State of Tennessee v. Davis Bradley Waldroup, Jr.

Citation: Not availableDocket: E2010-01906-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; October 20, 2011; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Davis Bradley Waldroup, Jr. was indicted by the Polk County Grand Jury on charges including two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, first degree murder, and attempted first degree murder, stemming from an incident with his wife, Penny Waldroup, and her friend, Leslie Bradshaw, on October 13, 2006. A jury convicted Waldroup of aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted second degree murder, resulting in a thirty-two year sentence. On appeal, he contested the sufficiency of evidence for aggravated kidnapping, denial of a venue change, admission of a victim’s injury photograph, and rejection of his motion for judgment of acquittal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgments after a comprehensive review. 

The factual background highlights that Waldroup's relationship with his wife had deteriorated by October 2006. On the day of the incident, after Mrs. Waldroup and Ms. Bradshaw arrived at Waldroup's trailer with their children, he prevented them from leaving by throwing away Mrs. Waldroup's van keys. Armed with a rifle, Waldroup verbally abused both women and ultimately fired the weapon. Mrs. Waldroup attempted to escape but was shot in the back after fleeing. The situation escalated, leading to tragic outcomes for the victims.

Appellant physically attacked Mrs. Waldroup with a pocketknife, which she managed to throw away, but he then pursued her with a shovel and later a machete, inflicting severe injuries, including the loss of her pinkie finger. During the assault, Appellant also kicked the body of Ms. Bradshaw and threatened Mrs. Waldroup, indicating intent to sexually assault her. Despite her severe injuries and blood loss, Mrs. Waldroup attempted to protect herself and eventually managed to escape when a police officer arrived. Following her escape, Appellant confessed to the officer about killing Ms. Bradshaw. Mrs. Waldroup was airlifted to a medical center for treatment. Subsequently, Appellant was indicted on multiple serious charges, including first-degree murder and attempted murder. After a jury trial, he was convicted of several offenses, including voluntary manslaughter, and received a thirty-two-year sentence. Appellant's motion for a change of venue due to concerns about a fair trial in Polk County was granted, with the jury being selected from Bradley County following a court hearing where the State acknowledged the need for an external jury pool.

The State dismissed its initial indictment and subsequently filed a superseding indictment in August 2008. On December 4, 2008, the Appellant renewed a motion to change the trial venue outside the Tenth Judicial District, which the trial court denied, deciding that jury selection would occur from nearby Bradley County. The Appellant contends that this denial was erroneous, while the State argues that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court. According to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a), a change of venue is warranted if a fair trial is unlikely due to excessive local sentiment against the defendant. However, such motions are evaluated at the discretion of the trial court, and appellate reversal requires clear evidence of abuse. Prior case law indicates that mere exposure of jurors to pretrial publicity does not automatically necessitate a venue change, and prejudice is not presumed from extensive publicity. Jurors with knowledge of the case facts may still serve if they can fairly judge the case based solely on trial evidence. The defendant bears the burden to prove juror bias or prejudice, and the fairness of the trial cannot be established solely by the presence of pretrial publicity without a severely compromised trial atmosphere. The trial court also has discretion over the scope of voir dire, allowing jurors who have been exposed to media coverage to serve if they can remain impartial.

Factors for granting a motion for change of venue include: the nature and timing of pre-trial publicity, whether it is fair or inflammatory, the content and reach of the publicity, the elapsed time since its release, jury selection care, ease of jury selection, juror familiarity with the publicity, and any bias or prejudice demonstrated during voir dire. A defendant must prove actual juror bias to reverse a conviction due to denied venue change. The absence of a voir dire transcript leads to a presumption that the trial court's denial was correct, suggesting the jury was fair. Regarding admissibility of evidence, trial courts have broad discretion, and their decisions are upheld unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Admissible evidence must be relevant, as defined by Tennessee Rules of Evidence, which states it must make a consequential fact more or less probable. The court found no error in admitting a photograph of the victim's injuries, as it fell within the standards of relevancy and discretion.

Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, as outlined in Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Graphic photographs of crime victims can be admitted if they are relevant and their probative value is not overshadowed by their prejudicial effect. If the photographs are not relevant to the prosecution’s case, they cannot be used merely to provoke an emotional response from the jury. The trial court has the discretion to decide on the admissibility of such evidence, and this decision will not be overturned on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion.

The term 'undue prejudice' refers to an inclination to suggest a decision based on improper, often emotional, grounds. In the case of Banks, guidance was provided for trial courts in assessing the admissibility of photographic evidence, considering factors such as the accuracy of the image, its depiction of the body, the sufficiency of testimonial evidence, and the necessity of the evidence for establishing guilt or rebutting the defendant’s claims.

Initially, the trial court ruled that a photograph of a victim’s injuries was more prejudicial than probative. However, during trial when the Appellant’s counsel questioned a witness about witnessing the assault, the State argued that the photograph’s probative value had increased. The trial court then reversed its decision, allowing the photograph into evidence based on the evolving context of the testimony, stating that the photograph now had significant probative value related to the witness’s mental state during the incident. The court emphasized that the photograph was relevant to clarifying the witness’s condition and reactions during the event being discussed.

References were made by both parties regarding the actions of an individual who may have leaned against a trailer, potentially due to loss of blood and disorientation. This behavior was deemed probative to understanding her state of mind and physical condition at that moment. The trial court ruled that the probative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial impact, and it was accepted into evidence. The court affirmed this decision upon review, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, particularly after considering the relevance of the photograph to Mrs. Waldroup's injuries.

Regarding the appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court denied it after the State's proof, which the State argued was waived when the appellant subsequently introduced his own evidence. Under Tennessee law, an appellant waives any error related to the denial of such a motion if they continue to present evidence afterward. The court reiterated that the standard for assessing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal focuses solely on the legal sufficiency of the evidence, not its weight.

The appellant also contested the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of aggravated kidnapping involving Ms. Bradshaw. The court maintained that a jury's guilty verdict, endorsed by the trial judge, validates the State’s witnesses' testimony and resolves testimonial conflicts in favor of the State. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support the conviction.

The presumption of innocence for the accused is overturned by a guilty verdict, which necessitates that the defendant demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. The appellate court must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and refraining from re-evaluating the evidence or substituting its inferences. Credibility and weight of evidence are assessed by the trier of fact, not the appellate court. 

The appellant contends that the evidence does not support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping, arguing that the victim was not confined since she was seen moving freely. However, aggravated kidnapping encompasses false imprisonment, which is characterized by unlawfully removing or confining another person and significantly interfering with their liberty. The evidence demonstrated that the appellant took the van keys during an argument, preventing the victims from leaving and creating a situation of fear, as he brandished a firearm. The remote location and lack of nearby assistance further substantiated the claim of substantial interference with the victim's liberty. The statutory definition does not require a specific distance of movement or duration of restraint for a finding of aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, the court concludes that the evidence supports the conviction, affirming the trial court's judgment.