State of Tennessee v. Christopher Stephen Hayes

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2007-01894-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; October 7, 2008; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Christopher Stephen Hayes was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of attempted second-degree murder, two counts of reckless endangerment, and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to use it, receiving a ten-year sentence. On appeal, Hayes argued that the evidence for the attempted murder conviction was insufficient, that his sentences were excessive and that the trial court improperly granted alternative sentencing, and that there were clerical errors on the judgment form for the attempted murder conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the convictions but modified the attempted murder sentence from ten to eight years. The case was remanded to the trial court to address the sentencing for the possession of a deadly weapon conviction, reconsider alternative sentencing, and correct clerical mistakes on several judgment forms. 

Testimony from Debra Seward revealed that on January 2, 2005, she babysat for the Copleys and received threatening phone calls from Hayes and two associates. Seward identified Hayes as the caller and reported threats to her safety. After a series of calls, Hayes and his associates shot into the air outside the Copley residence, prompting Seward to contact the police. Officer Chris Johnston investigated the situation following her report.

The appellant made a threatening phone call to Seward, stating an intention to kill her and implying he was outside her window. Following this, Seward reported bullets striking her trailer, prompting her to instruct the Copleys' sons to take cover. She felt a pain in her side from a bullet that ricocheted off a chain she was wearing, though her injury was not severe. Seward acknowledged that multiple shots were fired into the trailer, with the first incident occurring around 8:30 p.m., coinciding with a loud vehicle outside. After the initial shooting, she contacted her brother and her boyfriend, Johnny Clifton, who briefly visited before leaving. The second shooting took place around 11:00 p.m., and Seward did not see who fired those shots. She received numerous calls that night, including some recorded on the Copleys' answering machine, although the messages were not preserved.

Mary Copley provided testimony about her past relationship with the appellant, which ended in August 2004 when she reconciled with her husband, Terry. The appellant continued to contact her, leaving threatening messages directed at Terry, including threats to harm him. Upon returning home on January 2, 2005, Mary learned from her children and police that their home had been shot at. She found the appellant's number repeatedly appearing on their caller ID and recalled a message he left before their trip to Nashville. During cross-examination, Mary noted that while Terry had previously argued with the appellant, she had never heard him threaten him. The answering machine recorded multiple messages from the appellant on the night of the shooting, but a lightning strike later erased these recordings. Mary speculated that the appellant's phone number began with "415" and acknowledged that some calls originated from associates of the appellant, indicating the men had been drinking.

Deputy Sean Shepard from the Gibson County Sheriff’s Department testified about an incident on January 2, 2005, involving harassing phone calls and gunshots directed at the Copleys' trailer. Debra Seward implicated the appellant and a person known as "Smokehouse," later identified as Ronnie Green. At around 11:30 p.m., Deputy Shepard located the appellant at his home and seized two .22 caliber rifles found on a bed. The appellant admitted to using one of the rifles during the shooting, claiming he had fired approximately ten shots while attempting to scare Terry Copley, but was too intoxicated to aim properly. He described the incident as a "drunken mistake" and stated that there was no intent to cause harm.

Deputy Shepard observed bullet holes in the trailer—six on the exterior and at least four on the interior—and found .22 caliber shell casings nearby. While the police report indicated two shooting incidents occurred at approximately 9:00 p.m. and 10:51 p.m., Shepard did not conduct further forensic tests on the firearms or shells after the appellant's confession. Although the appellant appeared intoxicated, he was coherent and responsive during the interaction with the deputy.

Michael Smith, the thirteen-year-old son of Mary Copley, testified that he recognized the appellant's voice from threatening phone calls, including one where the appellant said he would kill Michael's mother. During the first shooting, Michael heard two to four gunshots that struck the trailer's underpinning. Afterward, the appellant threatened to shoot again. He described the second shooting, which occurred shortly after, as he took cover while hearing eight to nine shots. Michael confirmed he recognized the appellant's voice from prior messages on their answering machine and noted that the appellant's number appeared multiple times on their caller ID.

