Christa Gail Pike v. State of Tennessee

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2009-00016-CCA-R3-PD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; April 25, 2011; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Christa Gail Pike appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of her post-conviction relief petition after being convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The jury identified two aggravating circumstances: the murder was especially heinous involving torture and was committed to evade arrest. Pike was sentenced to death, and her conviction was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Initially, she filed a pro se post-conviction petition in 1999 but sought to withdraw it in 2001, leading to its dismissal in 2002. After litigation, the Tennessee Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of her petition. Several evidentiary hearings occurred between 2007 and 2008, resulting in the post-conviction court denying relief on December 10, 2008. In her appeal, Pike raised issues including the post-conviction court's alleged bias, ineffective assistance of counsel, her ineligibility for the death penalty, and the constitutionality of the death penalty itself. The appellate court affirmed the post-conviction court's judgment after a comprehensive review.

On January 12, 1995, at around 8:00 p.m., Iloilo witnessed the Petitioner, along with Slemmer and two other Job Corps students, leaving the Job Corps center. By approximately 10:15 p.m., the Petitioner and the two others returned without Slemmer. Later that night, the Petitioner confided in Iloilo that she had killed Slemmer, showing her a piece of the victim's skull and detailing the murder, which included cutting the victim's throat six times, beating her, and throwing asphalt at her head. The Petitioner recounted that Slemmer had begged for mercy but continued to be attacked. She described using a meat cleaver and a box cutter in the assault and stated that a pentagram was carved into the victim's forehead and chest. Iloilo noted that the Petitioner was dancing, smiling, and singing while recounting the murder.

The following morning, the Petitioner mentioned to Iloilo that she had the skull piece in her pocket, joking that she was having breakfast with it. During class, she similarly told another student, Stephanie Wilson, that the brown spots on her shoes were blood and displayed a piece of bone she claimed was from Slemmer's skull. The Petitioner further described slashing Slemmer's throat and indicated that blood and brains had spilled out.

On January 13, 1995, a University of Tennessee Grounds Department employee discovered Slemmer's battered and semi-nude body near greenhouses on campus. Initially mistaking the body for an animal due to its condition, he notified law enforcement when he recognized it was human. Police found the body covered in blood and dirt, with multiple cuts and slashes. Officer John Terry Johnson reported that the victim was face down, and upon turning her over, they noted her slashed throat and a bloody rag around her neck. The crime scene revealed signs of a struggle, including trampled bushes and drag marks, and expanded to a significant area with a large pool of blood found nearby.

Detective Donald R. Cook from the U.T. Police Department transported the victim's body to the morgue, where he observed a pentagram carved into the victim’s chest. Randy York, a criminal investigator with the Knoxville Police Department, began the investigation on January 13, the same day the body was found. On January 14, York interviewed the Petitioner and another individual, Shipp, at the police station. The Petitioner was informed of her Miranda rights, which she waived, leading to a detailed, tape-recorded statement spanning forty-six pages.

In her statement, the Petitioner described ongoing issues with the victim, Slemmer, claiming that Slemmer had threatened her. She stated that she had no intention to kill Slemmer, only to confront her, despite bringing a box cutter and a borrowed miniature meat cleaver to the encounter. The Petitioner invited Slemmer to walk with her to a music store, during which she mentioned having hidden marijuana. 

Upon reaching the U.T. agricultural campus, the Petitioner admitted to physically assaulting Slemmer, hitting her and slamming her head into the ground. When Slemmer threatened to report her, the Petitioner intensified her attack, kicking Slemmer and ultimately cutting her with the box cutter. The Petitioner described hearing voices compelling her actions to prevent Slemmer from reporting her. Despite Slemmer's attempts to escape and pleas for her life, the Petitioner continued to inflict harm, indicating a clear escalation of violence throughout the incident.

The Petitioner recounted a violent altercation with Slemmer, during which she kicked Slemmer in the face and subsequently cut her throat multiple times while Slemmer pleaded for her life. Despite severe injuries, Slemmer attempted to sit up and escape, prompting the Petitioner and an accomplice to physically restrain her and strike her with rocks. After Slemmer fell, the Petitioner continued to assault her until she observed Slemmer struggling to breathe. The Petitioner and her accomplice then dragged Slemmer's body to a secluded area near some trees, leaving it on debris and discarding Slemmer's clothing nearby. The incident lasted between thirty minutes to an hour, during which the Petitioner forced Slemmer to remove her blouse and bra and used a rag to gag her. Although she denied carving a pentagram on Slemmer, the Petitioner acknowledged that her accomplice had cut Slemmer’s chest.

Post-incident, the Petitioner and her accomplice washed their hands and shoes in a mud puddle and disposed of a box cutter. The Petitioner returned a borrowed meat cleaver to an unidentified individual at Job Corps. She also admitted to Investigator York that bloodstained jeans from the incident were in her room, concealed with mud, and that she had discarded Slemmer's identification and gloves at a Texaco station. After consenting to a search of her room, the Petitioner led Investigator York to the location of Slemmer's body. Evidence presented at trial included photographs of the Petitioner and her accomplice wearing pentagram necklaces, as well as items retrieved from the Texaco station and various blood evidence documented by law enforcement. Forensic analysis confirmed blood samples collected from the Petitioner and her accomplice's clothing and shoes.

Blood samples identified as human were sent to the DNA unit for analysis. Margaret Bush from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation reported that while DNA analysis on blood from the Petitioner's and Shipp's shoes was not possible, blood from their clothing matched the victim's DNA profile. The victim, identified as Colleen Slemmer, a nineteen-year-old Job Corps student, was autopsied by Dr. Sandra Elkins. Her body showed signs of extensive trauma, including numerous stab and slash wounds, with an emphasis on serious injuries. Dr. Elkins noted the victim was partially clothed, with dirt and twigs on her body, and described a significant gaping wound on her neck along with ten other neck wounds and additional slashes on her face and chest, including a pentagram carving.

Dr. Elkins concluded that the victim's heart was still beating when the wounds were inflicted, indicating consciousness during the attack. The cause of death was determined to be blunt force trauma to the head, with evidence of multiple skull fractures resulting from at least four blows. A major injury, labeled as "W," caused severe damage to the left side of the head, fracturing the right side and embedding skull fragments into the brain. Black particles found in the skull were linked to an asphalt chunk believed to be the weapon. Blood found in the sinus cavity suggested the victim was alive and conscious at the time of injury. Dr. Elkins performed a procedure to remove the victim's skull for further examination by forensic anthropologist Dr. Murray Marks, who reconstructed the skull using the embedded fragments.

Dr. Elkins demonstrated to the jury that a piece of skull found in a jacket belonging to the Petitioner perfectly fit a gap in the victim's skull. The jacket, identified by Job Corps employees, was turned over to law enforcement after being left in an office. Robert A. Pollock, an orientation specialist, noted the jacket was still there two days later and reported it to the security captain, who subsequently handed it to Officer Arthur Bohanan. Bohanan found a small bone fragment in the jacket's pocket, which Dr. Marks confirmed matched the victim's skull reconstruction.

The State concluded its case after presenting various evidence, including the victim's skull and clothing. For the defense, Dr. Eric Engum, a clinical psychologist, testified that the Petitioner, despite being bright with a full-scale IQ of 111, suffered from severe borderline personality disorder and substance abuse issues. He stated she was not insane or brain damaged, but struggled with interpersonal relationships and behavioral control. Dr. Engum contended that the Petitioner acted without deliberation or premeditation during the murder, attributing her actions to a loss of control linked to her disorder. He also suggested that her display of the skull piece was a distorted cry for recognition, reflecting a lack of identity.

Dr. Engum testified on cross-examination that the Petitioner was responsible for Slemmer's death and stated that she lost control during the attack. He acknowledged that the Petitioner had intentionally lured Slemmer to the park, inflicted severe injuries, and possessed weapons, indicating premeditation. Engum also noted that the Petitioner had an opportunity to reassess her actions when she paused to investigate a noise. Dr. William Bernet, after reviewing statements and reports, suggested the crime had satanic elements but characterized it as adolescent behavior rather than indicating intent or premeditation, admitting he did not consult any witnesses. The jury convicted the Petitioner of first-degree murder and conspiracy. During sentencing, the State used evidence from the guilt phase, while the defense presented testimony from the Petitioner’s aunt, Carrie Ross, who discussed the Petitioner’s troubled upbringing, including lack of maternal bonding and a history of family substance abuse. Ross also admitted to labeling the Petitioner a pathological liar and expressed concerns about her behavior. The Petitioner’s father, Glenn Pike, confirmed he had expelled her from their home and signed adoption papers due to her misconduct, including allegations of sexual abuse. The Petitioner’s mother, Carissa Hansen, testified about their close but troubled relationship, which included drug use and the Petitioner’s suicide attempt following her grandmother's death.

Hansen testified that her boyfriend had whipped the Petitioner, leading to his arrest. On cross-examination, Hansen acknowledged the Petitioner’s long-standing problematic behavior, including starting to grow marijuana at age nine, threatening to run away, and being allowed to have a live-in boyfriend at fourteen. Hansen revealed that the Petitioner had once threatened her boyfriend with a butcher knife and had been dishonest and theft-prone, quitting high school and being out of control since age eight. Subsequently, the defense rested its case. The State then called Harold James Underwood, Jr., a police officer who secured the crime scene on January 13, 1995. Underwood noted that the Petitioner arrived with a group of females, questioned him about the crime scene, and exhibited unusual behavior, including giggling and wearing a pentagram necklace. He reported these observations after learning the murder victim had a pentagram carved on her chest.

The jury found two aggravating circumstances for the murder: it was especially heinous, involving torture, and was committed to avoid arrest. The jury determined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating factors, resulting in a death sentence by electrocution, which was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner’s mother, Carissa Henson, testified about her limited interactions with the defense team prior to trial and her presence with family members during the penalty phase.

Ms. Henson revealed she was informed just before the second week of the trial that her testimony would be used to portray the family negatively to support the Petitioner’s case. She detailed her family background, including her marriage to Glenn Pike in 1975 and the birth of the Petitioner in March 1976, as well as the existence of an older half-sister, Alicia. Their marriage involved two periods of marriage separated by a divorce, and they lived in Beckley, West Virginia.

