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State of Tennessee v. Lance Sandifer, Stephon Dante Cunningham, Tornita Crenshaw, & Glenard Thorne
Citation: Not availableDocket: M2008-02849-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; December 20, 2010; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
On November 7, 2006, the Davidson County Grand Jury indicted Tornita Crenshaw, Stephon Dante Cunningham, Lance Sandifer, and Glenard Thorne for multiple charges, including two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Crenshaw, Cunningham, and Thorne faced additional counts of facilitation to commit aggravated rape, while Crenshaw and Cunningham were charged with coercion of a witness. Sandifer was indicted on four counts of aggravated rape. The appellants were tried together in August 2008, resulting in various convictions: Crenshaw received convictions for robbery, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and coercion of a witness; Cunningham was convicted on two counts of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, facilitation of aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and coercion of a witness; Thorne was found guilty of similar charges as Cunningham; Sandifer faced multiple counts, including aggravated rape and attempted aggravated rape. Subsequent to a sentencing hearing, the court imposed effective sentences: Crenshaw (23 years), Cunningham (52 years), Thorne (52 years), and Sandifer (108 years). The appellants raised several issues on appeal, including insufficient evidence for their convictions, errors in sentencing, failure to merge certain convictions, denial of motions for severance, and issues related to courtroom procedures. After a thorough review, the court affirmed the trial court's judgments, concluding that the appellants' arguments did not necessitate reversing their convictions or adjusting their sentences. The opinion was delivered by Judge Jerry L. Smith, with Judges Thomas T. Woodall and Robert W. Wedemeyer concurring. The State of Tennessee was represented by District Attorney Victor S. Johnson, III, and others. In November 2006, R.N. and A.B. were roommates in a two-bedroom apartment that also housed a recording studio. On the morning of November 7, after receiving a call from Cortez Thorne, R.N. let Thorne and Tornita Crenshaw into the apartment around 5:00 a.m., waking A.B. who asked them to leave. They left but returned two hours later. Upon opening the door, R.N. was forced inside by Lance Sandifer and Stephon Cunningham, who were armed with a shotgun and a pistol. They demanded R.N. to unplug recording equipment for theft. A.B., awakened by a struggle, encountered Thorne pointing a gun at her and was ordered into the living room where she was robbed of her personal belongings. Sandifer commanded A.B. to undress at gunpoint; she complied after threats. R.N. was ordered to perform sexual acts on A.B. under duress, which included cunnilingus and digital penetration, while being threatened by Sandifer. Sandifer then used a mop handle to penetrate A.B. vaginally and anally, forcing her to perform self-penetration as well. Throughout the assault, Sandifer held a weapon, while the other assailants carried off recording equipment. Crenshaw watched and mocked A.B. during the assaults, also threatening her and demanding R.N.’s car. After the assaults, A.B. was allowed to dress, only to find R.N. tied up and beaten. Crenshaw coerced A.B. into leaving with them, citing threats of violence if she stayed behind. The assailants displayed a callous demeanor throughout the ordeal, laughing while they robbed the apartment. Cunningham and Crenshaw took A.B. to her car and placed her in the backseat while R.N. remained tied up in the apartment, overhearing an argument between Sandifer and Thorne about shooting him. R.N. managed to escape and called the police after seeking help from neighbors. Officer Kenneth Alexandrow responded to the scene, confirming R.N.'s account of a ransacked apartment. Detective David Achord investigated further, collecting evidence including a mop handle that contained A.B.'s DNA, indicating it was used in a more significant manner than just cleaning. Thorne was found at a hospital with a gunshot wound, where Detective Achord seized a PDA linked to A.B. Thorne and Sandifer followed Cunningham, Crenshaw, and A.B. to Cunningham’s aunt's house, where an injury to Thorne prompted a hospital visit. During this time, A.B. was coerced by Cunningham and Crenshaw, who made her pretend to be Crenshaw’s sister and attempted to manipulate her into staying with them. A.B. later faced further attempts to control her movements, including an incident where R.N. called her phone pretending to be Thorne, which Crenshaw recognized immediately. Crenshaw informed A.B. that R.N. had caused a situation requiring her to stay with them due to police involvement. At that time, Cunningham was driving A.B.'s car, which Crenshaw ordered him to pull over. Crenshaw then engaged the child locks on the rear doors, preventing A.B. from escaping. The group, including Kendre Howard and Tracy Phillips, intended to go to a hotel. Howard claimed to be "strapped," indicating he was armed, which alarmed A.B. Upon arriving at the hotel, A.B. was forced to pay for a room with her credit card. In the room, Howard propositioned A.B., but she refused, and he did not press the issue. A chair was positioned in front of the door, and someone kept watch