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State of Tennessee v. Alisha J. Glisson
Citation: Not availableDocket: M2006-02115-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; March 4, 2009; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Alisha J. Glisson was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and three counts of attempted aggravated robbery, resulting in a life sentence. On appeal, she challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her felony murder conviction, arguing that the State did not prove her criminal responsibility for the victim's death and that the accomplices' testimonies lacked sufficient corroboration. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee reviewed the evidence and upheld the trial court's judgments. The case originated from the shooting death of William R. "Randy" St. Laurent outside Glisson's apartment on December 15, 2001. Following her and her accomplices' statements, a grand jury indicted them for multiple charges, including first-degree murder and robbery. Testimony revealed that Michael Wayne Henry, who was unemployed and selling drugs, met with Glisson on December 14 to plan the robbery of the victim, whom Henry did not know. Other accomplices, David Sullivan and Andrew Warner, joined the plan, believing the victim possessed a significant amount of cash and drugs. The plan involved robbing the victim’s apartment while he was supposedly out with Glisson. Sullivan, dressed in black Army fatigues, and Warner, in a trench coat, were armed with guns, while Henry also had a gun and Warner carried a stun gun. At a motel, Sullivan made a call before they headed to the victim's apartment complex. Once there, Sullivan confirmed the address with the Defendant. Around 10:30 p.m., they knocked on Apartment 313, where Mr. Lucas Norris answered. When one robber attempted to enter, Norris resisted while another man, armed and described as Caucasian, threatened him. The robbers demanded to know about "Randy" and a "stash," but realizing they were in the wrong apartment, they left without taking anything, warning Norris not to contact the police. Afterward, the trio proceeded to Apartment 314 where victim Cortney Perry was present. Sullivan entered brandishing a weapon, and Henry threatened Perry while they searched for drugs. They found a pound of marijuana, stole Perry's jewelry, and approximately $1500 in cash. As they left, Perry pleaded for her belongings but was ignored. The men returned to the motel, contacting the Defendant to check the victim’s whereabouts. The Defendant informed them she was with the victim in a limousine and would be returning to her apartment. Upon the limousine's arrival, despite the Defendant's claim of wanting no involvement, Sullivan and Warner confronted the vehicle at gunpoint. Warner attempted to use the stun gun, but the victim resisted, leading to a struggle. In the ensuing chaos, Henry struck the victim with a gun, resulting in the weapon discharging and fatally shooting the victim. Henry, Sullivan, and Warner fled to a motel after an incident, with Warner later contacting the Defendant. The day after, Henry took marijuana and jewelry to sell, claiming he would return, but did not. He sold the marijuana and hid a gun at his parents' house, maintaining phone contact with Sullivan and Warner but never seeing them again. Sullivan was AWOL from the military and incarcerated during the trial. Both Henry and Warner testified against the Defendant, hoping for better plea deals in exchange for their testimony. Henry admitted to occasionally exchanging drugs with the Defendant and visiting her apartment on December 14 for pills and marijuana. The State presented witnesses, including Ms. Perry, who identified the robbers from photos, and Meredith Runion, who recounted events of December 14, including the arrival of men in black and a gunshot. Detective Danny Satterfield testified about his investigation, revealing that the Defendant admitted to planning a home invasion with the co-defendants to rob the victim. A videotaped confession was presented to the jury. The Defendant did not testify or call witnesses in her defense. The trial court acquitted her of premeditated first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated kidnapping but submitted remaining charges of felony first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery to the jury, which found her guilty. At sentencing, the trial court imposed life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction, eight years for aggravated robbery, and three years each for attempted aggravated robbery, all to be served concurrently. The Defendant's post-trial motion for acquittal or a new trial, citing insufficient evidence for the felony murder conviction, was denied, leading to the current appeal. The Defendant contests her felony murder conviction on multiple grounds, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. She asserts that the only intention shared with her co-defendants—Sullivan, Warner, and Henry—was to rob the victim's apartment, not the victim himself, and therefore claims she cannot be held criminally responsible for the resulting death during the attempted aggravated robbery. Additionally, she challenges the lack of corroboration for the accomplice testimony and argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on the felony murder charge. The trial court had previously overruled her motion, citing Detective Satterfield's testimony that the Defendant admitted to planning the robbery at the victim's apartment while knowing Ms. Perry would be present. After the robbery yielded less than expected, the plan shifted to robbing the victim directly. The Defendant maintained communication with her co-defendants throughout the events, a fact corroborated by Mr. Henry's testimony. Furthermore, evidence indicated that the co-defendants had made prior preparations for the robbery at a motel. Despite