James Gleaves, a former deputy sheriff in Shelby County, Tennessee, appealed his termination upheld by the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board. The Chancery Court found substantial evidence supporting the termination, which was affirmed on appeal. The incidents leading to his termination involved a traffic stop on December 9, 2000, during which Gleaves cited Dexter Creel for an inoperable tail light and failing to yield. Creel alleged that Gleaves used excessive force and threatened him with felony charges if he complained. Following a complaint to Internal Affairs, Gleaves arrested Creel on a felony charge during a subsequent court appearance.
Additionally, another complaint was filed by Thomas Willett, alleging that Gleaves stalked his minor daughter, which included repeated visits to her workplace and attending her softball games uninvited. Gleaves was charged with stalking and violations of several Shelby County Government Rules and Regulations, including Conformance to Law, Unbecoming Conduct, Abuse of Process, and Arrest, Search and Seizure.
Two Loudermill hearings were conducted on September 27, 2001, with union representation for Gleaves. He was found guilty of multiple rule violations and terminated effective October 1, 2001. An appeal to the Civil Service Merit Review Board followed, where Gleaves admitted during testimony that Creel had not attempted to evade him, contradicting his earlier claims.
Deputy Gleaves activated his blue lights and siren during a traffic stop when the driver, Mr. Creel, failed to pull over, covering a distance of approximately 3,500 to 3,800 feet before stopping. Gleaves chose not to arrest Creel for felony evasion at the scene, expressing uncertainty about prosecution by the Attorney General’s office and wishing to avoid unnecessary detention. During the incident, Gleaves denied making any threats to Creel regarding arrest for contesting the ticket. He handcuffed Creel in the courtroom after explaining the circumstances to the judge, denying any remarks such as "I told you so."
Gleaves acknowledged discussions with Captain Yancey about the incident but could not recall specific complaints from Creel. Yancey indicated he wanted the situation addressed, but Gleaves claimed it did not occur as described. Gleaves sought an arrest warrant from Judge Broffitt, who refused to sign it, citing concerns that the warrant was too old and should have been issued at the time of the stop. Gleaves then approached Judge Robinson, who also had reservations about the warrant's adequacy, especially since it was for a two-month-old incident. Assistant District Attorney General Donald Siemer provided a conflicting account, noting that Gleaves had asked to dismiss the case just before the court session, indicating a change in the prosecutorial approach to the citation.
A case was addressed in which Deputy Gleaves initially considered arresting Mr. Creel for evading police but ultimately opted to issue a misdemeanor citation instead. Following the incident, Deputy Gleaves was later implicated in misconduct after Mr. Creel filed a complaint with Internal Affairs (IA). Lieutenant Holland testified regarding multiple IA complaints against Deputy Gleaves, including an incident where Gleaves warned Creel of a warrant for his arrest after Creel had complained. Deputy Gleaves admitted to visiting a restaurant where a 17-year-old minor worked and requested to be seated in her section, as well as visiting her at a sporting goods store after she left the restaurant. He claimed these visits were at her request. Furthermore, Deputy Gleaves set up a speed trap near the minor’s residence, justifying it by her previous mention of receiving traffic tickets in that area. The Review Board upheld Deputy Gleaves' termination based on findings that included threats made to Mr. Creel regarding his arrest if he complained, arranging for Creel's arrest following the IA complaint, and frequent visits to the minor's workplace, which raised concerns of official misconduct and abuse of process. The chancery court concurred with the Review Board’s findings after Deputy Gleaves filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on August 1, 2007.
Patrolman Gleaves attended a minor's softball game uninvited and later followed her in his patrol car, leading to a focus on her home where he set up radar. This behavior prompted the minor's father to seek a stalking arrest warrant against Gleaves. The conduct was deemed excessive and inappropriate, violating Sheriff’s Department policies and resulting in embarrassment for the department. The chancery court upheld Gleaves' termination, finding reasonable grounds and substantial evidence supporting the Review Board's decision. In his appeal, Gleaves raises three issues: the correctness of the chancery court's review standard, the sufficiency of evidence supporting the termination, and alleged due process violations regarding his participation in a Loudermill hearing without legal counsel while facing criminal charges. The appeal follows a statutory writ of certiorari, allowing judicial review of administrative decisions affecting civil service employees. Judicial review standards under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) permit affirmation, remand, or reversal of agency decisions if they violate legal provisions, exceed statutory authority, involve unlawful procedures, are arbitrary or capricious, or lack substantial evidence. The court must assess whether the agency’s decision is supported by relevant evidence sufficient to uphold a rational conclusion.
Evidence is deemed sufficient if it provides a reasonable factual basis for the decision under review, as established in relevant case law. The credibility of witnesses is heavily weighted in appellate reviews. Deputy Gleaves argues that the chancery court misapplied the standard of review by considering evidence not present in the administrative record. However, the court correctly confined its review to this record and did not accept disputed assertions without substantiation. Although Gleaves claims the court overlooked certain facts, he fails to specify what those facts are. The court's conclusions, while differing from Gleaves' perspective, are supported by evidence in the record. The court applied the appropriate statutory framework, rendering Gleaves' arguments unconvincing.
Regarding the evidence supporting the Review Board’s decision, Gleaves cites testimonies from Officers Bradley Yugaly and Debra Scott. Officer Yugaly, who was present during an incident involving Gleaves, noted that the individual in question had the option to pull over earlier. His recollection was vague, attributed to the passage of time. Officer Scott, who had a past relationship with Gleaves, testified about his actions during the incident and his inquiries regarding potential felony charges related to stalking. She acknowledged her limited knowledge of the allegations against Gleaves. The Review Board's decision is upheld as it is backed by substantial and material evidence.
The Board concluded that Officer Yugaly and Officer Jones were not credible witnesses, a determination that cannot be contested. Both witnesses faced multiple instances of impeachment and displayed inconsistencies in their testimonies. Although conflicting evidence exists regarding the incidents in question, the presence of alternative interpretations does not warrant overturning the administrative decision, as supported by case law. The record contains sufficient evidence to uphold the agency's decision.
Deputy Gleaves contended that his due process rights were violated during his Loudermill hearing due to lack of legal counsel and pending criminal charges. However, there is no record of Gleaves requesting legal representation instead of a union representative at the hearing, nor did he provide legal support for his claim that a continuance should be granted in such circumstances. The Board did grant a continuance while the stalking charges were pending, and Gleaves had legal representation at the subsequent Board hearing. Consequently, his argument lacks merit.
The decision is affirmed, with costs of the appeal assigned to James Gleaves and his surety, subject to execution if necessary.
