State of Tennessee v. Robert L. Adams

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2010-00916-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; November 7, 2011; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Robert Lee Adams fled during jury deliberations in a 2007 drug-related shooting case and was subsequently convicted of attempted first-degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. He was sentenced in absentia to life without parole plus twenty years. Upon his counsel's timely motion for a new trial, the State moved to dismiss it, arguing that Adams had abandoned his right to proceed due to his fugitive status. The trial court dismissed the motion based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and allowed counsel to withdraw. After being returned to custody, Adams filed a pro se appeal and was appointed new counsel.

On appeal, Adams raised four issues: the trial court's dismissal of his motion for a new trial, sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, denial of his counsel's motion for a continuance, and improper application of enhancement factors during sentencing. The State contended that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the new trial motion due to Adams’ fugitive status but maintained jurisdiction to review his appeal post-custody. The court concluded that sufficient evidence supported his convictions and that sentencing for conspiracy was appropriate. Although one enhancement factor used for the aggravated robbery sentence may have been applied incorrectly, the overall sentence was deemed appropriate given the circumstances. The judgments of the trial court were affirmed.

Ms. Darice Brown was shot multiple times and left for dead near an abandoned construction site on December 15, 2007, after arranging a drug transaction for the defendant. On August 6, 2008, the defendant and three co-defendants were indicted on four counts: attempted first-degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery (all Class A felonies), and conspiracy to commit kidnapping (a Class D felony). During the trial on December 16-17, 2009, Ms. Brown testified that the defendant, known as “P.T.,” repeatedly asked her to find cocaine. She contacted an individual, “B.I.,” to arrange a meeting at Walmart. The defendant arrived with three others, including a large man, “Debo,” and two women, one of whom was the defendant’s wife, “Cash.” Despite initial reluctance, Ms. Brown entered the vehicle after the defendant assured her of safety. At Walmart, after Ms. Brown disclosed her companions, B.I. refused to proceed with the transaction. The defendant insisted she call B.I. back, assuring him nothing would go wrong, leading to a successful exchange of money for what seemed to be cocaine. After returning to the vehicle, Debo revealed a prior conflict with B.I. and requested a gun from the defendant, which he received. This frightened Ms. Brown, who urged them to avoid confrontation, but the defendant instructed her to lure B.I. to another location, which he did not answer.

Michelle, the car's driver, attempted to locate B.I.'s residence for about 30 to 45 minutes while the victim remained trapped in the back seat between two individuals, Debo and the defendant. The atmosphere in the car was tense, with Debo accusing the victim of lying about B.I.'s location. During the search, the defendant sampled cocaine and deemed it unsatisfactory, a sentiment echoed by Cash after he tried it. Following this, Debo provided driving instructions to Michelle, while the victim sought reassurance from the defendant, who ominously stated, “somebody’s going to die tonight.”

In a state of panic, the victim offered money and attempted to call for help, but Debo confiscated her phone. The group traveled along dark back roads until Debo ordered Michelle to stop and reverse the vehicle. He forcefully pulled the victim out of the car, robbed her of her belongings, and shot her in the leg. As the victim played dead, Debo shot her multiple times until the gun clicked empty. Afterward, Debo re-entered the vehicle, and the group fled, nearly hitting the victim as they sped away.

Despite her injuries, the victim crawled through the mud to reach a highway, where she collapsed and signaled for help. Bystanders called the police and an ambulance, and she was airlifted to Vanderbilt Hospital. She suffered severe injuries, including liver damage and a fractured pelvis, leading to multiple surgeries, including the insertion of screws and rods, and a colostomy. The victim endured long-term physical and mental rehabilitation and has been unable to return to work since the incident.

The victim revealed her prior criminal record, including a drug-related conviction, and identified Robert Adams as the individual accompanying Debo on the night of her shooting, referring to him as “P.T.” and “Tracy.” She reported that her cell phone and purse were never recovered post-incident. Officer Ty Downing responded to a call on December 16, 2007, regarding a woman found shot multiple times. Upon arrival, he learned that the victim had already been transported to a hospital. The victim had informed officers that she was with two black males, “P.T.” and “Debo,” and two white females, “Cash” and “Michelle,” in a green car, and that the shooting was linked to a drug deal. Officer Downing processed the crime scene near a construction site, recovering five .380 caliber shell casings and a woman's purse devoid of money. He later contacted the victim at Vanderbilt Hospital, where she could not speak but managed to write down that “Debo” and Robert Adams (alias “Tracy”) were her shooters. Officer Downing conducted photo lineups, leading to the victim identifying Adams as “P.T.” and another individual as “Cash.” After Adams failed to attend a scheduled questioning, a warrant for his arrest was issued. Upon his arrest, he received Miranda warnings and consented to a videotaped statement, admitting he was present during the shooting and had exited the car to let the victim out before Debo shot her. Additional witnesses, including Stevie Trotter and Ryan Trotter, testified they found the victim after a Christmas party and described her attempts to flag them down, during which she mentioned being shot by “Debo.”

