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State of Tennessee v. Martha Ann Freeman
Citation: Not availableDocket: M2006-02751-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; March 28, 2008; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Martha Ann Freeman and Rafael DeJesus Rocha-Perez were convicted of first-degree murder in the death of Freeman’s husband, Jeffrey Freeman. On appeal, Freeman raised three objections: the admission of a nude photograph of Rocha-Perez, the denial of her request to play a 911 call recording, and the refusal to sever their trials. Rocha-Perez contended that a police officer's testimony regarding Freeman's statement violated the Confrontation Clause. Both defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient for their convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the trial court's judgments after reviewing the case. During pre-trial motions, testimony revealed that Raegene Beverly, a neighbor, witnessed Freeman enter her home after the incident and state that "a man killed my husband." Beverly called 911 after Freeman indicated she had not done so. Freeman was described as stern and not visibly emotional during this interaction. Beverly noted that Freeman claimed to know the assailant and that her husband had "found him." She also expressed concern for Freeman's mental health prior to the hearing. Karen Neal, a neighbor of the Freemans, observed Freeman on her porch on the morning of April 11, 2005, at 7:45 a.m. Freeman appeared alone, still, and unusual, prompting Neal to feel concerned for her well-being. Although Neal initially did not recognize the significance of her observations, she later decided to call the police after discussing the situation with another neighbor. On redirect-examination, Neal characterized Freeman as "emotionless" and "zoned out," but not in distress. Lori Estridge, a Walgreens pharmacist, confirmed that a prescription for Freeman was filled the previous evening at 10:01 p.m., noting the medications' potential effects. Tara Cantrell, an employee at the Freemans' business, Resi-Fax, testified that Freeman called her between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. that morning to inform her that the victim would not be at work due to illness; Freeman sounded normal and not upset. Beverly, another neighbor, recounted that Freeman appeared "shaking, panicking, and scared" when she arrived at Beverly’s house, though Beverly did not see any signs that Freeman had been held hostage. The trial court ruled against admitting a 911 call recording as hearsay, determining that the time lapse between the victim's death and the call undermined its spontaneity related to the stress of the situation. The court also denied motions to sever the trials of Freeman and Rocha-Perez, citing a lack of compelling prejudice and irreconcilable defenses. Beverly further noted that the Freemans' business, Resi-Fax, had expanded and relocated, with the victim managing it full-time after leaving his previous job. Beverly observed that Freeman's car was absent from the Freemans' residence starting in September 2004, and she did not see Freeman again until Superbowl Sunday in January 2005. The last time Beverly saw the victim was on April 9, 2005, in the yard with Freeman, without any unusual behavior noted. On April 11, 2005, Freeman forcefully knocked on Beverly's door and entered her home, prompting Beverly to call 911 after Freeman made a statement that alarmed her. During the call, Freeman briefly spoke to the operator before returning the phone to Beverly. Emergency services arrived shortly thereafter, and Beverly reported not seeing anyone leave the Freemans' house during this time. Under cross-examination, Beverly confirmed her friendship with Freeman, though they did not frequently socialize. She recalled that Freeman's mother moved in with them after Beverly stopped working there, and that Freeman took care of her until her death. Beverly mentioned a conversation with Freeman about taking walks together, which did not happen, and noted that Freeman was on medication two weeks after the Superbowl. On April 11, Freeman appeared to be "shaking," "panicking," and "anxious," indicating she was scared. Beverly stated that while she never saw Freeman cry, her demeanor calmed after the initial moments of distress. Firefighter Brian Hampton testified that he responded to a call regarding a "potentially expired person" at the Freemans' home. Upon arrival, he found Freeman emerging from a nearby house, visibly upset and demonstrating signs of agitation and distress. Freeman indicated that the incident had occurred approximately twenty to thirty minutes prior. When Hampton entered the Freemans' house, he discovered the victim's body, which was partially zipped in a sleeping bag with a plastic bag over his head, suggesting a prolonged presence at the scene as rigor mortis had begun. There was no blood visible, and Hampton concluded