Deonta Baskin was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first-degree murder and aggravated assault after shooting Alvis Cross during an altercation on August 1, 2005. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted murder conviction, sentencing Baskin to twenty-four years as a Range I offender. On appeal, Baskin contested the sufficiency of evidence regarding the premeditation of the shooting. The appellate court reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's judgment.
The incident began when Cross intervened in a dispute between Baskin and his girlfriend, Sheretta Graffread, leading to a verbal confrontation that ended with Baskin leaving after threatening to return. Approximately 30 to 45 minutes later, Baskin returned, engaged in a physical altercation with Cross, and subsequently shot him in the hip. Cross sustained significant injuries from the bullet, which fractured his hip bone. During police questioning, Cross initially provided a false name due to his background in the foster care system. The appeal was affirmed by Judges Alan E. Glenn, John Everett Williams, and J.C. McLin.
Ross's uncle, Howard, attempted to bribe the victim regarding his testimony, which the victim reported to the district attorney's office, providing Howard's phone number. During cross-examination, the victim denied refusing to cooperate with police or providing a false description of his assailant. He acknowledged knowing of an outstanding warrant for his arrest at the time of the shooting but denied that it motivated him to give a false name to the police, admitting to having done so previously when caught driving without a valid license. Contrary to his earlier testimony, he stated that he had turned sideways and was not close enough to hit the defendant when shot.
Rhonda Ross testified about the events leading to the shooting on August 1, 2005. She lived with the victim and their daughter, along with others, and after hearing a scream, they found the defendant and Graffread in the hallway. Ross and the victim had previously told the defendant he was unwelcome and reiterated this confrontation outside. During a verbal exchange, the defendant threatened to return and "wet this place up," which Ross interpreted as a threat of violence, though she initially did not take it seriously. Later, while visiting a neighbor, she saw the defendant approaching their home, and despite seeing no unusual behavior from him, he suddenly shoved the victim and shot him before fleeing.
Ross was later informed by her family that threats and bribes had been made regarding her testimony, threatening harm to her and her family if they testified against the defendant, but offering payment if they did not. On cross-examination, Ross acknowledged stating to the police that the defendant had swung at the victim, who had blocked the blow. Sheretta Graffread corroborated that Ross had expressed her desire for the defendant not to be in their home and described events leading up to the confrontation, including a call from the defendant while she was with Cookie in a bedroom. Graffread stated she did not know Cookie's whereabouts at that time.
Graffread heard a gunshot, which was common in her neighborhood. Ross rushed inside to inform her that the victim had been shot and urged her to call 9-1-1. Initially dismissive, Graffread did not call for help, believing Ross was joking and expressing a lack of concern for the victim. When Ross returned in distress asking her again to call, she still did not comply, but another individual, Cookie, ultimately made the call. Graffread had maintained communication with the defendant, who had made a threatening remark about her potential testimony, which she did not take seriously due to his incarceration.
Officer Ronald Weddle, who responded to the shooting, testified that the victim was uncooperative, only providing his name and expressing anger while offering an inaccurate description of the shooter. Carolyn Chambers, a sheriff's department employee, identified recordings of the defendant's phone calls from jail, which were entered into evidence. The defendant chose not to testify and rested his case, leading to a jury conviction for attempted first-degree murder, merged into a single conviction. The defendant’s motion for a new trial was filed late, beyond the required thirty-day period as dictated by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b), rendering it untimely and the trial court's consideration of it ineffective. Consequently, the defendant could not appeal issues related to this motion. Despite this, the court allowed consideration of the defendant's appeal regarding the sufficiency of evidence, despite the untimeliness of the appeal notice.
The reviewing court evaluates the sufficiency of convicting evidence by determining if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, as established in Jackson v. Virginia. Findings of guilt must be set aside if the evidence does not support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and the credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are determined by the trier of fact. A guilty verdict, supported by the trial judge, affirms the State's witness credibility and resolves conflicts in favor of the prosecution. The rationale emphasizes the trial's unique environment, where the judge and jury can assess witness demeanor and testimony firsthand, a perspective not replicable in appellate review.
In this case, the defendant was convicted of criminal attempt to commit first-degree premeditated murder. First-degree murder involves a premeditated and intentional killing, with premeditation defined as an act performed after reflection and judgment, indicating that the intent to kill must form prior to the act. The statute clarifies that a person commits a criminal attempt if they act with the required culpability and take a substantial step toward committing the offense.
While the defendant acknowledges some circumstantial evidence of premeditation, he argues it was insufficient to exclude reasonable alternative explanations for his actions, including the possibility that he intended only to injure the victim. He cites the nature of the confrontation with the victim, the single shot fired, and his departure from the scene without further harm as evidence. The State contends that sufficient circumstantial evidence exists for a jury to conclude premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence presented was deemed sufficient to establish premeditation, which is a factual determination for the jury based on the totality of the evidence. Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the circumstances of the killing. Such circumstantial evidence must be compelling enough to exclude any reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's guilt. Factors indicating premeditation include the use of a deadly weapon against an unarmed victim, cruelty in the killing, declarations of intent to kill, weapon procurement, preparatory actions for concealing the crime, and calmness post-killing.
In this case, the defendant, angered by the victim’s demand to leave, threatened to return to the premises with violent intent. His subsequent calm demeanor led the victim and his fiancée to believe he was there to apologize. Instead, he assaulted the victim and shot him before fleeing. The defendant's actions post-incident, including efforts to intimidate witnesses, further supported the finding of premeditation. The nature of the shooting, with a single bullet wound to the hip, did not negate the established intent to kill. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the defendant’s attempted first-degree murder conviction.