not testifying, the Defendant's statements during the police interviews supported the accomplices’ testimonies, linking her to the offenses. The appellate review affirms that the standard for assessing the sufficiency of evidence mirrors that applied to a motion for judgment of acquittal. Under Tennessee law, findings of guilt can only be overturned if there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is on the Defendant to demonstrate the inadequacy of the evidence, as a conviction establishes a presumption of guilt. A convicted criminal defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence must be rejected if any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, with the evidence viewed in favor of the prosecution. The State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence, and a guilty verdict credits the testimony of the State’s witnesses, resolving conflicts in favor of the prosecution's narrative. Questions of witness credibility and the weighing of evidence are determined by the trier of fact, which this Court will not re-evaluate or replace with its own inferences. In this case, first-degree felony murder involves the killing during the commission of certain felonies, with the required mental state being the intent to commit the underlying offense—in this instance, attempted aggravated robbery. The definition of criminal attempt indicates that one must intentionally engage in actions that would constitute an offense under the circumstances as believed by the actor. The aggravated robbery charge necessitates proof that the robbery involved a deadly weapon or the display of an object that could reasonably be perceived as a deadly weapon. The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction of felony murder, claiming a lack of intent to commit the robbery and citing testimony that she did not want to participate in the robbery. However, the law supports her conviction under the theory of criminal responsibility, meaning she can be held accountable for the actions of another if she intended to promote or assist in the commission of the offense. The statute codifies the common law concepts of "accessories before the fact" and "aiders and abettors," establishing that criminal responsibility is not a distinct crime but a means for the State to prove a defendant's guilt based on another's actions. Criminal responsibility can be inferred from a defendant's presence and association with the perpetrator during and after the crime, without the need for a specific act or physical involvement. A defendant must associate with the criminal venture, know that the offense is planned, and share in the principal's criminal intent. In this case, the Defendant intended to benefit from the crime and directed others to commit it. The Defendant was central to the conspiracy involving three men, having long-standing relationships with them. On December 14, 2001, they devised a plan to rob a victim, believing he would be absent. Following an unsuccessful burglary, the plan shifted to directly robbing the victim. The Defendant communicated with the trio about her and the victim's whereabouts, leading them to ambush the victim upon their return. Testimonies from the involved men supported the State's claim that the Defendant was the mastermind behind the robbery. The Defendant's admissions to Detective Satterfield, including a videotaped confession, were introduced as evidence. She acknowledged the shift in their plan to rob the victim and maintained contact with the conspirators throughout the evening. A key issue for the jury was the Defendant's intent regarding her participation in the robbery scheme. Henry's testimony indicates the Defendant did not wish for the robbery to proceed, but this alone does not provide an affirmative defense under Tennessee law, which requires a complete and voluntary renunciation of criminal intent after the attempt has begun (Tenn. Code Ann. 39-12-104). The Defendant's involvement and intent to benefit from the robbery establish her criminal responsibility for the attempted aggravated robbery, particularly as the victim's killing occurred during this attempt. The Defendant contends that the State failed to corroborate the accomplice testimonies of Warner and Henry. Tennessee law mandates that a conviction cannot solely rely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony (State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903; State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803). However, only a minimal level of corroborative evidence is required, which must independently connect the defendant to the crime. This evidence can be direct or circumstantial and need not be sufficient for a conviction on its own. It is sufficient if it links the defendant to the crime in question (State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d 577, 588-89). The corroborative proof must lead to the conclusion that a crime occurred and implicate the defendant, including elements of identity (Shaw, 37 S.W.3d at 903). Corroboration must establish the identity of the defendant as a criminal actor, as highlighted in Boxley. It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to assess the sufficiency of corroboration, although mere suspicion is insufficient to support an accomplice’s testimony. In this case, the evidence was found adequate to corroborate the testimonies of accomplices Henry and Warner, particularly through the defendant’s confession and a taped conversation that aligned with the accomplices' accounts. Independently, neither the testimony nor the confession would suffice to prove the crime; however, together they adequately supported the defendant's conviction. The evidence also sufficiently corroborated the crime of incest. Ultimately, the court concluded that the evidence supported the defendant's conviction for felony murder based on criminal responsibility, affirming the trial court's judgments.