throughout the night while A.B. tried to stay awake on the bed with Howard. The following morning, they took A.B. to a mall, where they demanded her ATM card and PIN. Howard and Phillips withdrew money from her account, while Crenshaw used some of the funds to accompany A.B. for a manicure. A.B. spotted a security guard but feared approaching him due to potential retaliation from her captors. After returning to Cunningham’s mother’s house, A.B. begged to be released. Although they considered letting her go, they were concerned she might contact the police. After promising not to call law enforcement, Cunningham allowed her to leave, during which A.B. staged a scene to retrieve her cellphone. Once free, A.B. contacted her best friend and parents, who called the police. Detective Achord met A.B. at a nearby Mapco, where she recounted her ordeal and consented to a rape kit examination. A.B. neglected to inform the nurse about an incident involving Sandifer, which resulted in no examination of that area. The rape kit tests yielded no significant evidence. A.B. later reported to Detective Achord that Crenshaw and Cunningham had been contacting her with threats and had taken a selfie with her cellphone during her captivity. On November 17, 2006, Crenshaw and Cunningham were found in a Nashville hotel room. In January 2007, a Davidson County Grand Jury indicted them along with Sandifer and Thorne on multiple charges, including several counts of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and witness coercion. The indictments specified incidents for each count, particularly detailing the involvement of Appellant Sandifer in the aggravated rape charges. The trial occurred in August 2008, resulting in convictions for all Appellants with varying sentences: Sandifer received 108 years, Crenshaw was sentenced to 23 years, while both Cunningham and Thorne received 52 years each. Each Appellant subsequently filed timely appeals. Crenshaw contended that the evidence was insufficient for her convictions and argued sentencing errors regarding mitigating factors. Cunningham raised issues about his motion for severance, sufficiency of evidence for certain counts, and sentencing errors. Thorne also argued for severance, exclusion of victims from the courtroom, the State's election of facts for kidnapping counts, evidentiary sufficiency, and sentencing errors. Appellant Sandifer contends that: 1) there was insufficient evidence for his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping; 2) Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 for aggravated rape should have been merged into a single charge; 3) his due process rights were violated when the trial court did not merge Counts 11 and 12 with Counts 1 and 2; and 4) sentencing errors occurred due to the trial court's failure to apply mitigating factors and imposing consecutive sentences. Co-defendants Cunningham and Thorne argue that the trial court wrongly denied their motions for severance, claiming that the evidence against them was significantly less compelling and that their defenses were mutually antagonistic to Sandifer's. They reference Rule 14(c)(2)(ii) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, which stipulates that severance should be granted if necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence. Case law indicates that the decision to sever is at the trial judge's discretion, reversible only if clear prejudice is demonstrated. The court must balance the rights of the accused with the prosecution's right to a joint trial for those charged with the same crime unless it would result in unfair prejudice. The supreme court notes that while antagonistic defenses may sometimes necessitate severance, they do not automatically warrant it; defendants must show that joint trials would lead to compelling prejudice. Cunningham and Thorne argue that evidence of the rapes was prejudicial and would not have been presented in their separate trials, yet they were both indicted for facilitating aggravated rape, complicating their claim. Thorne also asserts he was uninvolved in events following the assaults, as he was hospitalized. The excerpt addresses the arguments presented by the Appellants regarding their alleged lack of responsibility for especially aggravated kidnapping and the prejudicial nature of evidence presented during their joint trial. The determination of guilt lies with the jury, and the Appellants' claims are insufficient to demonstrate that the evidence presented was prejudicial, as it pertained directly to their charges of facilitation of aggravated rape and kidnapping. The Appellants assert that their defenses were antagonistic, which could necessitate severance; however, the presence of antagonistic defenses alone does not inherently cause prejudice in a joint trial. Appellant Cunningham contends that the defense strategies aimed to minimize each defendant's involvement and shift blame. Nonetheless, the supreme court has previously ruled that merely blaming co-defendants does not, by itself, establish prejudice. To prove prejudice, an appellant must show that it was so severe that a fair trial was impossible, which the Appellants failed to do. Testimonies from the victims indicated that all Appellants were present during the commission of the crimes, leading to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for severance, deeming this issue meritless. Appellant Thorne's motion in limine to exclude witnesses