Patrick Trawick was convicted by a Shelby County jury of premeditated first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault, resulting from the death of his estranged girlfriend, Tujauna Smith, and the assault of her companion, Darryl Turner. The jury sentenced Trawick to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder, with concurrent six-year sentences for the aggravated assaults, served consecutively to the murder sentence. Trawick appealed the trial court’s decisions, claiming errors in (1) the refusal to recuse the judge, (2) the admission of his prior rape conviction for impeachment, (3) the admission of crime scene photographs, and (4) the failure to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of murder. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgments.
Turner testified that he began dating the victim shortly before her death and described the Defendant's displeasure with their relationship. On the day before the incident, Trawick confronted Smith about their daughter. On September 30, 2002, Smith picked Turner up for dinner, but was pursued by Trawick, who shot at them during the chase. After Smith crashed the car while attempting to evade Trawick, Turner escaped and reached the police precinct to report the incident, only to learn shortly thereafter that Smith had been killed in a shooting nearby.
Mr. Turner identified the Defendant as the individual who chased and shot at him after providing a full statement to the police. While both were incarcerated, the Defendant claimed he never intended to harm Mr. Turner and asked him not to testify, citing his issue was with the deceased victim. Mr. Turner felt compelled to testify because the victim had saved his life. Ranelle Duncan, the victim’s cousin, testified that the victim had just turned nineteen and had two young daughters, with the Defendant being the father of the younger child. She noted the victim had moved in with her weeks before her death and described arguments between the victim and Defendant as minor. A week prior to the victim’s death, the Defendant visited Duncan’s home to drop off diapers and expressed frustration over the victim’s absence, stating, "she's going to make me kill her," which Duncan did not take seriously.
Witness Raymond E. Williamson, an assistant manager at the gas station where the murder occurred, testified he saw the victim and Defendant arguing before the incident. He observed the Defendant enter the store with a chrome-plated .45 caliber handgun, aggressively confront the victim, and pistol-whip her. Williamson activated the panic button as the situation escalated. The victim attempted to escape but was shot multiple times by the Defendant, who then fled the scene. Williamson confirmed that the entire incident was captured on video surveillance, which was shown to the jury. Another employee, Rodney Middlebrook, also recounted seeing the Defendant pistol-whip the victim and hearing gunshots as he escaped the store.
Torrance Holmes, a customer at a gas station, witnessed an altercation where two cars arrived at high speed. He observed the Defendant confront the victim, expressing anger over her association with another man and questioning if their child was in her car. The Defendant threatened to kill the victim and pursued her into the store, where Holmes witnessed him choke and pistol-whip her. After the victim fled to the back, the Defendant shot her before checking her car for the child and leaving the scene. Holmes, trained in CPR, found the victim unresponsive and bloodied. Rodarius Ellis corroborated Holmes' account, stating he also saw the Defendant follow the victim into the store and shoot her, and returned to help after initially attempting to leave.
Officer Patrick Taylor, responding to a shooting report, initially thought it was a false alarm until directed to the victim's body by the store clerk. He secured the scene and called for medical assistance. Sergeant Connie Justice, the case coordinator, indicated that the investigation quickly focused on the Defendant, who was eventually arrested in May 2003. Cedric Thompson reported his car stolen prior to the incident and denied giving the Defendant permission to use it. A Mercury Mystique, found abandoned near the scene, contained a bullet linked to the victim, although no fingerprints were recovered from the vehicle. Officer Steven Ford confirmed evidence from the scene, including skid marks and a bullet retrieved from the store. Officer Shan Tracy completed a crime scene sketch and noted the victim's car keys were found in a pool of blood, with no shell casings discovered in the parking lot. Francis Donald Carpenter processed the abandoned vehicle for evidence.
A shell casing was found on the driver-side floor of a vehicle, with a bullet embedded in the passenger-side door, which shattered the passenger-side window. Although the driver-side window was also shattered, no bullet evidence was found there. It was suggested that the noise and force from firing a gun inside the vehicle could have caused this. TBI firearms technician Alex Brodhag confirmed that both the casings and bullets were fired from the same .45 caliber handgun. Dr. O’Brian Cleary Smith, former Shelby County Medical Examiner, performed an autopsy on the victim, revealing she suffered four gunshot wounds. The wounds included one that entered the top of her head, causing instant death, and another that severed her spinal cord, which would eventually be fatal. The other two wounds were survivable.
Witness Ms. Duncan testified about the Defendant's anger towards the victim for not being home and recalled a threatening comment made by the Defendant, though she initially did not take it seriously. She described the Defendant as jealous and disappointed. The jury convicted the Defendant of premeditated first-degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault, finding one statutory aggravating circumstance: the Defendant's prior conviction for rape. The jury unanimously recommended life without parole as the appropriate sentence.
On appeal, the Defendant argued for the trial court's recusal, citing the judge's prior role as a Shelby County Assistant District Attorney and perceived bias during the trial. The Defendant did not request recusal during the trial, acknowledging this oversight but contending the judge should have recused himself sua sponte. The appellate court noted that the decision for recusal lies within the trial court's discretion and can only be reversed for clear abuse of that discretion.