that the victim was deceased and could not be revived. On April 11, 2005, around 3:30 p.m., Karen Kirby observed a Hispanic man, identified as Rocha-Perez, running from a wooded area into a house under construction in her neighborhood. She described him as having shoulder-length hair, wearing knee-length shorts and a maroon t-shirt. Shortly after, police were alerted, and Sergeant Danny Collins was dispatched to Incline Drive, where Kirby’s husband provided information about the man. At approximately 6:20 p.m., Collins and another officer entered a residence on Palomar Court and found Rocha-Perez hiding in the attic rafters while two other individuals were examining the house. Officer Joseph High arrived at the Freeman residence, where he found the victim deceased on the bathroom floor, and subsequently assisted in the arrest of Rocha-Perez. Tony Cantrell, a friend of the Freemans, testified about his relationship with them and his acquaintance with Rocha-Perez, noting a discrepancy in Rocha-Perez’s hair length. He recounted a trip in December 2004, where he was asked to pick up Rocha-Perez and take him to Murfreesboro, and indicated he had been working on the Freemans' deck on April 7, 2005, but did not return until April 11 due to rain. Cantrell had a prior conviction for cocaine possession and mentioned assisting Freeman with various tasks over the years, including taking her elderly mother for babysitting. He also stated that Freeman sometimes requested errands while staying at an extended-stay hotel. Cantrell observed that the relationship between Freeman and Rocha-Perez appeared to be ending when Freeman called him to pick up Rocha-Perez. Upon arrival, Cantrell found Freeman had packed Rocha-Perez's belongings and he subsequently drove to Murfreesboro. Freeman instructed Cantrell to withdraw $100 from her account for Rocha-Perez. Cantrell indicated he was closer to Freeman than to Rocha-Perez and did not inform Rocha-Perez about Freeman’s stay at an extended-stay hotel. During re-direct examination, Cantrell acknowledged he was unaware of any renewal of the relationship between Freeman and Rocha-Perez after taking Rocha-Perez to Murfreesboro, and he planned to complete a deck-staining job on April 11. Bixby, the manager of Candlewood Suites, confirmed Freeman checked in on October 12, 2004, and checked out on January 29, 2005, while Rocha-Perez stayed with her. He noted he saw the victim, Jeffrey Freeman, visit the hotel to speak with Freeman. Dodd, the housekeeping supervisor, stated Rocha-Perez was always present during his room servicing and described Freeman as "overly friendly," which made him uncomfortable. Detective Joseph Winter reported on his investigation into Rocha-Perez's apartment, confirming he found Freeman at her residence when he arrived. She later provided a statement to the police. Detective David Achord executed a search warrant at the Murfreesboro apartment on April 22, 2005, discovering Freeman’s business card in a bag and emails between Freeman and the victim, some referring to the nickname "Snookums." He noted the victim's car was parked in the garage while Freeman's was in the driveway, and found a wet bath mat among the trash bags in the residence. Achord reported finding an empty hydrocodone prescription bottle dated April 10, 2005, but no pills or shotgun shells were located, although a shotgun was present. He also mentioned that Freeman voluntarily cooperated with the investigation, including a tape-recorded walk-through of the residence. During the Murfreesboro search, a woman named Beatrice Ruiz had difficulty understanding the search warrant process. Dr. Thomas Deering, an Assistant Medical Examiner, conducted an autopsy on Jeffery Freeman on April 12, 2005, and identified several significant findings. The victim, who was 5'7" and weighed 231 pounds, exhibited scrapes on the head, blanching of skin around the neck, ligature marks on the wrists, a black eye, and internal mouth injuries. Dr. Deering concluded that the cause of death was strangulation, likely from ligature or manual pressure, noting that the head and facial injuries, while severe, were not fatal but could cause loss of consciousness. He indicated that loss of consciousness could occur within seconds of strangulation, but death would require several minutes. No definitive evidence suggested drowning, despite the victim being found in wet clothes, and any blood present was likely from a busted lip. Dr. Deering presented photographs from the autopsy, highlighting ligature marks and bruising. He confirmed that the ligature marks on the wrists were inflicted while the victim was alive, indicating resistance against restraints. The bruising around the eye suggested moderate force was used, consistent with being struck. In estimating the time of death, Dr. Deering noted signs of lividity, indicating the victim had been dead for several hours before being discovered at 4:00 p.m. on April 11. He estimated the