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Cory Myers v. State of Tennessee
Citation: Not availableDocket: W2009-00814-CCA-R3-HC
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; March 24, 2010; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Cory Myers appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition by the Circuit Court for Gibson County, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him to life for first-degree murder because he allegedly pled guilty to "felony homicide," which he argues does not exist under Tennessee law. Myers originally pled guilty to first-degree felony murder in 1997 after confessing to killing a former mayor during a burglary. He previously sought post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, but this was denied, with the court affirming that his plea was informed. The court reviewed the plea hearing, where Myers acknowledged understanding the charges and potential penalties. The habeas corpus petition, filed while incarcerated in Hickman County, reiterated claims of jurisdictional error and involuntariness regarding the plea agreement. The court ultimately affirmed the dismissal of Myers' petition. The State moved to dismiss the habeas corpus petition on three grounds related to procedural compliance with Tennessee law. First, the petitioner allegedly failed to affirm that the claim of illegality had not been previously raised and that this was the first application for the writ, or to provide copies of any prior petitions. Second, the petitioner did not file the petition in the most convenient court nor provide adequate justification for filing in Gibson County. Third, the State contended that the reference to "felony homicide" in the plea agreement did not render the judgment void. The dismissal was granted on April 21, 2009, following a hearing on April 9, 2009, for which no transcript exists. The dismissal order stated that the petition lacked claims for relief. The petitioner’s notice of appeal, filed prematurely on the hearing date, will be considered as filed post-dismissal in accordance with T.R.A.P. 4(d). The petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition, asserting that his plea to a non-existent offense invalidated the judgment and jurisdiction. However, the State argues that the petitioner did not meet the procedural requirements and failed to demonstrate that the judgment was void or that his sentence had expired. The court affirmed that the grounds for habeas corpus relief are limited to cases where the judgment shows the convicting court lacked jurisdiction or authority, or where the sentence has expired. A void judgment is one that is facially invalid, whereas a voidable judgment requires evidence beyond the record to challenge its validity. Ultimately, the court concluded that the petitioner did not establish that his judgment was void, justifying the dismissal of his petition. A conviction that requires proof beyond the record for invalidation is considered voidable, precluding the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in Tennessee. The petitioner bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the judgment is void or the confinement is illegal. A habeas corpus court may dismiss a petition summarily if it finds no valid claim or if the judgment does not indicate void convictions, without appointing counsel or conducting an evidentiary hearing. The State contends that the petitioner did not adhere to two procedural mandates for habeas corpus petitions. First, it claims a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(c), which requires that the petition state whether the legality of the restraint has been previously adjudicated and whether it is the first application for the writ. The review confirmed compliance with these requirements. Second, the State argues a violation of section 29-21-105 regarding filing in the most convenient court. The petitioner, incarcerated in Hickman County, filed with the convicting court in Gibson County, asserting it was the most convenient venue for addressing an illegal sentence. Citing case law, the petitioner reasoned that the convicting court could correct an illegal sentence and had relevant records, justifying the choice of venue despite the procedural requirement. The Davis v. State case clarifies that asserting an illegal sentence allows for filing in the convicting court when it possesses pertinent records and authority. Davis, the petitioner, provided sufficient justification for filing in Gibson County, where he was convicted and where relevant records exist to potentially correct his sentence. The trial judge can correct an illegal sentence at any time, as established in State v. Burkhart. The petitioner asserted that his plea agreement form represented a guilty plea to a non-existent offense, claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction. However, the judgment form identified the offense as first-degree murder under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202(a)(2), which defines first-degree murder in the context of various felonies, including felony murder. The terminology in the plea agreement—stating "felony homicide" instead of "felony murder"—does not invalidate the conviction. A breach of the plea agreement renders the judgment voidable, not void. During the guilty plea colloquy, the petitioner confirmed his understanding of the charges, including being charged with first-degree murder. The court found that the petitioner voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea, concluding he did not prove his judgment void or his confinement illegal. Consequently, the court affirmed the Circuit Court for Gibson County's decision, denying the petitioner habeas corpus relief.