Mark VII Transportation Co. v. Responsive Trucking, Inc.

Docket: W2009-00143-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; September 18, 2009; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Mark VII Transportation Co., Inc. filed a lawsuit against Responsive Trucking, Inc. for breach of contract and indemnification, based on their "Contract Motor Carrier Agreement." The agreement specified that Responsive would adhere to the liability standards outlined in the Carmack Amendment for loss or damage to cargo. Both parties submitted motions for summary judgment; the trial court denied Mark VII's motion and granted Responsive's. The appellate court found material factual disputes and affirmed the trial court's decision in part while reversing it in part, remanding for further proceedings.

Mark VII operates as a property broker, arranging transportation for customer shipments, while Responsive acted as one of the carriers. The contract stipulated that Responsive's liability for cargo loss began upon loading and continued until unloading. It also included an indemnification clause requiring Responsive to defend and indemnify Mark VII against any claims related to damage to goods during transit. The case involved allegations of "short shipments" of toys from Hasbro, with disputes over which party was responsible for counting items prior to shipping. Responsive's employees acknowledged the quantity of toys loaded by signing the bills of lading, and the trailers were sealed and checked by a guard upon departure, with all seals intact upon delivery.

Cynthia Herring, vice president of Responsive, indicated that shortages in shipments could have occurred during loading or unloading, either before the trailer seal was applied or after its removal. Hasbro filed a claim against Mark VII for the short shipments, leading Mark VII to claim against Responsive based on their agreement. Responsive declined to pay, arguing there was no evidence the loss happened while the toys were in its custody. Mark VII subsequently paid Hasbro $129,627.07 and initiated a lawsuit against Responsive. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, with the trial court denying Mark VII's motion due to the existence of material factual issues, while granting Responsive's motion for summary judgment. Mark VII is appealing both the grant of summary judgment to Responsive and the denial of its own motion.

Key issues for review include: 1) Whether Responsive is liable for the short shipments under the Carmack Amendment; 2) Whether Responsive is liable for breach of its indemnification contract; 3) If the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Responsive; and 4) If it erred in denying Mark VII's motion for summary judgment.

The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo, meaning the appellate court does not presume correctness of the trial court's decision. The evidence is evaluated in favor of the nonmoving party, who is tasked with demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact if the moving party has adequately supported their motion. Contract interpretation is also a legal issue focused on ascertaining the parties' intent, requiring that each provision is understood within the context of the entire agreement, giving specific provisions precedence over general ones when there is a conflict.

A court must interpret an unambiguous contract as written, focusing on the explicit terms rather than the parties' unexpressed intents. In this case, Responsive argues that the agreement limits Mark VII’s recovery to indemnification under paragraph 13 due to Mark VII's prior payment of Hasbro’s claims. Conversely, Mark VII claims entitlement to recovery under both paragraph 10 (breach of contract) and paragraph 13 (indemnification). The trial court sided with Mark VII but found insufficient proof for claims under either provision. Responsive contends that the two paragraphs conflict, thus making the more specific paragraph 13 controlling; however, the court determined that the agreement does not restrict Mark VII’s remedies and that the provisions are not in conflict. Paragraph 10 outlines the liability standards, and Mark VII alleges that Responsive lost the toys, which allows for a remedy under this provision. Additionally, Responsive is required to indemnify Mark VII for claims related to the shipped toys.

Mark VII cites paragraph 10 as the basis for its claim against Responsive regarding the lost toys, asserting that the Carmack Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 14706) governs liability. The contract specifies that liability for cargo loss or damage begins upon loading and continues until unloading. Although the trial court found that Mark VII could not establish a claim under the Carmack Amendment, Responsive argues this statute does not apply since Mark VII is a broker, not a shipper. Nonetheless, the contract states that the Carmack Amendment's liability standard applies, which typically allows shippers to recover damages caused by carriers without needing to identify a negligent party among several carriers. The Carmack Amendment imposes liability on carriers for property damage or loss during transportation, making them accountable regardless of fault.

To establish a prima facie case against a carrier under the Carmack Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) delivery of goods to the carrier in good condition, 2) receipt by the consignee of fewer goods at the destination, and 3) damages. If established, the burden shifts to the carrier to prove it was not negligent and that the damage was due to an excepted cause. The trial court found that Mark VII failed to prove the first element, although elements two and three were agreed upon. The focus was on whether the toys were delivered to Responsive in good condition. The court concluded that the bills of lading did not establish delivery and that Responsive had no duty to count the items. Mark VII argued that the bills of lading, signed by Responsive employees, proved delivery in good condition. Case law supports that a bill of lading can establish a prima facie case of good condition unless noted otherwise. However, the trial court referenced The Pillsbury Co. case, which found bills of lading insufficient for proof of delivery where goods were sealed, distinguishing that case from the current one since the toys were not sealed and were visible to Responsive’s agents. As such, the bills of lading could establish a prima facie case of delivery. The trial court also stated that Responsive was only responsible for loading the toys, while Hasbro was responsible for counting them.

Responsive did not verify the quantity of toys delivered; it merely loaded and sealed trailers for delivery. Mark VII claims that Responsive had a legal obligation to count the toys based on the assumption that the toys listed on the bills of lading were shipped in good condition. Mark VII argues that the absence of a "shipper’s load and count" notation implies that Responsive is liable for any discrepancies. However, the trial court noted that the bills of lading and loading sheets were incomplete and illegible, making it impossible to ascertain the items shipped. As a result, a material fact regarding the number of toys delivered remains in dispute, rendering summary judgment inappropriate.

Regarding indemnification, Paragraph 13 of the agreement mandates that Responsive indemnify Mark VII for any claims related to damages to goods while under Responsive's control, regardless of the damage's cause. Since it is unclear how many toys were delivered and when the loss occurred, a factual dispute exists that must be resolved before addressing the indemnification clause. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Responsive on this claim.

Mark VII's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied, which is appropriate due to the material factual disputes present in the case. Summary judgment is not intended to replace trials for disputed factual issues. Consequently, while Mark VII can pursue recovery under the Carmack Amendment and the indemnification provision, material issues of fact prevent summary judgment for either party. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of Responsive is reversed, and the denial of Mark VII’s summary judgment motion is affirmed. Costs are shared equally between Mark VII and Responsive.