Officer Philip Martin from the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department testified about photographing the crime scene and collecting evidence, including the victim’s clothing, which was later admitted into evidence. He noted that no gun was recovered and no fingerprints were found on the shell casings. Officer Duane Jackson, also from the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department, assisted in the investigation and confirmed that the victim identified the defendant in a photo lineup shortly after the shooting. Jackson recounted that the defendant, after receiving Miranda warnings, provided inconsistent accounts of the incident but admitted to being in the vehicle with the victim at the time of the shooting. The defendant's final version claimed he dropped off the victim at a construction site and heard gunshots as he was leaving.

Dr. Richard Miller, the trauma unit's medical director at Vanderbilt University Medical Center, testified about the victim's severe injuries, multiple surgeries, complications, and likelihood of permanent disabilities. He stated that the victim would have died without timely medical intervention. After this testimony, the State rested its case.

The defense then moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence to prove the defendant's involvement in the attempted murder or other charges, which the court denied. The defendant waived his right to testify after being advised of his rights. Subsequently, the defense requested a continuance to subpoena a new witness, “Jeremy Jenkins,” who the defendant claimed would testify that the victim believed he was not involved in the incident. During the hearing, the defendant admitted he did not know Jenkins’ workplace location and that Jenkins required a subpoena to testify, as he was unwilling to do so voluntarily.

The trial judge noted that the defense should have alerted him sooner about a surprise witness but granted a two-hour continuance for the defendant to secure that witness. After this period, the defense rested its case, and closing arguments were made before the jury began deliberations. During this time, the defendant, who was on bond, absconded from the courthouse. The jury subsequently convicted him of attempted first-degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. 

After the verdict, the trial judge inquired about the defendant's whereabouts, with the defense counsel reporting that the defendant texted claiming to be heading to the hospital for a brother with multiple sclerosis. The defendant remained at large for weeks. During a February 12, 2010, sentencing hearing held in his absence, testimony was presented linking the defendant, Robert Adams, to an alias, Tracy Greer, through records and fingerprint analysis, affirming they were the same person. 

The trial court found the defendant to be a repeat violent offender under Tennessee's three strikes law, sentencing him to life without parole for the attempted first-degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, to be served concurrently. For the remaining counts, he was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender, with several aggravating factors considered, including his criminal history, leadership role in the offenses, cruelty to the victim, severity of harm, use of a firearm, and willingness to engage in high-risk crimes.

The trial court found no mitigating factors and sentenced the defendant to twenty years for aggravated robbery and eight years for conspiracy to commit kidnapping, both at thirty-five percent and to be served concurrently. However, due to the defendant's status as a career criminal and dangerous offender, these sentences were ordered to run consecutively to a life sentence without parole. On March 2, 2010, the defendant's counsel filed a motion for a new trial, which was dismissed by the court on March 23, 2010, after ruling that the defendant had waived his right to present the motion since he was a fugitive. Additionally, on March 12, 2010, the counsel moved to withdraw due to the defendant's unavailability, and this motion was granted on March 24, 2010. The defendant was returned to state custody on April 15, 2010, and filed a pro se notice of appeal on April 21, 2010, which was timely according to Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, confusion arose regarding the filing date of the notice of appeal, leading to a motion for waiver of an allegedly untimely appeal, which was granted. Both parties incorrectly assumed the notice was untimely, with the State's brief stating it was filed on April 22, 2010. Examination of the original notice revealed a filed date of April 21, 2010, and despite discrepancies in the record, it was concluded that the notice of appeal was timely filed, and this confusion should not adversely affect the defendant's case regarding the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.

The trial court properly dismissed the defendant's motion for a new trial due to his status as a fugitive from justice. The defendant contended that the Tennessee Supreme Court's fugitive disentitlement doctrine, established in Bradford v. State, should not apply to his case and was incorrectly decided. He also claimed there was no evidence that his absence during the hearing was voluntary. However, the court affirmed that the defendant remained a fugitive while his motion was pending, thus waiving his right to have it considered. 

The court emphasized that it lacks the authority to overturn the Bradford decision, which states that a fugitive waives his right to a new trial. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is well-established and serves public policy by preventing individuals who flee from benefiting from judicial processes. The court noted that allowing a fugitive to enjoy favorable rulings while avoiding adverse consequences undermines the judicial system. The dismissal of the defendant's motion was deemed appropriate given his choice to evade the court's jurisdiction.

The trial court correctly determined that the defendant was voluntarily absent during his hearings, as supported by the record showing his absence from the conclusion of his trial, sentencing, and the motion for a new trial. The court noted that the defendant left the jurisdiction voluntarily and had not been located since his trial. To counter the application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the defendant would need to prove that his absence was involuntary, similar to the burden placed on a defendant who fails to appear in court. However, the defendant neither provided a reason for his absence nor any supporting evidence on appeal. Consequently, the trial court made no error in concluding that the absence was voluntary.

