Richard L. Hollow, Trustee, filed a lawsuit against Beulah Butler regarding a boundary line dispute between their adjacent properties in Roane County, Tennessee. Following a trial, the Chancery Court determined that the boundary line is defined by a survey conducted on September 17, 2003, by surveyor James Ogle. The court ruled that Butler failed to establish claims of adverse possession, laches, or gross laches. Butler subsequently appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment, maintaining that the boundary was as per the survey and remanding the case. The background of the case includes the historical ownership of the properties, with Butler owning two parcels acquired in 1946 and 1948, and the Wilson Property being transferred through various deeds, ultimately to Johnson Bend Properties and then to Hollow as trustee. Testimony from Ogle at trial supported the court's finding, as he confirmed the accuracy of his survey in alignment with historical deeds and tax maps.
Mr. Ogle provided a detailed description of the Disputed Area, noting its steep terrain on the north side of an old fence and a gentler slope on the south side. He observed that both sides of the property line appeared similar in timber, with evidence of past logging indicated by old stumps. The wooden fence posts were largely decayed, while a few metal posts remained. The fence wire was attached to the south side of the trees and posts, which corresponded to the Wilson property side. Mr. Ogle, a surveyor and cattle farmer, explained that he places fence wires on his side of the posts to better contain his cattle. He has visited the Disputed Area multiple times between 2003 and the trial date but has never seen livestock there, only a deer once. He found no signs of animal trails, cultivation, or human activity, and he actively searched for evidence to clarify the property line, which he identified using stone piles.
Charles Douglas Irwin, a partner at Johnson Bend Properties, testified about the Wilson Property, which spans approximately 1,160 acres, comprising wooded areas, open fields, and hay land. He described the presence of various cross fences and noted that after acquiring the property, Johnson Bend Properties sold about 1,100 acres, retaining a 60-acre tract in the northwest corner that features a ridge.
Mr. Irwin observed remnants of an old fence on the ridge, noting that most of it was buried under leaves and inadequate for containing livestock. He indicated that the wire was on the Wilson side of the boundary line and described the slope toward the Butler Property as very steep, without any visible structures, animals, cultivation evidence, or carcasses in the Disputed Area.
William D. McSpadden, a partner in Johnson Bend Properties, testified that he discovered the fence remnants after hiring a chipping company to clear the area following the construction of a road. He estimated that about one hundred trees were cleared but noted that the fence's condition remained unchanged post-chipping. He described the fence as insufficient to contain livestock, with sections either down or buried, and confirmed the absence of any animals, people, structures, or cultivation signs in the Disputed Area.
Morgan Alexander Schubert, another partner, noted that before Johnson Bend Properties acquired the Wilson Property, it was leased to Glen Long, who had maintained fences for cattle. Schubert found an old, dilapidated stock fence after the road construction, similar in style to Long's fences but in worse condition, primarily attached to trees. He stated that this old fence was entirely on the Wilson side of the property boundary.
Mr. Schubert indicated that the fence in question was inadequate for containing animals, citing extensive disrepair due to fallen trees that had broken the wire. He noted that a significant portion of the wire was pinned to the ground by a tree that had rotted away. During his inspection of the Disputed Area, Schubert observed no signs of human activity, structures, livestock, or cultivation, describing the area as "very dense." Though he raises cattle, he expressed doubt about their ability to access the ridge near the old fence, suggesting it was possible but not probable.
George Wilson, III, familiar with the Wilson Property since childhood and involved in its management, testified that his father held the property since 1941 and allowed lessees to move or establish fences. After forming a partnership in the 1990s, the family sold the property while affirming in an affidavit that there were no boundary disputes, a declaration supported by a conducted survey that aligned with deed descriptions.
Bob Easter, a long-time community member and cattle doctor, recognized the fence as a boundary and confirmed that cattle could access the wooded area, particularly if they were attracted to forage. He noted that while he had seen cattle near the fence, the slope was steep, which could deter them. Easter emphasized that the wooded area lacked grass and water sources, making it less appealing for grazing. He also remarked on the presence of interior fences within both the Wilson and Butler properties.
Beulah Butler, at 90 years old during the trial, testified about her long-term residence on the Butler Property since 1948. She identified a fence as the property boundary, stating her husband maintained it, although they did not build it or post boundary signs. Community members sought permission to use the land for various activities, which the Butlers regulated by pointing out the fence. While their cattle roamed freely, Ms. Butler acknowledged they often stayed near the lake rather than venturing into the woods of the Disputed Area. She noted the cows could access a steep slope but preferred the pastures and admitted they lacked water and food on the ridge. Her son, Walter E. Butler, also testified, affirming the fence's role as a boundary and that the cattle preferred pasture grasses. He indicated timber cutting on the property occurred only once. Noel Fletcher Marsh, a community member, confirmed the fence's significance as a boundary based on local knowledge and shared hunting experiences, noting he had seen Butler's cattle near the fence eating acorns during hunting seasons.
