Eric Lumpkins appeals his convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and two counts of aggravated assault from a July 19, 2003 shooting incident in Memphis. The court affirms the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions, rejecting the application of the physical facts rule, and confirms that consecutive sentencing can be determined by the trial judge without jury input. The evidence revealed a history of conflict between the defendant’s father, Jerry Lumpkins, and the victim's family. On the night of the incident, Eric Lumpkins taunted Bishop Tatum, leading to a confrontation. Following attempts by the Tatum family to de-escalate the situation, Jerry Lumpkins was overheard instructing someone to retrieve a firearm. The defendant then reappeared in a red car, from which he shot at the Tatum family members on their porch, resulting in the victim's death. The court's opinion was authored by Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr. with concurrence from Judges Jerry L. Smith and Robert W. Wedemeyer.
The Tatums were attempting to enter their duplex when the defendant fired five shots from a passing vehicle, with the fourth shot hitting the victim in the right buttock as she was pushing Bishop Tatum inside. Bishop Tatum confirmed the victim was standing when shot and bent over afterward. The defendant then fired a sixth shot from a stopped vehicle toward the Tatums' porch. All surviving Tatums denied possessing a gun that evening. Witness Harry Johnson testified he drove the defendant to a friend’s house and later picked him up again when the defendant needed a ride. Johnson did not see a gun but noted the defendant appeared tense. During Johnson's attempt to park near the Tatum and Lumpkins residences, gunfire erupted; he ducked for cover, realizing the defendant was shooting after witnessing the defendant pull a large-caliber revolver back into the car. The defendant took control of the vehicle, instructing Johnson to drive away while warning him to remain uninformed. The victim ultimately died from her gunshot wound on September 13, 2003. Medical examiner Dr. O.C. Smith noted the bullet entered the victim's right buttock and lodged in her left hip joint, causing a fracture. He indicated that the bullet's path through the victim’s body would be consistent with being shot from an elevation equal to or above the entry wound if she was standing. However, he acknowledged uncertainties in the specifics of the shooting incident, including the possibility of the bullet deflecting off another object.
Testimony indicated that the path of the victim's wound could be explained by various body positions at the time of the shooting, but the doctor could not determine the shooter's position with medical certainty. The bullet was recovered and sent for analysis, but the State did not present evidence regarding its characteristics. The defendant did not testify or provide direct evidence. The jury convicted him of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree murder, and two counts of aggravated assault, resulting in a life sentence for homicide and 23 years for attempted homicide, running concurrently, along with consecutive five-year sentences for the aggravated assaults, totaling an effective sentence of life plus ten years.
The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient for the convictions, citing the path of the gunshot wound and asserting that it contradicted the State's claims about the shooter's level. He invoked the "physical facts rule" to request dismissal of the charges. The appellate court's review standard requires evaluating evidence in favor of the prosecution to determine if any rational jury could find the necessary crime elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof shifts to the defendant after a conviction, and the prosecution is entitled to the most favorable interpretation of the evidence. The jury's guilty verdict resolves any conflicting evidence in favor of the prosecution, with questions of witness credibility and evidence weight assessed by the jury, not the appellate court.
The court cannot replace the inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence by the trier of fact, as the trial judge and jury are uniquely positioned to assess witness credibility through direct observation. The 'physical facts rule' allows testimony to be disregarded when it is irreconcilable with physical evidence, but this rule is applied sparingly and only when testimony is inherently unbelievable. The jury retains the role of determining the credibility and inconsistencies in testimony. First degree murder is defined as the intentional and premeditated killing of another, while aggravated assault involves causing fear of imminent bodily injury with a deadly weapon. In this case, the defense attempted to challenge the first degree murder conviction by highlighting inconsistencies in witness testimony regarding the shooting. However, the court concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate physical impossibility of the defendant being the shooter, thus upholding the jury's findings.
The jury may have reasonably determined that Bishop Tatum’s account of the victim’s posture was influenced by the chaotic circumstances surrounding the initial gunfire. Furthermore, there is no evidence suggesting that anyone other than the defendant fired a weapon during the incident, presenting a jury question regarding who shot Emma Thelma Tatum. Evidence indicates that the defendant fired the shots leading to all four convictions. Testimony from the Tatum brothers and Mr. Johnson confirmed that the defendant shot from a car window near their duplex, corroborating that they were victims of a gunfire barrage.
Despite conflicting testimonies regarding details such as the location of a red car and characteristics of the firearm, determinations of credibility and factual inferences are the responsibility of the trier of fact, not the appellate court. The presence of conflicting evidence does not negate the legal sufficiency of the verdicts, as there was testimony establishing the elements of the offenses.
Additionally, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the venire after prospective juror Brenda Echols referenced a homicide involving a "Lumpkin" near the shooting location. Despite the defense's concerns that her comments could bias the jury, the trial court excused Ms. Echols and instructed the jury to disregard her remarks. The State clarified that the defendant’s father is Jerry Lumpkins, differentiating him from Lewis Lumpkins. The trial court ultimately denied the motion to strike the venire, emphasizing the importance of disregarding Ms. Echols’ comments.