Steven Ray Copley, age fourteen, testified that on January 2, 2005, he received a threatening phone call from the appellant, who made violent comments about raping and harming Mary Copley. Later that day, the appellant fired shots in front of the Copleys' trailer, prompting Steven to seek safety as gunfire erupted, hitting Seward, who was injured. Testimonies from Janet and Roger Hayes, relatives of the appellant, indicated that they saw him leaving with Christie Clark on the night of the incident and that Roger witnessed John Clark discarding .22 caliber shell casings into the appellant's truck. Christie's testimony revealed that prior to their trip to a store, John and Ronnie took guns from the appellant's home, and she claimed police pressured her into providing a statement about hearing gunshots. The appellant acknowledged his past affair with Mary Copley, which ended in August 2004, and denied making any threatening calls, asserting that phone calls to the Copleys’ home were made from John Clark's phone, with one call involving Mary.

A woman identified herself as not being Mary Copley during a phone call, prompting the appellant to return the phone to Ronnie. The appellant claimed he had never spoken to the Copleys' sons or threatened Seward. He recounted that he, Ronnie, and John visited a bar, consumed a significant amount of alcohol, and later stopped by the Copleys' residence around 9:00 p.m. During this visit, John and Ronnie shouted at someone from the trailer, who then opened fire, prompting the three men to flee in John's truck after seven shots were fired, believed to be from a .22 or .25 caliber gun. 

Afterward, the appellant and Christie Clark drove to Three Way, returning between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. Upon arrival, Ronnie and John appeared excited and showed the appellant an empty shotgun shell, indicating they had confronted the Copleys again. The appellant joined Ronnie and John as they called the Copley home, and he fired several rounds into the air from a .22 caliber gun, asserting he aimed straight up and intended to scare someone, not to hit the trailer. 

He later admitted to providing two statements to the police, claiming he was untruthful in the first due to pressure from Deputy Shepard. Initially, he stated that he fired a shotgun into the air while someone else used the .22 caliber gun, which he later retracted, explaining he lied to satisfy the deputy's expectations. The appellant indicated he was unaware of anyone being in the trailer during the shooting, attributing his lack of awareness to being heavily intoxicated. 

During cross-examination, he acknowledged previous conflict with Terry Copley but denied any threats. He expressed remorse for the shooting's impact on his family, reiterating he did not aim at the trailer. The parties agreed that John Clark and Ronnie Green pled guilty to unlawful possession of a deadly weapon. Although charged with attempted first-degree murder of Debra Seward, the jury convicted the appellant of attempted second-degree murder and also found him guilty of reckless endangerment regarding Michael Smith and Steven Ray Copley, alongside unlawful possession of a weapon. 

In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant argued that his extreme intoxication and other factors indicated his actions were reckless rather than intent to kill. He noted the lack of forensic evidence and the failure of law enforcement to preserve his answering machine messages, while the State maintained that sufficient evidence supported the conviction, a position with which the court concurred.

In reviewing the sufficiency of convicting evidence, an appellate court applies the standard that evaluates whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution. The State is afforded the strongest legitimate interpretation of the evidence and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn. Issues of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence are determined by the trier of fact, and the appellate court will not reweigh evidence or substitute its own inferences for those of the jury. A jury conviction shifts the presumption from innocence to guilt, placing the burden on the convicted defendant to demonstrate the evidence's insufficiency.

Second degree murder is defined as the knowing killing of another, which requires awareness that one's conduct is likely to result in such a consequence. Criminal attempt necessitates intent to cause a result and belief that the conduct will achieve that result without further action. In this case, the evidence showed that the appellant, Ronnie Green, made multiple threats and fired shots at a trailer occupied by Mary Copley and Debra Seward, with one bullet striking Seward. Although Green argued that he did not aim at the trailer and was too intoxicated to form the requisite mental state, the jury, after considering the evidence, convicted him of attempted second degree murder rather than attempted first degree murder. Testimony indicated that while he had been drinking, he was sufficiently aware of his surroundings and engaged coherently with law enforcement. The trial court instructed the jury on voluntary intoxication, which the jury found not to negate the "knowing" mental state. Consequently, the appellate court upheld the jury's conclusion as reasonable and denied the appellant relief.