A judge must recuse themselves if their impartiality could reasonably be questioned, as established in Alley v. State. Recusal is warranted when a reasonable person in the judge’s position would doubt their impartiality. A trial judge must assess both subjective bias against the defendant and whether impartiality can be questioned objectively. In this case, the defendant did not formally request the judge's recusal nor raise objections during the trial regarding alleged bias. Although the defendant refused to sign a waiver of disqualification, the trial judge stated he had no prior involvement or knowledge of the case from his time as a prosecutor. He emphasized that he had presided over the case without issues until the trial date. The judge's decision not to recuse himself is generally within his discretion and will only be reversed on appeal if there is evidence of abuse of that discretion. The defendant cited Rule 10, Canon 3(E) of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules, asserting that the judge should have recused himself; however, the defendant failed to specify circumstances that would warrant such a recusal and instead made general claims of bias based on adverse rulings, which do not typically indicate judicial bias sufficient to necessitate recusal.
The court found that the Defendant's argument regarding the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself was without merit and that there was no abuse of discretion. The Defendant contested the admissibility of his prior rape conviction as impeachment evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609, arguing that the trial court improperly balanced the probative value against its prejudicial impact, particularly given the violent nature of both the rape and the murder charges. The State maintained that the trial court's decision to admit the conviction was appropriate and, if erroneous, was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.
The trial court deemed the rape conviction relevant as it reflected on the Defendant's moral character, establishing it as a crime of moral turpitude, and stated that allowing the Defendant to testify solely subject to a less severe conviction would be unfair. The court ruled that the probative value of the rape conviction outweighed any prejudicial effects, especially since the Defendant chose not to testify, which he attributed to this ruling. During a motion for a new trial, the court denied the Defendant's attempt to present a full offer of proof regarding his intended testimony but allowed a summary by his counsel. The Defendant's intended testimony would have detailed a tumultuous relationship with the victim, difficulties in seeing their daughter, and circumstances surrounding the victim's death, including claims of provocation leading to his actions. Under Rule 609(a)(3), the trial court must assess whether the probative value of a prior conviction on credibility surpasses its prejudicial effects before admission.
A trial court's decision can only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. In evaluating whether a prior conviction's probative value on credibility outweighs its prejudicial impact, the court should consider the relevance of the conviction and its similarity to the current charges. A prior rape conviction may be admissible for impeachment under Rule 609, and prior convictions do not require exclusion merely because they involve similar crimes. However, if the offenses are closely related, the prejudicial effect must be scrutinized more closely. In this case, the trial court deemed the Defendant's prior rape conviction a crime of moral turpitude, relevant to credibility, and concluded that its probative value surpassed any potential unfair prejudice, thus not abusing its discretion.
Regarding the admission of photographs of the deceased victim, the Defendant argued they were excessively inflammatory and unnecessary. The State countered that the photographs were relevant to the crime scene and the victim's attempt to escape. The trial court's discretion in admitting evidence, including potentially gruesome photographs, is upheld unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless its prejudicial impact significantly outweighs its probative value. Ultimately, the court agreed with the State that the photographs were not excessively graphic and relevant to the trial, affirming that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting them.
The trial court has increased discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, as highlighted in the case involving crime scene photographs which illustrate the victim's injuries and the circumstances of the crime. The photographs, showing the victim's body, nearby shell casings, and the victim's attempted escape, are relevant to demonstrating the Defendant's actions during the assault. The court found the images not excessively gruesome, thus upholding their admission.
The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on all lesser included offenses of first-degree murder. Although the State acknowledges the omission, it argues that the error was harmless given the jury's verdict of premeditated first-degree murder. The Defendant had specifically requested instructions on several lesser offenses, but the trial court only provided instructions on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter, claiming insufficient evidence for the other lesser charges.
A defendant has a constitutional right to instructions on all lesser included offenses, and the analysis of whether the trial court erred includes determining if the offenses are indeed lesser included, if evidence supports such instructions, and if the failure to instruct constitutes harmless error. The court recognizes reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide as lesser included offenses of first-degree murder. The evaluation involves whether reasonable evidence exists for a lesser offense and whether this evidence is sufficient when viewed favorably towards that lesser offense.
In this case, criminally negligent homicide requires a substantial and unjustifiable risk awareness, while reckless homicide involves conscious disregard of such risk. Evidence indicates the Defendant approached the victim with intent to assault, which plays a critical role in determining the necessity of lesser included offense instructions.
The Defendant shot at the victim's vehicle and pursued her into a Mapco station, where he physically assaulted her by grabbing and pistol-whipping her. He ultimately trapped her and shot her to death at the store's back room doorway. The court upheld the trial court's decision not to provide instructions on criminally negligent homicide or reckless homicide, determining that the evidence did not support such instructions. Additionally, the court referenced precedent stating that a jury's guilty verdict for the highest offense excludes lesser offenses, making any failure to instruct on lesser included offenses harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury's conviction of the Defendant for premeditated first-degree murder implied a rejection of all lesser offenses. Consequently, the Defendant is not entitled to relief for the alleged error, and the trial court's judgments are affirmed.
