Kathy D. Partee filed a pro se medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Jaime Vasquez following complications from a myomectomy he performed on August 22, 2007, after she presented with fibroids and abnormal bleeding. Dr. Vasquez claimed he adhered to the relevant medical standards, providing an affidavit to support his motion for summary judgment. Despite being granted several continuances to secure legal representation and expert testimony, Partee was unable to do so. Consequently, the trial court granted Dr. Vasquez's motion for summary judgment, leading to an affirmation of the trial court's decision on appeal.
The surgical procedure involved the removal of fifteen fibroids with minimal blood loss, and Partee initially showed signs of recovery. However, her condition deteriorated, resulting in severe abdominal pain and profuse bleeding, prompting her hospitalization on September 19, 2007, with a diagnosis of postoperative ileus, which Dr. Vasquez defined as a temporary intestinal paralysis following surgery. The court upheld the trial court's ruling, indicating that Partee's lack of expert testimony to challenge Dr. Vasquez's affidavit was pivotal in the decision.
Ms. Partee was hospitalized and underwent diagnostic procedures, including a CT scan, which showed no significant abdominal or pelvic issues, except for a small, non-removable fibroid. Dr. Vasquez, her physician, consulted with other doctors during her hospital stay, noted her symptoms improved, and discharged her after a week. On October 4, 2007, during a follow-up appointment, Ms. Partee reported ongoing symptoms, leading Dr. Vasquez to prescribe medication and advise further visits if issues persisted. Despite multiple calls to his office, she did not return until November 15, 2007, when Dr. Vasquez recommended she see additional specialists for her ileus, advice she declined. He reported that she was also receiving treatment from other doctors whose names she withheld and that she ultimately discharged him as her physician.
On August 18, 2008, Ms. Partee filed a pro se complaint against Dr. Vasquez in Davidson County Circuit Court, detailing adverse physical effects post-myomectomy and alleging inadequate treatment and failure to meet professional standards. She sought compensation for pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of her husband's work time. Dr. Vasquez responded on September 24, 2008, asserting appropriate care, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment with an affidavit outlining his qualifications and treatment of Ms. Partee, accompanied by extensive medical records. His affidavit claimed compliance with accepted medical standards, shifting the burden to Ms. Partee to provide expert testimony to dispute this. The summary judgment hearing was set for January 2009. However, Ms. Partee filed multiple motions for extensions to secure legal representation, including requests for a 90-day continuance and a specific hearing date of April 3, 2009.
On February 13, 2009, the trial court postponed the motion for summary judgment to April 24, 2009, allowing the Plaintiff, Ms. Partee, time to secure legal representation or respond. On April 15, 2009, Ms. Partee requested an additional extension, claiming her medical records were with potential attorneys and sought "fifteen or thirty more days" for them to decide. The summary judgment hearing occurred on May 1, 2009, where Ms. Partee represented herself, while Dr. Vasquez was represented by counsel. During the hearing, Ms. Partee indicated she was still looking for an attorney, but the court emphasized the need for timely resolution given the delays.
In its May 8, 2009 order, the trial court found no genuine issue of material fact and ruled in favor of Dr. Vasquez, but granted Ms. Partee a final extension. The court mandated that if Ms. Partee did not file a notice of appearance for counsel by 4:00 p.m. on May 22, 2009, a summary judgment would be entered. If she did file, a further hearing would be held on June 5, 2009. Ms. Partee failed to file the notice or provide sufficient evidence to contest the summary judgment, leading the court to grant summary judgment to Dr. Vasquez.
The excerpt notes that appellate review of a trial court's summary judgment decision is de novo, without any presumption of correctness. For summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact exists and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The burden of proof shifts to the nonmoving party to show specific facts that indicate a genuine issue exists if the moving party sufficiently supports their motion. The moving party can achieve this by negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or showing the nonmoving party's inability to prove an essential element at trial.
Evidence presented at the summary judgment stage must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, allowing for reasonable inferences (Doe v. HCA Health Servs. Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 196; Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504, 507). When a properly supported motion for summary judgment is filed, the opposing party cannot rely solely on allegations or denials but must provide specific facts via affidavits or other means to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, as outlined in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. If the opposing party fails to respond adequately, summary judgment may be granted against them (Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 211).
In the case at hand, Ms. Partee alleged that Dr. Vasquez did not adhere to the accepted standard of care, resulting in her injury. Dr. Vasquez’s affidavit claimed compliance with the standard of care for gynecologists in Nashville, thus shifting the burden to Ms. Partee to provide expert testimony to counter his assertion. Medical malpractice claims require expert testimony to establish the standard of care, deviation from that standard, and a direct link to the injury (Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115). Specifically, the claimant must prove the recognized standard of care, its breach, and that the injury would not have occurred but for the breach. Expert witnesses must be licensed healthcare professionals practicing in Tennessee or contiguous states, relevant to the case's issues, and have practiced within the year prior to the injury (Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115 (b)).
Without expert testimony, a medical malpractice case is unlikely to succeed. Dr. Vasquez’s affidavit asserting compliance with the standard of care necessitates that Ms. Partee present expert testimony to contradict it. If she fails to meet this burden, the defendant's affidavit supports a summary judgment dismissal (Bowman v. Henard, 547 S.W.2d 531; Fitts v. Arms, 137 S.W.3d 187, 190). The trial court acknowledged the difficulty Ms. Partee would face in securing a qualified expert under Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115 (b) and noted her need for legal representation to succeed in her claim.
The court granted Ms. Partee a continuance, postponing her summary judgment hearing from January to April 2009 to allow her time to secure legal counsel. She was ultimately given over six months to find an attorney or respond to the motion. The court recognized that pro se litigants, lacking legal training, deserve fair treatment and some leeway in their pleadings. However, new statutory requirements for medical malpractice cases, effective in 2008 and 2009, mandated that plaintiffs provide notice to healthcare providers at least 60 days before filing suit and obtain a signed certificate from a medical expert confirming the case's validity. Ms. Partee's complaint, filed on August 18, 2008, was not subject to these statutes. Nonetheless, courts must balance fairness to pro se litigants with fairness to opposing parties, meaning pro se litigants must still adhere to substantive and procedural rules. Ms. Partee failed to file a properly supported response to Dr. Vasquez's motion for summary judgment, resulting in no material fact dispute. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled in favor of Dr. Vasquez, and the judgment was affirmed. The case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Davidson County for further proceedings, with costs of the appeal taxed to Ms. Partee.
