Douglas Jordan was convicted of second-degree murder in the death of Jennifer Byerley and sentenced to twenty-three years in prison. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Jordan later sought post-conviction relief, claiming that the state suppressed evidence favorable to his defense, violating his rights under Brady v. Maryland. The post-conviction court acknowledged the suppression of evidence but determined it was not material to the defense. Jordan raised several points on appeal, including the claim that the post-conviction court misapplied the materiality standard under Brady, that the suppression violated the Tennessee Constitution, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate adequately.
Upon review, the appellate court concluded that the state did indeed fail to disclose evidence that was favorable and material to Jordan's defense, which constituted a violation of his due process rights. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the post-conviction court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The facts of the case indicated that the victim, Byerley, who was deaf and mute, had been seen with Jordan at a bar prior to her murder, and her body was found later, showing signs of violence.
Ms. Roberts testified that during the victim's two-year patronage at the End Zone, she primarily associated with individuals of Mexican descent. Although she initially denied preventing the victim from leaving with them on the night of the victim's death, she later confirmed to police that she had done so. Ms. Roberts stated that the Mexicans left the bar shortly before the petitioner departed. In her police statement, she described the petitioner as having light brown hair and visible injuries from a recent car wreck.
Earl Horton, a bartender, recalled a conversation between the victim and the petitioner around midnight, after which the petitioner exited quickly, leaving the victim visibly upset. Horton followed the victim outside and confirmed with the petitioner that they were "fine" as the victim nodded affirmatively. Horton later observed scratches on the petitioner’s face two days after the incident, which the petitioner attributed to a skin condition.
Martha Gaston, an employee at a laundromat, recounted that the petitioner brought in laundry the afternoon following the murder, appearing sweaty and mentioning an accident. He pointed out blood on the sheets, which she noted was unusual and deep. Despite her attempts to bleach the sheets, the blood stains remained.
Detective Scott Carpenter, executing a search warrant at the victim's apartment, found no signs of struggle but discovered a crumpled note in the petitioner's motel room's trash. Nearby, officers seized bloody sheets, which were subsequently confirmed to contain the petitioner's blood. In a police interview the day after the murder, the petitioner claimed he had met the victim several nights prior and communicated with her through writing. He stated that he spent the evening of the murder at the bar with another woman and intervened to prevent the victim from leaving with another man, after which she declined his offer for a ride home.
The petitioner initially claimed that the victim left first and that he had finished his beer before exiting through the back door. He stated this was the last time he saw her but later acknowledged that she had been in his room that night after police found a note in his trash that he helped read. In the note, he expressed disinterest in a romantic relationship, stating he only wanted casual interactions. He described the victim as having followed him home and insisted she left after about fifteen minutes. When questioned about blood found in his bathroom, he attributed it to a prior car accident and denied any sexual contact or involvement in the victim's death. He agreed to provide samples for police analysis and consented to have his vehicle examined.
In a subsequent interview, he admitted to feeling angry with the victim on the night of her murder due to repeated conversations about their relationship but maintained he was not angry enough to harm her. He explained blood found on his sheets was due to a skin condition. In an August interview, he continued to deny any physical contact with the victim, disputing police claims regarding blood evidence. Detective Carpenter confirmed the petitioner cooperated fully with the investigation. Key facts established include the presence of the petitioner's blood on his vehicle, mixed blood on the victim's clothing, and the petitioner's DNA found under the victim's fingernails.
Deanna Jordan, the petitioner's father’s wife at the time of the murder, testified that the petitioner, who appeared to be under the influence of drugs, came to their home shortly after the murder. He was emotional and admitted to having done something terrible, stating he had injected illegal drugs fourteen times that day, and confirmed this when she questioned if that was related to the incident. Although he did not explicitly mention killing the victim, Ms. Jordan's testimony indicated he was distressed.
Megan Clement from LabCorp conducted DNA testing on evidence related to the case, finding no victim's blood on the petitioner's sheets. She noted that bleach could degrade DNA, and her tests from the victim's fingers revealed a DNA mixture consistent with both the victim and the petitioner, although she could not specify the source of the petitioner's DNA.