A.B. and R.N. was denied by the trial court, which Thorne argued violated his due process rights under Rule 615 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. This rule allows for the exclusion of witnesses but provides trial judges with discretion regarding its enforcement. The supreme court has noted that while Rule 615 allows for witness exclusion, it does not require it for all individuals, permitting the prosecution to designate a victim to remain in the courtroom. Thus, if desired by the prosecution, they may allow the victim to stay even if the defense invokes Rule 615. The court declined to consider the State's claim that Article I, Section 35 of the Tennessee Constitution overrides the sequestration rule for crime victims, emphasizing that constitutional issues are not addressed when cases can be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds. The trial court held a brief hearing on Appellant Thorne's motion to exclude victims A.B. and R.N. from the courtroom, where the State argued for their presence due to their victim status. The court concluded that the State's designation of the victims was permissible, and even if the trial court erred in denying the motion, such errors are subject to harmless error analysis. A.B. had previously testified multiple times, and Thorne could have cross-examined her on any inconsistencies. R.N. was called as the first witness and did not hear A.B.'s testimony beforehand. The court found no demonstrated prejudice to Thorne's case from the victims' presence, rendering this issue meritless. Regarding Thorne's motion for the State to elect facts for the aggravated kidnapping counts, the court affirmed that the trial court did not err in its denial. Citing State v. Adams, the court noted that the State is not required to elect offenses when the conduct is continuous, which applies to kidnapping as established in previous case law. On the sufficiency of evidence, the court reiterated that a jury's guilty verdict, approved by the trial judge, credits the State's witnesses and resolves testimonial conflicts in its favor. The presumption of innocence is replaced by a presumption of guilt upon conviction. The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate evidence insufficiency on appeal, and the reviewing court must determine if any rational juror could find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence for Appellant Crenshaw's convictions, the court must view the evidence favorably to the State, refraining from reweighing or reconsidering it. Appellant Crenshaw contends that insufficient evidence supports her convictions, arguing a lack of preplanning and citing her acquittal on rape charges as indicative of minimal criminal responsibility. However, the court notes that the crimes for which she was convicted—robbery, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and coercion of a witness—do not require preplanning. Evidence presented shows that Crenshaw was present during the crimes, brandishing a gun, demanding cars, holding a victim captive, and threatening the victim post-release, which sufficiently supports the jury's verdicts. Similarly, Appellants Sandifer, Cunningham, and Thorne argue that the evidence for their convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping is insufficient, claiming these acts were integral to the robberies and rapes, and thus should not be treated as separate offenses. Their argument, which hinges on due process, lacks a distinct explanation of how the evidence fails to meet the statutory requirements for especially aggravated kidnapping. The court notes that these appellants have not adequately demonstrated how the evidence was insufficient to uphold their convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping. Rule 27(a)(7) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that a brief must include an argument detailing the appellant's contentions regarding the issues presented, along with supporting reasons and citations to relevant authorities and the record. Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b) stipulates that issues lacking argument, authority citation, or record references will be considered waived. Appellants Sandifer, Cunningham, and Thorne did not adequately argue the insufficiency of evidence for their convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, leading to a waiver of those arguments. Regarding the convictions for facilitation of aggravated rape, Cunningham and Thorne contended that they were not aware of Sandifer's intent to rape the victims. However, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-403(a) does not require knowledge of intent prior to the crime, only that they provide substantial assistance. The court referenced State v. Grills, where a defendant was found guilty of facilitating rape despite her lack of prior knowledge of the crime. Evidence indicated that both appellants were present when Sandifer ordered A.B. to undress and that Thorne brandished a gun at R.N. during the assault. Additionally, they were noted to have laughed during the incidents, implying knowledge of Sandifer's intent. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could determine that both appellants provided substantial assistance in the commission of the rapes and upheld their convictions. Furthermore, the appellants claimed the trial court erred by not instructing on the natural and probable consequences rule. Instruction for prosecution of felony facilitation under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-403 does not require specific guidelines mandated for criminal responsibility under section 39-11-402, as established in State v. Richmond and State v. Howard. Appellants Sandifer and Thorne claim the trial court improperly failed to merge Counts 11 and 12 (especially aggravated kidnapping) with Counts 1 and 2 (aggravated robbery). Cunningham raises a similar argument regarding Counts 11 and 1. They assert that the restraint of victims was not excessive for the robberies, violating their due process rights as discussed in Anthony. The Tennessee Supreme Court determined that dual convictions for armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping violate due process if the confinement is “essentially incidental” to the felony. The court emphasized the need for narrow construction of the kidnapping statute to uphold due process rights. A trial court must assess whether the confinement exceeded what was necessary for the accompanying felony, considering if it limited the victim's ability to seek help, reduced the risk of detection for the offender, or increased the victim's risk of harm. The intent is to avoid unjust convictions for kidnapping when restraint is merely part of completing another crime, as reiterated in State v. Dixon. The analysis must ensure that the additional confinement or movement is significant enough to warrant separate charges. The supreme court clarified the process for assessing the legality of dual convictions for kidnapping and related offenses under due process. In Richardson, the court established that the two-part test from Dixon supersedes the previously used "essentially incidental" analysis from Anthony, which should not be applied alongside the Dixon test. This Dixon test is now the sole standard for future cases. In the case of Appellants Sandifer, Thorne, and Cunningham, evidence indicated that after the rapes of victims R.N. and A.B., R.N. was restrained with electrical cords and beaten by the appellants, who also contemplated killing him. The court found that the confinement of R.N. exceeded what was necessary to complete the aggravated robbery, as he had already been forced to unhook recording equipment and the robbery was nearly finished. The restraint prevented R.N. from seeking help and posed an increased risk of harm, corroborated by his severe beating and the intent to kill him. Consequently, the court concluded the actions met the Dixon test's criteria, affirming no due process violation related to the trial court's decision not to merge Count 11 into Count 1. For Appellant Sandifer, arguments concerning Counts 12 and 2, and references to the rapes of A.B. (Counts 4, 6, 7, and 8) were addressed, although specific charge numbers were not mentioned in his brief. Testimony revealed that after the rapes and theft of A.B.'s belongings, Appellant Crenshaw, armed, insisted A.B. would accompany them. A.B. was transported by Appellant Cunningham to a house where Appellants Sandifer, Thorne, and Crenshaw were present. Thorne was later taken to the hospital for a foot injury. During this incident, Sandifer told A.B. that he would have raped her if he had a condom. It was established that the rapes had been completed, and the robbery was either substantially or fully completed when A.B. was taken. Consequently, the trial court's decision not to merge Count 12 with Counts 2, 4, 6, 7, and 8 for Sandifer, or Count 12 with Count 2 for Cunningham, did not violate their due process rights. Sandifer contested the trial court's failure to merge counts related to his convictions for three counts of aggravated rape and one count of attempted aggravated rape. Despite this issue not being raised at trial, he argued on appeal that it constituted plain error. For plain error review, five factors must be met: clarity of the trial record, breach of a clear law, adverse effect on a substantial right, no tactical waiver, and necessity for substantial justice. The analysis must determine if there was a breach of a clear rule or substantial rights affected. To assess multiple convictions from a single incident, the court applies the Blockburger test, which checks if statutory elements of the offenses differ and if neither offense is included in the other. The court confirmed that the aggravated rape charges and the attempted aggravated rape charge share the same elements and evidence, indicating they would be considered the same offense under Blockburger, thus supporting the trial court’s decision not to merge certain counts. There is no requirement to compare the purpose of the statute since the situation involves one statute and a lesser included offense. The focal point is whether there were multiple victims or discrete acts. The relevant convictions include: Count 4 (aggravated rape of A.B. involving R.N.’s tongue), Count 5 (aggravated rape of R.N. involving A.B.’s vagina by R.N.’s tongue), Count 7 (attempted aggravated rape of A.B. by a mop handle), and Count 8 (aggravated rape of A.B. by her own fingers). There are no due process or double jeopardy issues with Count 5, as the victim R.N. differs from the other counts involving A.B., alleviating constitutional concerns. The discussion then shifts to whether the acts supporting Counts 4, 7, and 8 are distinct or part of a continuous assault. Appellant references State v. Barney and the test from People v. Madera, which considers whether an