As a licensed practical nurse, Ms. Henson recounted a work-related incident while pregnant that led to complications, resulting in the Petitioner being born prematurely via Caesarean section with health issues, including hyaline membrane disease and bilateral hip dysplasias, necessitating a two-week stay in a neonatal intensive care unit. After relocating to North Carolina in 1982 and briefly returning to West Virginia to care for her mother until 1985, Ms. Henson moved back to North Carolina due to her marriage to Danny Thompson. 

During their childhood, Ms. Henson noted that both the Petitioner and Alicia frequently spent time with their grandmother and expressed their unhappiness after moving to North Carolina, ultimately returning to West Virginia, with the Petitioner returning to North Carolina in fourth or fifth grade. 

Alicia became pregnant at fifteen and lived with Ms. Henson and her fiancé for two years, during which Ms. Henson was separated from Thompson. Ms. Henson discussed her relationship with Steve Kyaw when the Petitioner was twelve, noting conflict between them, including a court case involving an incident of physical aggression. She denied awareness of any abuse from the Petitioner’s stepfathers.

Later, after marrying Gerard Henson, Ms. Henson discovered the Petitioner was pregnant and using cocaine, leading to an abortion, though she did not know the father’s identity. Additionally, she admitted to occasionally smoking marijuana with the Petitioner and her friends when the Petitioner was seventeen, though she denied encouraging drug use. Ms. Henson also recounted an incident when the Petitioner, in third grade, overdosed on Tylenol, resulting in outpatient psychiatric treatment for depression.

The psychiatrist prescribed medication to the Petitioner that negatively affected her, leading her to stop taking it; the therapist supported this decision and eventually discharged her. Ms. Henson, the Petitioner’s mother, noted that they sought therapy and psychological help over the years. She testified that the Petitioner reported being raped after school, coinciding with a suicide attempt, and that Claude Davis was arrested in relation to this incident, but the Petitioner could not identify him in a lineup, resulting in no charges. Additionally, Ms. Henson recounted an incident when the Petitioner was sixteen, where she was sexually molested by a man who grabbed her while she was walking to a store, although Ms. Henson could not recall if there was penetration. 

Ms. Henson described the Petitioner’s various jobs, including positions at Waffle House and a steakhouse, and mentioned a relationship with Brian Wilson, a homeless young man who briefly lived with them before being asked to leave due to his inability to find work. Following Wilson's departure, the Petitioner moved out as well, and they rented a trailer together. Ms. Henson indicated that the Petitioner often ran away from home and school and had lived in a group facility twice. 

In tenth grade, the Petitioner spent about a year at Swannoa, a juvenile facility, after which she expressed interest in the Job Corp Program to obtain her GED and training as a nursing assistant. Ms. Henson and her husband allowed her to join the program in fall 1994. During a visit, Ms. Henson observed the poor living conditions at the dormitory, including graffiti and blood on the walls from a recent stabbing. Although they encouraged her to come home, the Petitioner chose to remain at the program. 

While home for Christmas, the Petitioner reported being threatened by a girl who would loom over her bed with a knife, but indicated she felt protected by a friend, Tadaryl Shipp. On cross-examination, Ms. Henson acknowledged the Petitioner’s traumatic life experiences but denied witnessing any incidents of alleged sexual abuse or blood on the Petitioner.

Ms. Henson testified that her father, Chris Fotos, owned a meat packing plant where the petitioner would have witnessed animal slaughter and processing. She recounted a threatening phone call from Kenny Clyde, who stated he would rape her, prompting her husband to search for him. The petitioner and a friend later found Clyde at a McDonald's parking lot and physically assaulted him. Ms. Henson acknowledged that the petitioner frequently got into trouble and described her as having a bad temper, characterizing their home as a "continuous battle zone." She noted the petitioner was known for dishonesty and admitted the petitioner had chased an individual named Steve Kyaw with a butter knife. Ms. Henson mentioned that a friend, Breanna, who had lived with them, got into a violent altercation with the petitioner, resulting in Breanna moving out after being pushed down the stairs.

The petitioner returned home during Christmas break from the Job Corp Program with crystals, claiming they had special powers, but Ms. Henson could not recall if the petitioner mentioned being part of a WICCA group. She acknowledged the petitioner had a devil tattoo, which she described as a "cute little cartoon." 

Gerard Henson, the petitioner’s stepfather, testified about the petitioner’s enrollment in the Job Corp Program, noting that it was her initiative. He described her as open and friendly but did not testify during her trial. He denied making statements regarding the petitioner being out of control or pushing Breanna down the stairs but admitted to saying that she enjoyed the attention from her behavior.

Carrie Ross, the petitioner’s aunt, testified about the petitioner’s birth, stating she was born via caesarean section and experienced respiratory arrest, requiring ventilation in a neonatal intensive care unit. Ross, who was not subpoenaed but encouraged to attend by the petitioner’s legal team, confirmed her background and family connections, including a history of abuse related to their aunt, Norma Privett.

Ms. Ross provided testimony regarding her experiences with Norma Privett, who babysat her and her sister Alicia. She described Privett as abusive, recalling incidents where Privett would drag her by the hair, leading to Privett's eventual cessation of babysitting. Ms. Ross's father, Chris Fotos, was an addict of Talwin, which impaired his perception of reality, resulting in violent behavior, including a gun threat towards her and an incident in a federal courtroom. Ms. Ross also recounted her mother’s alcoholism, noting that while she was nurturing towards Alicia, she resented the Petitioner, particularly as her drinking worsened with the Petitioner’s birth. Ms. Ross characterized her sister Carissa Henson as violent, irresponsible, and prioritizing men over her children, having been married five times. She mentioned that she raised Alicia during Carissa's marriage to Danny Thompson due to his aversion to children. Ms. Ross described the Petitioner as a challenging child who struggled to comprehend boundaries and exhibited emotional flatness. An incident in first grade involved the Petitioner drawing inappropriate images, prompting school officials to recommend counseling. Despite hopes that the Petitioner would benefit from the Job Corp Program, she expressed fear about returning home for Christmas.

Ms. Ross expressed concern that the Petitioner’s family would not have approved of her relationship with Tadaryl Shipp due to his race. Dr. Jonathan Henry Pincus, a neurology expert, conducted a comprehensive examination of the Petitioner in March 2001, which included her medical history, a physical neurological exam, neuropsychological testing, an EEG, and an MRI. Although the physical exam was largely normal, Dr. Pincus identified minor abnormalities such as generalized hyperreflexia and an unusual hand posture indicating potential basal ganglia dysfunction. He noted a positive nuchocephalic reflex, suggesting disruption in motor area fibers, and concluded that there was subcortical dysfunction affecting the basal ganglia and possibly the thalamus.

The MRI revealed an abnormality, specifically a small heterotopia in the frontal lobe, attributed to maternal factors such as exposure to radiation or alcohol during pregnancy. Dr. Pincus indicated that heterotopia can be linked to mental retardation and epilepsy, although the Petitioner had outgrown her epilepsy diagnosis. He emphasized the significance of the frontal lobes for moral and ethical reasoning, stating that while individuals are born with the capacity for these traits, they require appropriate influences to develop them. He highlighted the unusual visibility of the Petitioner’s heterotopia on the MRI, noting that it is often undetectable in most cases.

The frontal lobe is the last area of the brain to become myelinated, completing this process in a person's early twenties. Dr. Pincus conducted an MRI on April 2, 2001, and an EEG when the Petitioner was fourteen months old, concluding that the Petitioner had a damaged brain. He stated that Dr. Engum's earlier finding of no brain damage does not contradict his assessment, noting that the Petitioner’s heretopia is challenging to test. Dr. Pincus identified a "big triumvirate" often seen in convicted murderers: brain damage, a history of abuse, and mental illness, all of which applied to the Petitioner.

Dr. Pincus detailed the Petitioner's history of abuse, including self-reported incidents and physical scars corroborated by family interviews. Significant traumatic events included rape by a neighbor involving grotesque acts, which the Petitioner disclosed to her family but was not believed. The Petitioner also recounted exposure to pornography in her home and abusive incidents with her mother’s boyfriend, including a painful physical assault witnessed by a neighbor, leading to criminal charges that were later dismissed.

At seventeen, the Petitioner was stalked and sexually assaulted by a man named Kenny Clyde, prompting her to retaliate violently, which Dr. Pincus flagged as indicative of impaired frontal lobe function. He affirmed a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, detailing behaviors consistent with the condition: excessive spending despite lack of food, severe mood fluctuations, periods of extreme activity followed by debilitating depression, and significant weight changes. The Petitioner experienced sleep disturbances and substance abuse, further demonstrating the impact of her mental health issues on her daily life.

Weight fluctuations are common in individuals with bipolar disorder, which affects the Petitioner, who experiences significant periods of immobility, emotional distress, and suicidal ideation, including two overdose attempts. The Petitioner has a notable family history of mental illness, addiction, and violent behavior, particularly on the maternal side. Dr. Pincus, a psychological expert, assessed that the Petitioner suffers from a hereditary bipolar disorder exacerbated by past abuse and potential brain damage. He noted that prior to January 12, 1995, the Petitioner had poor sleep and was in an irritable, excited state due to derogatory remarks from the victim. Dr. Pincus opined that the Petitioner did not initially intend to kill the victim, but lost control and acted impulsively, influenced by her mental illness. He asserted that her mental disease originated in utero and that the interplay of abuse, mental illness, and potential brain damage contributed to her actions in 1995. During cross-examination, he acknowledged Dr. Engum’s conflicting assessment, which found no brain damage, labeling it incorrect due to a lack of an MRI. Alicia Wills, the Petitioner’s half-sister, testified about her upbringing and the impact of their grandmother's alcoholism and death on both their lives, indicating that it led to her own struggles with fights and drug use.

