Rosendo Reyna v. State of Tennessee

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2007-01637-CCA-R3-PC

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; December 9, 2008; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Rosendo Reyna appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not filing a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirms the post-conviction court's judgment. The case originated from a May 31, 2003, traffic stop by the West Tennessee Drug Task Force for speeding. Officers detected a strong odor of fabric softener, often used to conceal drugs, and observed Reyna’s nervousness. Although he had an expired Texas driver's license and was driving a vehicle with an Ohio temporary tag, he claimed to be traveling to Ohio after visiting family in Texas. He consented to a search, which led to the discovery of 2.8 pounds of cocaine and three pounds of marijuana concealed in his car. Reyna was indicted on multiple counts, convicted on all, and sentenced to eighteen years for the cocaine offenses and two years for the marijuana charges, to be served concurrently.

During the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel explained she believed there were no legal grounds for a suppression motion, as the stop was lawful, consent was given for the search, and the traffic violations justified the stop. She stated that filing a suppression motion would have been without merit. The court upheld the effectiveness of the trial counsel's representation.

Counsel argued that filing a motion to suppress would not have benefited the defense, as the petitioner maintained that he was unaware of any drugs in the vehicle and consented to the search without knowledge of their presence. Counsel did not recall the frequency of meetings with the petitioner, stating there was little to discuss given the petitioner’s stance. The petitioner had no prior criminal record. Counsel did file a motion for a new trial based on the sufficiency of evidence. The petitioner testified that he was not speeding when stopped by police, who searched his vehicle immediately after arriving at the scene. He provided his license and vehicle title to the officers, who requested consent to search while he was detained in the police car. The petitioner met with trial counsel about three times and inquired about a motion to suppress, but was discouraged by counsel. He also requested that counsel contact the United States Immigration Office regarding perceived racial profiling and mentioned the existence of video evidence showing police misconduct, which counsel allegedly ignored. The petitioner expressed a desire for counsel to investigate the vehicle's prior ownership, but no such investigation occurred. On appeal, the petitioner claims the post-conviction court wrongly denied his petition for relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress based on the illegality of the traffic stop. Under the standards of Baxter v. Rose and Strickland v. Washington, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his trial outcome. The court may deny relief if the petitioner fails to establish either element. To prove prejudice, he must show a reasonable probability that the trial's result would have differed but for counsel’s errors, undermining confidence in the outcome. The determination of effective assistance is based on whether counsel's performance met the standard expected in criminal cases, with a presumption favoring the adequacy of counsel's conduct.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate that the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, as outlined in Strickland v. Washington. This requires a careful assessment that minimizes hindsight bias, evaluating the attorney's performance based on the circumstances and perspective at the time. A failed strategy alone does not indicate unreasonable representation; deference is given to informed tactical decisions that are based on adequate preparation. The petitioner bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, and factual findings from the post-conviction court are deemed conclusive unless the petitioner shows otherwise.

In this case, the post-conviction court found counsel’s decision not to file a motion to suppress evidence was informed and tactical, crediting the counsel's testimony over the petitioner's. The petitioner must prove that the motion to suppress would have been successful, but he failed to provide evidence that it would have led to the exclusion of the seized drugs. Consequently, the petitioner is not entitled to relief, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.