act is preparatory or facilitates the subsequent act. Key factors for determining the nature of the acts include: temporal proximity, spatial proximity, presence of intervening events, sequence of acts, and the defendant’s intent. Appellant Sandifer contends that the acts were one continuous assault with no interruptions, all taking place in the same location without any breaks or intervening events. He also disputes the penetration of A.B.’s anus, asserting it was merely an attempt. Appellant Sandifer contends that the acts constituting his charges should be treated as a single continuous offense based on factors such as temporal and spatial proximity, and the absence of intervening events or different orifices. The court disagrees, noting that while the charges stem from the same conduct, each charge is supported by distinct acts. Citing *Duchac v. State*, the court emphasizes that serial penetration of different orifices indicates separate offenses. Specifically, Count 7 involves anal penetration, while Counts 4 and 8 involve vaginal penetration. The court references *State v. Randall Ray Mills*, where differing forms of penetration were deemed separate offenses due to the defendant's intentional acts. The court concludes that the various penetrations performed by Sandifer, utilizing different objects, justify the trial court's decision not to merge aggravated rape and attempted aggravated rape convictions. Sandifer's arguments regarding due process and double jeopardy are rejected, as he fails to demonstrate a breach of law or substantial rights. The court finds no plain error in the trial court's actions, rendering this issue without merit. Regarding sentencing, the appellate court conducts a de novo review, presuming the trial court's decisions are correct, contingent upon proof that the trial court considered relevant sentencing principles and facts. When a trial court improperly applies mitigating or enhancement factors or fails to adhere to the Sentencing Act, the presumption of correctness for its sentencing decision is negated. The defendant is responsible for proving that the sentence is improper. In determining a sentence, the trial court assesses various elements: evidence from the trial and sentencing hearing, the presentence report, sentencing principles and arguments, characteristics of the criminal conduct, presented evidence regarding enhancement and mitigating factors, statistical information on similar offenses, the defendant's statements, and the potential for rehabilitation. The court must impose a sentence within the designated range, considering advisory guidelines that suggest the minimum sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense and adjustments based on mitigating and enhancement factors. However, the trial court has discretion in weighing these factors, and its decisions are upheld by appellate courts as long as they align with the Sentencing Act’s principles. The recent amendments to the Sentencing Act have made the guidelines advisory rather than binding, removing the requirement for appellate review of the factor weighing. Nevertheless, trial courts must still consider relevant advisory guidelines and document their reasoning for the specific sentence imposed, including the identification and evaluation of the mitigating and enhancement factors. The trial court's presumption of correctness fails if it improperly applies mitigating or enhancement factors, leading to a de novo review, as established in Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345. Appellant Crenshaw contends that her twenty-three-year sentence is erroneous due to the trial court's failure to adequately weigh three mitigating factors: her minor role in the offense, her voluntary release of the victims, and the duress under which she acted. Additionally, she argues that the court undervalued her youth and mental condition while improperly applying enhancement factor (10), which concerns the defendant's disregard for human life risk. The trial court maintains that the weight assigned to these factors is not grounds for reversal, as mitigating factors are advisory. It also clarifies that enhancement factor (10) is applicable when the risk to human life is not limited to the victim, which the court justified based on Crenshaw's violent actions during the offense. Although she correctly notes that this factor generally applies when the risk to others is distinct from the victim, the court found that her possession of a firearm posed a risk to her co-defendants present in the apartment. Consequently, the court concludes that Crenshaw's challenges regarding the application of mitigating and enhancement factors lack merit, affirming that there is no basis for reversing the trial court's sentencing decisions. Appellant Sandifer similarly argues against the trial court's failure to apply two requested mitigating factors, but the specifics of her claims were not detailed in this excerpt. The defendant, Appellant Thorne, contends that the trial court erred by not applying specific mitigating factors during sentencing, including his youth and a mental condition that diminished his culpability. The trial court did recognize factor (13) based on his allocution but assigned it minimal weight. The court adhered to sentencing principles, resulting in a presumption of correctness for the imposed sentence. Mitigating and enhancement factors are deemed advisory, and a failure to adjust a sentence based