Anthony Keshun Goods v. Tony Parker, Warden

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2006-00849-CCA-R3-CO

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; July 24, 2007; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the habeas court's grant of habeas corpus relief to Petitioner Anthony Keshun Goods, who argued that his sentence was illegal due to a requirement for consecutive terms rather than concurrent ones. The State contended that the statutory requirement for consecutive sentences did not apply to Goods, his petition was premature, and the habeas court's remedy was inappropriate. The appellate court found no error in the habeas court's judgment. 

The case details reveal that Goods was initially brought into juvenile court in 1995 for theft and subsequently committed serious offenses, including second-degree murder, while out on bail. He entered a global plea agreement that stipulated concurrent sentences. However, the trial court later determined that Goods' sentences were void under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3) because he was released on bail at the time of his subsequent crimes, necessitating consecutive sentences. The State sought reconsideration of its stipulation regarding Goods' release status, arguing that he was released on his own recognizance instead of bail. The case was remanded to the Shelby County Criminal Court for further proceedings aligned with the appellate court's opinion.

The trial court ruled that the Petitioner’s release on his own or his mother's recognizance should be regarded as bail under the relevant statute, indicating that any offenses committed while on recognizance would be treated similarly to those committed while on bail per Rule 32(c)(3). This finding rendered the contested stipulation moot, as the court aligned with the agreed point. Additionally, the court cited the Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling in McLaney v. Bell, which necessitated declaring the Petitioner’s sentence void, leading to the case being transferred back to Shelby County Criminal Court for further action. 

On appeal, the State argued that the trial court erred in: 1) concluding the Petitioner was on bail during the subsequent offense; 2) granting habeas corpus relief despite the uncontested sentence not having expired; and 3) remanding the case to address the void sentence and voidable conviction. In response, the Petitioner asserted that the State acknowledged he was on bail during the subsequent offenses; that the trial court correctly interpreted ‘bail’ in Rule 32(c)(3) as including being out on recognizance; that no part of the sentence was uncontested; and that the remand was appropriate under Tennessee law.

The Petitioner emphasized that the State stipulated to the fact he was on bail, which the State did not counter in its brief. Initially, the trial court’s opinion relied on this stipulation, but in later proceedings, the State argued that being out on recognizance differed from being on bail. It was noted that stipulations must be clear and binding, but in this case, the stipulation effectively interpreted Rule 32(c)(3) in a way that was not allowable under Tennessee law. Consequently, the court found the stipulation without merit and would examine the substantive issues further.

The State argues the Petitioner’s claim is not ripe for review because the uncontested portion of his sentence has not expired. Specifically, the State asserts that the first twelve years of the Petitioner’s sentence are valid and uncontested, requiring the Petitioner to wait until those years have elapsed to challenge his detention. However, the court acknowledges the Petitioner’s contention that he has contested all of his convictions and sentences, finding no evidence in the record to support the State's claim of partial contestation. 

The court critiques the State's reliance on three Tennessee Supreme Court cases: 

1. **State ex rel. Dickens v. Bomar** - Inapplicable as the petitioners only challenged one of their sentences.
2. **Ussery v. Avery** - Also inapplicable since the petitioner did not contest all charges.
3. **Adams v. Russell** - The court disagrees with the State’s assertion that this case requires the Petitioner to await the expiration of part of his sentence, noting that the Petitioner alleges all sentences are illegal, rendering his detention illegitimate.

Consequently, the court concludes that the case is ripe for habeas corpus review, emphasizing the constitutional right to such relief under Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution, governed by statute (T.C.A. 29-21-101). The determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a legal question subject to de novo review.

Habeas corpus petitions do not have a statutory time limit; however, the grounds for granting relief are limited. Petitioners must show by a preponderance of the evidence that their sentence is void or their confinement is illegal, specifically by asserting either a void judgment due to lack of jurisdiction or that the sentence has expired. A voidable judgment, in contrast, is valid on its face and requires additional proof for invalidation. If a defendant is incorrectly sentenced concurrently instead of consecutively when required, they may be entitled to habeas relief. Tennessee law mandates consecutive sentences for felonies committed while on bail if the defendant is convicted of both offenses. The definition of "bail" includes cash or bond required for release, while "recognizance" refers to a promise to appear in court. The distinction in language between Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3) (which uses "bail") and Rule 32(d) (which mentions "bail or release upon recognizance") suggests a legislative intent to treat the two concepts differently. Recent Tennessee Supreme Court rulings indicate that sentences imposed in violation of statutes are void and can be corrected by trial courts at any time.

The State contends that interpreting 'bail' to include 'out upon recognizance' would disadvantage defendants, particularly regarding consecutive sentences for crimes committed while on recognizance. This interpretation contradicts the principle of narrowly construing statutes in favor of defendants. The Petitioner counters that 'out on recognizance' constitutes a 'recognizance bond,' which falls under the general definition of 'bail.' Tennessee law prioritizes statutes over conflicting court rules. The relevant statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-111, does not differentiate between types of bail and simply states 'released on bail.' The Petitioner argues for the inclusion of 'out on own recognizance' in the definition of bail based on public policy, as supported by Tennessee Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the need for consecutive sentencing to protect society from repeat offenders.

The Court concludes that 'bail' encompasses the circumstances of the case, where a 'recognizance bond' is a form of bail security, evidenced by the Petitioner’s mother's guarantee. The Legislature's intent was to require consecutive sentences for any crimes committed while out on recognizance, aligning with public safety objectives. The Court finds no valid reason to differentiate between various forms of bail when determining sentencing. Consequently, the Petitioner, having committed crimes while on bail, is required to serve consecutive sentences. The State's request for relief is denied, and the habeas court's judgment is affirmed, with the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.