Bernice Walton Woodland and John L. Woodland v. Gloria J. Thornton

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2004-02829-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; August 25, 2005; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of Bernice Walton Woodland and John L. Woodland v. Gloria J. Thornton, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed a personal injury lawsuit stemming from an automobile accident where the defendant, Gloria J. Thornton, rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle. Following a jury trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages for personal injuries and future pain and suffering. The defendant contested the judgment, claiming that certain aspects of the jury’s verdict lacked evidentiary support, but this motion was denied by the trial court.

The appellate court affirmed part of the trial court's decision, reversed part of it, and remanded the case for the trial court to amend the judgment in accordance with trial evidence. The incident occurred on October 12, 2001, resulting in property damage and personal injury to the plaintiff, who was 65 years old at the time. The plaintiff alleged negligence against the defendant, who countered with claims of comparative fault.

During the trial, the jury heard testimony and reviewed evidence, focusing primarily on damages. A key witness, Dr. James Burnett, testified about the plaintiff’s pre-existing neck condition, which was exacerbated by the accident. Although imaging showed no acute injuries from the accident, Dr. Burnett indicated that the plaintiff suffered from chronic pain due to a whiplash-type injury and ongoing degenerative changes in her neck. He believed the accident aggravated her condition and anticipated that she would experience intermittent pain for the rest of her life. Despite being referred for possible surgery, the plaintiff did not undergo any such procedure.

In October 2001, Woodland was involved in a motor vehicle accident that led to lasting pain, though the exact cause remains uncertain. A report from Dr. Lindermuth on December 9, 2002, suggested Woodland would recover without permanent impairment. Woodland's daughter, Bernstein Walton Owen, testified that Woodland was unable to drive or perform household duties for about three months post-accident, during which Owen assisted her and was compensated approximately $200. Woodland described her ongoing neck and back pain, which persisted until around January 2002, although by trial, her constant pain had subsided, with occasional flare-ups during specific activities. She also reported sleep difficulties following the accident. Woodland acknowledged prior neck pain treated by Dr. Burnett in 1998 but claimed to be pain-free at the time of the accident. She had been receiving Social Security disability benefits since 1994 for a pinched nerve. 

The jury found Thornton 75% at fault and Woodland 25% at fault, awarding Woodland total damages of $25,500, which was reduced to $19,125 due to her partial fault. The breakdown of damages included $3,500 for past medical care, $4,000 for future medical care, $1,000 for miscellaneous expenses, $2,000 for property damage, and various amounts for pain and suffering, permanent injury, and loss of enjoyment of life. Thornton filed a motion to amend the judgment or for a new trial, disputing the damage amounts, but the trial court denied this motion. On appeal, Thornton challenges only the damage award, not the liability, and the standard of review focuses on whether any material evidence supports the jury’s verdict.

A legal determination requires evaluating evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, presuming its truth, and only overturning the verdict if there is no material evidence to support it, barring any reversible legal error. The review of a denial to alter or amend is conducted for abuse of discretion. Thornton contests the jury's damage award to Woodland, arguing the evidence supports a maximum of $4,353 in economic damages rather than the $10,500 awarded. She specifically challenges the $3,500 for past medical expenses, asserting that the only proof presented totals $2,403.80, as derived from Exhibit 5, which includes specific medical expenses incurred. Woodland counters that Dr. Burnett's deposition allows jurors to reasonably infer additional medical expenses beyond those documented. The plaintiff must prove damages with reasonable certainty, although exact figures are not required. The trial court failed to adjust the jury's award to align with the evidence, which supported only $2,403.80 for past medical expenses. Thornton also disputes the $4,000 awarded for future medical care, claiming no evidence was presented for this element, while Woodland cites Dr. Burnett's testimony about her chronic condition as a basis for future care costs.

Dr. Burnett’s testimony lacks any indication of Woodland's future medical expenses resulting from the accident, leading to the conclusion that the jury's award of $4,000 for future medical care is based on speculation and must be vacated. Thornton contests the trial court’s award of $1,000 for miscellaneous expenses, arguing that the only substantiated out-of-pocket loss was the approximately $200 Woodland paid to her daughter for transportation post-accident. Woodland claims Owen's uncertainty regarding her payment and argues for additional mileage expenses for rides to medical appointments, but there is no evidence to support expenses beyond the $200. Therefore, the trial court erred by not reducing the miscellaneous expenses award to this amount.

Thornton also challenges the $2,000 award for property damage, noting that the parties had stipulated the damages at $1,750. Woodland argues that photographic evidence justified the higher award, but it is established that some evidence of monetary value for property damage is necessary to recover. Consequently, the property damage award must be reduced to $1,750.

Regarding non-economic damages, Thornton argues that there is no material evidence supporting awards for future pain, permanent injury, or future loss of enjoyment of life, as there is no proof that the accident caused these damages. Although acknowledging Woodland's potential for permanent damage and future pain, Thornton points to Dr. Burnett's ambiguous statement about the pain's causation and Dr. Lindermuth's report predicting recovery with no permanent impairment. Woodland counters that Dr. Burnett’s testimony establishes the causal connection, highlighting her inability to perform normal household duties since the accident.

Dr. Burnett classified Woodland's condition as permanent and predicted ongoing neck pain. Woodland argues that her post-accident pain indicates a causal link to the accident, given she was pain-free prior. In a negligence claim, the plaintiff must establish causation without relying on speculation. While Dr. Burnett supports Woodland's claim of permanent impairment, he cannot definitively connect it to the accident due to her preexisting degenerative condition. Dr. Lindermuth further opined that Woodland would have no permanent impairment, suggesting the accident did not cause future pain or impairment. Consequently, the jury's $8,000 award for future pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and permanent injury is invalidated. The trial court erred by not modifying the jury's awards related to past medical care and future damages. The court's decision is partially affirmed and partially reversed, with instructions to adjust the jury verdict according to the trial evidence. Costs of the appeal are to be borne by Appellee Bernice Walton Woodland.