Curtis Meredith v. Cruthchfield Surveys

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2004-02460-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; July 28, 2005; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Curtis Meredith filed a lawsuit against Crutchfield Surveys and Jerry Crutchfield for damages stemming from allegedly incorrect property surveys. The trial court dismissed the suit, leading Meredith to appeal, claiming the dismissal was erroneous. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, determining that Meredith’s lawsuit was not filed within the statute of repose timeframe and that his allegations of fraud did not meet the specificity requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9.02. 

In 1993, Meredith hired Jerry Crutchfield to survey his property due to a boundary dispute with neighbors, the Spanglers. The survey, dated August 17, 1993, was later introduced in a Chancery Court case where it was deemed accurate, with the court ultimately ruling in favor of the Spanglers regarding a disputed 0.026 acres. Meredith's lawsuit, filed on June 18, 2004, included claims of fraud and malpractice, alleging that Crutchfield intentionally misrepresented the property boundaries to favor the Spanglers. He sought $150,000 in damages, citing both financial loss and personal distress caused by the situation, including legal troubles with the Spanglers.

The defendants submitted a 'Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment,' arguing that the plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, statute of repose, and the doctrine of res judicata. They also contended that the claim fails to state a valid cause of action under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, relying on the statute of repose, res judicata, and the failure to state a claim. The plaintiff alleged that Mr. Crutchfield prepared a fraudulent survey to transfer land to Jeroline Spangler but did not provide specific details about the fraud as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 9.02, leading to the dismissal of the fraud claim alongside malpractice claims.

Regarding malpractice, the court considered affidavits and materials outside the pleadings, thus treating the defendants' motion as one for summary judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03 and 56. The court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, conducting a de novo review without any presumption of correctness. The court determined that the malpractice claim was barred by the statute of repose outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. 28-3-114(a), which mandates that any action against surveyors must be initiated within four years of the survey's recording. The defendants' actions were deemed to fall within this statute, confirming that the malpractice claim was time-barred.

The term "recorded on the plat" refers to the creation of a drawing or written document that reflects survey results, not the filing of the survey with the register of deeds, as established in Douglas v. Williams. In this case, the written survey was provided to the plaintiff on August 17, 1993, marking the start of the four-year period under Tenn. Code Ann. 28-3-114. The court agrees with the defendants that this statute is a statute of repose, triggered by the specific event of recording the survey, rather than a statute of limitations. The statute states that a cause of action accrues when the services are performed, aligning with the definition of a statute of repose. Although the Douglas case previously labeled the statute as a statute of limitations, it did not address this specific issue, and thus does not negate the current ruling.

The trial court ruled the plaintiff's malpractice claim was barred by res judicata due to an earlier suit that was dismissed without a merits ruling. Consequently, the prior dismissal does not invoke the res judicata doctrine. The court concludes that the malpractice claim accrued on August 17, 1993, and since the suit was not filed until June 18, 2004—nearly ten years later—it is barred by the four-year statute of repose. The trial court's judgment is affirmed, with costs on appeal assigned to the appellant, Curtis Meredith. The case is remanded to the trial court to collect costs incurred below. Additionally, even if the statute were deemed a statute of limitations instead, the plaintiff would still not benefit, as there is no indication that the discovery rule applies to extend the limitations period in this case.