Michael Todd Highfill v. Heather (Highfill) Moody

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2009-01715-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; May 25, 2010; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Michael Todd Highfill appealed a decision from the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, regarding his petition to enroll and modify a foreign child visitation and support decree from Arkansas. Highfill sought to modify the Arkansas decree after alleging that all parties had become residents of Shelby County, Tennessee. However, Heather Highfill Moody contested the petition, claiming she was still a resident of Arkansas, thus asserting that Arkansas retained exclusive jurisdiction.

The Tennessee Court found that both the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act applied to the case. The trial court erred in its determination that Moody was residing in Arkansas at the time the petition was filed, which affected jurisdiction. Consequently, the Tennessee Court ruled that it had the jurisdiction to modify the Arkansas decree regarding child support and custody. The trial court's dismissal of Highfill's petition was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Mr. Highfill contended that the Arkansas Court lost jurisdiction over his divorce and child support case, claiming that jurisdiction transferred to the Tennessee Court. He petitioned the Tennessee Court to enroll the Arkansas divorce decree and modify child support according to Tennessee guidelines, including a request for Ms. Moody to pay for their child's private school tuition, and to adjust the visitation schedule based on his proposed parenting plan. Ms. Moody countered, asserting her residency in Arkansas and arguing that the Arkansas Court retained exclusive jurisdiction, urging the Tennessee Court to reject Mr. Highfill's petition.

On May 29, 2009, the Tennessee Court issued an order to enroll the Arkansas decree but bifurcated the issues for a separate hearing on its enforcement, which took place on July 15, 2009. The Tennessee Court ultimately denied Mr. Highfill's petition on August 11, 2009, despite the previous enrollment order, citing the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) as governing the case. The Court found that Ms. Moody had been temporarily living out of state for work but maintained her residency in Arkansas, as evidenced by her nursing and driver's licenses. Consequently, the Court ruled that the Arkansas Circuit Court had continuous jurisdiction, preventing the enrollment and enforcement of the Arkansas decree by the Tennessee Court. Mr. Highfill appealed, questioning whether the trial court erred in denying the enrollment and modification of the Arkansas decrees, given that both parents and the child resided in Tennessee at the time of the petition. The appeal is reviewed de novo, with a presumption of correctness regarding the trial court's factual findings.

Affirmation of trial court findings is required unless evidence strongly contradicts them, unless a legal error is present, as stated in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo, without a presumption of correctness. The appellate review is confined to the record provided by the appellant, who must ensure it is sufficient for meaningful review, according to Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). In the absence of a transcript from the July 15, 2009 hearing regarding the enrollment of the Arkansas decree, a statement of evidence was submitted by Mr. Highfill, with no objections noted from Ms. Moody. This appeal centers on the Tennessee Court's jurisdiction to modify child custody and support orders from Arkansas, which is defined by the court's power to adjudicate specific cases based on subject matter jurisdiction, derived from the Tennessee Constitution or legislative enactments. Parties cannot grant subject matter jurisdiction to a court through actions like consent or silence. The determination of subject matter jurisdiction depends on the nature of the case and the relief sought. The Tennessee Court identified the applicability of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) instead of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) for this case. Mr. Highfill's petition requested both enrollment of the Arkansas decree and modifications to visitation and support. The court will assess whether it erred in applying UIFSA for jurisdiction in enrolling or modifying the Arkansas order. The UCCJEA, established in 1997, provides specific standards for initial child custody determinations to receive full faith and credit nationwide, outlines the criteria for modifying another state's custody order, and details expedited enforcement procedures. Under the UCCJEA, a court must first determine if the original state retains exclusive jurisdiction before modifying its custody order, as per Tenn. Code Ann. 36-6-218(1), (2).

The UCCJEA jurisdiction analysis involves a three-step process. First, a court must determine if the court that made the initial custody ruling has lost jurisdiction. Subsequently, the court assesses whether it has jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination based on the circumstances of the case. Finally, if jurisdiction is established, the court must evaluate whether it should decline to exercise its modification jurisdiction based on specific grounds in the UCCJEA. According to Tenn. Code Ann. 36-6-218, modification of a custody determination from another state is not permitted unless the initial state has lost its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction or a more convenient forum is found in the modifying state. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction is lost if either the state finds that neither the child nor any associated parties maintain a significant connection to it or if a court determines that all parties have moved out of the state. The modification state can assert jurisdiction if it verifies that all parties have relocated. Additionally, the UIFSA governs the establishment and modification of support orders across state lines, emphasizing the principle that only one valid support order can exist at a time, maintaining that the issuing state retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction unless it relinquishes it.

Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), the issuing tribunal maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order unless specific conditions are met. According to Tenn. Code Ann. 36-5-2205, a tribunal in Tennessee has this jurisdiction if at least one party (the obligor, obligee, or child) resides in the state, or if all parties have consented in writing to modify the order in a different state. Arkansas law mirrors this provision. The comments to the Tennessee statute clarify that if one party or the child remains in the issuing state, jurisdiction is retained, allowing for modifications regardless of which party has left. Conversely, jurisdiction is lost if all relevant individuals permanently leave the issuing state, as there would be no connection justifying the state's authority to modify the order. 

Tenn. Code Ann. 36-5-2611 (a) details how a Tennessee court can modify a child support order from another state, noting that this can only occur if the child, obligee, and obligor do not reside in the issuing state, or if one party is subject to the court's jurisdiction and all parties consent to modification. Therefore, a Tennessee court cannot modify an out-of-state child support order unless the original state has lost its jurisdiction or there is written consent from the parties involved. The court emphasizes the importance of distinguishing custody issues from child support matters, stating that UIFSA governs interstate jurisdictional questions related to child support and parentage.

Interstate jurisdictional issues regarding child custody and visitation are governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) as established in Tennessee Code Annotated. In the case of Mr. Highfill, who filed a petition to modify both child visitation and child support, both the UCCJEA and UIFSA are relevant. The trial court incorrectly concluded that only UIFSA applied to the jurisdictional issue. Despite this error, the appellate court noted it is permissible to uphold a correct judgment even if based on erroneous reasoning. The trial court declined jurisdiction based on the belief that Ms. Moody resided in Arkansas. Both the UCCJEA and UIFSA maintain that a court cannot modify orders from another state unless that state has lost exclusive jurisdiction, which occurs when neither the child nor the parents reside in the issuing state. The statutes require that both parents (or anyone acting as a parent) and the child must not reside in the state that issued the original orders for a Tennessee court to gain subject matter jurisdiction for modifications. The determination of residency is pivotal, and since neither act defines "reside," the interpretation will rely on official comments, case law, and other legal sources.

A state loses its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over a child custody case when a court determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent no longer reside in that state. The relevant statutory language, derived from Tenn. Code Ann. 36-6-217 and the PKPA, emphasizes that jurisdiction ceases unless a modification proceeding is initiated, regardless of an individual's legal domicile status. In the Staats case, it was established that exclusive jurisdiction ended because the child had not lived in the issuing state for eleven months, and neither parent had lived there for several years. Similarly, in Arendale v. Arendale, the court found that jurisdiction was lost as all parties had moved to Mississippi, despite the mother's connections to Tennessee, such as property ownership and maintaining a driver's license and voter registration there. The determination of residence is based on actual living arrangements rather than legal domicile.

The Shelby County trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify its prior custody order due to the interpretation of "reside" under Tennessee law. The court referenced Comment 2 to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-217, clarifying that "do not presently reside" does not imply technical domicile. In the case of Jordan v. Jordan, the court examined whether the issuing state maintained exclusive jurisdiction under the UCCJEA despite neither parent nor the child residing there. The critical condition for Tennessee courts to modify a visitation decree requires that neither the children nor the parents reside in Alabama.

While Mr. Jordan is considered to have a domicile in Alabama, as he has no intention of permanently living elsewhere, the court determined his present residence to be Massachusetts, based on his own admission of "staying" there for work. The distinction between "domicile" and "residence" is emphasized; domicile refers to a place intended for eventual return, whereas residence is simply where one currently lives. This distinction is crucial for jurisdictional determinations in custody cases. The evidence confirmed that Mr. Jordan resided in Massachusetts when the action commenced, supporting the conclusion that the trial court in Tennessee could not modify the custody order.

Mr. Garner clarifies the terms 'residency' and 'domicile,' noting that while commonly used interchangeably, they have distinct meanings. 'Residence' refers formally to a 'house,' while 'residency' aligns with a person's domicile. The Tennessee Court found that Ms. Moody resided in Arkansas, citing her maintenance of a nursing license and driver’s license there. Mr. Highfill contends that the trial court erred by focusing on these technicalities regarding domicile rather than the actual place of residence, which is critical for subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and UIFSA. Although Highfill is correct that the court's reliance on technical inquiries was misplaced, the court's decision also referenced 'laws of residency,' indicating a misunderstanding of the distinction between 'residency' and 'residence.' The court's assertion that 'residence is where you live rather than where you have your suitcase' is deemed only partially accurate; a person can have multiple residences and only one domicile, and intent alone does not establish domicile. Additionally, the record of the Tennessee Court includes testimony from Jina Gentleman, who stated that Ms. Moody resided with her in Memphis, Tennessee, from November 2008 to February 2009, without opposition from Mr. Highfill.