Ms. Willis denied allegations of mistreatment by Grandfather Fotos but acknowledged his profession as a butcher and their visits to his slaughterhouse, stating she felt no emotional scars from witnessing animal processing. She expressed anger towards her mother for marrying Danny Thompson and relocating to North Carolina, describing Thompson as mean but denying any physical harm. Ms. Willis felt neglected as her mother prioritized her own happiness over her children’s needs, contributing to her feelings of depression and anger. She testified about her parents' tumultuous marriage, including her father's temper and her mother's infidelity and alcoholism, noting that parties were a significant part of their lives. Ms. Willis recounted an incident in second grade where her mother packed beer in her lunch and stated she rarely received affection from her mother. 

She characterized the relationship between the Petitioner and her mother as more of a friendship than a traditional mother-daughter bond, claiming she often felt like the maternal figure. Ms. Willis testified that she never witnessed the Petitioner’s father, Glenn Pike, physically discipline her. During a shopping trip funded by child support, both she and the Petitioner engaged in shoplifting, with the Petitioner stealing a significant quantity of jewelry. Ms. Willis noted the Petitioner had an interest in horror stories and expressed a desire for a glamorous lifestyle similar to her mother’s. She admitted to using marijuana starting at age twelve and becoming pregnant at fifteen, abstaining from drug use until she was seventeen. Ms. Willis described the Petitioner as kind-hearted with aspirations of becoming a nurse, but noted troubling behaviors, including episodes of sudden rage. She concluded by stating the Petitioner had a nurturing relationship with her son, Keith, and was unaware of any abuse allegations against the Petitioner.

Ms. Wills expressed discomfort with the Petitioner giving her son, Keith, a bath, despite the Petitioner’s desire to do so. She refuted any allegations made by Dr. McCoy regarding the Petitioner’s sexual abuse of Keith, asserting they were false. While Ms. Wills acknowledged that the Petitioner drew inappropriate pictures at a young age, she claimed not to know if the Petitioner had been sexually abused and dismissed the Petitioner’s claims of having been raped. Ms. Wills denied allegations of abuse against her sister, including intentionally burning the Petitioner with a curling iron during a beauty shop play incident when the Petitioner was three or four, and she also denied other abusive actions such as slamming the Petitioner’s fingers in a door or using an electric plug on her. She indicated she was not subpoenaed for the Petitioner’s trial but expected to be called as a witness, expressing a belief that the Petitioner had never received fair treatment in life. At the time of her testimony, Ms. Wills resided in Dallas, Texas, owned a business, had been married for twelve years, and felt a sense of peace.

Emil Glenn Pike, the Petitioner’s father, testified about his background, including his upbringing in West Virginia, his family's disciplinary methods, and his military service in Vietnam, where he suffered health issues related to Agent Orange exposure. He recounted his marriage to Joanne Lily and subsequent marriage to the Petitioner’s mother, noting issues in their relationship, including infidelity and a suicide attempt by the Petitioner’s mother that led to their remarriage. He described the circumstances surrounding the Petitioner’s birth, mentioning complications that required hospitalization. After his military service, he returned to Beckley, West Virginia, to work in road construction and opened a motocross race track on the family farm.

The Petitioner’s mother resumed partying, leading to a rift between her and Mr. Pike, who noted that his mother often babysat the Petitioner and had a close bond with her, while expressing a belief that his mother-in-law disapproved of him and the Petitioner due to perceived social class differences. Mr. Pike admitted to using physical discipline on the Petitioner, specifically with a hand or belt, though he claimed he never made her undress for spankings and denied any scars resulted from his discipline. He recounted a time when the Petitioner’s mother sought his help with the Petitioner’s behavioral issues after marrying Danny Thompson, leading to periods where the Petitioner lived with him but subsequently returned to her mother due to ongoing problems.

Mr. Pike later married Kathleen Almond and had two children, during which an allegation arose that the Petitioner had sexually abused his younger daughter. This allegation stemmed from the younger daughter's report to a therapist, leading to a recommendation that the Petitioner not be around her. Mr. Pike did not believe the Petitioner had committed any wrongdoing and had not witnessed any inappropriate behavior. He was unaware of the Petitioner’s stay at a juvenile facility in North Carolina and did not visit her there, nor did he know about her entry into the Job Corp Program until after it happened. Although he denied calling the Petitioner a manipulator, he admitted to labeling her a liar and acknowledged an instance of her forging a teacher's signature.

Faye Johnson Guy, a neighbor and associate of the Petitioner’s family, testified about the Petitioner’s home life, noting that the Petitioner’s mother, Carissa, abused alcohol and had a turbulent relationship with Danny Thompson, whom she described as drunk and violent. After separating from Thompson, Carissa began dating multiple men, including a married man and Steve Kyaw, who moved into her home shortly after they began seeing each other. Ms. Guy often included the Petitioner in family outings due to her being frequently left alone and mentioned that the Petitioner had access to pornographic materials belonging to her mother or Steve Kyaw.

Ms. Guy observed the Petitioner watching horror movies with her mother, Carissa, and expressed concerns about the appropriateness of this behavior. Carissa dismissed these concerns, stating the Petitioner had enjoyed such films since early childhood. Ms. Guy characterized Carissa and the Petitioner as having a friendship rather than a traditional mother-daughter relationship, noting that Carissa discussed inappropriate topics with the Petitioner, including sexual matters. During Ms. Guy's wedding rehearsal dinner, Carissa was caught engaging in sexual activity with Ms. Guy's future brother-in-law, which occurred multiple times that evening. Ms. Guy, who had a friendship with Ann Marie Hansen and her husband Gerard, noted that Carissa had an affair with Gerard, leading to Gerard leaving his wife and moving in with Carissa, prompting Ms. Guy to distance herself from Carissa.

Ms. Guy testified that the Petitioner exhibited mood swings, which she initially attributed to hormones but later recognized as potential signs of bipolar disorder, recalling similar symptoms in her own mother. She mentioned that the Petitioner’s sister, Alicia, seemed to bully her. Ms. Guy described Carissa's father, Chris Fotos, as prejudiced and violent in his speech.

Orlando Powell, a former manager at a local Pizza Hut, testified about his romantic relationship with the Petitioner, noting a lack of a close relationship between her and Carissa. He described the Petitioner as energetic and temperamental, expressing concern for her well-being and stating that she was involved with substances like marijuana and alcohol. Their relationship lasted approximately one to one and a half years, and Powell mentioned that no one from the Petitioner’s defense team contacted him before her trial. Carol Goehring, a childhood friend of the Petitioner, also recounted visiting the Petitioner at home, where Steve Kyaw was living with Carissa at the time.

Steve Kyaw verbally confronted the Petitioner during a visit, prompting her to instruct Ms. Goehring to leave. Ms. Goehring witnessed Kyaw physically nudge the Petitioner into a room, followed by the Petitioner fleeing while holding a knife, visibly panicked and adjusting her pants. Ms. Goehring, alarmed by the yelling and commotion, called her mother for help, after which she was banned from visiting the Petitioner. A month later, the Petitioner’s mother left Steve Kyaw. Ms. Goehring characterized the Petitioner as loyal, happy, and energetic.

Jamie Robinson recounted that the Petitioner had previously lived on the streets with her ex-boyfriends, Brian Wilson and Jeffrey Crank. Robinson noted that their living conditions were dire, with instances of sleeping in hospitals and eating only condiments. She observed tension between the Petitioner and her stepfather and noted a lack of food in their home, including the absence of sheets on the Petitioner’s bed. One evening, the Petitioner and Robinson secretly brought Jeffrey Crank into the home, and later they shoplifted shirts for their boyfriends, resulting in the Petitioner’s arrest while Robinson did not run away.

Robinson mentioned that security officers at the mall called their parents after they spent too long there, highlighting a contrast in the officers' communication with their mothers. She described the Petitioner as seemingly unfazed by her circumstances and noted that the Petitioner had been raped but did not express any visible emotion regarding it. Robinson observed that the Petitioner frequently fought with Brian Wilson and recalled a violent incident involving the Petitioner and her new boyfriend against Wilson. Lastly, Robinson indicated she was never contacted by the Petitioner’s defense team.

Kerry Sherrill, a treatment worker for the Child Protective Services Unit in Orange County, North Carolina, was assigned to the Petitioner’s case due to allegations of child abuse and neglect involving the Petitioner’s mother’s boyfriend, Steve Kyaw. Ms. Sherrill characterized the Petitioner, a middle school student, as bright and sociable, but reported concerns about her mother’s ability to meet the Petitioner’s needs. The Petitioner was eventually placed at Shaeffer House after issues with truancy and running away. While there, the Petitioner expressed feelings of unhappiness and mentioned a plan to commit suicide, citing a past rape by Claude Davis as a reason. The case was closed after Kyaw left the home.

Peggy Hamlett, a counselor with the North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, testified that the Petitioner was initially charged with felony breaking and entering and larceny, resulting in her being adjudicated delinquent and placed under supervision. The Petitioner’s probation was later revoked, leading to over a year in juvenile detention due to multiple infractions. Hamlett described the Petitioner as intelligent but “out of control,” engaging in substance abuse, including huffing, which is dangerous. 

Debby Howell Burchfield, a social worker at the Juvenile Evaluation Center, testified that she had direct daily contact with the Petitioner while she was confined from November 1991 to March 1993. Burchfield noted that the Petitioner’s time at the center was extended due to her inability to achieve the required points for release, describing her behavior as self-sabotaging. During her stay, the Petitioner was allowed one visit per week.

The Petitioner was at Swannoa for approximately fifteen months, during which she was entitled to sixty visits but only received eight. Testimony from Ms. Burchfield revealed that the Petitioner felt emotionally disconnected from her parents, feeling abused by her father and unsupported by her mother. The Petitioner exhibited self-mutilation behaviors and had also reported abuse by her older sister. Ms. Burchfield acknowledged that, previously, the Petitioner had shown interest in devil worship and gothic culture, but noted that seeking her way was typical behavior for adolescents. Upon her release, the Petitioner intended to enroll in nursing studies at Alamance Technical College, and staff had helped her complete her GED and apply to the Job Corp Program.

