State of Tennessee v. Edward Johnson

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2009-01372-CCA-R9-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; July 22, 2010; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Edward Johnson appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a warrantless search conducted by law enforcement on his properties during a manhunt for a fugitive. Officers approached Johnson's ex-wife, Joanne Johnson, believing they were still married, and sought her consent to search the properties. During the search, they discovered a marijuana laboratory, leading to charges against Johnson for manufacturing marijuana, possession with intent to sell, possession of drug paraphernalia, and maintaining a building for drug-related purposes. 

The trial court upheld the search, ruling that Joanne had common authority over the garage where the lab was found. Johnson contests this ruling, questioning both the validity of her consent and whether officers violated his rights by entering the property without a warrant. The appellate court found that while Joanne did not have actual common authority over the garage, the officers acted reasonably under the belief she did, thereby affirming the trial court's decision. Additionally, the court ruled that the officers did not violate Johnson's rights by entering the property prior to obtaining consent. The case is remanded for trial following the affirmation of the motion to suppress denial.

Officers discovered marijuana leaves in plain view while searching the garage/shop at 4501 Big Hill Road, prompted by the smell of raw marijuana detected by Officer Wilder. They subsequently obtained a search warrant for both 4501 and 4545 Big Hill Road, leading to the discovery of a marijuana grow lab, multiple plants, processed marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. The defendant and his ex-wife, Ms. Johnson, were arrested. 

The legal context involves the ownership of the properties: during their marriage, the couple owned both properties, but following their 2002 divorce, Ms. Johnson retained 4545, and the defendant retained 4501, as documented by quit claim deeds and county tax records. The properties are adjacent, featuring separate driveways and mailboxes, with Ms. Johnson's property encompassing ten acres and a house, while the defendant's includes thirteen acres, a shop/garage, a small shed, and a house where their daughter and son-in-law reside.

Detective Wilder believed both properties to be the Johnsons’ based on local knowledge and evidence from phone listings showing the couple residing at both addresses. After initially finding marijuana leaves, Ms. Johnson confirmed ownership of the shop when asked. Despite this, on cross-examination, Wilder acknowledged discrepancies in tax records that suggested limitations on Ms. Johnson's ownership claims. 

The defendant faces multiple charges related to marijuana manufacturing and possession. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, which the trial court denied, allowing for a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal that is now under review. The central issue before the court is the validity of the denial of the motion to suppress.

The defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing an error occurred during the suppression hearing. Appellate courts uphold trial court findings of fact unless the evidence suggests otherwise, granting the prevailing party the strongest view of the evidence and reasonable inferences. Credibility, evidence weight, and conflict resolution are determined by the trial judge, while legal applications to facts are reviewed de novo without presumption of correctness. 

The Fourth Amendment and Tennessee Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring warrants unless exceptions are met. These exceptions include consent, lawful arrest searches, probable cause with exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, stop-and-frisk, and plain view. Evidence from a search that fits an exception is admissible. Consent for warrantless searches must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and free from coercion. Courts assess consent validity by examining the totality of circumstances, with valid consent possible from individuals or third parties with common authority over the property. Common authority is defined as mutual property use by individuals with joint access or control, allowing any co-inhabitant to permit searches.

Valid consent for a search exists if either the consenting party has common authority over the premises or a reasonable person would believe they do. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence based on several points. First, he claims that Joanne Johnson's consent to search 4501 Big Hill Road was invalid. Second, he contends that even if valid, she lacked common authority to consent to a search of property owned solely by him. Third, he asserts that officers were illegally positioned when they detected the odor of marijuana since they should not have entered the property’s curtilage without exigent circumstances.

In asserting that Ms. Johnson did not give valid consent, the defendant highlights inconsistencies in officer testimonies that question their credibility. He notes uncertainty regarding whether officers searched the shop before consent was communicated and claims Detective Wilder did not confirm her ownership of the property but only asked to search "her property." The court finds these arguments misplaced, stating that it cannot reweigh credibility determinations made by the trial court and that consent was given prior to any search.

Regarding common authority, the defendant argues that Ms. Johnson's connection to the shop is insufficient for her to provide valid consent, emphasizing her lack of ownership and limited access to the building post-divorce. However, the trial court determined she had common authority based on her use of the garage for vehicle repairs and the involvement of her employee. The Supreme Court defines common authority as mutual use of property by individuals with joint access or control, and the court disagrees with the trial court's finding of actual common authority in this case.

An employee's occasional use of a shop for vehicle repairs does not equate to the 'common authority' as defined by the Supreme Court, which clarifies that such authority cannot be inferred merely from a third party's property interest. Specifically, Ms. Johnson lacked actual ownership interest or sufficient use of the property to establish authority. The State can prove common authority by showing that reasonable officers would believe the consenting party had authority based on the circumstances. This belief must be grounded in the facts available at the time of the search. If the situation is ambiguous and officers do not make further inquiries, warrantless entry is deemed unlawful. 

The defendant contends that ambiguity existed due to separate driveways, distance, and mailboxes, and that officers should have sought clarification on mutual use. However, Detective Wilder testified that he was familiar with the properties belonging to the Johnsons, supported by community knowledge indicating their relationship as a couple. Testimony from a neighbor further corroborated that the couple's marital status was uncertain, suggesting that community perception did not reflect any separation. Therefore, officers were not required to investigate ownership further when it appeared that both parties were co-owners. Ms. Johnson's affirmative consent to search was interpreted to apply to all properties associated with the Johnson name, validating the denial of the motion to suppress evidence.

Additionally, the defendant argues that the detection of marijuana odor did not justify the search, citing that the officer was not in a lawful position to smell it and that, while the odor might indicate probable cause, it did not alone warrant a warrantless entry without exigent circumstances.

The court expresses confusion regarding the defendant's argument about the trial court's reliance on the smell of marijuana as a basis for obtaining a warrant. The search was conducted with the consent of Ms. Johnson, not based on the odor detected by officers. The trial court’s remarks pertain to the validity of the search warrant, which is not the focus of the current appeal. 

While acknowledging that the curtilage of a home receives Fourth Amendment protection, the court concludes that the officers did not conduct a search of the curtilage but were present to prevent a fugitive's escape until consent was given. Even if the officers had entered with the intent to search, exigent circumstances justified their actions; specifically, the need to prevent a possible escape, as recognized by the Tennessee Supreme Court. As a result, the defendant's argument is deemed misplaced. The court affirms the Cannon County Circuit Court's decision to deny the motion to suppress and remands the case for trial.