Mary Elizabeth Stillwell, represented by her husband H. Chester Stillwell, filed a wrongful death and personal injury lawsuit against rental property owners Kenneth Wayne Hackney, Sr. and Linda Darline Hackney after Mrs. Stillwell fell in their gravel driveway on July 7, 2003. The fall was allegedly caused by a partially hidden concrete divider, resulting in a broken ankle and ultimately leading to her death from a pulmonary embolism 18 days later. The Stillwells claimed that the Hackneys failed to exercise reasonable care for the safety of their tenants and visitors, asserting that the owners should have known about the dangerous condition of the driveway.
The trial court granted the Hackneys' motion for summary judgment, determining that the Stillwells did not establish an exception to the general rule of landlord non-liability for dangerous conditions on leased premises. The court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the cause of Mrs. Stillwell's fall since no witness could confirm what led to the accident. The Stillwells appealed the decision, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the evidence did not support the claim that the Hackneys were liable for the injuries or death of Mrs. Stillwell.
On July 1, 2005, the trial court granted the Hackneys' motion, concluding that no exception to the general rule of landlord non-liability was applicable. On July 28, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, claiming for the first time that an exception existed due to Mrs. Stillwell's fall occurring in a common area under the landlord's control. The trial court denied this motion on September 16, 2005, leading to Plaintiff's appeal.
The appellate review of the trial court’s summary judgment is conducted de novo, meaning the appellate court does not presume the trial court's decision is correct. Summary judgment is warranted only when there are no genuine material facts in dispute and the moving party is legally entitled to judgment. The facts must be interpreted favorably for the plaintiff, but a complete failure to prove an essential element of the case renders other facts immaterial.
Generally, landlords are not liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on leased premises, although exceptions exist. If a landlord retains possession of common areas for use by multiple tenants, they have a legal duty to maintain those areas safely. This duty arises because the landlord is in a superior position to manage the property, unlike tenants who may not afford necessary safety measures.
In this case, Plaintiff contends that Mrs. Stillwell's injuries occurred in the driveway, which they argue is a common area controlled by the defendants. However, this assertion lacks supporting allegations or evidence.
Kenneth Wayne Hackney, Sr. and Linda Darline Hackney, residents of Nashville, Tennessee, co-owned the property located at 115 Forest Park Road, which they rented to their granddaughter Victoria Marie Davis. On July 7, 2003, Mary Elizabeth Stillwell, the Plaintiff's wife, fell on a concealed concrete divider in the driveway while visiting Victoria. The Plaintiff alleges the Defendants were negligent for failing to maintain safe conditions on the property, having knowledge of the dangerous divider. As a result of this negligence, the Plaintiff incurred funeral and burial expenses for his wife. In response, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that there is no material factual dispute regarding the existence of a dangerous condition and that the Plaintiff failed to establish the Defendants' liability under the relevant legal standards. The Defendants confirmed they owned the property and rented it to Victoria at the time of the incident, which the Plaintiff admitted.
The trial court applied the precedent from Lethcoe v. Holden, stating that landlords are not liable for dangerous conditions on leased premises that cause injury to tenants or third parties. The court did not consider the "common areas" exception because it was not raised in the Complaint, and no evidence of such areas was presented. The plaintiff’s injury occurred while visiting her granddaughter at the rented property, and the "common areas" exception was only introduced in a Motion to Alter or Amend after summary judgment was granted. Tennessee law prohibits using a Rule 59 motion to introduce new theories or arguments not previously asserted. The trial court correctly denied this motion because the new theory of liability was not included in the original Complaint.
Additionally, a recognized exception to landlord non-liability exists if a dangerous condition was present when the lease was signed, the landlord was aware of it, and the tenant could not have reasonably discovered it. The plaintiff contended that a concrete divider constituted a dangerous condition known to the defendants at the time of the lease. However, even if the plaintiff could prove the divider's presence, there was no evidence presented to establish that it was indeed dangerous.
Thomas P. Clemmons, a professional engineer, provided an affidavit regarding a curb at 115 Forest Park Road in Madison, Tennessee, asserting that the curb, approximately six inches high, serves no functional purpose and poses a safety hazard. He opined that the property owner should have recognized the curb as hazardous and taken corrective action. However, the affidavit lacks specific factual evidence connecting the curb to an incident involving Mrs. Stillwell, who had previously visited the property multiple times and had an unobstructed view of the driveway during the sunny afternoon incident on July 7, 2003. Testimony indicated that she should have been able to see the curb and exercise reasonable care. Additionally, there was no indication that the property owners were aware of the curb's potential danger, as none of the witnesses informed them of it. Consequently, the court determined that the defendants had no duty to protect Mrs. Stillwell from the concrete divider, affirming the trial court's judgment and assigning costs of appeal to the appellant.
