Rondal Akers v. Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc.

Citations: 270 S.W.3d 67; 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 715; 2007 WL 4146206Docket: E2006-01513-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; November 21, 2007; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The case involves an appeal from three consolidated lawsuits against T. Ray Brent Marsh, his former business Tri-State Crematory, and Buckner-Rush Enterprises, Inc., stemming from the mishandling of deceased individuals' bodies. The plaintiffs, relatives and a girlfriend of the deceased, alleged that their loved ones' bodies, sent for cremation by Buckner-Rush Funeral Home, were instead either dumped or improperly buried by Marsh at the Tri-State site. The trial court dismissed the lawsuits, determining that the plaintiffs lacked standing for their tort, contract, or statutory claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Significant background details include the discovery in 2002 that Tri-State Crematory had not operated for years, with Marsh accepting bodies for cremation while disposing of them improperly. Over 300 un-cremated bodies were found on the premises, leading to criminal charges against Marsh, resulting in concurrent sentences of 12 years in Georgia and 9 years in Tennessee. Additionally, numerous civil lawsuits were filed by families of the deceased, including a certified class action in Georgia that was settled.

Three lawsuits are under appeal, initiated by individuals not involved in a prior Georgia class action. The plaintiffs claim various legal grievances, including breach of contract, negligence, misrepresentation, emotional distress, mishandling of a corpse, and fraud. All cases were consolidated in the Circuit Court for Bradley County, Tennessee, due to shared issues. Defendants filed for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs lacked standing, which partly hinges on the familial connections to the deceased.

1. **Akers Lawsuit**: Rondal D. Akers, III, died in 2001, leaving behind a divorced status and one child, Lindsey D. Akers. His father, Rondal D. Akers, Jr., signed the funeral service contract. The body was sent for cremation, but due to the crematorium's inoperability, the body remains unidentified or has not been recovered. The lawsuit is filed by the decedent’s parents.

2. **Burns Lawsuit**: William R. Burns passed away in 1999, survived by his wife Linda and daughter Donna, who arranged the funeral. The body was sent to Tri-State, later identified and returned to the family. Linda Burns has since settled her claims in the Georgia class action, leaving Donna as the sole plaintiff.

3. **Hall Lawsuit**: Lloyd Nolan Harden died in 2000, leaving a pregnant girlfriend and a large family. His sister signed the funeral contract, while all siblings authorized cremation. The body was found on Tri-State premises in 2002 and was returned for proper cremation. The lawsuit is filed by his siblings and girlfriend.

Ultimately, the Trial Court granted summary judgment for the defendants in all cases, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing based on their familial relationships with the deceased.

The Trial Court dismissed the Akers case based on the standing of the Plaintiffs, parents of Rondal Douglas Akers III, who died on November 23, 2001. They sought to hold Defendants accountable for mishandling the decedent's remains, which were cremated by Tri-State Crematory. Under Tennessee law, only relatives with superior title can bring such claims. Superior title is defined as the surviving spouse, or, in their absence, the next of kin, established by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Hill v. Traveler’s Inc. Co. The decedent’s daughter, Lindsey Dominica Akers, holds the superior right to sue, thereby excluding the Plaintiffs from standing.

The Plaintiffs argued their claims were contract-based, which the court rejected, stating the contractual relationship was limited to a release authorization. This aligns with the precedent set in Crawford v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, where claims were similarly dismissed due to lack of standing. The court also noted that similar rulings were made in the Burns and Hall cases regarding standing based on superior rights.

On appeal, the Plaintiffs contest the dismissal, asserting the Trial Court erred in determining they lacked standing. The appellate standards for reviewing summary judgment emphasize resolving legal issues rather than factual disputes, requiring the moving party to show no genuine issues of material fact exist. The appellate court must assess evidence favorably for the non-moving party, applying a de novo review without presumption of correctness on the trial court's conclusions. The discussion will further address the tort claims filed by the Plaintiffs.

In the companion case of *Crawford v. J. Avery Bryan Funeral Home, Inc.*, the court affirmed the Trial Court's ruling that the decedent’s wife had the sole right to control the disposition of his body, granting her exclusive standing to bring tort claims against the Funeral Home and Tri-State. The decedent's sister, Teri Crawford, lacked standing to appeal these claims. The court referenced *Hill v. Travelers’ Ins. Co.*, establishing that the surviving spouse holds superior rights in such matters. 

In addressing three consolidated cases, the court found no Tennessee authority directly addressing who controls disposition when there is no surviving spouse. However, it noted that Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-30-109(a) provides insight into the order of priority among relatives for making anatomical gifts, which indirectly informs the standing for tort claims. The statute prioritizes the spouse, followed by adult children, parents, adult siblings, adult grandchildren, and grandparents regarding anatomical gifts. 

The court concluded that the same order of priority applies for standing in tort claims related to unauthorized mutilation of a deceased body, establishing that the spouse is first, followed by adult children, parents, adult siblings, adult grandchildren, and grandparents.

In the appeal involving Akers, the decedent was not survived by a spouse or adult child, leading to his parents, Rondal D. Akers, Jr. and Lucinda Akers, being the next in line to assert claims. The Trial Court's prior determination that the parents lacked standing was found to be erroneous, and that judgment is vacated. In the Burns case, Linda Burns, the decedent’s wife, settled her claims and dismissed them, leaving only her daughter, Donna Burns, with claims. However, as Linda had exclusive control over body disposition, only she had standing, resulting in the correct dismissal of Donna Burns' claims, which is affirmed. In the Hall lawsuit, the decedent's five siblings and girlfriend sought to assert claims, but since he was survived by his mother, who is not a party to the lawsuit, the Trial Court's dismissal of their claims is also affirmed. 

Regarding breach of contract and statutory claims, two documents were signed by family members in relation to funeral services: a standard service agreement and a "Cremation and Disposition Authorization" that allowed the Funeral Home to release the body for cremation. The appeal centers on whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring claims based on these documents. The ruling confirms that individuals who signed the contracts with the Funeral Home have standing to pursue breach of contract and Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) claims based on alleged breaches or deceptive practices related to those documents. The court refrains from commenting on the merits of these claims.

Rondal D. Akers, Jr. has standing to pursue breach of contract and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (TCPA) claims based on the general contract for funeral services. Both Rondal D. Akers, Jr. and Lucinda Akers have standing for claims arising from the cremation and disposition authorization. The Trial Court's judgment is vacated where inconsistent with this determination. Donna Burns has standing for breach of contract and TCPA claims related to both the general contract and cremation authorization, with the Trial Court's judgment similarly vacated where inconsistent. Susan Hall has standing for claims under the general contract, while she and co-plaintiffs Doyle Harden, Ricky Harden, Sandra Fogle, and Mollie Denton have standing for claims regarding the cremation authorization, with any inconsistent judgment also vacated. All other issues are set aside. The Trial Court's judgment is partially affirmed, partially vacated, and remanded for further proceedings and cost collection, with appeal costs divided equally between specified appellees.