A boundary line dispute arose between Plaintiffs Melvin Quarles, Charlotte Quarles, Glen Hayden, and Cheryl Hayden, and Defendant June Walker, Jr. Plaintiffs claimed ownership of a fourteen-acre tract adjoining Defendant's land, which they believed was included in their property. They conducted a survey that supported their claim, prompting them to file a lawsuit against both Defendant Walker and Defendant Barbara Atkins Smith for breach of contract and to establish the boundary. In response, Defendant Walker asserted ownership through adverse possession, citing continuous payment of property taxes since 1948 and exclusive possession of the disputed land. The trial court ruled in favor of Defendant Walker, granting summary judgment based on the finding that he had indeed adversely possessed the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that the trial court's judgment was correct.
Walker’s parents possessed and occupied the disputed property exclusively prior to his own continuous use since 1948 for farming and cattle operations. The boundary line between Walker and the plaintiffs' predecessors, marked as “A” on a survey by Jack A. McAdoo, has been recognized and maintained since 1948 by both parties. An internal fence marked as “B” was not recognized as a boundary fence. Charlie Quarles, who leased the land from the plaintiffs' predecessors, confirmed that the recognized boundary line remained unchanged since he began leasing in 1992 and acknowledged Walker's occupation of the disputed area. No boundary disputes were raised until after the November 2005 McAdoo survey. A 1958 plat and historical aerial photographs from the USDA support Walker’s claim to the property. The plaintiffs admitted they had not claimed the disputed property since Walker's occupation began in 1948 and were unaware of any other claims. The trial court found the plaintiffs' response to undisputed facts untimely and granted Walker’s motion for summary judgment, concluding he had openly and adversely possessed the disputed property since 1948, thereby acquiring title through common law prescription.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Walker, stating that even considering the Plaintiffs' late responses, the judgment would still apply. Plaintiffs appealed this decision but did not contest the trial court's findings regarding their untimely filings. The court's order was finalized under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The central issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
The standard for reviewing summary judgment involves determining if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The review is de novo, with no presumption of correctness regarding the trial court's findings, and evidence must be viewed favorably towards the nonmoving party.
The trial court's summary judgment appears to be based on both common law adverse possession and prescription. The Plaintiffs did not challenge the court’s refusal to consider their response to Walker's undisputed material facts, which allows for the examination of Walker’s claims for judgment. Adverse possession acts as a limitation on property recovery and can confer title after 20 years of continuous, exclusive, actual, open, and notorious possession. The policy behind this doctrine includes stabilizing boundaries, respecting apparent ownership, and ensuring land productivity. The burden of proof for adverse possession lies with the claimant, who must provide clear and convincing evidence of the necessary elements.
An adverse possessor can acquire title to land after holding it for twenty years, even without color of title. The Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment for Defendant Walker was improper due to his minimal use of the disputed property, specifically citing his 1997 timber cutting and vague claims of maintaining cows and growing hay as insufficient for establishing adverse possession. They reference case law indicating that occasional use, such as grazing or logging, does not suffice for adverse possession. However, the key point in Defendant Walker's favor is that the disputed property has been enclosed within his recognized boundary fence since 1948, with no challenge to his possession from the Plaintiffs or their predecessors for over fifty years. The court noted that fencing typically signifies ownership, regardless of any mistaken belief about property boundaries. The Tennessee Supreme Court has established that exclusive possession and use are presumed adverse in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, and the occupant's ignorance of a boundary issue does not negate the adverse nature of their possession. Given the longstanding enclosure of the property within the boundary fence and lack of ownership disputes, the trial court's ruling of common law adverse possession is affirmed, rendering the elements of common law prescription unnecessary for consideration.
Defendant Walker is not barred from claiming title to the disputed property under Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-110, which restricts claims to real estate based on failure to pay property taxes for over twenty years. Plaintiffs argue that they paid taxes on the property, thus preventing Walker's claim; however, Walker disputes this and contends that Plaintiffs cannot use section 28-2-110 as a defense because it was not included in their pleadings. The court finds the statute inapplicable, noting it aims to facilitate tax collection and should not impede adverse possession claims when the property in question is relatively small compared to the total land owned by the parties and both have paid taxes on their respective properties. The disputed fourteen-acre property is considered small compared to the over 150 acres of undisputed land. The timeline indicates that the issue of property boundaries arose only after the Plaintiffs purchased the land. Consequently, the court affirms the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Defendant Walker, ruling that he has met the requirements for common law adverse possession. All remaining issues are set aside, and costs of the appeal are assigned to the Appellants.