Kristina Hargis, a social worker at Swannoa, provided further context, indicating she was in close contact with the Petitioner, spending an hour weekly discussing her feelings. Hargis described the Petitioner as struggling and depressed, unable to comprehend her troublesome behaviors, and suggested she was intentionally prolonging her stay at Swannoa. The facility housed 180 males and 45 females with structured activities and limited free time.

Frederic Marshall Muse, a teacher at Swannoa during the 1990s, noted the Petitioner’s initial defiance which changed as she recognized authority. He recommended her for teacher aide positions, where she excelled and developed a respectful relationship with him, demonstrating a delightful sense of humor. Muse did not recall stating to the post-conviction investigator that the Petitioner “seemed to have two faces.”

The Petitioner was recognized as having one of the higher intellects at Swannoa but was adept at masking her true feelings of unhappiness. Mr. Muse, who was not contacted by the Petitioner’s trial team, provided insights into her situation. Andrew Drace, a former Job Corp student who knew the Petitioner, described the center as a small and violent environment characterized by gang activity, particularly targeting white students, of whom there were fewer than ten. He identified Tadaryl Shipp as a gang member who consistently instilled fear, even attempting to throw Drace off a bridge. 

On January 12, 1995, Drace encountered Colleen Slimmer, who inquired about Shipp, marking the last time he saw her. The following day, Drace and a friend purchased alcohol and met the Petitioner, who consumed two cups of Mad Dog 20/20 and left intoxicated, expressing a desire to continue drinking. After Slimmer's murder, the Job Corp Center was locked down, disrupting classes and resulting in Drace losing his job. He later reached out to the Petitioner’s attorneys but felt they were dismissive. The center subsequently closed, forcing students to relocate to Gulfport, Mississippi, where Drace did not complete the program due to the requirement to restart.

Onas Perry, a supervisor at the Juvenile Evaluation Center, testified about her interactions with the Petitioner, noting her desire for a better relationship with her mother and reports of abuse. Perry believed the Petitioner might have intentionally undermined her situation to remain at Swannoa. She also observed the Petitioner engaging in occult activities with other girls, which included chanting and the presence of a pentagram, interpreting these actions as a search for identity. Perry noted the Petitioner exhibited unusual mood swings.

William Joseph Mode, a Job Corp instructor in fall 1994, described the environment at the program as chaotic and unsafe, noting incidents of violence from students, including threats against him. He characterized Tadaryl Shipp as often arriving to class under the influence and disrespectful, while he viewed Colleen Slemmer, the Petitioner, as a sweet but sometimes out-of-control student. Jacqueline Olebe, a health instructor at Job Corp, testified that the Petitioner was non-violent and completed her coursework, though she occasionally fell asleep in class. Olebe acknowledged the Petitioner’s use of marijuana and alcohol and mentioned a conversation regarding voodoo. Kim Rhodes, a fellow student, described the Job Corp atmosphere as scary and noted widespread drug use. She testified to feeling safe with the Petitioner and was shocked by news of the victim's death, stating she never witnessed the Petitioner act violently. Judge Matthew Martin, who previously represented the Petitioner, testified that sending her to training school was a mistake, advocating for a different approach due to her background as an abused child and her bipolar disorder diagnosis. He provided his file to the Petitioner’s trial counsel after the charges were filed. Tadaryl Shipp, the Petitioner’s co-defendant, was also called to testify.

Shipp testified about his membership in the Gangster Disciples and confirmed that co-defendant Peterson was also a member, while asserting that the Petitioner was not affiliated with the gang. He described his romantic relationship with the Petitioner, characterizing her as a caring individual who experienced significant mood swings, which could lead to random physical aggression towards him. Shipp noted that these mood swings could last between two to sixty minutes, often resulting in rage, and stated that the Petitioner was particularly agitated prior to the murder. He admitted to having been unfaithful during their relationship, claiming the Petitioner was unaware of his other romantic involvements, and mentioned that she continued to write to him frequently after the incident.

Shipp confessed to carving a pentagram on the victim’s chest, a deviation from his initial police statement that implicated the Petitioner in bringing the weapons and assisting with the carving. He expressed uncertainty about whose idea it was to take the victim to the scene, although he had previously attributed it to the Petitioner in a statement given while intoxicated and under police pressure. He indicated he would have supported the Petitioner’s defense at trial, even against his attorney's advice.

Tyrone Comfort, another witness, described his friendship with the Petitioner, noting her emotional volatility and witnessing her distress on multiple occasions. He expressed disapproval of Shipp's treatment of her, highlighting instances of visible abuse and control. Former girlfriends of Shipp, DeAndrea Gates and Amanda Robertson, corroborated his abusive and manipulative behavior, with Gates stating that Shipp targeted women he could dominate. Jermaine Bishop, a former Job Corp student, also testified about Shipp's controlling nature in his relationship with the Petitioner and noted frequent arguments between them.

Co-counsel for the Petitioner testified about her legal background, indicating her appointment to the case in January 1996 and her experience in criminal law, having previously served as an assistant public defender.

Co-counsel, handling her first murder case, primarily focused on research and drafting motions, including preparing voir dire and conducting 35 cross-examinations during the guilt phase. She was appointed to replace prior co-counsel and acknowledged that foundational work had been completed before her involvement. Initially, she considered the possibility of proving second-degree murder due to the chaotic circumstances of the crime and the Petitioner’s mental health issues, viewing the sentencing phase as critical from the outset.

Dr. McCoy was retained as the mitigation expert before co-counsel's appointment, and she met with both Dr. McCoy and the lead counsel to review the prepared materials. The defense aimed to demonstrate the Petitioner’s dysfunctional family background with substance abuse issues. However, a last-minute decision was made not to have Dr. McCoy testify due to concerns about her relationship with the prosecution and disagreements with another expert, Dr. Engum. Consequently, attempts to admit Dr. McCoy's report and related materials into evidence were unsuccessful.

Only three witnesses were called, and co-counsel suggested that additional lay witnesses might have strengthened their case. Despite the setbacks, she endeavored to present the mitigation theme during closing arguments but recognized the absence of expert testimony to support their claims. Co-counsel was aware that some contents of Dr. McCoy’s report could negatively impact the defense, as they faced a challenging case with incriminating confessions from the Petitioner.

The defense filed a "don’t ask/don’t tell" motion regarding the death penalty, aiming to secure at least one juror opposed to it, despite the risk of a jury entirely in favor of capital punishment. Additionally, co-counsel acknowledged that Dr. McCoy’s complete report was disclosed to the prosecution, despite containing potentially privileged information, especially given the decision not to call Dr. McCoy as a witness.

The prosecution's cross-examination of witnesses, based on a report, was detrimental to the defense's case. The defense co-counsel testified that the decision not to call Dr. McCoy prevented the State from utilizing several damaging facts from the report. Co-counsel could not recall why no objections were raised regarding the State's inconsistent theories about conspiracy charges and the aggravating factor of avoiding arrest. She acknowledged awareness of lead counsel's overbilling issues but believed it did not impact his representation, describing him as zealous. A release allowing the attorneys to profit from the Petitioner’s story was signed, but co-counsel clarified it pertained only to public aspects, not attorney-client privileged information, and did not influence trial strategy.

Co-counsel aimed to secure a conviction for second-degree murder by emphasizing the chaotic scene and the Petitioner’s controlling relationship with Shipp, despite some witnesses and the Petitioner’s own statements undermining this narrative, along with aspects of Dr. McCoy's report. She had met with the Post-Conviction Defender’s Office once in 1999 and provided her file but felt everything necessary had been addressed.

General William Crabtree, the lead prosecutor for the Petitioner’s trial, testified about his previous relationship with Dr. McCoy, the mitigation expert, which had ended before the trial. He only became aware of her involvement when he received her report during the penalty phase and expressed dissatisfaction at its late submission. Crabtree could not recall specific information from the report used in cross-examination and saw no conflict of interest from his past relationship with Dr. McCoy, having successfully prosecuted other cases she was involved in without issue, except for one case where he withdrew due to prior discussions with her.

Lead counsel for the Petitioner, who had been practicing criminal defense in Knoxville since 1986, testified regarding his qualifications and experiences prior to his appointment in the Petitioner’s case. Although he had handled several murder cases, he had not previously managed a capital case. In 1993 or 1994, he became aware of an audit of the indigent defense system and subsequently conducted a self-audit, revealing instances of billing over 24 hours in a single day. Following this, and on his counsel's advice, he self-reported to the Board of Professional Responsibility and repaid approximately $67,000 in April 1995, just before his appointment. He avoided new cases during this period to maintain integrity and believed the investigation would not impact his representation of the Petitioner, having been cleared to practice law.

Lead counsel noted that at the time of his appointment, he faced only a disciplinary complaint, which remained unresolved until 1998, but he did not face any active suspension. He had previously taken a dozen felony cases to jury trial and often enlisted the help of investigators and experts. Early in his representation, he engaged Dr. Engum for psychological testing of the Petitioner and maintained communication with him about the findings. He also hired Dr. Diana McCoy as a mitigation specialist, planning to utilize her insights during the penalty phase after focusing on the guilt phase with Dr. Engum. Additionally, he brought in Dr. Bernet as a psychiatrist to provide background on the Satanic elements of the case, although he did not request an evaluation from Dr. Bernet.

Co-counsel was appointed after prior co-counsel withdrew; although lead counsel had not worked with her before, he was aware of her experience with criminal cases in the Public Defender’s Office.

Lead counsel acknowledged that co-counsel lacked experience in capital and murder cases but believed her involvement in the penalty phase could be beneficial due to her gender. He maintained that he was actively involved in both trial phases and recognized the case's complexity, especially since the Petitioner had confessed to a brutal murder. Lead counsel prioritized sentencing issues and aimed to avoid a death sentence, reflecting on potential regrets about his trial strategy. He presumed he discussed witness testimony with Dr. McCoy but expressed satisfaction with her work overall. During the guilt phase, he focused on challenging intent and premeditation, while also attempting to humanize the Petitioner. Extensive case investigation was conducted, including interviews in North Carolina, and he planned to call the Petitioner’s family as witnesses.