time of death to be between the evening of April 10 and early morning April 11, with a more specific range of 10:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. He stated the victim had likely been dead for at least eight to twelve hours prior to discovery. Blood spots were noted on the sleeping bag and the victim's t-shirt. On cross-examination, Dr. Deering acknowledged that the time of death was an estimate, allowing for a range from 6:00 p.m. on April 10 to 8:00 a.m. on April 11. He estimated the victim sustained four to seven blows to the head, with the possibility that multiple injuries could have led to loss of consciousness. He clarified that ligature marks could result from various sources, including manual strangulation or constriction from clothing, and agreed that several scenarios could explain the observed injuries. The victim could have been struck, incapacitated, bound, and then strangled, or the head injuries might have occurred post-mortem. Dr. Deering testified that while drowning was a theoretical possibility, it was less plausible due to wrist marks indicating the victim was alive at the time. He mentioned numerous other hypothetical scenarios but could not ascertain the number of assailants involved. On cross-examination, Dr. Deering stated that the time of death was estimated primarily from scene photographs and noted that a bag found on the victim’s head could have contributed to the neck marks. He could not identify the specific object used for binding the victim's wrists and acknowledged that self-hanging could occur with minimal force. On redirect, he suggested that a shotgun’s butt could inflict the victim’s injuries, and a covering might reduce skin tearing upon impact. John Hollands, a divorce attorney, met with the victim on December 29, 2004, but the victim did not return for further consultation. Lori Estridge, a Walgreens Pharmacy Manager, confirmed that Freeman purchased a hydrocodone prescription on April 10, 2005, and detailed other medications Freeman obtained from January to April 2005, including various treatments for anxiety, depression, and hypertension. Estridge clarified that Freeman's only recorded condition was hypertension, with no medications for bipolar disorder or schizophrenia, and noted that most prescriptions were from psychiatrist Dr. Nyquist, except for hydrocodone. Officer George Bouton, who investigated the crime scene, reported no signs of forced entry and described several photographs taken, including those of trash bags and a shotgun. Tara Cantrell testified about her acquaintance with the Freemans, employment with them from September 2002, and the transition of their business, Resi-Fax, to an office in Brentwood after outgrowing their home. She noted the victim's consistent work schedule, typically arriving at 8:00 to 8:30 a.m. and leaving around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., without reported sick days. Cantrell testified about a call she received from Freeman on the morning of April 11, 2005, informing her that the victim was ill and would not be coming in to work. She later learned of the victim's death. Cantrell noted that the Freemans were experiencing marital troubles, and Freeman had moved out of their home. She acknowledged that the victim consistently wore his wedding band. Cantrell’s husband attended a motorcycle event in St. Louis over the weekend of April 9-10, returning late on April 10. During cross-examination, she confirmed that Freeman's involvement in their shared business had decreased from 2003 to 2005 and mentioned observing erratic behavior from Freeman in 2004. Cantrell also indicated her husband had seen a Hispanic man with Freeman at a hotel where she had moved. Cantrell recounted picking up medication for Freeman after the victim's death and cleaning the bathroom at Freeman's request the weekend of April 16-17. Neighbor Karen Neal described seeing Freeman on her porch at 7:45 a.m. on April 11, appearing motionless and "odd." Hazel Freeman, the victim's mother, testified that she spoke with Freeman on the night of April 10, who claimed the victim was ill and had gone to bed after taking medication; she noted nothing unusual in Freeman's tone. The State introduced a stipulation that Martha Freeman signed two business documents acknowledging Jeffrey Freeman's death. Officer William Kirby processed the crime scene on April 11, finding the victim lying on the bathroom floor, along with various items, including a bag around the victim's head, a silver ring in a trash bag, and bloody linens. Officer Kirby discovered various items during the investigation, including adult magazines (Playboy, Penthouse, Maxim), a beach towel, clothing, and a shotgun in different bedrooms. He processed both the shotgun and soda cans for fingerprints but found none. Kirby noted that he arrived at the scene at 4:15 p.m. and left between 8:00 and 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 2005. He returned on