Dr. David M. Gilliam, who performed the autopsy, determined that the victim had been dead for three to five hours and attributed the cause of death to manual strangulation, despite the presence of a throat cut and blunt force injuries. He described the neck wound as consistent with a right-handed individual attacking from above.
Defense witness Sandra Scott recounted having lunch with the petitioner two days before the murder, noting his facial and bodily scars, which he claimed were from a car accident. Carl Anderson, a friend, confirmed seeing the petitioner shortly after this accident, describing him as injured. Mike Michaels, the petitioner's stepfather, recounted picking him up after the accident, where the petitioner had multiple cuts and bruises, requiring first aid for glass wounds sustained in the crash.
Sharon Monterrosol testified about her interactions with the victim and her boyfriend, Marco Villo-Gomez. She first met the victim in November 1997 and noted that the victim had a black eye. After Christmas of that year, Monterrosol overheard Villo-Gomez making threatening statements about 'killing her,' despite not naming the victim and being intoxicated at the time. Later, she heard him, in a drunken state, express intentions to harm the victim again. During cross-examination, she acknowledged Villo-Gomez's protective behavior towards the victim.
David Cockrill, the victim's neighbor, reported that she would occasionally ask to borrow money and often socialized with other residents of the apartment complex. He described the victim as unemployed, relying on Social Security disability, and noted her tendency to buy alcohol and cigarettes for others. Cockrill last saw the victim on the morning before her death and heard a disturbance that night involving a shouting male voice in Spanish and the victim making grunting noises.
The defense presented evidence of Villo-Gomez's prior guilty plea for assaulting the victim in October 1997, resulting in a sentence of nearly a year. In rebuttal, the victim's apartment manager, Gladys Horton, stated she questioned tenants after the murder, with none reporting unusual sounds. Cockrill, recalled by the defense, denied being questioned by Horton. Rhonda Gillespie, a close friend of the victim, testified that the victim and Villo-Gomez ended their relationship in early December 1997, and she had not seen him since then.
On appeal, the petitioner claimed that the evidence was insufficient, that the trial court made evidentiary errors, denied a motion for continuance, and imposed an excessive sentence. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The petitioner submitted a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on October 3, 2006, which the post-conviction court deemed a colorable claim, leading to the appointment of counsel. The final amended petition was filed on March 28, 2008, and evidentiary hearings were conducted on March 27 and April 2-3, 2009. During these hearings, the petitioner presented investigative documents from the Blount County Sheriff's Department.
Exhibit 6 included a June 23, 1998, Case Memorandum by Detective Scott Carpenter, which detailed a call from Alicia Holloway claiming she knew the murderer of Jennifer Byerley. Holloway alleged that a Mexican national named Alfredo confessed to the crime and showed her the murder weapon. Detective Carpenter investigated and found a knife matching the description in Alfredo's hotel room.
A follow-up memorandum dated June 24, 1998, detailed Carpenter's difficulties in locating Holloway, including the inability to verify her employment and the lack of a corresponding Tennessee driver's license. Carpenter concluded that Holloway's information was unreliable.
Additionally, the petitioner submitted a March 13, 1998, memo listing individuals interviewed by detectives, including Alfredo Rubio Vaesia, who denied knowing Holloway and claimed he was not in Tennessee during the relevant timeframe. A document summarizing investigative activities from March 17 to June 23, 1998, was also introduced, noting the recovery of a knife from Teresa Webb on April 9, 1998, by Deputy Doug Moore, which was subsequently processed.