Despite intending to use Dr. McCoy to provide background on the Petitioner, concerns about her report and its admissibility arose. Lead counsel ultimately decided against calling Dr. McCoy, primarily because she could not support Dr. Engum’s findings due to a lack of personal evaluation. He was also wary of Dr. McCoy's relationship with General Crabtree, although he did not question her integrity. The decision to exclude Dr. McCoy was made last minute, and while he regretted not calling additional witnesses, he was uncertain of their potential impact on the verdict. Lead counsel could not recall the timeline for deciding on the number of witnesses or when he received Dr. McCoy’s final report, although billing records indicated it was completed shortly before the penalty phase. He remembered providing her report to the State during an in-camera hearing, noting that the timing frustrated General Crabtree as it limited the State's review period.

Lead counsel acknowledged providing the final report and supporting documents from Dr. McCoy’s folder, planning to use Dr. McCoy as a witness at that time. He later regretted not limiting the disclosure to just the report, as he believed the additional materials were not privileged. He did not challenge the State's inconsistent theories regarding the conspiracy conviction and the aggravator of murder to avoid arrest, though he now perceives them as inconsistent. During jury selection, he noted extensive media coverage had reached most potential jurors, and he recognized that his questioning might have reinforced jurors' preconceived notions. He admitted the risks of his strategy regarding jury qualification and could not recall whether he attempted to "life qualify" the jury.

Lead counsel discussed post-trial interactions with the Petitioner’s aunt about potentially writing a book, clarifying he never profited from the Petitioner’s story, despite having a signed document that would have permitted him to do so. He revealed that the State had offered the Petitioner a plea deal for life without parole, which she declined due to a desire not to spend her life in prison; lead counsel felt he should have urged her to accept the deal more strongly. He denied asking Dr. McCoy to lie and recalled receiving a complaint from her post-trial regarding her employment prospects. Although he recognized the defense was not perfect and acknowledged that different actions could have been taken, he concluded that the case's brutality likely would not have led to a different outcome.

On cross-examination, he addressed an overbilling issue, stating it had been resolved prior to his appointment in the Petitioner’s case, with no pending criminal liability at that time. He confirmed that he discussed the billing matter with the Petitioner, who was unconcerned, asserting it did not affect his representation. He explained the decision against seeking a continuance was based on co-counsel’s preparedness and significant prior work, coupled with hopes that the State would fail to locate key witnesses.

Lead counsel determined there was no legal basis to file a motion to suppress the Petitioner’s statement and believed the timing of Dr. McCoy’s report did not influence the decision not to call her as a witness. He assessed that the potentially damaging information in Dr. McCoy’s report was too prejudicial to present without her support for Dr. Engum’s diagnosis. Although providing the report to the State allowed for some damaging information to be used in cross-examination, not calling Dr. McCoy helped avoid the introduction of other harmful evidence. Neither Dr. Engum nor Dr. McCoy recommended involving another mental health professional, though lead counsel later recognized that hiring a psychiatrist may have been advantageous.

Carrie Ross, the Petitioner’s aunt, testified that lead counsel had discussed the possibility of a book deal during the trial and expressed doubt that the Petitioner could avoid the death penalty while suggesting he was leaving room for an appeal. Ms. Ross emphasized the violent and abusive environment in which the Petitioner was raised, stating that the questions during the penalty phase did not allow her to accurately portray the Petitioner’s character.

Dr. Diana McCoy, the mitigation expert, explained her role involved gathering information and developing themes for the penalty phase, but not diagnosing the Petitioner’s conditions. She had mainly interacted with lead counsel, having numerous meetings and conversations with him, and was instructed to prepare a report rather than provide an opinion. Dr. McCoy met with the Petitioner nine times before the trial to build rapport and confirmed her agreement with Dr. Engum’s diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. She reviewed her report with the defense team shortly before its finalization and discussed potential lay witnesses to support the Petitioner’s case.

Dr. McCoy testified regarding the defense strategy and her role as a witness in the case. She noted that lead counsel intended to delay submitting a report to the prosecution and expressed concern that family members alone could not adequately portray the Petitioner’s background and motivations for the crime. While she assumed witnesses had been subpoenaed, she emphasized the potential value of several professionals from Swannoa and Shaeffer who had worked with the Petitioner. Dr. McCoy identified Matthew Martin and the Petitioner’s aunt as strong potential witnesses, while expressing doubt about the Petitioner’s mother serving as a positive witness.

As of March 14, Dr. McCoy believed multiple lay witnesses would testify before her, allowing her to integrate the diagnosis into the broader context. She confirmed her agreement with the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder and clarified that she had never contradicted this diagnosis to either attorney. Dr. McCoy described characteristics of the disorder, including fear of abandonment, unstable relationships, mood swings, unstable self-image, and impulsivity. She prepared charts detailing the Petitioner’s family history, educational background, and substance abuse issues, linking these factors to the development of her disorder.

Dr. McCoy highlighted the Petitioner’s "tough girl image," suggesting it masked her underlying fearfulness, and discussed instances of self-destructive behavior and unstable relationships. She noted the Petitioner’s tendency to lie for attention and mentioned poor parental role models in an environment marked by substance abuse, glamorized violence, and lack of boundaries.

In a meeting on March 24, Dr. McCoy learned she would be the sole witness for the penalty phase, a decision she criticized, believing it inadequate to convey the strength of the mitigation evidence she had gathered. She argued that multiple perspectives were necessary to fully depict the Petitioner’s situation.

Dr. McCoy emphasized the necessity of depicting the early physical and emotional abuse in the Petitioner’s life to convey the depth of her issues. She noted that the jury would not expect the Petitioner to appear virtuous given her conviction for first-degree murder. Regarding the Petitioner’s relationship with Shipp, Dr. McCoy described her as seeking attention, feeling validated by Shipp's interest, and suggested that past rejections contributed to her attachment to him. She recommended Dr. Bernet as an expert on the Satanism elements of the case, addressing concerns from lead counsel about references to Satanism in a report. Despite her insights, Dr. McCoy learned post-verdict that she would not testify, as lead counsel mentioned the prosecutor's extreme displeasure over receiving her mitigation report late, which they deemed hearsay. Lead counsel then asked Dr. McCoy to misrepresent the timing of the report's submission, which she refused. After lengthy discussions about strategy, it was decided to call only three family witnesses, which Dr. McCoy criticized as insufficient to explain the Petitioner’s background. Post-trial, Dr. McCoy faced requests for her report from the victim’s attorneys and consulted lead counsel, who cautioned against sharing it and later questioned her ethics, prompting her to seek legal advice. Additionally, she disclosed a brief past dating relationship with General Crabtree to lead counsel early in the case, clarifying that it ended prior to her involvement. Upon hearing accusations that she had withheld this information, she reached out to attorney Herb Moncier for support.

Dr. McCoy, although not initially engaged for trial, prepared an opinion for the post-conviction hearing regarding the Petitioner’s borderline personality disorder, supported by charts and graphs. Her conclusions highlighted several key factors: 

1. The Petitioner came from a highly dysfunctional family, which impacted her development.
2. She suffered multiple traumatic experiences in childhood and adolescence, including assaults, exacerbating her psychiatric issues.
3. Her parents did not adequately address her emotional and psychological challenges.
4. The Petitioner exhibited various psychological problems, such as:
   a) Attachment issues leading to dysfunctional relationships.
   b) Difficulty maintaining emotional control, especially under stress, relying on others for stability.
   c) A persistent need for attention.
   d) A tough-girl persona masking low self-esteem and self-respect.
   e) A tendency to please others, often at her own expense.
5. At the time of the homicide, the Petitioner faced significant stress, feeling her identity was slipping away, particularly relating to her associations with Shipp and issues at Job Corp.

Dr. McCoy noted that the Petitioner experienced irrational anger linked to her borderline personality disorder, asserting she lacked normal emotional control. During cross-examination, she mentioned her past experience as a mitigation specialist but had never testified in capital cases. She expressed confidence in Dr. Engum’s diagnosis but confirmed that it was not her role to provide a diagnosis in this instance. 

Attorney Herb Moncier testified about advising Dr. McCoy regarding her relationship with General Crabtree and mentioned her concerns about being asked to misrepresent facts. He advised her to remain truthful, indicating that such matters would be addressed in post-conviction proceedings. Moncier noted that competent legal assistance was available in Knoxville. Attorney Gregory Isaacs also testified, endorsing Dr. McCoy's competence and effectiveness as a witness.

Mr. Isaacs testified about his involvement with Dr. McCoy after the Petitioner’s trial, specifically assisting in drafting a response to lead counsel's ethical concerns regarding her. Dr. William Kenner, a forensic psychiatry expert, was appointed by the court in 2001 to evaluate the Petitioner’s competency regarding her post-conviction appeals. He met with her seven times and reviewed extensive medical records, diagnosing her with Bipolar Disorder (hypomanic recurrent), Borderline Personality Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, and von Willebrand Disease. His evaluation revealed significant changes in the Petitioner’s condition, particularly a notable improvement upon being prescribed Lithium in 2002, leading to a revised diagnosis that excluded borderline personality disorder as part of her bipolar spectrum.

Dr. Kenner acknowledged the complexities of diagnosing bipolar disorder, emphasizing the need for observation due to its cyclical nature. He noted the impact of sleep deprivation on the Petitioner’s irritability and behavior, particularly around the time of the murder, when she experienced a two-to-four day cycle of sleep deprivation. He also indicated that critical medical data suggesting early onset bipolar disorder existed but was not adequately explored during the trial, which could have influenced the jury's understanding of her mental state. Additionally, he pointed out the potential for brain damage related to her medical history, including seizures and a head injury, which warranted further investigation.

Medical testing, specifically an MRI, was recommended for the Petitioner prior to a final diagnosis. Dr. Kenner noted that borderline personality disorder was a reasonable diagnosis based on the defense team's information at the time of trial. He criticized the defense team’s structure, indicating that communication was primarily directed to lead counsel, with little sharing of expert opinions. Notably, Dr. Bernet had not examined the Petitioner, and Dr. Engum did not review Dr. McCoy's work, raising concerns about the validity of Dr. Bernet's theory in front of the jury. Following the presented evidence, the post-conviction court denied relief, leading the Petitioner to appeal.