April 15 with another officer and Detective Corcoran, collecting additional evidence with the consent of the homeowner, Freeman. Kirby mentioned that the scene was not "secured" during the period between his visits and that he did not process several items, including a black plastic bag from the victim’s head and various door hardware. Officer Steve Stone, an identification officer, attempted to collect fingerprints from numerous objects but was only successful with a few, including a paper plate and a plastic cup. He noted challenges in obtaining prints from doorknobs. Linda Wilson, a fingerprint examiner, identified prints from Rocha-Perez on multiple magazines and a Dr. Pepper can, while also matching prints from Freeman at the scene. Wilson confirmed that all prints examined belonged to either Freeman or Rocha-Perez, with no unidentified prints found. Wilson, during cross-examination, indicated she did not analyze any plastic bags, the victim's wallet, or latex gloves from the crime scene. Many prints collected were insufficient for identification. Detective Brad Corcoran, the lead investigator, arrived at the scene at 4:15 p.m. on April 11, 2005, describing the victim, found in a sleeping bag with a plastic bag over his head, as cooperative and assisting in the investigation after initially being upset. The victim's body was wet, and signs of lividity and rigor mortis were present. Blood was found only around the collar and on a pillowcase inside a trash bag, suggesting potential clean-up evidence. Corcoran chose not to test the wet trash bag for prints or the wallet, believing robbery was not a motive. A bag containing lingerie, sexual material, a hotel receipt, and a nude Polaroid of Rocha-Perez was discovered, along with a camera showing the victim wearing a silver ring found at the scene. During questioning, Rocha-Perez was placed in a small, windowless room, where Freeman later entered and excitedly identified a gold wedding band belonging to Jeffery. After questioning, Freeman was released, and several items were sent for testing to the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation. Corcoran noted Freeman was initially very upset, and all searches conducted were with her consent, including fingerprints and blood tests. Detective Corcoran reported that no 12-gauge shotgun shells were found during the search of the residence, but an empty prescription bottle dated April 10, 2005, was discovered. He noted the absence of trash bags in the victim’s vehicle that matched those found in the house. Rocha-Perez was wearing a tee-shirt from Boom-Boom’s Boxing School when discovered. Corcoran revealed that this shirt was purchased at Old Navy and acknowledged that while the crime scene appeared untouched, he could not confirm it. He viewed a tape that did not capture Rocha-Perez handling a ring found later at the scene and did not request fingernail clippings for evidence. Initially suspecting the mattress and closet in Rocha-Perez's living area were staged, he later learned he had access to the house for several hours daily. Corcoran identified Rocha-Perez as an illegal alien. During cross-examination, he noted Freeman was not crying when approached but became emotional briefly and appeared coherent without signs of being drugged. Forensic scientist Agent Donna Nelson analyzed various items, including a foam mattress and clothing, finding DNA from Freeman on a pair of women's panties and a gray tee-shirt, while Rocha-Perez's DNA was present on a tee-shirt, a ball cap, and men's underwear. A beach towel contained both Rocha-Perez's sperm and Freeman's DNA, suggesting possible sexual intercourse. Degraded DNA was found on latex gloves, with several factors potentially contributing to this degradation. The jury convicted both defendants of first-degree murder, leading to life sentences, from which they now appeal. Freeman claims trial court errors regarding the admission of a nude photograph, denial of a 911 call recording, and refusal to sever her case. Rocha-Perez challenges a police officer's testimony about Freeman's statement as a Confrontation Clause violation. Both defendants argue there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions, which will be addressed together alongside the other claims. When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, the court reviews whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. This standard applies to both direct and circumstantial evidence. The court is not permitted to re-evaluate or re-weigh the evidence, nor can it substitute its own inferences for those made by the trier of fact. Credibility questions, as well as the weight and value of the evidence, are determined by the trier of fact, and a jury's guilty verdict, which is supported by the trial judge, affirms the credibility of the State's witnesses and resolves conflicts in favor of the State's theory. The rationale for this approach is that the trial judge and jury observe