Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 2, 1952; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Black articulated the Court's opinion regarding the constitutional authority of the President to issue an executive order for the seizure and operation of the nation’s steel mills. The steel mill owners contended that the President's order constituted lawmaking, a power reserved for Congress. The Government defended the action as a necessary response to avert a national emergency due to an impending strike by steelworkers, which threatened steel production critical to national defense.
The dispute began in late 1951 and escalated when the United Steelworkers of America announced intentions to strike, prompting the President to refer the issue to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board after unsuccessful negotiations. As a strike loomed, the President issued Executive Order 10340, directing the Secretary of Commerce to take control of most steel mills. The Secretary's orders required mill owners to operate under federal regulations. Following this, the President communicated his actions to Congress, which did not respond.
The affected companies challenged the legality of the seizure in District Court, arguing it lacked congressional authorization or constitutional backing. The Government claimed the President had "inherent power" to act in the face of a national emergency and contended that the companies failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or inadequate legal remedies. The District Court ruled against the Government, issuing a preliminary injunction that restrained the Secretary from enforcing the seizure under Executive Order 10340.
The Court of Appeals stayed the District Court’s injunction, prompting the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on May 3, with arguments set for May 12. Two key issues emerged: whether the constitutional validity of the President’s order should be determined at this preliminary stage and whether the seizure order falls within the President’s constitutional powers. It is argued that the District Court could have denied the preliminary injunction on non-constitutional grounds, specifically that the seizure did not cause irreparable harm and that adequate legal remedies were available for any damages. The Government contends that the companies could recover full compensation for unlawful seizures in the Court of Claims, although prior cases suggest doubts about such recoveries for properties taken unlawfully for public use. The District Court believed the constitutional question was ripe for decision, agreeing with the notion that the President’s authority to issue the order must derive from either Congress or the Constitution. However, there is no explicit statutory authorization for the President’s actions, and the Government admits that applicable statutory conditions were not met. Previous congressional actions, specifically during the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act discussions, indicated a rejection of seizure as a method to resolve labor disputes, suggesting a deliberate choice against such measures.
The plan aimed to resolve labor disputes through mediation, conciliation, investigations, and public reporting, with temporary injunctions allowed for cooling-off periods. If these methods failed, unions could strike following a secret employee vote on employer settlement offers. The President's authority to issue the order in question must derive from the Constitution, yet no explicit constitutional language grants such power. Instead, the argument is that presidential power can be implied from various constitutional provisions, particularly Article II, which vests executive power in the President and mandates the faithful execution of laws.
However, the order cannot be justified as a military action under the President's role as Commander in Chief, as past cases supporting military authority in war do not apply here. The Constitution grants the President the responsibility to execute laws but does not empower him to make laws, which is reserved for Congress as stated in Article I. The President's order directs the implementation of a presidential policy rather than executing a congressional mandate. The order articulated reasons for the proposed policies, resembling a statute, and authorized officials to implement regulations. While Congress possesses the authority to create public policies, including regulations on labor relations and property use, this legislative power is independent of presidential or military oversight. Furthermore, historical instances of past Presidents seizing private enterprises without congressional approval do not validate the current order's legality.
Congress retains its exclusive constitutional authority to enact laws necessary to fulfill the powers granted by the Constitution to the U.S. Government and its officers, regardless of circumstances. Historical concerns about power and freedom affirm that the seizure order in question cannot be upheld. The District Court's judgment is affirmed. Justice Frankfurter concurs with Justice Black's opinion, emphasizing that while views on the separation of powers may differ in emphasis, the expression of individual opinions in reaching a consensus is vital.
An executive order issued by the President on December 16, 1950, declared a national emergency due to military engagements in Korea and the need for rapid enhancement of national defense. Steel is deemed crucial for military operations and essential programs, such as those of the Atomic Energy Commission. A labor dispute between steel companies and the United Steel Workers of America has led to a strike that threatens national defense. To ensure the uninterrupted supply of steel during this emergency, the President is authorized to take possession of and operate the companies' facilities as necessary.
The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to take possession of specified plants, facilities, and properties for national defense purposes, as deemed necessary. He may operate these properties directly or designate others to assist, with full cooperation from federal agencies. The Secretary will set terms for employment at these facilities, acknowledging workers' rights to collective bargaining, provided such activities do not disrupt operations. Management of the affected properties will continue normal functions, including financial transactions, unless directed otherwise by the Secretary. Existing rights and obligations of the companies will remain intact, allowing for regular payments like dividends and interest. If the Secretary determines that continued possession is unnecessary for national defense, he will return the properties to their original companies. The Secretary is also empowered to issue regulations to implement this order and can delegate his functions as needed. This order was issued by Harry S. Truman on April 8, 1952.
