Brian N. Knight, M. Chance Dudley, Kristy Dudley, and D. Chad Dudley v. Flanary & Sons Trucking, Inc., Patrick Ray Strum, J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. and Sean M. Hansen

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2005-01412-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; June 29, 2006; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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An automobile accident occurred on August 7, 2002, involving plaintiffs Brian Knight, M. Chance Dudley, and D. Chad Dudley, who were traveling westbound on Interstate 40 in a pickup truck towing a U-Haul trailer. The plaintiffs slowed to a stop due to road construction, prompting the driver of the first commercial truck, Sean M. Hansen, to swerve into the emergency lane to avoid a direct collision and strike the U-Haul. Following this, the second truck driver, Patrick Ray Sturm, was unable to stop in time, colliding with both the U-Haul and the pickup truck, resulting in a fire and serious injuries to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued Hansen, Sturm, and their employers for damages, settling with Sturm and his employer before proceeding to trial against Hansen and J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. The jury found Hansen 25% at fault for the accident. The defendants appealed, contending insufficient evidence supported the jury's conclusion of negligence. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment.

On November 7, 2002, the Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against Flanary Trucking, Sturm, Hunt Transport, and Hansen for damages related to an accident, alleging negligence by all defendants. Before trial, the Plaintiffs settled with Flanary Trucking and Sturm, proceeding to jury trial against Hunt Transport and Hansen (referred to as the Hansen Defendants) on February 23-25, 2005. 

During the trial, all parties testified, including accident reconstructionists. Chance Dudley, the driver of the Plaintiffs’ truck, described traveling from Nashville to Jackson when they encountered construction signs and a line of stopped vehicles. After stopping their U-Haul trailer, they resumed conversation until Hansen’s truck collided with them from behind. Chance recounted that Hansen’s truck passed close by before impact, causing a jarring effect, and that a second truck hit them shortly after, knocking him unconscious. Upon regaining consciousness, he found himself beside the road with the truck on fire.

Hansen testified he had been following the Plaintiffs’ vehicle since just outside Nashville, acknowledged seeing construction warnings and a speed limit reduction, and stated he was traveling at approximately sixty-two miles per hour. He noted that he attempted to brake and veer right when he saw the U-Haul’s brake lights but claimed he was not speeding at the time of the accident. Despite initially stating he was traveling faster, he later admitted fault and cleared the Plaintiffs of any wrongdoing.

Sturm, whose deposition was also read into evidence, noted he was following Hansen at a distance of about 210 feet and was unable to see ahead. He learned of traffic slowing via CB radio and made a lane change when he observed Hansen brake. Sturm witnessed Hansen swerve and subsequently hit the U-Haul, which then spun into the left lane in front of him.

Sturm attempted to avoid a collision with a U-Haul by braking and veering left but was unsuccessful, resulting in an explosion upon impact that knocked him unconscious. He later stated he could not see the Plaintiffs’ vehicle until after Hansen swerved around it. Lieutenant Jerry Elston, an accident reconstructionist, testified that Hansen was traveling approximately 58 miles per hour at the time of the collision. Elston concluded that Hansen failed to brake in time, control his speed, and remain attentive, thus violating Tennessee law. Both Hansen and Sturm were deemed partially responsible for the accident, with Elston asserting that if Hansen had maintained a safe distance and braked appropriately, the collision could have been avoided, which would have resulted in less damage to the Plaintiffs. Sergeant Barry Waldrop also testified, echoing Elston's findings regarding Hansen's failure to brake timely and react appropriately. Additionally, traffic officer Tim Massengill confirmed the existence of a construction zone and the presence of troopers warning motorists to slow down, emphasizing the legal responsibilities for drivers to manage their speed and braking in relation to vehicles ahead of them.

On March 2, 2005, a jury awarded the Plaintiffs $1,510,000 in damages, attributing 25% of the fault to Hunt Transport and Hansen, resulting in a judgment of $377,500 against them. The Hansen Defendants subsequently sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which the trial court denied on May 26, 2005. They now appeal, arguing insufficient evidence to establish that Hansen's actions were the proximate cause of the accident or the Plaintiffs' injuries, claiming that only Sturm's intervening negligence was responsible. The Hansen Defendants contend they had no duty to control Sturm's actions and that their duty ended after Hansen avoided a collision.

The appellate court's review of jury verdicts is limited, requiring material evidence to support the verdict. The court must adopt the most favorable view of the evidence for the verdict and cannot reweigh the evidence. The Hansen Defendants do not dispute Hansen's negligence but argue that since his truck did not physically strike the Plaintiffs’ vehicle, they cannot be held liable for the resulting injuries. Conversely, the Plaintiffs assert that Hansen's negligent veering off the road created an emergency for Sturm, contributing to the accident. They argue that liability cannot be avoided merely because Hansen's truck did not collide with theirs. 

To prove negligence, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate both cause-in-fact (the injury would not have occurred but for Hansen’s actions) and proximate cause (whether the law extends responsibility for the conduct). These causation concepts are typically questions for the jury unless the facts clearly point to one conclusion. The court will first examine if there is material evidence indicating Hansen's negligence was a cause-in-fact of the Plaintiffs’ injuries, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Evidence presented at trial indicated that the Plaintiffs were stopped on Interstate 40 due to road construction, with advance warnings from signs and state troopers. Hansen, who was unable to stop his truck in time, struck the Plaintiffs despite their stopped position. Sturm, a witness, could not see the Plaintiffs' vehicle until Hansen swerved off the road. Expert testimony from Elston suggested that had Hansen maintained a safe following distance and proper lookout, he could have avoided the collision. Hansen admitted to passing the Plaintiffs at nearly 59 miles per hour and did not brake while swerving, leading to the inference that earlier braking could have prevented or mitigated the accident's severity.

The Hansen Defendants contended that Hansen's actions were not the cause of the Plaintiffs' injuries, asserting Sturm's negligence was the primary factor. However, for 'but for' causation, it suffices that Hansen's actions contributed to the accident, not that they were the sole cause. Elston testified that both Hansen and Sturm shared responsibility and that Hansen's negligence instigated the chain of events leading to the crash. The jury found sufficient evidence to support that Hansen's negligence was a 'but for' cause of the accident.

To establish proximate cause, it must be shown that Hansen’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the Plaintiffs' harm, that no policy should relieve him of liability, and that the resulting harm was foreseeable. The ruling clarified that proximate cause does not require the negligent act to be the sole or final cause, just a substantial factor. The court concluded Hansen's negligence was indeed a substantial factor, as operating his truck properly could have avoided the accident or lessened the injuries. Hansen's argument that the accident was unforeseeable was rejected, as it was deemed reasonable to expect serious consequences from his failure to maintain a safe distance and awareness while driving at high speed in a construction zone.

The Hansen Defendants contended they owed no duty to the Plaintiffs after Hansen avoided a collision, arguing that Hansen was not responsible for controlling Sturm’s operation of the Flanary truck. Duty is defined as the legal obligation to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm, governed by the foreseeability of risk. While it is true that individuals generally do not have a duty to control others to prevent harm, the Hansen Defendants were found liable not for Sturm's actions but due to Hansen's own negligence. The court determined that the injuries to the Plaintiffs were a foreseeable result of Hansen's negligence, establishing that a duty of care existed and was breached. The trial court's decision is affirmed, with costs on appeal assigned to J. B. Hunt Transport, Inc. and Sean M. Hansen, with execution permitted if needed.