witnesses in person, offering insights that cannot be fully captured in a written record. The court must give the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences. A guilty verdict negates the presumption of innocence, placing the burden on the convicted defendant to demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient for a guilty verdict. Circumstantial evidence, which consists of collateral facts leading to reasonable deductions about the main fact, can form the basis of a conviction. However, for a conviction to rest solely on circumstantial evidence, the facts must be so strong as to exclude any reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant’s guilt. A compelling case of guilt against the defendant is established through circumstantial evidence, which the jury is tasked with weighing and interpreting. The timeline begins with the defendant, Freeman, and her relationship with Rocha-Perez starting in 2004, continuing after Freeman moved to a hotel. By late December 2004, the victim consulted a divorce attorney, although it remains uncertain if Freeman was aware of this. Following this, Rocha-Perez was moved to an apartment by a friend, Tony Cantrell, who believed the relationship had ended. However, Freeman returned to the marital home, where Rocha-Perez secretly moved in. On April 10, 2005, Freeman picked up a prescription for hydrocodone, which can cause drowsiness, and later called the victim's mother to report the victim was ill. The next morning, a neighbor observed Freeman behaving unusually. Freeman reported the victim's absence from work and later exhibited distress and agitation when seeking help from a neighbor, ultimately calling 911. Emergency responders found the victim deceased in the master bathroom, wrapped in a sleeping bag. Medical evidence indicated the victim had been dead for over eight hours, with signs of struggle evident from marks on his wrists and multiple head injuries. The cause of death was strangulation, indicating a prolonged application of pressure, and there were signs of a cleanup in the house, with minimal blood found at the scene. Trash bags containing a wet pillowcase, bath mat, latex gloves, and a phone cord were found, along with a beach towel in the living room that had Rocha-Perez’s sperm and Freeman’s DNA. There was no sign of forced entry. On April 11 at 6:30 p.m., police, acting on witness information, located and arrested Rocha-Perez in an attic of a nearby under-construction house. He was taken to the police station for questioning. Freeman, in two business documents, confirmed the victim's death occurred on April 10, 2005. Tennessee law defines first-degree murder as a premeditated and intentional killing (T.C.A. 39-13-202(a)(1)). Premeditation requires the intent to kill to be formed before the act, with the accused being free from excitement and passion at the time of the decision. The Tennessee Supreme Court has identified multiple factors supporting premeditation, such as the use of a deadly weapon on an unarmed victim, the cruelty of the killing, threats made by the defendant, procurement of a weapon, preparations to conceal the crime, destruction of evidence, and calmness post-killing (State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660). Evidence of repeated blows can indicate premeditation, though is not solely sufficient (State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 8). The circumstantial evidence supports convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, particularly regarding the element of "intentional killing." Evidence shows the victim was tied up while alive and ultimately strangled, which would have taken several minutes, allowing a jury to reasonably conclude he was intentionally killed. The medical examiner indicated the victim died between the night of April 10 and the morning of April 11. Freeman's signing of the death date and a phone call to the victim’s mother at 11:00 p.m. on April 10, claiming the victim was ill, suggest his involvement in the killing and a subsequent cover-up, as he was aware of the mother's expectations for a call. Police notification would have hindered the Defendants' efforts to clean up the murder scene. Freeman contacted Resi-Fax the morning after the crime, likely to buy time for body disposal and scene cleanup, aware that Tony Cantrell would return that afternoon. The urgency of their actions suggested they were racing against time. The Defendants separated, with Rocha-Perez fleeing the scene and Freeman going to Beverly's house to call the police. Notably, there was no evidence of forced entry, which, along with other evidence, supported the jury's conclusion that both Defendants were involved in the murder. While the Defendants posited a single killer theory, the evidence indicated that binding the victim before other actions necessitated at least two people. Their post-murder actions—cleanup, phone calls, and Rocha-Perez's flight—contradicted