Mr. Marsh asserts that the fence delineates the property boundary based on Mr. Butler's statement and his belief that the Wilsons constructed it, as it is consistent with their old woven wire style. He has not observed any agricultural developments or water troughs nearby. Jim Rogers, a community member, testified that it was widely accepted that the fence marked the boundary and recounted a conversation between Mr. Wilson and his father, in which Mr. Wilson indicated that the property line followed the fence. However, Rogers admitted to not having visited the area of the fence for about 35 years.
Judy Butler, living on the Butler Property, confirmed community recognition of the fence as the boundary and described its use for cattle grazing, timber cutting, and recreational activities. Carolyn Butler Johnson, also a daughter of Beulah Butler, shared that their property supported dairy farming, hay cutting, tobacco cultivation, and allowed for cattle grazing. She assisted in maintaining the fence and noted that the cows could navigate the property terrain.
On October 7, 2010, the Trial Court concluded that the boundary is defined by a survey conducted on September 17, 2003, and affirmed that the Plaintiff, Richard L. Hollow, has superior title to the disputed area east and southeast of this boundary. The Court also ruled that Ms. Butler did not demonstrate adverse possession or establish defenses of laches. Ms. Butler has appealed, raising three issues: the correctness of the boundary established by the 2003 survey, her failure to prove adverse possession, and the rejection of her laches defenses. The appeals court will review the record de novo but will presume the trial court's factual findings to be correct unless the evidence suggests otherwise. Legal conclusions made by the trial court will be reviewed without any presumption of correctness.
Evidence must convincingly support a different finding of fact to preponderate against a trial court's findings. In this case, the Trial Court found the boundary line per the 2003 Ogle survey. Ms. Butler criticized the survey and noted the lack of an independent survey from the Plaintiff or Johnson Bend Properties to assess her claimed acreage. While she questioned Mr. Ogle's methods, she failed to provide evidence at trial that he did not adhere to industry standards or made errors in his survey. Ms. Butler argued that her 1941 and 1946 deeds indicated that the boundary lines joined, citing similar compass bearings and distances. However, the court referenced the established principle of using natural objects first in boundary disputes, followed by artificial monuments, neighboring land boundaries, and lastly, courses and distances. The evidence indicated Mr. Ogle searched for artificial monuments before considering neighboring boundaries or measurements. Hence, the court rejected Ms. Butler's argument that Ogle should have solely relied on the deeds.
Moreover, the Plaintiff's survey closely matched the tax and TVA maps and relevant deeds. Ms. Butler had the option to conduct her own survey but did not do so, and the Plaintiff was not obligated to validate her claims. The evidence did not sufficiently challenge the Trial Court's conclusion regarding the boundary line as presented in the 2003 survey.
Regarding Ms. Butler's claim of adverse possession, the court stated that to establish such a claim, possession must be exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious for the required time period. Adverse possession remains a factual question. Ultimately, the Trial Court did not err in its findings regarding both the boundary line and the adverse possession claim.
The burden of proof for claiming ownership by adverse possession lies with the claimant, requiring clear and convincing evidence. Knowledge of the adverse possession by the actual owner is necessary, or the possession must be open and notorious enough to imply such knowledge. If an adverse possessor maintains control of the land for twenty years, title may vest in them, regardless of color of title. Ms. Butler contends there was no evidence of the Wilsons using the disputed land from 1948 to 2006, aside from checking a fence, asserting that the burden is on her to prove adverse possession. Her claims include her cattle straying into the area, allowing neighbors to hunt, occasional cutting of firewood, and minor repairs to the fence. However, occasional use, such as grazing or cutting timber, does not suffice for establishing adverse possession. Actions like taking firewood or hunting suggest trespass rather than intent to claim ownership. Furthermore, there was no indication that the Wilsons or subsequent owners were aware of Butler's claim to the land, as they did not observe any significant use. Ms. Butler's assertion that her family's fence repairs indicated a claim was undermined by evidence showing that the Wilsons' lessees were responsible for such maintenance, leaving no basis for the owners to assume the Butlers were claiming the land.
Repairs to the fence in the Disputed Area did not adequately notify the Wilsons of the Butlers' claim to the land. The Trial Court determined that Ms. Butler failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that her possession of the Disputed Area was exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious for the required duration. Evidence indicated only one instance of timber cutting, occasional cattle straying, and sporadic use by neighbors for firewood and hunting, with some hunters having the Wilsons' permission as well as the Butlers'. The Court found no error in concluding that Ms. Butler did not establish adverse possession. Additionally, the Court ruled that the defenses of laches and gross laches were not substantiated, as the Plaintiff and predecessors were unaware of the alleged possession, which was not sufficiently open and notorious to suggest a presumption of knowledge. The Trial Court’s judgment is affirmed, with costs of the appeal assessed against Beulah Butler and her surety.