The appellant argues that his ten-year sentence for attempted second-degree murder is excessive due to the trial court's incorrect application of enhancement factors and the denial of alternative sentencing. The State defends the sentence as appropriate. Upon review, the court finds that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factors and modifies the sentence to eight years. Additionally, the case is remanded for sentencing on the possession of a deadly weapon conviction and for reconsideration of alternative sentencing.

During the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed to the presentence report, which the appellant did not include in the appellate record. The appellant, age thirty-four, is married with four children and was employed at Taylor Trucking with no prior convictions. He expressed regret for his actions, acknowledging their impact on his family, particularly his wife and her son with cerebral palsy. However, he denied making calls to a trailer prior to the incident and claimed no intent to shoot into it.

The trial court applied multiple enhancement factors, including the appellant's leadership role in the offense, the involvement of multiple victims, and the vulnerability of some victims. It also noted the appellant's lack of accountability. In mitigation, the court recognized unusual circumstances surrounding the crime and the appellant's family support responsibilities, alongside his clean criminal record. The appellant received a ten-year sentence for attempted murder, with concurrent two-year sentences for reckless endangerment, resulting in an effective ten-year confinement. The court did not sentence him for the possession of a deadly weapon conviction or address alternative sentencing.

Appellate review of the sentence is de novo, considering evidence from the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report, sentencing principles, the nature of the offense, enhancement and mitigating factors, the appellant's statements, and rehabilitation potential. The burden lies with the appellant to prove the sentence's impropriety.

The trial court’s sentencing decisions are presumed correct if it adequately considers relevant principles and facts. The presentence report was not formally introduced as evidence, nor included in the appellate record, placing the responsibility on the appellant to provide a complete record for appeal. Without the report, the appellate court must assume the sentences are correct. The case involves ambiguity regarding whether the appellant should be sentenced under the pre-2005 or post-2005 Tennessee sentencing statutes, as the offenses occurred in January 2005 but sentencing took place in June 2007. The trial court failed to clarify which statute was applied. Since the appellant did not waive ex post facto protections, he should have been sentenced under the prior law, which required the application of enhancement and mitigating factors for sentencing. The trial court correctly imposed the minimum sentence for reckless endangerment but incorrectly enhanced the attempted second-degree murder conviction to ten years, despite the appellant's lack of prior convictions. The State acknowledged misapplication of enhancement factors (4) and (5). For alternative sentencing, the prior statute allows eligibility if the imposed sentence is eight years or less, with certain presumptions favoring alternative sentencing for specific offenders.

The appellant, classified as a Range I standard offender, has been convicted of Class B and E felonies, which typically makes him ineligible for alternative sentencing for attempted murder. However, with his sentence modified to eight years, he may now be considered for alternative sentencing. The case is remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing to evaluate alternative sentencing options for the Class E felony convictions and to impose a sentence for the possession of a deadly weapon conviction.

Additionally, there are errors on the judgment of conviction forms that need correction. Specifically, the form for attempted second-degree murder incorrectly cites the statute, which the trial court must rectify. Furthermore, while the jury did not convict the appellant of reckless endangerment (count four), the judgment incorrectly states a conviction and a two-year sentence, which also requires correction. Lastly, although the jury convicted the appellant of possession of a deadly weapon (count seven), the judgment mistakenly indicates a "not guilty" verdict, and the appellant has not been sentenced for this conviction. The trial court is instructed to amend the judgment forms and impose the correct sentences upon remand.

In conclusion, the appellant's convictions for attempted second-degree murder, reckless endangerment of two individuals, and possession of a deadly weapon are affirmed. The appellant’s sentence for attempted murder is modified to eight years, and the case is remanded for further action by the trial court on sentencing and correction of the judgment forms.