the plausibility of a single assailant. The victim's death, marked by cruelty—being bound, beaten, and strangled—suggested premeditation, as indicated by signs of struggle before death. Freeman's calm demeanor post-murder, including calling the victim's mother and making work-related calls, coupled with witness observations of his emotional fluctuations, further implied premeditation. The presence of a beach towel at the scene raised suspicions that the Defendants may have engaged in sexual activity after the murder, placing them together at the crime scene and supporting the premeditation claim. Their intimate relationship could also provide a motive for the murder. Collectively, these factors reinforced the jury's finding of premeditation, countering the Defendants' arguments that alternative hypotheses could explain the circumstances. Sufficient evidence supports the first-degree murder convictions of Freeman and Rocha-Perez, with a rational trier of fact concluding that essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Freeman's argument against the admissibility of a photograph of Rocha-Perez, found in the Freemans' house, is rejected. He claims the photograph, which shows Rocha-Perez mostly nude, is irrelevant and prejudicial. Under Tennessee Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise stated by law. The trial court found the photograph relevant as it evidenced an intimate relationship, providing a motive for the murder of Freeman’s husband. Freeman failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion regarding relevance and the balancing of probative value against potential prejudice. Although the photograph is somewhat inflammatory, it is not excessively graphic, and its relevance to motive is significant. Consequently, Freeman is not entitled to relief on this matter. Freeman contends that the trial court improperly excluded a 911 call tape from Beverly’s house, ruling it hearsay without exceptions. She argues for the excited utterance exception under Rule 803(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, which admits statements made under stress from a startling event. To qualify, three criteria must be met: (1) a startling event, (2) a statement related to that event, and (3) the statement must be made while the declarant is still under stress from the event. The Tennessee Supreme Court has emphasized that such statements are generally considered more reliable due to their spontaneous nature and the freshness of memory. In assessing Freeman’s claim, the court notes that the timing of her statement—approximately 18 hours after the victim’s death—raises concerns about potential fabrication. Although a startling event occurred and the statement pertained to it, the delay suggests that Freeman was not under the stress of the event when she made her statement. Consequently, the court concludes that Freeman has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the tape, as the factors considered indicate a lack of spontaneity and stress at the time of the statement. A statement made by Freeman shortly after the victim's death is deemed self-serving and lacks reliability, as evidenced by Beverly's observations of Freeman's fluctuating emotional state upon arrival. Freeman contends that the statement was necessary for her defense, citing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees a defendant's right to present a defense and offer testimony. However, while the right to present a defense is fundamental, it is not absolute; defendants must adhere to established rules of procedure and evidence, which are intended to maintain fairness in trials. The court evaluates whether the exclusion of evidence constitutes a constitutional violation based on three factors: the critical nature of the excluded evidence, its reliability, and the significance of the exclusionary interest. In Freeman's case, the excluded 911 tape claiming Rocha-Perez killed her husband is seen as critical in theory but is ultimately deemed unreliable and self-serving. The court also emphasizes the importance of cross-examination rights, indicating that Freeman sought to testify without facing this scrutiny. As such, the trial court's decision to exclude the testimony was upheld, and Freeman is not entitled to relief on this matter. Additionally, Freeman's argument regarding the refusal to sever the trials is noted. The Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure permit the severance of defendants under specific circumstances, either pre-trial to protect a defendant's right to a speedy trial or to ensure a fair determination of guilt, or during trial with the defendant's consent. The trial court has discretion in deciding whether to grant a severance, which cannot be overturned unless there is clear abuse of that discretion. In assessing whether a defendant was prejudiced by joint trials, the focus is on whether the joint trial adversely affected the defendant's case. In this