On appeal, the Petitioner raises several issues: 1) the post-conviction court should have recused itself; 2) the trial counsel was ineffective; 3) the Petitioner is ineligible for the death penalty; and 4) the death penalty is unconstitutional. Post-conviction relief requires the Petitioner to prove that their conviction is void or voidable due to a violation of constitutional rights, governed by the 1995 Post-Conviction Act, which mandates clear and convincing evidence for claims. The post-conviction court's findings are conclusive unless evidence suggests otherwise, and issues of witness credibility and evidence weight are determined by that court. The burden lies with the Petitioner to demonstrate that findings preponderate against the court's conclusions. However, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are assessed as mixed questions of law and fact, warranting a de novo review of factual findings with a presumption of correctness unless evidence indicates otherwise. Additionally, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred constitutionally by not recusing itself from the proceedings it previously oversaw.

The Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court should have disqualified itself from deciding the Petitioner’s claims due to personal knowledge of disputed facts, particularly regarding a conflict of interest involving trial counsel. At a hearing on February 26, 2007, the Petitioner’s counsel contended that the court had an obligation to recuse itself since it had appointed the lead counsel while being aware of potential conflicts related to overbilling. Counsel also noted an appearance of impropriety due to the court’s involvement with trial counsel and the overbilling issue. Additionally, it was claimed that the court was a necessary witness in an unrecorded hearing after the guilt phase verdict. 

In response, the post-conviction court found that it had the discretion to hear its own petitions for post-conviction relief, arguing that familiarity with the case allows for a better understanding of the issues. The court acknowledged the general knowledge of problems related to lead counsel’s billing but emphasized that he had been presumed innocent and maintained his law license. The court concluded it had no vested interest in protecting its prior rulings and stated that having knowledge of the case did not compromise its impartiality. The court dismissed the notion of mandatory disqualification based on the knowledge of lead counsel’s issues and clarified that its ruling was judicial, not personal, and that the potential appearance of impropriety did not warrant recusal.

The author expresses a commitment to proceeding with the post-conviction petition after a prolonged period of legal challenges, emphasizing a duty to ensure the proper review of convictions. The petitioner claims that her trial counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest stemming from an investigation by the Indigent Defense Fund and pending disciplinary sanctions. This situation purportedly led the counsel to avoid challenging the prosecution or trial court, impacting the defense strategy. The petitioner argues that an unrecorded in-camera meeting held before the penalty phase of the trial constitutes a conflict of interest, suggesting that lead counsel submitted mitigation materials to appease the State, supported by testimonies from experts and attorneys.

While acknowledging the typical propriety of the same court adjudicating post-conviction petitions, the petitioner asserts that this case is unique due to the court's involvement in actions that allegedly compromised her right to a fair trial. The petitioner references statements made by the post-conviction court regarding its limited recollection of the in-camera meeting, arguing that this undermines the presumption of impartiality usually afforded in such proceedings. The petitioner contends that the court's prior knowledge and role in the alleged unfairness warrant reconsideration of its involvement in the case.

Materials were submitted to the State following a verdict, but the State lacked sufficient time to address them. There was contention regarding the timing of lead counsel’s receipt of these materials, but they had not been provided to the State at that point. The judge emphasized that rulings represent the court's communication, and while those rulings can inform a post-conviction petition, personal inquiries into the judge's thoughts or memories are not permissible. The judge recounted their recollection of the evening of the verdict and discussions regarding the materials.

The Petitioner claimed the post-conviction court's prior knowledge of facts adversely influenced its decision-making and violated her constitutional right to confront witnesses, arguing the court should have recused itself due to its involvement in an in-camera meeting. However, the court found no evidence that this meeting affected its impartiality, and the Petitioner failed to demonstrate any basis for disqualification.

Additionally, referencing Frazier v. State, the Petitioner argued that her conviction should be overturned due to the trial court’s failure to address an alleged conflict of interest among her counsel, claiming this constituted a structural error. The court acknowledged the interpretation of Frazier but determined it was inapplicable since there was no evidence of a conflict of interest in her case.

The excerpt also addresses the right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, highlighting its fundamental importance to a fair trial. Key cases reinforcing this right include Gideon v. Wainwright, Cuyler v. Sullivan, and Strickland v. Washington.

Ineffectiveness of counsel claims are evaluated using a two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington. The first prong requires the defendant to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, indicating errors serious enough to undermine the role of counsel as protected by the Sixth Amendment. The second prong necessitates proving that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense, compromising the fairness and reliability of the trial's outcome. The performance standard requires that counsel's actions be assessed against an objective standard of reasonableness, with a strong presumption favoring the adequacy of counsel's performance and deference to strategic choices made with proper preparation. Criminal defendants are entitled to constitutionally adequate representation rather than perfect representation, and courts must scrutinize for constitutional deficiencies, especially in capital cases.

In this context, the Petitioner argues ineffective assistance of counsel due to two conflicts of interest involving lead counsel: first, the theft from the indigent defense fund, which led to an investigation and a repayment of over $60,000, resulting in a suspension of counsel's license after the Petitioner’s conviction; second, the procurement of media rights from the Petitioner. The Petitioner claims these conflicts rendered her representation constitutionally inadequate, asserting that no showing of prejudice is necessary for these claims.

The Petitioner argues on appeal that lead counsel faced a conflict of interest due to his fear of prosecution by the State, which allegedly influenced his decision not to call Dr. McCoy, a key mitigation witness. This claim arises from an in-camera meeting where lead counsel reportedly requested Dr. McCoy to misrepresent the timing of her report's delivery, fearing the State's reaction. The Petitioner asserts that lead counsel’s decision-making during the penalty phase was compromised by this conflict, and any alternative explanations provided by counsel were deemed incredible and unsupported by other witness testimonies.

To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the Petitioner must demonstrate that an actual conflict adversely affected counsel's performance, as outlined in Cuyler v. Sullivan. Mere potential conflicts do not suffice, especially if no objection was raised during the trial. If a conflict is proven, the Petitioner must also show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice, as per Strickland v. Washington. Prejudice is assumed only if it can be shown that counsel actively represented conflicting interests. 

The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding the conflict claims waived, asserting that lead counsel had informed them of the conflict and that they had no issues with it during trial. Despite this, the court ruled on the matter and found no actual conflict adversely affecting lead counsel's performance, basing its decision on multiple factual findings. Prior to counsel's appointment, the trial court had confirmed that the investigation had been completed and reimbursement fully paid.

The investigation relevant to the Petitioner concluded before lead counsel was appointed as her attorney. Lead counsel, appointed by the Tennessee Supreme Court in March 1995, maintained good standing as a licensed attorney throughout the investigation period. He asserted that he considered the investigation concluded prior to his appointment and informed the Petitioner about it, which she reportedly appreciated. The Petitioner did not provide evidence contradicting lead counsel’s assertions, and the court found no substantial proof that the alleged overbilling impacted his representation. Lead counsel did not communicate with the district attorney regarding the investigation and stated he would not have settled if criminal charges were possible. Claims that fear of prosecution caused lead counsel to mislead the court or avoid calling Dr. McCoy as a witness were dismissed as speculative, especially since witnesses at the in-camera meeting had no clear recollection of the events. Lead counsel explained that Dr. McCoy was not used as a witness because her testimony could not support Dr. Engum’s statements. Furthermore, the post-conviction court noted inconsistencies in Dr. McCoy's claims compared to lead counsel's recorded statements. The Petitioner’s claims of a conflict of interest due to media rights were also addressed; she had signed a release allowing lead counsel and co-counsel to narrate her story, which was limited to public information and personal experiences related to her case.

The release acknowledged that attorneys might financially benefit from retelling the Petitioner’s story. Under Rule 1.8(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers cannot enter into business transactions with clients or acquire conflicting interests without full disclosure, independent counsel opportunity, and a written agreement. An agreement for literary or media rights can create a conflict of interest. If such a conflict exists, the Petitioner must demonstrate that it adversely affected their counsel’s performance, as established in Mickens v. Taylor.

The Petitioner alleges that lead counsel’s discussions with Ms. Ross indicated an early interest in profiting from the Petitioner’s story, suggesting counsel’s motivation was monetary during the trial. The Petitioner argues that the failure to seek a continuance reflects this conflict, undermining their defense due to inadequate preparation. The State counters that no agreement existed with the Petitioner during the trial and acknowledges a discussion regarding the story with Ms. Ross, who had no legal rights to it. The post-conviction court found no evidence of an agreement prior to or during the trial. The only release was signed after the Petitioner’s conviction, making it illogical to claim the Petitioner was adversely affected during the trial. The court concluded that the evidence presented did not contradict this finding, and a mere discussion about a book deal was insufficient to prove a conflict of interest.

The Petitioner cannot rely on post-trial events to demonstrate a conflict affecting counsel’s performance during the trial. While a potential conflict in counsel's representation on appeal is acknowledged, establishing ineffective assistance of counsel requires showing prejudice, which the Petitioner has failed to do. Testimony indicated that the sole purpose of a book related to the Petitioner was to present an alternative perspective, with no evidence of financial gain or progress towards this goal. 

In terms of the penalty phase, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel did not fulfill their constitutional duty, claiming the death sentence resulted from multiple deficiencies: failure to present available mitigation evidence, failure to discover relevant evidence, disclosure of privileged information to the State, ineffective opening and closing arguments, inadequate voir dire, and failure to object to inconsistent aggravating factors. 

Specifically, trial counsel admitted at the post-conviction hearing that they should have called various witnesses, including juvenile detention workers and friends, but opted to rely solely on Dr. McCoy’s testimony and materials to present the Petitioner’s social history. The Petitioner asserts that this approach was ineffective, contending that a social history is better conveyed through multiple lay witnesses. Although trial counsel provided reasons for not calling Dr. McCoy, the Petitioner challenges their plausibility, arguing that her testimony and report supported the necessary diagnosis, and that negative information could have been framed positively. Moreover, counsel's knowledge of Dr. McCoy’s prior relationship with General Crabtree undermines their rationale for not utilizing her testimony.