on these factors does not warrant a sentence modification. Thorne also challenges the application of enhancement factors (2) and (9), arguing insufficient evidence for their applicability. However, the court found adequate support for these factors, noting Thorne's admission of intent to rob and possession of a weapon during the incident, including an instance where he injured himself with a firearm. Appellant Cunningham similarly claims the trial court failed to apply mitigating factors related to youth and unusual circumstances surrounding the offense, as well as factor (13) regarding the victim's choices during the crime. The trial court's adherence to sentencing principles establishes a presumption of correctness for the imposed sentence. Mitigating and enhancement factors are considered advisory, meaning a failure to properly apply them does not warrant sentence adjustment. Appellant claims the trial court incorrectly applied enhancement factors regarding leadership in the offenses and the nature of the crime. Specifically, the court noted Appellant Cunningham's leadership role in the especially aggravated kidnappings, evidenced by his actions during the incidents. However, the trial court’s application of enhancement factor (7), which relates to committing the offense for pleasure or excitement, was deemed unsupported as Appellant's presence and laughter during the assaults did not sufficiently demonstrate this motivation. Despite the inappropriate application of enhancement factor (7), three other enhancement factors were correctly applied, justifying the midrange sentences for each conviction and a maximum four-year sentence for the coercion of a witness charge. The issue regarding these sentences was found without merit. All four Appellants contended that consecutive sentences were improperly imposed. Tennessee law allows for consecutive sentencing if criteria in T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b) are met, including being a professional criminal, having an extensive criminal record, or being deemed a dangerous offender. The court evaluated these criteria in deciding on the appropriateness of consecutive sentencing. The defendant is convicted of multiple statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of minors, with consideration given to aggravating factors such as the relationship with the victims, duration of undetected abuse, nature of the acts, and the resulting physical and psychological harm to the victims. The defendant also faces additional sentencing for committing an offense while on probation or for criminal contempt, as per T.C.A. 40-35-115(b). When imposing consecutive sentences, trial courts must consider whether the sentence length reflects the seriousness of the offenses (State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708), and the imposition of such sentences is at the trial court's discretion (State v. Adams, 973 S.W.2d 224, 230-31). In this case, the trial court deemed the appellants as dangerous offenders, necessitating two findings from State v. Wilkerson (905 S.W.2d 905): that an extended sentence is needed to protect the public and that consecutive sentencing is reasonably related to the severity of the offenses. The trial court found that the defendants displayed little regard for human life and that the aggregate sentences were necessary for public safety. Specific findings included threats made by Crenshaw against the victim, Cunningham’s use of a deadly weapon during the assaults, Thorne’s possession of a handgun while the crimes occurred, and Sandifer’s attempts to hire someone to kill the victims. The appellants argue that the trial court's findings were insufficient under Wilkerson, and the court agrees that the findings lacked sufficient factual detail for each appellant. The Court may uphold consecutive sentencing if the Wilkerson determinations are made from the record on appeal. The trial evidence indicated that the Appellants conspired to rob R.N. of drugs and weapons, using subterfuge to gain entry into his apartment. Appellants Thorne and Crenshaw allowed Cunningham and Sandifer access, who then entered brandishing weapons. During the incident, Thorne held R.N. at gunpoint and forced A.B. into the living room, where Sandifer coerced her into undressing. Sandifer orchestrated multiple rapes of A.B., while R.N. was also forced to perform sexual acts. Crenshaw threatened A.B. and demanded both her and R.N.'s cars while smirking during the assaults. After the rapes, R.N. was tied up and beaten until unconscious. A.B. was held for over twenty-four hours by Crenshaw and Cunningham, who threatened her and stole from her. Following their capture, the Appellants harassed A.B. with threatening voicemail messages. The Court expressed shock at the cruelty and disregard for human safety exhibited by the Appellants, noting the dangerousness of their behavior. The evidence supported the need for public protection against such actions, justifying the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court, which were deemed appropriate relative to each Appellant’s culpability. Appellants Cunningham and Thorne claimed due process violations regarding the trial court's reliance on uncharged facts for sentencing; however, the Court found sufficient support for consecutive sentences through its own review, rendering this claim unnecessary to address. Ultimately, the convictions and sentences of all four Appellants were affirmed.