The trial court instructed the jury to disregard comments made by Ms. Echols regarding a person named Lumpkin, clarifying that this individual had no relation to the defendant, whose surname is Lumpkins. The court emphasized the need for jurors to remain unbiased and to evaluate the case based solely on the evidence presented and the law as instructed. It was stated that the State must prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; if not, the defendant must be found not guilty.
When there is exposure to extraneous prejudicial information, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises, shifting the burden to the State to show the information was harmless. In this case, despite Ms. Echols’ comments about a past homicide, the trial court found that the context mitigated any potential bias. The jury would learn that the defendant's father is Jerry Lumpkins, distinct from the individual mentioned by Ms. Echols. Additionally, Ms. Echols’ brother was not killed on the same block as the defendant's family, further reducing the likelihood of confusion.
Although the trial court did not poll jurors post-admonishment, it acted promptly to address any potential influence from Ms. Echols’ remarks. The court reaffirmed that the defendant was not involved in her brother's homicide, and the pre-trial instructions aimed to minimize any impact from her statements. Therefore, the court concluded that Ms. Echols’ comments did not result in reversible error.
Separately, Leland Tatum testified that he left his job upon learning a coworker was related to the defendant, prompting the defendant to question the State's justification for this tactic.
The defendant's claim regarding Leland Tatum's testimony was deemed waived on appeal due to a lack of legal authority supporting the assertion that any remarked trial event constituted reversible error, as per Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b). Additionally, the trial court limited the defendant's cross-examination of the arresting officer concerning the defendant's alleged statement during the arrest. The State objected, arguing that the question was self-serving and irrelevant, and the court agreed, stating that allowing the testimony would unfairly introduce the defendant's exculpatory statement without his testimony. The court instructed the jury to disregard the question. The appellate court reviews such evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and typically, self-serving statements from defendants are inadmissible. The defendant contended that he aimed to show he did not refuse questioning by officers; however, he failed to establish the relevance of this assertion for appellate review, as he did not present the officer's potential answer. Furthermore, during cross-examination of Bishop Tatum, the defendant sought to challenge Tatum's credibility using a prior bond hearing transcript, but the State objected, leading to a jury-out hearing focused on the ambiguity surrounding the pronoun "he" in Tatum's statement about the shooter.
The defendant withdrew a proposed exhibit during the hearing, and his counsel indicated the matter would need to be argued to the jury. Upon the jury's return, the trial court instructed them to disregard specific testimony regarding a witness's denial that the defendant’s father shot the victim. Later, the defendant sought to compel the prosecuting attorney or a subordinate to testify about the State’s knowledge of an attribution made by Bishop Tatum regarding Jerry Lumpkins, aiming to show the State's failure to investigate this alternative suspect. The trial court denied this request, ruling that the potential probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in this ruling.
In the closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the jury could not consider lesser included offenses unless they found the defendant not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, asserting that the defendant's guilt was "inescapably clear." The defendant contended this statement diminished the State’s burden of proof and minimized the significance of lesser offenses. However, the defendant failed to object contemporaneously, waiving the claim. Although the court may consider plain error under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), it noted that for an error to be recognized as plain, it must be clear and affect a substantial right of the accused.
Plain error, as defined in United States v. Olano, refers to especially egregious errors that undermine the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. The Tennessee courts have established a five-factor test from State v. Adkisson to determine plain error: 1) clear establishment of trial court occurrences; 2) breach of a clear legal rule; 3) adverse effect on a substantial right of the accused; 4) no tactical waiver of the issue by the accused; and 5) necessity of addressing the error to achieve substantial justice. Each factor must be present for an error to qualify as plain error.
Trial courts have significant discretion regarding closing arguments, which should be based on trial evidence and relevant to the issues at hand. An argument must be so improper or inflammatory that it affects the verdict to warrant a new trial. Factors for assessing improper conduct from closing arguments include: the context of the conduct, remedial actions taken, the prosecutor's intent, cumulative effects of misconduct and other errors, and the overall strength of the case.
In this case, the defendant challenged two aspects of the prosecutor's argument regarding the burden of proof related to lesser included offenses. The court found the prosecutor’s comment about the jury considering lesser offenses only after finding the defendant not guilty of the greater offense to be a slip of the tongue, not a calculated obstruction of due process. The comment was brief, not repeated, and occurred in the context of strong evidence against the defendant, leading the court to conclude that it did not significantly affect the verdict.
Noticing plain error is deemed unnecessary for achieving substantial justice, as the prosecutor's comments regarding lesser included offenses were not improper under Tennessee law, which permits sequential jury instructions. These comments did not violate any legal rule or adversely affect the defendant's substantial rights, leading to the conclusion that no reversible error exists in the closing argument. Regarding consecutive sentencing, the defendant argues that it violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, citing Blakely v. Washington and Cunningham v. California. However, it is held that the trial court's authority to impose consecutive sentences without a jury does not contravene the Sixth Amendment, as established by prior rulings. Therefore, the constitutional challenge to the consecutive sentencing is rejected. The convictions and the consecutive sentencing order are affirmed, confirming that they do not violate the Sixth Amendment.