The Petitioner contends that the rationale for not calling Dr. McCoy during the penalty phase was irrational, noting that the decision was made the previous evening, prior to General Crabtree's arrival with a report laden with "yellow stickies." The Petitioner asserts that all explanations provided by counsel lack a reasonable strategic basis, thereby failing to meet the standard for effective assistance, particularly regarding the omission of mitigating evidence. 

In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance related to the absence of mitigating evidence, courts apply a three-pronged test from Goad v. State: (1) assess the nature and extent of the unpresented mitigating evidence; (2) determine whether similar mitigating evidence was presented during trial; and (3) evaluate whether strong aggravating factors overshadowed the mitigating evidence.

The post-conviction court analyzed the available mitigating evidence, especially Dr. McCoy’s report, and concluded the first Goad factor was not met. Although the court acknowledged the potential existence of unpresented mitigating evidence, it found lead counsel’s strategic choice to limit some of that evidence reasonable due to its negative aspects. The court also identified that much of the information in Dr. McCoy’s report was similar to evidence already presented, and some would have been redundant or detrimental to the Petitioner. Ultimately, the court ruled that strong aggravating factors would have rendered the mitigating evidence ineffective in influencing the jury's decision. The court upheld that, based on the circumstances, counsel's choice not to utilize Dr. McCoy at the penalty phase was not unreasonable, emphasizing that hindsight should not dictate the evaluation of counsel's decisions.

The post-conviction court acknowledged the potential harm from lay witness testimony on the petitioner’s case, concluding that trial counsel made a reasonable choice to limit such testimony. Initially, counsel opted for expert testimony to explain the petitioner’s behavior, which was later altered when Dr. McCoy declined to testify. Instead, the petitioner’s parents and aunt were called to provide her life history alongside existing information about her Borderline Personality Disorder. The court found that the petitioner did not present sufficient evidence to challenge the trial court’s findings, which were deemed appropriate after thorough analysis. Lead counsel’s decision not to call Dr. McCoy was based on her inability to corroborate another expert's report, and he expressed discomfort with her materials. The court noted that any contradictions from Dr. McCoy could stem from misunderstandings. The decision to limit lay witnesses was also deemed tactical, given the potential negative implications of their statements. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that omitted mitigation evidence would outweigh aggravating factors, leading to a conclusion that she could not establish prejudice. While trial counsel expressed a desire to have called more witnesses, he doubted it would have affected the outcome due to the case's severe facts. The petitioner further criticized counsel for not discovering critical mitigation evidence, particularly regarding her brain damage and Bipolar Disorder, arguing that various indicators should have prompted further investigation into potential lay witnesses.

The Petitioner argues that her trial counsel failed to investigate significant evidence of brain damage and mental illness, relying on the testimonies of Drs. Pincus and Kenner. Dr. Pincus identified the Petitioner’s history of seizures since infancy as a key indicator of brain damage, while Dr. Kenner noted the abnormal EEG at fourteen months, the seizure history, and a traumatic head injury at age fourteen as clear reasons for a neurological evaluation. Despite awareness of lay witness accounts regarding the Petitioner’s mother's alcoholism and the potential for in-utero exposure leading to neurological impairments, the defense did not pursue any neurological investigation, resulting in missed identification of the Petitioner’s brain abnormalities affecting impulse control.

The Petitioner critiques the psychological evaluation by Dr. Engum for two main reasons: first, as a neuropsychologist, Dr. Engum’s testing could not reveal the specific type of brain damage the Petitioner sustained, which Dr. Pincus confirmed; second, Dr. Engum failed to explain the various signs of brain damage present. The Petitioner asserts that competent counsel should have recognized the need for a medical expert with a different specialty and sought a second opinion.

Additionally, the Petitioner disputes the trial diagnosis of borderline personality disorder, claiming that the accurate diagnosis was bipolar disorder, supported by her positive response to mood-stabilizing medication and corroborated by Dr. Kenner’s testimony about indicators of bipolar disorder, including the Petitioner’s family reports and suicide attempts. Dr. Kenner emphasized the risk of misdiagnosing bipolar disorder as borderline personality disorder, highlighting the necessity of thorough clinical interviews, which were lacking in Dr. Engum's approach due to limited interactions with the Petitioner. The Petitioner also indicates that trial counsel's failure to uncover her post-traumatic stress disorder contributed to ineffective assistance, as this diagnosis was readily available at the time of trial.

The Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to discover crucial mitigation evidence, specifically regarding alleged brain damage, despite having access to information from potential lay witnesses that indicated the need for further investigation. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel relied on the expertise of Dr. Engum, who conducted testing and reported no signs of brain damage. Counsel did not seek additional expert opinions, as neither Dr. Engum nor Dr. McCoy suggested the need for a psychiatrist's evaluation. The court concluded that it was reasonable for counsel to trust the retained experts' assessments, especially since they agreed that the Petitioner acted without premeditation. Expert testimonies indicated that while the Petitioner had planned the attack, she lost control during its execution. Despite differing diagnoses from various experts, the court determined that the core acknowledgment of premeditation remained consistent. The court ruled that trial counsel's reliance on expert opinions was justified and that no relief was warranted due to the lack of recommended additional testing by the experts.

The Petitioner’s expert acknowledged that Dr. Engum's diagnosis was reasonable at the time, leading the post-conviction court to properly deny the Petitioner’s claims. The Petitioner argued that counsel's performance was ineffective for turning over three volumes of Dr. McCoy’s work product to the prosecution before the penalty phase, claiming there was no court order mandating this disclosure under Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence. The Petitioner cited lead counsel’s ambiguous testimony regarding the existence of such an order, suggesting he might have mistakenly believed one existed. However, the State contended that the evidence, primarily consisting of lead counsel's statements, indicated a court order likely did exist during an in-camera hearing, with no contradictory testimony provided by General Crabtree, the only other attendee. The court concluded that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice, as she did not prove that the mitigation report adversely impacted the trial's outcome, despite some information being used in cross-examination at sentencing.

General Crabtree, questioned during the post-conviction hearing, could not recall whether the information he encountered in a new report was previously known to him. The Petitioner did not provide evidence to contradict the post-conviction court's findings. The Petitioner argues that trial counsel's penalty phase arguments were poorly prepared, specifically pointing out that lead counsel failed to emphasize the Petitioner’s age and the shared culpability with two violent gang members, as well as neglecting to mention evidence from Drs. Engum and McCoy relating to the Petitioner’s mental health and history of abuse. Co-counsel's closing argument similarly failed to address mitigation factors such as mental illness, lack of prior criminal activity, the extreme emotional disturbance during the crime, and the Petitioner’s youth. The State claims these arguments are being raised for the first time on appeal, making them waived. The record shows these points were not previously presented in the Petitioner’s post-conviction petition or addressed by the post-conviction court, confirming their waiver for appellate review. Additionally, the Petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to conduct meaningful voir dire, particularly regarding the exclusion of a juror who could not impose the death penalty based solely on the Petitioner’s age, and for not sufficiently questioning jurors about racial biases or fears related to Satanism. The United States Supreme Court has extensively analyzed capital juror selection, a principle that Tennessee courts have adopted.

Illinois law permitted the State to challenge jurors for cause if they expressed conscientious objections to capital punishment, leading to the exclusion of many potential jurors in the case of Witherspoon. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this practice violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury, as the resulting jury was not representative of the community. The Court emphasized that many excluded jurors were not given the opportunity to demonstrate whether they could set aside their beliefs and adhere to the law. The ruling established that Illinois's statute crossed a line of neutrality, making it inappropriate to have a jury that could not fairly decide life or death cases. 

In Wainwright v. Witt, the Court clarified the application of Witherspoon, particularly in a Florida case where a juror opposed the death penalty. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of this juror, correcting the Eleventh Circuit's misconceptions regarding Witherspoon's scope. The Court noted that Witherspoon's context had evolved, and juries now faced limitations in capital sentencing discretion. It explained that the focus should be on whether a juror's beliefs would prevent them from being impartial, rather than solely on their views about capital punishment. The standard for juror exclusion was established as whether a juror's views would significantly impair their ability to fulfill their duties, without requiring absolute certainty of bias.

The trial process requires careful scrutiny of jurors' responses to assess potential bias, as emphasized by the Wainwright court. Even when the record is ambiguous, the trial judge’s impressions of prospective jurors are critical. The Supreme Court has mandated that deference should be given to trial judges who directly observe jurors. In Morgan v. Illinois, the Court reiterated that a juror who would never vote for capital punishment, regardless of instructions, is not impartial and must be dismissed for cause. In this context, the trial court acted within its discretion when removing Mr. Rutherford as a juror. During questioning, Mr. Rutherford expressed that he could not impose the death penalty, particularly due to the defendant's age, indicating that this factor alone would prevent him from doing so. The Petitioner contended that Mr. Rutherford could consider the death penalty for a more mature defendant, but the court disagreed, affirming that a juror must be impartial regarding the specific case at hand. The analysis concluded that Mr. Rutherford’s inability to impose the death penalty due to the defendant's age rendered him unfit to serve on the jury.

Mr. Rutherford’s statements suggest that his views would hinder his ability to perform juror duties as per his instructions and oath, justifying his removal for cause without objection from trial counsel. While his statements do not indicate an absolute bias against capital punishment, this is not the required standard for disqualification. The Petitioner argues that since a juror can find mitigating factors outweighing aggravating evidence, Mr. Rutherford should not have been disqualified based on his reluctance to impose the death penalty due to age. However, this argument does not align with the rationale in Wainwright, which focuses on identifying potential bias. Mr. Rutherford’s comments clearly reflect a refusal to impose the death penalty.

Additionally, the Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire for failing to inform jurors about the statutory mitigating factor of youth, and for not addressing themes related to mental illness, interracial dating, and knowledge of lead counsel’s overbilling. The Petitioner has not provided evidence of bias among jurors or improper exclusions, and thus fails to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court noted that the scope of voir dire is determined by counsel on a case-by-case basis, and no dissatisfaction with the selected jury was expressed.

