Joey Dewayne Thompson appeals his convictions for second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, which resulted in a 25-year sentence. He argues on appeal that the second degree murder conviction lacks sufficient evidence, that the verdicts are contradictory, and that his prosecution violated double jeopardy and collateral estoppel principles. This case stems from events on June 23, 2001, involving the killing of Latoya Robinson and the attempted murder of Travis Burgins. Initially charged with premeditated murder and felony murder, Thompson was convicted of second degree murder and an attempt to commit second degree murder in an earlier trial, but those convictions were reversed due to jury instruction errors.
On retrial, Thompson moved to dismiss the felony murder charge, which the court denied. The State later dismissed the attempt to commit second degree murder charge. Ultimately, the jury found Thompson guilty of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter in May 2006. The appellate court reviewed the evidence presented during this trial and affirmed the convictions, with the opinion delivered by Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr. and joined by Judges Joseph M. Tipton and Norma McGee Ogle.
A second vehicle stopped behind a black car, from which the defendant, known to Mr. Dixon, exited onto the street carrying a pistol. Mr. Dixon witnessed the defendant shoot into the passenger's window of the second car without any prior conversation. He estimated that seven to ten shots were fired before the car drove away, with the defendant continuing to shoot alongside it. After the shooting ceased, the defendant reappeared and crossed the street.
Ms. Shirley King, a witness, testified that she heard approximately three shots while on her porch on June 23, 2001, and subsequently saw a car coasting toward her yard. A man inside the car pushed a girl away from the steering wheel, parked the car, and fell out. When asked who shot him, the man replied, "Thug shot me," but no gun was visible. The female driver, Ms. Robinson, remained in the vehicle and later died.
Medical evidence indicated that Burgins sustained multiple gunshot wounds to his legs, while Ms. Robinson received five bullets, with the fatal shot damaging vital organs. Law enforcement recovered nine spent 9 mm cartridges from the scene, all fired from the same weapon. A .380 semi-automatic pistol, along with a magazine, was found in the car, but no identifiable fingerprints were on them. Bullet material recovered suggested a 9 mm gun was used.
Officer Todd Smith spoke with Burgins at the scene, who identified the shooter as "Thug," confirming he meant the defendant, known by that nickname. Smith noted that the scattering of the cartridges indicated the shooter was moving while firing. Burgins, called by the defendant as a witness, stated he had no prior issues with the defendant and acknowledged his relationship with Ms. Robinson, who drove the car during the incident. He had seen the defendant's brother shortly before the confrontation but claimed there had been no trouble.
Burgins made a peace sign to the defendant, who reciprocated, leading Burgins to believe everything was fine. While the Buick was stopped behind another car, Burgins noticed the defendant jogging toward them and heard a click from the back of the car, where he later saw a gun barrel protruding from the window. Burgins denied having any weapons or drugs in the vehicle and claimed the gun found under the seat was placed there by someone else. The defendant, who had known Burgins for a long time, testified that he received a call from his brother, Amos Wright, during which he heard a child screaming, leading him to believe Burgins had threatened Wright with a gun. The defendant retrieved a .9 mm handgun he had previously acquired for protection and concealed it before walking toward the Buick, expecting to talk to Burgins about the call.
As the defendant approached, he alleged Burgins pointed a gun at him and clicked it, prompting the defendant to draw his gun and fire, intending to shoot low to avoid fatal harm to Burgins. The defendant denied aiming at Latoya Robinson, who was in the vehicle. After the incident, police found a .380 pistol, marijuana, and cocaine in the Buick. The jury found the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and second-degree murder after initially being charged with first-degree premeditated murder, leading to a combined sentencing of 25 years for second-degree murder and 6 years for voluntary manslaughter. The defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient for the second-degree murder conviction, arguing it should have been considered self-defense or a heat of passion reaction provoked by Burgins, citing the presence of a gun in Burgins' car as supporting evidence.
