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Trevor Ford v. State of Tennessee

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2009-02434-CCA-R3-PC

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; October 8, 2010; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Trevor Ford appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition by the Shelby County Criminal Court, following his conviction for second-degree murder and a twenty-two-year sentence. He argues ineffective assistance of counsel at trial due to his attorney's failure to present evidence of the victim's specific violent acts, secure testimony on the victim's violent reputation, and pursue funding for a forensic pathologist. Ford also claims that the denial of funds for an expert during post-conviction proceedings violates his due process rights and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The appellate court, after reviewing the record and briefs, affirms the post-conviction court's judgment, concluding that Ford has not established grounds for relief. The factual background reveals that the incident leading to Ford's conviction involved an altercation with the victim at a bar, escalating to threats and a subsequent car ride where Ford expressed remorse after the altercation. The court previously upheld the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction.

Tammie Howard observed a gray car in her apartment parking lot around 2 AM on January 11, 2003, expecting her aunt. After hearing the horn and seeing the car's interior light, she noticed a man inside who later exited and wiped the car's exterior, revealing an arm slumped out of the vehicle. Frightened, she called her fiancé, Eddie Grandberry, who arrived and spoke to the man, later identified as the Defendant, about moving the car. Officer Ken Fox responded to a 911 call and found a deceased victim in the front seat of the car, which contained cash, marijuana, and a CD player. An autopsy by Dr. O.C. Smith determined the victim had been shot twice, with one bullet being fatal, and noted the victim tested positive for cocaine and had a blood alcohol content of .14. 

Defendant provided a statement to police, claiming responsibility for the shooting in self-defense during a struggle over a gun. He expressed remorse and stated he panicked after the incident. The Defendant did not testify at trial. Following his conviction, the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief on August 20, 2008, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds: failure to argue lack of probable cause for arrest, failure to suppress identification testimony, failure to subpoena medical records, failure to retain a forensic pathologist, and failure to present evidence of the victim’s past violence to support a self-defense claim.

Trial counsel's effectiveness was challenged on multiple grounds, including failure to investigate the case, inadequately preparing for trial, insufficient legal research, and lack of communication with the Petitioner. In a second amended petition, the Petitioner claimed trial counsel failed to argue that he underwent custodial interrogation before being read his Miranda rights. During the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner added claims that trial counsel did not introduce evidence regarding the victim’s violent reputation and inadequately cross-examined a witness, Tammie Howard. 

Witnesses Harry and Lisa Jarrett provided testimony regarding the victim's reputation for violence, describing him as a “thug” and “hood rat.” Both had informed trial counsel of the victim’s bad reputation prior to the trial. The State argued that the new claims were waived since they were not included in the original petitions; however, the post-conviction court allowed the amendment, reasoning that the record was sufficient to address these issues. Though the court did not specifically address the victim's reputation in its denial of relief, it acknowledged prior acts of violence as potential evidence supporting the defense's self-defense theory. Trial counsel, who had been practicing since 1982, testified that he reviewed all discovery materials related to the Petitioner’s case and provided the Petitioner with a copy.

Trial counsel met with the Petitioner frequently, conducting at least ten jail visits and numerous conferences outside of the courtroom, along with ten to twelve communications via mail. He did not seek funding for an independent forensic pathologist, believing the cause of death was clear and that he could not demonstrate a "particularized need" for expert services since he found the medical examiner's conclusions reliable. Counsel reviewed the victim's criminal history, which included multiple convictions and an assault charge, but did not thoroughly investigate the victim's past behavior beyond obtaining arrest records. Witnesses testified at trial that the victim threatened the Petitioner, with one stating she heard the victim say, “I’m going to kill you.” Counsel strategically focused on the victim's actions during the incident rather than his past, believing prior violent behavior would not affect the trial's outcome. The Petitioner and the victim were friends celebrating their birthdays at the time of the incident. The defense theory was self-defense, and although counsel encouraged the Petitioner to testify, he chose not to. The Petitioner claimed he met with counsel only eight to ten times during his four-year incarceration, provided information about the victim's past, and requested an independent forensic pathologist and interviews with his brother, which counsel did not pursue.

The victim exhibited violent behavior on multiple occasions, including a 2001 incident where he wrestled with a stronger man, subsequently returning with an assault rifle to threaten him. Witness Mr. Jones testified that the victim became aggressive when intoxicated but was not inherently violent. Mr. Huttig, another witness, described the victim as armed and noted his violent reputation as a drug dealer and heavy drinker. Both witnesses stated they did not communicate with trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, determining the Petitioner failed to prove claims of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the victim's violent history and the lack of a forensic pathologist. The Petitioner’s appeal highlighted two main challenges: trial counsel's failure to present evidence of the victim's prior violence and the failure to engage an independent forensic pathologist. The legal standards for ineffective assistance of counsel require proof of deficient performance and actual prejudice, which must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden lies with the defendant to demonstrate that counsel's mistakes altered the trial's outcome. The review standard for counsel’s performance is one of reasonableness, with deference to counsel's strategic decisions.

The court emphasizes that trial strategy should not be judged with hindsight, and any alleged errors by counsel must be evaluated based on the circumstances at the time decisions were made. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are assessed as a mixed question of law and fact, with factual findings reviewed de novo and legal conclusions receiving no presumption of correctness. The Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by ruling that trial counsel was not ineffective for not calling witnesses to testify about the victim's violent reputation and past actions. At the post-conviction hearing, four witnesses supported the victim's violent reputation, but trial counsel believed that the evidence from the victim's actions and the Petitioner’s statements were sufficient for a self-defense claim. The Petitioner did not inform trial counsel of any concerns regarding the victim's violence or suggest further witnesses, and the post-conviction court found trial counsel's strategic decision appropriate, aligning with the expected standards of defense counsel. The court also noted trial counsel’s belief that the victim's threats on the night of the incident supported the self-defense argument. The evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing was deemed weak regarding the victim’s violent nature, and the court will not second-guess a rational trial strategy. Additionally, the Petitioner’s admission that the victim was alive post-shooting and that he failed to seek help weakened his position. Therefore, the court concludes that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective regarding this issue and denies the Petitioner relief. The Petitioner also questions the effectiveness of trial counsel for not requesting forensic expert assistance to challenge medical findings, which remains unresolved.

Trial counsel's decision not to retain a forensic pathologist was deemed a sound strategic choice, supported by his satisfaction with the medical examiner's findings and the lack of evidence showing a “particularized need” for state funding for such an expert. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence during the post-conviction hearing demonstrating that forensic testimony would have aided his defense or influenced the trial's outcome. The court noted that neither trial judges nor appellate courts can speculate on potential witness testimony.

Post-conviction counsel's request for expert funding was denied by the court, which the Petitioner argued violated his due process rights and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. However, the Petitioner acknowledged that this argument contradicted established Tennessee law, which prohibits funding for expert services in non-capital post-conviction cases. Previous rulings affirmed that a petitioner must demonstrate the existence of an expert to substantiate claims about the potential benefit of expert testimony, and mere speculation is insufficient to establish a due process violation.

Ultimately, the court affirmed the post-conviction court's judgment, concluding that the Petitioner did not prove ineffective assistance of counsel and thus was not entitled to relief.