On April 15, 1998, the writer met Teresa Webb, who guided them to the location where a knife was found near a white shed, approximately 3/10 mile northwest of the crime scene. James Brooks, the Assistant District Attorney in 2002, testified about providing open file discovery to the petitioner’s trial counsel, stating they reviewed the entire investigation file, including handwritten notes. Brooks indicated that he offered to assist trial counsel with any additional investigations needed. He praised trial counsel’s effectiveness in litigating the case. The petitioner, unaware of the knife until a post-conviction hearing, expressed confidence in his trial counsel and believed that a more thorough investigation of other suspects could have influenced the jury's decision. Detective Jim Widener, a member of the Criminal Investigations Division, confirmed that the lead investigator, Detective Scott Carpenter, maintained the case documentation and that an open file policy was in place. Trial counsel, representing the petitioner after previous counsel withdrew, did not recall being informed about the knife and suggested that a failure to disclose it would violate Brady obligations. He asserted that he believed discovery was being adequately provided without needing to request specific documents. Upon reviewing a March 13 case memo for the first time, trial counsel expressed concern over its relevance to the investigation and acknowledged its potential significance regarding arguments about the alibi of another suspect, Alfredo Rubio Vaesia.
The document outlines several key points regarding the legal proceedings involving Mr. Vaesia. It notes that Mr. Vaesia allegedly lied to law enforcement regarding his whereabouts and knowledge of the victim's murder. Trial counsel indicated that the state's failure to disclose a March 13 case memo constituted a Brady violation, as the withheld information could have aided the defense and been used for cross-examination of Detective Carpenter. Counsel expressed that the defense strategy was to demonstrate a lack of evidence against the petitioner. He identified multiple challenges, including incomplete document transfer from a previous attorney, difficulties locating migratory witnesses, and the loss of evidence over time, such as the destruction of the victim's apartment.
The document references the Brady v. Maryland precedent, which establishes that suppression of favorable evidence by the prosecution violates due process if the evidence is material to guilt or punishment. Detective Widener, called by the state, testified about a paring knife found near the crime scene, which was not tested and deemed unrelated to the murder. He acknowledged the knife's exposure to the elements made fingerprint recovery unlikely and clarified that he was not responsible for the investigation decisions.
On appeal, the petitioner raises four issues: the state's withholding of evidence, the post-conviction court's application of the Brady standard, potential violations of the petitioner's rights, and claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner is required to prove factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence, as stipulated in Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-110(f) (2006). The findings of fact made by the post-conviction judge are generally conclusive on appeal unless there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Courts do not reevaluate evidence or substitute findings but review legal conclusions de novo without any presumption of correctness.
The excerpt elaborates on the obligation of the prosecution to disclose favorable material evidence as established in Brady v. Maryland. The prosecution's failure to disclose such evidence violates due process if the evidence could materially affect guilt or punishment, regardless of the prosecution's intent. This obligation encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence, extending to all favorable information, irrespective of its admissibility at trial. However, the state is not obliged to disclose information already known to the defendant or not within the prosecution's control.
For a defendant to claim relief under this theory, they must satisfy specific criteria: (a) a request for the information must have been made, unless it was evidently exculpatory; (b) the prosecution must have suppressed the evidence; (c) the evidence must be favorable to the accused; and (d) the evidence must be material. Favorable evidence may include information that could exonerate the accused, support their innocence claims, or help in further investigation. Materiality is assessed based on whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed, without requiring proof that such disclosure would guarantee an acquittal. Ultimately, the focus is on whether the defendant received a fair trial.
To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the undisclosed favorable evidence could significantly alter the case's outcome, undermining confidence in the verdict. The cumulative impact of suppressed evidence should be assessed in the context of the entire record regarding the accused's innocence or guilt. In this instance, the petitioner alleges the state failed to disclose two specific pieces of evidence—the knife and a memo from March 13—which were both favorable and material. While the defendant's request for Brady evidence is acknowledged, the prosecution contended that it adhered to an open file policy, asserting it provided all relevant materials to trial counsel. Testimonies indicated that trial counsel understood he would receive discovery from the state. The post-conviction court did not explicitly find suppression of evidence but noted that the documents were apparently not disclosed to trial counsel, despite the prosecution’s claims of an open file policy. The state argues that the existence of this policy absolves it from the obligation to disclose Brady evidence, asserting that mere unawareness of evidence by trial counsel does not equate to suppression by the state. Although there is no constitutional mandate for a detailed disclosure of all investigatory materials, Tennessee lacks a definitive rule on whether an open file policy suffices to meet Brady obligations. Previous court decisions have leaned on materiality rather than suppression to assess Brady compliance, with some emphasizing the open file policy and counsel's access as factors negating claims of suppression. The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the potential benefits of open file policies but cautioned that defense counsel may justifiably rely on such files to include all constitutionally required disclosures under Brady.