Ms. Moody borrowed furniture from Ms. Gentleman and paid $500 monthly without a written lease. She traveled frequently for nursing assignments across various states from April 2008 to March 2009 but maintained her nursing and driver's licenses, as well as voter registration and tax payments, in Arkansas. A "Residential Room Lease Agreement" dated February 1, 2008, indicates she rented a room in Maumelle, Arkansas, and she also rented a room in Memphis, Tennessee, at the commencement of the Tennessee court action on February 18, 2009. Although she had a residence in Arkansas, the determination of her residence at the time of the petition focuses on where she was physically located. The comparison to the Jordan case emphasizes that having multiple residences does not equate to residing in all of them simultaneously; thus, Ms. Moody's temporary assignments may have affected her current residence status.

The key issue is the residence of Ms. Moody at the commencement of the action. Although Ms. Moody held residency in Arkansas, her actual residence at the time of filing in Memphis, Tennessee, where she was served, indicates that she was residing in Tennessee. Therefore, Arkansas's continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under both the UCCJEA and UIFSA ended because neither Ms. Moody, Mr. Highfill, nor the child resided in Arkansas when the case began. 

For Tennessee to have subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Arkansas decree regarding child custody, it must first establish that Arkansas has lost its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, which has been confirmed since no parties were residing in Arkansas at that time. Secondly, Tennessee must meet the criteria for making an initial custody determination. According to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-216(a), this requires that Tennessee be the home state of the child at the time the proceedings commenced. The definition of "home state" is met as it is established that Mr. Highfill and the child had been living in Tennessee for over six consecutive months prior to the petition being filed. 

Consequently, Tennessee has the jurisdiction to modify the foreign decree under T.C.A. § 36-6-218. However, the inquiry continues regarding whether Tennessee is an inconvenient forum, a point raised in Ms. Moody’s brief.

The UCCJEA permits a court to decline jurisdiction if it identifies itself as an inconvenient forum, as outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-222. Specifically, a court may choose not to exercise jurisdiction if it determines that another state's court is more suitable. The issue can be raised by any party, the court itself, or at the request of another court. Prior to making this determination, the court must evaluate whether another state should take jurisdiction, allowing parties to present relevant information. Factors considered include: the child's residency duration outside the state, the distance between courts, the financial circumstances of the parties, any agreements on jurisdiction, the nature and location of evidence, the ability of each court to expedite the case, the presence of domestic violence, and the familiarity of the courts with the case's facts.

If the court finds it is an inconvenient forum, it will stay proceedings contingent on a prompt child-custody action being initiated in the more appropriate state. Ms. Moody argues that Tennessee is an inconvenient forum based on Mr. Highfill’s previous motion in 2005 to maintain the venue in Arkansas, which was denied. Mr. Highfill contended that the case's long history in White County justified retaining jurisdiction there for judicial economy. However, the current circumstances have changed since both the child and Mr. Highfill now reside in Tennessee, and Ms. Moody's residence in Arkansas is in Pulaski County, further weakening Arkansas's ties to the case.

At the commencement of this action, Mr. Highfill, Ms. Moody, and the child did not reside in White County, Arkansas, with the child having lived in Tennessee for several years. Given these circumstances, the Tennessee Court is determined to be the most convenient forum for the case. Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the Tennessee Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the Arkansas Court’s child custody and visitation order. 

Regarding child support, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) grants the state that issued a support order continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order. Tennessee Code Annotated (Tenn. Code Ann.) § 36-5-2205 supports this, while § 36-5-2613 allows Tennessee to enforce or modify child support orders if all parties reside in Tennessee, and the child does not reside in the issuing state. Since both Mr. Highfill and Ms. Moody resided in Tennessee at the time of the action, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-2613 applies, granting the Tennessee Court the authority to modify the child support order.

The conclusion reached is that the Tennessee Court has the jurisdiction to enroll and modify the Arkansas decree regarding child support and custody. The trial court’s previous order denying enrollment and modification is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, including the enrollment of the Arkansas decree and hearings on the modification. The costs of the appeal are to be borne by Heather Highfill Moody, with execution allowed if necessary.