard while attempting to steal car radios, initially charged with first-degree murder. At 20 years old and with a high school education, he opted for a guilty plea to second-degree murder, acknowledging the 100% service of his sentence. He later alleged his counsel's ineffectiveness in several respects, including failing to obtain a mental examination and not challenging his accomplice's police statement or his sentence range determination. 

Upon further review, Blackmon narrowed his claims to the failure to explain the 100% sentence service and not filing a motion to suppress a statement he made while injured and medicated. Testimony revealed that counsel believed he informed Blackmon about the sentence and that the plea decision was ultimately Blackmon's after consulting with his attorney and family. Counsel defended his strategic decision not to file a suppression motion, as it aligned with a self-defense argument. Blackmon confirmed he discussed the evidence and defense theory with his counsel before pleading guilty.

The petitioner, who had been in pre-trial detention, claimed he was misinformed by his counsel about the length of his sentence and release eligibility. He asserted that he only learned the actual duration of his incarceration upon entering the Department of Correction, and that he did not fully understand the guilty plea paperwork or court admonitions due to his inexperience in the criminal justice system. The petitioner expressed a desire for his counsel to file a motion to suppress, but counsel believed the statement in question was beneficial to the defense, leading him to decide against filing it. The trial court found that counsel had appropriately advised the petitioner regarding the plea agreement and confirmed that the petitioner entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. The court also ruled that counsel's decision not to file the suppression motion was a strategic choice, thus rejecting the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the petitioner raised the issue of the voluntariness of his plea, specifically regarding counsel's advice on release eligibility. The burden was on the petitioner to prove his claims by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court would defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they were found to be against the preponderance of the evidence, while reviewing the effectiveness of counsel de novo. To succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard, the petitioner must demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficiency was prejudicial, indicating that the outcome would have differed but for the inadequate representation. This standard is applicable under both the Sixth Amendment and the Tennessee Constitution.

A petitioner must show a reasonable probability that the outcome would differ if not for counsel's errors, as defined in Strickland v. Washington. A probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome must be established; failure to meet either prong leads to denial of relief. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Baxter v. Rose set a standard for attorney competence based on the range of services expected in criminal cases, measured against criteria from Beasley v. United States and United States v. DeCoster. Evaluations of attorney performance must avoid hindsight bias and consider the circumstances of the challenged conduct from the attorney's perspective at the time. A failed strategy alone does not indicate ineffective assistance if it was informed by adequate preparation. 

When assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the Supreme Court requires a determination of whether the plea was a voluntary and intelligent choice among available alternatives. This assessment considers the totality of circumstances, including the defendant's intelligence, familiarity with legal proceedings, representation by competent counsel, and reasons for the plea. A plea influenced by ignorance, coercion, or misunderstanding is not considered voluntary. In the case at hand, the petitioner claimed his attorney failed to inform him about serving his full sentence, while the attorney testified otherwise. The plea hearing record indicated the court provided this information, which the petitioner acknowledged. The trial court concluded that the petitioner was sufficiently advised of his rights and that his plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. The evidence supported the trial court's findings, leading to the affirmation of its judgment by the reviewing authority.