The Sixth Circuit has established that withholding evidence in violation of an open file policy can significantly prejudice a defendant, as noted in United States v. Atisha. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit determined in United States v. Driver that merely opening files satisfied Brady obligations, although the defendant’s argument centered on the state's failure to further investigate rather than on undisclosed evidence. Following the reasoning in Strickler, it was concluded that the state’s open file policy does not absolve it of the duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to the defendant. The defendant relied on the state's assertion that all relevant evidence was provided, and testimony from defense counsel indicated unawareness of certain evidence, including a knife (Exhibit 9) and a memo from March 13, suggesting these items were not disclosed.
The court assessed the favorability of the knife and the memo. The post-conviction court ruled the knife was not favorable since it was not linked to the murder, while it found the memo could have been used to question the investigation's reliability. However, upon review, it was determined that the knife's location near the victim's body constituted favorable evidence that warranted further investigation. The case of Branch v. State highlighted a situation where the state failed to disclose evidence—a knife found at the crime scene—critical to the defendant's self-defense claim. The court ruled that the state violated Brady principles by not revealing the existence of the knife, as it constituted favorable and material evidence relevant to the defense.
Defense counsel could have conducted further investigation into the knife found by a citizen, which was delivered to police about a month after the victim's murder and located not far from the crime scene. The Assistant District Attorney General had a duty to inform the defendant and his counsel about the knife's existence, despite the police's failure to obtain the name of the person who turned it in. The knife was considered favorable evidence that could have led to exonerating the defendant or implicating another suspect, as well as undermining the credibility of the police investigation.
Materiality of the evidence hinges on whether it could reasonably affect confidence in the verdict. The inquiry involves a cumulative review of the suppressed evidence in relation to the entire case record. The court noted a lack of direct evidence of the defendant's guilt, with no murder weapon produced and no blood found near the defendant's residence or vehicle. Testimony indicated the victim had a dispute with a Spanish-speaking male shortly before her death, and evidence was presented that suggested the victim's social circle included individuals of Hispanic descent, while the defendant did not speak Spanish. However, two witnesses testified that the defendant was the last person seen with the victim prior to her murder, and he had scratches on his face the next day. Initially denying the victim's presence in his room, the defendant later admitted she had been there when confronted with a note indicating a disagreement about their relationship.
The defendant expressed anger towards the victim due to her persistent romantic advances. Forensic evidence linked the defendant to the crime, including his blood on the victim's clothing and his DNA found under her fingernails. Testimonies from witnesses conflicted, with expert analysis indicating the murderer was right-handed, while the defendant is also right-handed. Under the influence of drugs, the defendant made potentially incriminating statements. After the murder, he exhibited suspicious behavior by paying extra for same-day laundry service for bloody sheets. The jury favored the state's witnesses over conflicting evidence and found the circumstantial evidence marginally sufficient for conviction.
Concerns arose regarding the thoroughness of the police investigation, with the state suggesting it was reliable, a representation the defendant could not contest due to withheld evidence that might have been used to challenge this characterization. This withholding raised concerns about the trial's outcome, as it was only weakly supported by evidence, making any favorable evidence potentially material. Consequently, the court found all elements of a Brady violation present, necessitating a remand for a new trial.
The trial court's analysis regarding materiality was questioned, but it was determined that it did not improperly use a sufficiency of evidence standard. The defendant also claimed a violation of constitutional rights due to evidence withholding; however, this issue did not need resolution following the Brady violation finding. Additionally, the defense's argument of ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to uncover the suppressed evidence was rendered moot by the Brady violation. The court reversed the prior judgment and ordered a remand to the Blount County Circuit Court for further proceedings.
