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Robert G. Crabtree, Jr. v. Jennifer L. Lund - Concurring

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2009-01561-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; October 28, 2010; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

The case involves an appeal in which the Trial Court's judgment was vacated concerning the service of summons under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3). The primary legal issue was whether the plaintiffs intentionally delayed serving the summons to the defendant. The court determined that the plaintiffs had made some attempts at service, leading to the conclusion that the defendant did not meet the burden of proving that the delay was intentional. Judge D. Michael Swiney concurred with the vacating of the judgment but expressed concern that the opinion could be misinterpreted to require proof of an advantage for the delay to be intentional. He emphasized that the rule focuses solely on intentionality, irrespective of any advantages gained. Ultimately, the burden of proving intentional delay remained unmet, resulting in the vacating of the judgment, with the focus remaining on whether the delay was caused intentionally by the plaintiffs or their counsel.

Legal Issues Addressed

Intentional Delay of Service under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3)

Application: The court assessed whether the plaintiffs' delay in serving the summons was intentional, as required by the rule, and determined that the defendant did not meet the burden of proving such intentional delay.

Reasoning: The court found that the plaintiffs made some attempts to serve the defendant, leading to the conclusion that the defendant did not fulfill her burden of proving intentional delay by the plaintiffs.

Interpretation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3)

Application: Judge Swiney clarified that the rule does not require proof of any advantage gained by the plaintiffs to establish intentional delay, focusing instead solely on whether the delay was intentional.

Reasoning: He clarifies that the rule focuses solely on whether the delay was intentional, not the motivations behind it.