instance, Freeman argues that she was prejudiced because she could not present her defense, claiming Rocha-Perez was the sole perpetrator. The trial court excluded a 911 tape where Freeman implicated Rocha-Perez and a statement from Rocha-Perez regarding the discovery of the victim's ring. The court found the exclusion of the 911 tape justified, asserting that even if severed, it would not be admissible. Regarding Rocha-Perez's statement, the trial court ruled that Freeman failed to demonstrate Rocha-Perez would testify if the trials were severed and disagreed with her belief that the jury would infer she gave the ring to Rocha-Perez as a trophy. The court considered the alleged inference weak and concluded there was no clear prejudice to Freeman's defense, affirming that a fair determination of her guilt or innocence occurred. Consequently, Freeman is not entitled to relief on this matter. Rocha-Perez contends that the trial court erred by permitting Detective Corcoran to testify about Martha Freeman's identification of the gold ring as belonging to the victim, arguing this violated the Confrontation Clause as established in Crawford v. Washington and Bruton v. United States. Implicit in his argument is a complaint regarding the trial court's refusal to sever the defendants. The review of decisions on permissive joinder and severance is conducted under an abuse of discretion standard per Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Crawford v. Washington holds that testimonial hearsay is inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior chance to cross-examine them. The Tennessee Supreme Court established that the initial inquiry in any Confrontation Clause matter is whether the statement in question is testimonial. If it is, the two conditions for admissibility must be met. If it is not, Tennessee's hearsay rules apply. To determine if Freeman's statement is testimonial, the Tennessee Supreme Court outlined several factors, including the relationship of the declarant to the crime, the context of the statement, and the intent behind it. The U.S. Supreme Court further clarified that statements made during police interrogations may be classified as nontestimonial if the primary purpose is to provide immediate assistance in an ongoing emergency, while they are considered testimonial if the interrogation seeks to establish past events for potential prosecution. A 911 call made during an attack is classified as nontestimonial, while responses to police questioning afterward are considered testimonial. Key distinctions include the immediacy of the emergency and the nature of the questioning. In this case, the trial court correctly permitted Detective Corcoran to testify regarding Freeman identifying the ring as her husband’s, as Freeman's statement was spontaneous and not the result of formal police questioning, thus deemed nontestimonial. Factors supporting this conclusion include that Freeman was an observer, initiated contact, made her statement informally before the interrogation began, and spontaneously observed the ring without prompting. Regarding Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that allowing a co-defendant's implicating statement at a joint trial without their testimony violates the Confrontation Clause. The trial court found no Bruton issue here, as Freeman's statement did not mention or implicate Rocha-Perez. The court concluded that Bruton does not apply to confessions that do not implicate a non-confessing defendant, which aligns with various precedents. The central issue was whether Freeman's statement implicated Rocha-Perez, and the trial court determined that it did not, noting that the statement merely addressed the appearance of the victim's ring without reference to Rocha-Perez. Rocha-Perez was present in the room before the discovery of a ring, which was not there prior to his arrival, raising questions about his involvement in the victim's murder. The case references *Richardson v. Marsh*, where the Supreme Court addressed whether statements that imply guilt through "evidentiary linkage" violate the Confrontation Clause. In *Marsh*, a confession was deemed non-incriminating until contextual evidence was introduced, leading the Court to allow its admission with a limiting instruction to the jury. The current case, however, lacked a similar limiting instruction, but the absence was deemed harmless since Rocha-Perez did not request one. Citing *United States v. Sherlin*, the court held that failing to request a limiting instruction does not constitute reversible error. Additionally, the evidence against Rocha-Perez was deemed unnecessary for conviction, and potential objections based on hearsay would likely have failed due to exceptions in the hearsay rule. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s decisions, finding no errors in the admission of evidence or the refusal to sever the trials, concluding that the Confrontation Clause was not violated.