The case involves William Edward Hargrove (Husband) and Merriellen Hargrove (Wife) in a post-divorce dispute regarding their Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA) and a modification to the visitation schedule in the permanent parenting plan. The final divorce decree was issued on August 25, 1998, incorporating the MDA, which stipulated that Husband would retain the marital home and pay Wife $15,000, contingent upon her executing a quitclaim deed to convey her interest in the property. The MDA also specified that Wife was entitled to half of Husband’s pension plan.
In the permanent parenting plan filed on February 12, 2004, Husband was designated the primary residential parent for their son, with Wife granted visitation every other weekend and specific holiday arrangements. After a contempt hearing, the court modified the parenting schedule and affirmed Wife’s entitlement to half of Husband’s pension but denied her claim to half of his annuity. The court also ruled that Husband had fulfilled his $15,000 payment obligation.
Wife, representing herself, appealed the court’s decision, arguing that the modification of the visitation schedule was void due to procedural noncompliance with Tennessee law and claimed that the MDA intended for her to receive half of the annuity as well as the pension. She also contended that Husband failed to prove his defense of accord and satisfaction. The appellate court upheld the lower court's judgment, affirming the findings regarding the pension and the parenting plan modifications.
On September 25, 2006, Wife filed a motion to enforce the Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA) obligations, claiming Husband failed to pay her half of his retirement funds and only paid $11,000 of the $15,000 owed for the marital residence. Wife also filed a petition for contempt, alleging multiple violations of the MDA, including Husband making negative remarks about her to their child. Husband responded to the contempt petition on October 5, 2006, and filed a counter motion, arguing that Wife would not have executed a Quitclaim Deed without receiving all her money, and asserting the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, including a copy of the quitclaim deed.
Wife subsequently moved to supplement her contempt petition, leading to a hearing on November 6, 2006. During this hearing, Husband’s counsel requested an in camera discussion regarding visitation with their 16-year-old child. The judge's order on January 3, 2007, established that visitation would be at the child's discretion outside of mandated Thanksgiving and Christmas visits. The court concluded that the child had his own commitments, which did not align with a rigid visitation schedule, and it favored the child’s wishes to avoid additional pressure.
Additionally, the court found that Husband had fully satisfied his obligation concerning the $15,000 for the marital home and determined that Wife was entitled to the Boilermakers National Pension Trust, with a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to be entered within 60 days. However, Wife was denied entitlement to the Boilermakers National Annuity Trust.
Wife filed a notice of appeal, raising three issues: whether the court erred in modifying the residential schedule without following the proper procedure, whether it misinterpreted the MDA regarding her entitlement to half of the annuity trust, and whether it incorrectly found that Husband proved his affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions. The standard of review indicated that factual findings are presumed correct unless evidence strongly favors an alternative finding, while legal conclusions are reviewed without such presumption.
Appellant contends that the failure to adhere to Tenn. Code Ann. 36-6-405(a) deprived her of notice regarding visitation issues, thereby infringing on her due process rights and fundamental parental rights. The court affirms that a permanent parenting plan must comprise a written outline for child care and include a residential schedule detailing each parent's physical custody of the child. This residential schedule must consider the child's developmental needs and promote stable relationships with both parents. Factors influencing the schedule include the reasonable preference of children aged twelve or older, which carries more weight than that of younger children.
The 2000 legislative amendments mandated that any final decree or modification in divorce actions incorporate a permanent parenting plan, a shift from prior law that allowed voluntary proposals without requirement. Additionally, modifications to such plans must include a proposed parenting plan filed with the modification petition, barring cases solely concerning child support. The court referenced Casby v. Casby, where a husband sought to modify visitation despite no existing permanent parenting plan, affirming that the procedure for modification under Tenn. Code Ann. 36-6-405(a) was not applicable because no such plan had been established prior to the motion.
In Mays v. Mays, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed a custody modification case following the parties' divorce in 1999, where the wife was initially designated as the primary custodial parent. The husband sought to change this designation in 2001, and the trial court incorporated his proposed parenting plan, making him the primary residential parent. The wife appealed, arguing the husband's motion should have been dismissed due to his failure to provide a verified income statement as required by Tennessee law; however, the court found this argument inapplicable because there was no existing parenting plan from the original divorce case.
The case highlighted the importance of timely objections in preserving issues for appeal, citing that the wife did not object during the hearing when the husband’s counsel requested an in-camera examination of their child. Despite the wife's claims of a lack of notice regarding the hearing and potential infringement on her parental rights, the court determined she was adequately informed and had the opportunity to object. The court concluded that her parental rights remained intact, as the child would still have visitation with her, and the decision was based on the child's best interests, considering his busy schedule.