The Petitioner also asserts that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the State’s use of a legally inconsistent aggravating factor, arguing that her simultaneous convictions for conspiracy and capital murder violated her constitutional rights. She claims it is inconsistent to find that she committed murder to avoid arrest while also being convicted based on premeditated intent. The State disagrees, asserting that determining ineffective assistance of counsel hinges on whether the aggravating factor was indeed legally inconsistent.

The post-conviction court denied the petitioner relief, affirming that sufficient evidence supported both the conspiracy charge and the motive of avoiding arrest during the murder. The court noted that the law does not require the motive to avoid arrest to be the sole reason for the act. Evidence indicated that this motive was present at the time of the murder, and thus, the petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice warranting relief. The court agreed with the findings that the State must show avoidance of prosecution as a motivating factor, which was met in this case. The petitioner had expressed intent to kill the victim, lured her to a secluded area, and attacked her with multiple weapons, indicating both intent and conspiracy through her actions with co-conspirators.

Additionally, the petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, arguing that trial counsel failed to present evidence undermining the first-degree murder conviction, made ineffective arguments, and poorly utilized voir dire. The petitioner asserted that the killing was neither deliberate nor premeditated, attributing her actions to a hypomanic, psychotic break. She criticized her counsel for not effectively using expert witnesses or relevant lay testimony, echoing deficiencies noted in the penalty phase.

Dr. Engum testified that the Petitioner acted without deliberation or premeditation due to her Borderline Personality Disorder, indicating a loss of control. However, the Petitioner claimed that Dr. Engum's testimony was insufficiently substantiated, relying solely on her self-reports, which the State effectively undermined during cross-examination. The Petitioner argued that introducing lay witness testimony would have strengthened Dr. Engum’s opinion, but this assertion was deemed speculative and insufficient for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner also criticized the testimony of Dr. Bernet, which characterized the killing as "collective aggression" rather than a satanic ritual, claiming it was prejudicial and irrelevant. The court concluded that the Petitioner did not demonstrate how specific lay witnesses could have enhanced the weight of Dr. Engum's testimony, nor did she show how Dr. Bernet's testimony constituted a "wasted opportunity." Furthermore, the Petitioner contended ineffective assistance of counsel due to inadequate opening and closing arguments, particularly neglecting to address whether her mental illness negated the allegations of deliberate and premeditated murder. Overall, the court found the Petitioner failed to meet her burden for relief.

Lead counsel and co-counsel are criticized for inadequate arguments regarding the Petitioner’s intent. This issue is deemed waived as it was not presented in the petition or addressed by the post-conviction court, per T.C.A. 40-30-106(g). The Petitioner also claims ineffective assistance of counsel due to poor use of voir dire, arguing that defense counsel failed to select a jury sensitive to mental illness issues, which negatively impacted her defense during both the guilt/innocence and penalty phases. However, since the trial counsel's performance was previously deemed sufficient, no further review is warranted.

The Petitioner argues that, based on Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons, an immature, mentally ill, brain-damaged eighteen-year-old is ineligible for the death penalty. This argument is supported by the principle that the death penalty should be reserved for the "worst of the worst" and the unique nature of capital punishment, which the Supreme Court has characterized as different from other sentences due to its irrevocability and rejection of rehabilitation. Relevant cases highlight the necessity for reliable determinations in capital cases and the unconstitutionality of arbitrary death penalty imposition, reinforcing the need for careful consideration of mitigating evidence.

Eddings v. Oklahoma and Lockett v. Ohio establish that a criminal defendant's punishment must correlate with their personal culpability, emphasizing that sentences should reflect a moral assessment of the defendant's background and character rather than mere sympathy. The principle that "death is different" has led the Supreme Court to exempt certain classes from capital punishment if a national consensus suggests that immutable characteristics affect individual responsibility and moral guilt, as demonstrated in Godfrey v. Georgia. The Court identified four criteria for determining such consensus: legislative enactments, decisions by sentencing juries and courts, indications of national and international opinion, and the Court's judgment itself. Subsequent rulings have exempted specific groups from execution, including those under eighteen (Roper v. Simmons), mentally retarded individuals (Atkins v. Virginia), and the insane (Ford v. Wainwright). 

The petitioner seeks to establish a new exempt class of eighteen-year-olds who are immature, mentally ill, or brain damaged, arguing that existing legal standards fail to protect less culpable individuals from cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Supreme Court language, the petitioner contends that the arbitrary age of eighteen does not adequately reflect cognitive development, as brain maturity extends into the early twenties. The state counters that this issue is waived due to its absence in the direct appeal and argues that the petitioner's claims lack merit.

The State argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the execution of older adolescents should be categorically banned. It contends that the Petitioner’s claim of incompetence to be executed is not ripe for consideration. The Petitioner maintains that many individuals, particularly older adolescents, may lack the necessary brain development for full culpability, despite falling outside the age limits of execution under Tennessee and federal law. She highlights that Tennessee law recognizes youth as a mitigating factor in death penalty cases and exempts those under eighteen from execution.

Statistical evidence from Tennessee indicates that no one younger than twenty-three has been executed, with only 7.7% of current death-sentenced inmates being nineteen or younger at the time of their crimes. Furthermore, by 1989, 29 out of 37 states with the death penalty acknowledged youth as a mitigating factor. The Petitioner cites the Supreme Court's decision in *Thompson v. Oklahoma* (1988), which ruled that executing offenders under sixteen violates the Eighth Amendment. The Court emphasized that juveniles are not afforded the same responsibilities as adults, and hence their actions are considered less morally reprehensible.

In *Roper v. Simmons* (2005), the Supreme Court deemed the execution of individuals who committed crimes under eighteen as cruel and unusual punishment. Prior rulings, including *Stanford v. Kentucky* (1989), indicated that it was permissible to execute juveniles aged sixteen and seventeen, based on a lack of national consensus against such practices at the time. These cases establish a legal precedent concerning the treatment of youthful offenders in capital punishment contexts, reflecting evolving standards of decency in American society.

At the time the Supreme Court addressed juvenile death penalty exemptions, thirty states had prohibited it, with twelve states rejecting the death penalty entirely and eighteen allowing it but excluding juveniles. The Court noted a decline in juvenile death penalty cases and concluded that the Eighth Amendment requires that juveniles under eighteen cannot be subjected to the death penalty. It identified three key differences between juveniles and adults: 

1. Juveniles exhibit a lack of maturity and responsibility, leading to impulsive behavior.
2. They are more susceptible to negative influences and peer pressure.
3. Their personalities are less developed and more malleable.

These differences cast doubt on the classification of juveniles as the worst offenders. The Court also determined that retribution and deterrence do not justify imposing the death penalty on juveniles. Regarding the age distinction, the Court recognized the challenges in drawing a line but concluded that eighteen is a reasonable threshold for defining adulthood and eligibility for the death penalty, reinforcing the precedent set by the Thompson plurality, which drew the line at sixteen. The petitioner failed to establish a new consensus for extending Roper's holding to individuals over eighteen.

The court does not recognize a national consensus that evolving standards of decency warrant a constitutional ban on executing individuals aged 18 to early 20 at the time of their offenses, and declines to extend the ruling of Roper to include this demographic. It acknowledges that both federal and state courts provide special protections for the mentally impaired in capital cases. Mental illness can be cited for incompetency to stand trial and as an affirmative defense, and according to Ford v. Wainwright, individuals must be mentally competent at execution. The mentally retarded are protected from capital prosecution under Atkins and Van Tran, which highlight their increased risk of wrongful execution due to disadvantages in legal proceedings, such as susceptibility to false confessions and difficulties in assisting counsel.

The petitioner argues that cognitive impairments share similar disadvantages as those faced by the mentally retarded, suggesting the need for broader exemptions from the death penalty for individuals with mental illness. Notably, twelve states have abolished the death penalty and New York has a moratorium, with many states allowing juries to consider mitigating factors related to mental impairment during sentencing. Several states have removed mentally ill inmates from death row, and only four states have imposed death sentences in "guilty but mentally ill" cases. Legislative efforts to abolish the death penalty for severely mentally ill individuals have been attempted but have not been successful.

The Capital Juror Project identifies a defendant's mental illness history as a significant mitigating factor, and the American Bar Association has passed a resolution opposing capital punishment for the severely mentally ill and those with similar brain injuries. The court acknowledges that the challenges faced by the mentally retarded may also apply to the mentally ill or cognitively impaired, and many states allow juries to consider a defendant's capacity to understand the criminality of their actions in capital cases.

State legislation does not support a categorical exclusion from the death penalty for individuals with mental illness, as federal and state courts have continually refused to extend the Atkins decision to this group. The court specifically declines to apply the Atkins bar to persons who are cognitively impaired or mentally ill. The Petitioner’s request for an exemption from execution due to mental illness and brain damage is viewed as an attempt to gain a second chance at proportionality review rather than a legitimate basis for a categorical exemption. The court maintains that such circumstances should be addressed within the individualized sentencing framework that considers mitigating factors, rather than creating broad exceptions.

Furthermore, the Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of capital punishment and lethal injection in Tennessee, asserting that the state fails to provide meaningful proportionality review. The court has consistently upheld the state's comparative proportionality review as constitutionally adequate. The Petitioner also claims that the discretion given to District Attorneys regarding the pursuit of the death penalty is problematic, referencing principles from Bush v. Gore. This argument has previously been rejected by the court. Overall, the Petitioner is denied relief on these grounds.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the state's lethal injection protocol, affirming that it aligns with contemporary standards of decency and is similar to protocols used in other jurisdictions, notably Kentucky. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Baze v. Rees supports this, affirming the three-drug protocol employed in executions. The Petitioner’s claim that the death penalty violates a fundamental right to life is rejected, as established precedents confirm the legitimacy of capital punishment under Tennessee law. Additionally, the argument that the indictment was unconstitutional for failing to specify aggravating circumstances is also dismissed, with the court referencing that neither the U.S. nor Tennessee constitutions necessitate this requirement in indictments for first-degree murder. The court reiterated that the state's capital sentencing procedure meets constitutional standards, including the necessity for a jury to determine aggravating factors. Consequently, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on any of the raised issues, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.