Dorothy King, R.N. and Patricia Battle, R.N. v. Virginia Betts,, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, in her Individual Capacity
Docket: M2009-00117-COA-R3-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; December 17, 2009; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
The case involves Patricia Battle and Dorothy King, registered nurses at the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, who filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Virginia Betts, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, alleging retaliation following their opposition to a hospital policy requiring nurses to dispense medication from a "mini-pharmacy" without a pharmacist present. The nurses believed this policy violated their nursing licenses and filed an administrative complaint in 2004, which resulted in an agreed order asserting no violation occurred. Despite this, they continued to express concerns, involving their State Representative, who communicated with the Commissioner regarding the policy's implications for patient care.
Battle claims she faced retaliatory actions for her advocacy, including hostility from a colleague, negative performance evaluation comments, targeted termination efforts, denial of a security detail for supervising violent patients, disparaging remarks, lack of notification about management rounds, an unwarranted written reprimand, exclusion from supervisory scheduling, and an office relocation. The trial court had granted summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Appellees, but the Court of Appeals found material factual disputes, reversed these decisions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The ruling affirmed some aspects of the trial court's decision while reversing others.
Battle filed a complaint on April 17, 2006, against the Tennessee Department of Health and the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. An amended complaint on September 6, 2006, named new defendants: Virginia Betts, Lynn McDonald, Dr. Lindsey Douglas, and Glynda Heinicke, all associated with the Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute. A second amended complaint on February 23, 2007, sought monetary damages against the defendants in their individual capacities for alleged violations of Battle's First Amendment rights due to retaliatory actions related to criticisms of the “mini-pharmacy” policy.
Appellees responded on March 15, 2007, asserting a defense of qualified immunity, which was reiterated in an amended answer on October 29, 2007. On January 11, 2008, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming there were no disputed material facts and that Battle could not prove a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Battle opposed this motion and submitted additional factual statements. The trial court heard arguments on February 22, 2008, and deferred ruling, requesting further legal memoranda on several issues, including public employees' First Amendment rights and qualified immunity.
Subsequently, Appellees filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding qualified immunity. Battle moved to strike this motion as untimely and also sought to strike certain arguments concerning the statute of limitations. A hearing on these motions was held on July 15, 2008. The trial court denied Battle's motion to strike the judgment on the pleadings but granted the motion to strike the statute of limitations defense. Ultimately, the court dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that Appellees were immune and granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court determined that Battle’s speech did not stem from her official duties nor was it as a citizen on public matters, suggesting adequate governmental justification for the actions taken against her. The court noted that the conduct aimed to inform nurses of potential job loss if they failed to adhere to the new policy.
The trial court determined that the actions in question did not constitute “negative action towards the plaintiffs’ employment” and deemed any alleged “cold shoulder treatment” as justified and reasonable. The court ruled that qualified immunity was applicable since the right allegedly violated was not clearly established. On November 2, 2008, the court adopted its bench ruling to dismiss the case. Following this, Battle filed a motion to alter or amend, which the court denied, prompting Battle to appeal, raising several issues:
1. Whether the Chancery Court applied the summary judgment standard correctly under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
2. Whether the court granted summary judgment despite not making a final determination on the First Amendment protection of the speech involved.
3. Whether the court erred in concluding that Nurse Battle did not experience an adverse employment action sufficient for a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
4. Whether the court allowed the Appellees to raise the qualified immunity defense for summary judgment in an untimely manner.
5. Whether the court properly granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity for the Appellees.
The standard of review for a motion for summary judgment is de novo, with no presumption of correctness, and evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The moving party bears the burden to show no genuine issue of material fact exists, and if properly supported, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate such an issue. The moving party must affirmatively negate an essential element of the claim or establish an affirmative defense, rather than merely challenging the nonmoving party to prove their case.
The analysis regarding the First Amendment claim clarifies that public employees retain certain rights to speak as citizens on matters of public concern, as established by various Supreme Court rulings.