Additionally, the court addressed the issue of the husband's annuity, affirming the lower court's ruling that the wife was not entitled to the Boilermakers National Annuity Trust. The court found that the evidence supported the conclusion that the annuity was not intended to be divided under the marital dissolution agreement (MDA).
An MDA (Marital Dissolution Agreement) is a contractual document governed by standard contract interpretation rules, as established in Tennessee law. The MDA in this case explicitly states the parties' intention to settle their rights and obligations concerning their property. Courts interpret MDAs like other contracts, focusing on the parties’ intentions as expressed through the language used, with the interpretation relying on the ordinary meaning of that language. If a contract's provision is clear and unambiguous, it is interpreted as written, rather than based on any unexpressed intentions of the parties.
Ambiguity in a contract arises only when the language can be understood in multiple ways. The court emphasizes the importance of the specific words chosen by the parties. In this case, the MDA includes Exhibits II and III, detailing the division of property between Husband and Wife. The original Exhibit III designated the Husband’s property to include his annuity and retirement account, while the amended Exhibit III, dated August 21, 1998, specifically states that the Husband shall receive half of his pension plan and all benefits from January 1, 1998. The amendments removed the broader term "retirement benefits" and replaced it with "pension," indicating a narrower scope.
The Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v. Johnson supports the notion that terms like "retirement benefits" carry a broad meaning unless explicitly defined otherwise. Given the amendments made in this case, the Wife's claim to both the pension and the annuity is weakened, as the parties opted for more specific language that excluded the term "annuity."
Wife contends that an annuity listed as Husband’s sole property was actually included in the amended property list under the formal name "Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust." She argues that the absence of the annuity from the amended list implies it defaults to her ownership. However, this claim is undermined by a catch-all provision in the Amended Exhibit III, which states that Husband retains all personal property of a strictly personal nature. The court emphasizes that the interpretation of the MDA regarding the pension must be based on its clear language rather than Wife’s inferred intentions.
Wife attempts to argue that the term "pension" is ambiguous, citing Woody v. Woody, where a trial court corrected an original judgment to include a pension in a marital property division. The court distinguishes Woody by noting that in that case, the judge made a clerical error, while here, the terms were set by the parties themselves in the MDA. The court also points out that Wife could have filed a motion under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 if she believed a mistake had been made, but she did not.
The court asserts that unless there is evidence of fraud or mistake—neither of which Wife has alleged—the MDA must be enforced as written. The MDA explicitly states that Wife is entitled to half of Husband's pension, amounting to $25,048.87, but not to any portion of the annuity. The court rejects Wife’s claim that the order contradicts the evidence or bench judgment, affirming that she received what she agreed upon: her half of the pension. Consequently, the trial court’s decision is upheld.
Wife contends that Husband failed to prove the defense of accord and satisfaction regarding the $15,000 obligation in the Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA). She argues that the lower court erroneously issued a final order despite reserving judgment on this issue. However, the court determined that oral statements made by the judge are not binding unless incorporated into a written judgment. The existence of an MDA is recognized as a contract in the context of divorce, with the burden on the breaching party to demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, that the other party agreed to accept a lesser payment as full satisfaction of the original obligation. The Tennessee Supreme Court defines accord as a mutual agreement where one party offers something different in settlement of a claim, and satisfaction occurs upon fulfilling that agreement. Both elements must be present for an accord and satisfaction to exist. Whether an accord and satisfaction occurred is a factual question for the court to decide based on the surrounding circumstances. In this case, the court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Husband met his burden in establishing an accord and satisfaction regarding the $15,000 obligation.
Wife questioned Husband during the hearing about his payments and requested receipts, which Husband claimed he did not possess. Instead, he presented a quitclaim deed signed by Wife, transferring her interest in the marital home. Husband's attorney invoked the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, arguing that an agreement existed where Husband would pay Wife $15,000 in exchange for the deed. He stated that Husband fulfilled various payments totaling this amount over time, including car and rent payments, and that an odd-numbered check completed the $15,000 obligation seven years prior.
Husband acknowledged that the payments were made incrementally rather than in a lump sum, as requested by Wife for her financial needs. Wife admitted to accepting $11,000 from Husband in her contempt petition. The trial court concluded that Husband successfully proved an accord and satisfaction, noting Wife's inaction to enforce the MDA for eight years as a potential indication of agreement. The court referenced the case Belcher v. Belcher, which supported similar conclusions based on delay. Although the exact date of the quitclaim deed transfer remains unknown, the court affirmed the chancery court's findings, assigning the appeal costs to Wife.
