Robin R. Rippy and Darrell Rippy v. Cintas Corporation Services, Inc.

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2010-00034-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; September 17, 2010; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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On July 14, 2010, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee upheld a jury's verdict awarding damages to Robin R. Rippy and Darrell Rippy following a motor vehicle accident on June 5, 2007, where Brandy Sefranek, driving a Cintas Corporation truck, rear-ended Ms. Rippy's vehicle. The Plaintiffs sued Sefranek and Cintas for injuries sustained and loss of consortium. The jury awarded a total of $94,637.29, which included both economic and non-economic damages. 

Defendants appealed, arguing that the jury’s award lacked material evidence and that the trial court made improper evidentiary rulings that prejudiced the jury. They also sought a new trial or a remittitur, claiming the verdict was excessive. The court found that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence presented at trial and affirmed the judgment. 

Key points from the trial included an incident report from Cintas, where Sefranek acknowledged responsibility for the accident and did not blame Ms. Rippy. The court's decision was delivered by Judge Richard H. Dinkins, with Judges Frank G. Clement, Jr. and Andy D. Bennett concurring.

Plaintiffs' counsel pointed out that the form in question did not state that Mrs. Robin Rippy was not responsible for the incident. Defendants' counsel requested to see the form, claiming it was necessary for their review. Plaintiffs' counsel indicated that the form was not provided to him. Defendants' counsel objected to the statements made by Plaintiffs' counsel, arguing that they were unfounded without the form's presence in evidence. The court ruled that Mr. Sefranek could testify based on his memory of the incident report he provided to Cintas, rather than requiring the actual document. The court found that the objection raised by Defendants was not supported by the record.

Additionally, Defendants challenged the admissibility of a photograph of a Cintas vehicle, asserting it was neither the vehicle involved in the incident nor similar enough to avoid confusing the jury. The court maintained broad discretion in determining evidence admissibility and would not overturn its decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Prior to testimony, the court indicated it would defer ruling on the photograph until the proper foundation had been established. 

Mr. Sefranek confirmed that Cintas has accident reporting procedures, which include submitting a written statement on a specific form after any accident, a process he followed in this case.

A witness, Ms. Rippy, testified that a photograph showed a truck "very similar" to the one that collided with her vehicle, and she noted no differences. The court admitted the photographs, clarifying to the jury that they depicted a similar truck rather than the exact one involved in the accident. The court ruled that the lack of identification of the truck in the photograph did not render it inadmissible, as the defendants failed to challenge its relevance or provide evidence of a different vehicle. 

The defendants claimed that hearsay testimony was improperly introduced, specifically regarding statements made by a police officer. However, the court clarified that statements made by attorneys during the trial are not considered evidence and cannot be classified as hearsay. The testimony of Mr. Sefranek, which involved recounting his communication about the accident, was also deemed non-hearsay, as it did not include statements from an out-of-court declarant. The defendants did not object to this testimony during the trial, leading to a waiver of their right to contest it on appeal.

Finally, the defendants challenged the jury's damage award, arguing it was excessive and not supported by evidence, suggesting it stemmed from passion or prejudice. The trial court's refusal to grant a remittitur indicated its belief that the jury's award was justified and backed by sufficient evidence.

The resolution of the case hinges on whether the evidence substantiates the jury's verdicts, as guided by Tennessee appellate procedures. Non-pecuniary damages for future pain, suffering, enjoyment of life, and permanent impairment are inherently difficult to quantify, and their valuation is entrusted to the jury's discretion. The appellate court does not assess the appropriateness of the award's amount but rather evaluates if there is material evidence supporting that the jury's award falls within a reasonable range.

Defendants argue that the $15,000 awarded for future pain and suffering lacks support, citing Ms. Rippy's ability to engage in prior activities and Dr. Schoettle's assessment that she would not require surgical intervention. However, Ms. Rippy testified to persistent pain in her neck and shoulders, corroborated by Dr. Schoettle’s prediction of ongoing symptoms, which collectively provide material evidence for the awarded amount.

Regarding the $10,000 for permanent impairment, defendants contend this is excessive since Ms. Rippy noted she is not severely hindered in daily life and her five percent impairment rating appears insufficient for such a sum. Nonetheless, damages for permanent impairment address injuries from which complete recovery is impossible. Testimony from Dr. Tigges indicated that Ms. Rippy would experience lasting negative effects from her injury, including increased neck stiffness and accelerated cervical degeneration. Both treating physicians confirmed her permanent five percent impairment rating and noted that no medical intervention could eliminate this impairment. Ms. Rippy also expressed her inability to perform overhead or repetitive tasks. The combination of her impairment rating and the medical testimony supports the jury's award for permanent impairment.

Defendants challenge the jury's $25,000 award to Ms. Rippy for loss of enjoyment of life, arguing it lacked material evidence since she claimed she could still participate in pre-accident activities. However, Ms. Rippy testified about difficulties such as interrupted sleep due to pain and her inability to perform household chores she once enjoyed, which supports the jury’s award. Additionally, her strained marital relationship due to the accident further substantiates the claim for damages. Regarding the $1,700 awarded for past loss of earning capacity, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to provide documentary evidence of lost wages. Nonetheless, Ms. Rippy’s testimony regarding missing 134 hours of work for therapy and her hourly wage of $13.04 constitutes material evidence supporting this award as well. Defendants also contend that the total recovery should be limited to $40,637, the amount requested by Plaintiffs’ counsel during trial. This argument is rejected, as the initial complaint sought a reasonable sum determined by the jury, and counsel's statements do not amend the complaint nor limit the jury’s discretion. The jury's total award aligns with the pleadings, court instructions, and evidence presented. The trial court’s rulings are affirmed, and the jury’s verdict of $94,637.29 is upheld.