When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against them, appellate courts evaluate whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies regardless of whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination of both. A conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence, provided that the evidence is overwhelmingly compelling, leaving no reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt. The court must not reweigh evidence or assess witness credibility; those determinations are reserved for the trier of fact. The court is required to view the evidence in the strongest possible light for the prosecution.
In the case at hand, the evidence indicated that the defendant knowingly killed Ms. Robinson by firing multiple shots into her vehicle, supporting the conviction for second-degree murder. Additionally, the defendant's claim of inconsistent verdicts, with a conviction for second-degree murder alongside a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, was not sufficient to disturb the conviction, as Tennessee courts typically do not overturn verdicts on inconsistency grounds. Lastly, the defendant argued that a retrial for felony murder was barred by double jeopardy and collateral estoppel principles, which were to be examined in light of the original charges against him, including first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree murder of another individual.
The legal proceedings involved two trials concerning charges against the defendant: the first trial resulted in a hung jury regarding second degree murder, leading to a mistrial, while an attempted second degree murder conviction was reversed and subsequently nolle prosequi. The defendant faced a second trial for voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder concerning Latoya Robinson's death, which was linked to an attempted premeditated first degree murder of Travis Burgins. The defendant argued that his acquittal on the attempt charge barred the felony murder conviction under the double jeopardy clause of both the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions, asserting that the felony murder charge required a finding of guilt on the attempted murder, thus violating double jeopardy protections against multiple convictions for the same offense.
Double jeopardy principles protect against multiple prosecutions or punishments for a single offense, which includes protections against retrial after an acquittal, after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense. The court determined that the defendant’s acquittal on the attempt charge did not impede retrial for the felony murder of Robinson nor did it infringe upon double jeopardy protections, as separate convictions for felony murder and its predicate felony are permissible under Tennessee law. The court also noted that a mistrial declared without acquittal may bar retrial only if it was not manifestly necessary, with jury deadlock being a recognized justification for such a declaration. The defendant did not contest that the mistrial was manifestly necessary.
Lastly, the court addressed the notion of collateral estoppel, which could potentially bar the second degree murder conviction if the specific issue had been previously litigated and necessary to the earlier judgment, but no such claim was made by the defendant regarding his retrial for this charge.
Res judicata prevents a second lawsuit between the same parties regarding the same cause of action, covering all issues that were or could have been litigated in the initial suit. Collateral estoppel applies to different causes of action, barring subsequent suits on issues that were actually litigated and necessary to the judgment in the prior case. For collateral estoppel to apply, it must be established that the issue was both litigated and essential to the previous judgment. Once an issue has been conclusively determined by a competent court, that determination is binding on the parties in later litigation, even with different claims. In Tennessee, while collateral estoppel cannot be used offensively against a criminal defendant, it can be applied defensively, allowing a defendant to invoke an acquittal in a prior case to prevent retrial on those facts in a subsequent prosecution for a different offense, as supported by the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy protections.
In the present case, the State contends that the prosecution is ongoing and that the not-guilty verdict from the first trial does not constitute a final determination. Conversely, the defendant argues that the prosecution for attempted first-degree murder effectively ended with the not-guilty verdict. The State lacks the right to appeal this verdict, and principles of double jeopardy prohibit further prosecution for the same attempt charge. Additionally, an attempt to commit second-degree murder cannot serve as a predicate for charging first-degree felony murder. The issue at hand is novel, prompting speculation on the implications had the jury convicted the defendant on the first-degree felony murder count alongside other charges in the initial trial.
Contradictory jury verdicts do not necessitate the reversal of any conviction. Specifically, a felony murder conviction based on attempted first-degree murder is not invalidated by a not guilty verdict on the attempted murder charge, as principles of collateral estoppel do not apply in this context. Additionally, the outcome of a prior trial that ended in a deadlocked jury and mistrial does not affect the felony murder charge; a mistrial merely extends the prosecution rather than concluding it. The three counts were initiated together, and the acquittal for attempted first-degree murder does not qualify as a "prior suit" for collateral estoppel. Consequently, the continued prosecution of the felony murder charge in the second trial was permissible. The court affirms the convictions for second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.