A three-part test is applied to assess a public employee’s claim of First Amendment retaliation: (1) the employee must demonstrate that the speech in question is protected; (2) the employee must establish that they suffered an adverse employment action that would deter a reasonable person from exercising their First Amendment rights; and (3) the employee must show a causal link between the speech and the adverse action. To determine if the speech is protected, the trial court first assesses whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a public concern. If so, the speech may be protected; if not, the employee lacks a First Amendment claim. The Supreme Court clarified that speech made as part of official duties is not protected. The trial court must evaluate the speech's content, form, and context, and assess its point rather than the speaker's motivations. If the speech is deemed protected, the court must weigh the government’s interests against the employee’s interest in the speech. The court's determination of whether speech is protected is a legal question. In this case, Battle argues that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment without determining if her speech was protected. Battle must prove all three elements of her claim for it to succeed; failure to establish any element allows for summary judgment.
Battle failed to demonstrate the necessary element of adverse employment action, leading the trial court to grant summary judgment without assessing whether her speech was protected. To establish her claim, Battle must show her employer took actions that would deter a reasonable person from exercising First Amendment rights. The trial court concluded that the warning given to nurses regarding job termination did not constitute negative employment action, and while there were claims of "cold shoulder treatment," such conduct was deemed reasonable. However, the appellate court identified factual disputes regarding retaliatory actions, indicating that summary judgment was inappropriate since it could not definitively determine if Battle experienced adverse employment actions.
Additionally, the court addressed the issue of qualified immunity raised by the Appellees. Battle argued the trial court abused its discretion by allowing this defense, claiming it was introduced late, causing her prejudice. The court found that the Appellees had consistently asserted qualified immunity in their original and amended answers, and the trial court's order for supplemental briefs encompassed multiple issues, not solely qualified immunity. The doctrine protects government officials from liability unless they violate clearly established rights. The evaluation of qualified immunity claims follows a specific three-part procedure.
The court must first ascertain if a constitutional violation occurred, then evaluate if the violated right was clearly established and known to a reasonable person, and finally assess if the plaintiff has provided adequate factual support and evidence to show that the official's actions were objectively unreasonable regarding the established rights. The U.S. Supreme Court clarified in Pearson v. Callahan that these questions can be addressed in any order deemed appropriate by the court. Once qualified immunity is raised as a defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendants are not entitled to this immunity.
In evaluating a constitutional violation, the court considers the allegations in the light most favorable to the injured party. The determination of whether a right is "clearly established" must be context-specific rather than generalized. The trial court concluded that the right allegedly violated by the defendant, Battle, concerning the "mini-pharmacy" policy was not clearly established. It noted that the resolution of qualified immunity often necessitates resolving factual questions. Summary judgment is inappropriate when factual disputes exist that affect the determination of immunity.
In this case, the trial court could not decide if Battle was acting within her official duties or as a private citizen, nor could it determine if her concerns were legitimate or if she was merely a disgruntled employee. These conflicting narratives create different contexts for assessing whether her speech was constitutionally protected. Furthermore, qualified immunity cannot apply if the defendants' actions were unreasonable in light of established rights. Due to these unresolved factual disputes, summary judgment regarding qualified immunity was deemed inappropriate.
Battle argues that the trial court improperly allowed Appellees to submit a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings after the dispositive motion deadline established by the Scheduling Order. While the trial court has discretion regarding scheduling orders, it did not abuse that discretion in permitting the motion. However, the court erred in granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which functions as a dismissal for failure to state a claim. In reviewing the motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences from the plaintiff as true, an inquiry treated as a question of law reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Upon review, the court found that Battle sufficiently stated a claim for relief, leading to the reversal of the trial court's decision.
The court concluded that the trial court did not err in considering the Motion for Summary Judgment or allowing Appellees to assert qualified immunity, but it did err in granting summary judgment due to material factual disputes. As a result, both the summary judgment and the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The costs of the appeal are equally divided between Battle and the Appellees.