The State contended that the dismissal of the defendant's motion for a new trial precluded his right to appeal, relying on Tennessee Supreme Court precedent which states that an appeal can only occur after a motion is denied, not dismissed. The State argued that the trial court's dismissal insulated it from appellate review. However, this interpretation mischaracterizes the Byington decision, which addressed procedural requirements for filing an appeal rather than the nature of dismissals. The trial court's dismissal of the defendant's motion on March 23, 2010, was a definitive ruling, confirming that the court’s final decision on the motion has been properly documented.

Byington's reference to a denial rather than a dismissal of a motion for new trial does not impede the court's jurisdiction. Under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, what determines jurisdiction is whether there is a pending motion for new trial in the trial court. In this case, since no such motion is pending, the court can assume appellate jurisdiction. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine does not necessitate dismissal of the defendant's appeal because he was returned to custody and filed a timely notice of appeal. Precedent supports that a defendant who escapes but returns before appeal consideration should not have their appeal dismissed. However, since the defendant's motion for a new trial was dismissed as abandoned, he will be treated like a defendant who failed to file such a motion, limiting this court's review to the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions and sentences. Any other claims, including the claim regarding a denied continuance for testimony, are waived under Rule 3(e) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Plain error review under Rule 13(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure is not warranted in this case, as it does not prevent needless litigation, judicial prejudice, or public interest harm. The defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial court's denial of an extended continuance compromised the integrity of the proceedings, which is a necessary condition for such review. The defendant's claims regarding insufficient evidence for his conviction of conspiracy to commit kidnapping and his criminal responsibility for Debo's actions lack merit. 

A jury’s guilty verdict replaces the presumption of innocence with a presumption of guilt, which the defendant has not successfully challenged on appeal. The defendant contends that he merely aimed to arrange a drug transaction and should not be held accountable for Debo's criminal acts. However, the sufficiency of evidence is assessed by whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In this instance, the jury rejected the defendant's arguments, and ample evidence supported their conclusion. The definition of conspiracy requires that two or more individuals with the necessary mental state agree to engage in conduct constituting the offense. The defendant argues that there was no evidence of a collective intent to kidnap the victim, asserting that their intent was limited to obtaining illegal drugs. However, circumstantial evidence supports the jury's finding of a conspiracy to kidnap, distinct from any drug-related conspiracy. Key testimonies indicated the defendant's involvement, such as urging the victim to enter the vehicle, handing a weapon to Debo, making threatening statements, obstructing the victim’s escape, and fleeing the scene after the shooting. This evidence sufficiently substantiates the jury’s determination of the defendant's participation in the conspiracy to kidnap the victim. The defendant also contests his criminal responsibility for Debo's actions, which remains under consideration.

An individual can be found guilty for crimes committed by another if they are criminally responsible for that conduct, as defined under T.C.A. 39-11-401 and 39-11-402(2). Criminal responsibility arises when a person acts with intent to promote, assist, or benefit from the criminal act of another. In this case, sufficient evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the defendant was criminally responsible for Debo's actions during the especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and attempted murder of the victim.

Evidence included the victim's testimony, which indicated that the defendant brought a firearm to the victim's house, coerced her into a vehicle, restricted her escape, and handed the firearm to Debo for intimidation. Additionally, a tape-recorded police interview showed the defendant allowed Debo to remove the victim from the car before shooting her, indicating intent to assist in the kidnapping.

Regarding the attempted murder, the victim recounted that the defendant stated, "somebody’s gonna die tonight," prior to the shooting, further supporting the jury's conclusion of his intent to assist Debo in this act. For the aggravated robbery, the victim testified that the defendant was upset after buying bad cocaine and engaged in discussions with his wife. He trapped the victim in the car near Debo, allowed Debo to take her cell phone, and subsequently drove away after the shooting. None of the stolen items were recovered, reinforcing the conclusion of the defendant's intent to assist in the robbery.

Though the defendant presented conflicting interpretations of the evidence—claiming he gave the gun to Debo for protection and contesting the assertion that he blocked the victim's escape—the jury had sufficient grounds to conclude otherwise.

The defendant claims his failure to prevent Debo’s crimes was due to fear. However, legal precedent dictates that the State's evidence must be viewed in the most favorable light, and appellate courts cannot replace the jury's inferences with their own. Consequently, the jury's conclusions differ from the defendant's assertions, leading to a denial of his sufficiency of evidence challenges.

Regarding sentencing, the defendant contends that the trial court wrongly held the sentencing hearing in his absence. The court found adequate evidence to support that the defendant willfully waived his right to be present, as it could take judicial notice of his prior absence during trial proceedings. Thus, no evidentiary hearing was required.

The defendant does not contest the imposition of two life sentences without parole under Tennessee’s three strikes law for attempted first-degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping. He does, however, dispute the application of enhancement factors for a consecutive twenty-year sentence for aggravated robbery, which runs concurrently with an eight-year sentence for conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The burden to prove a sentencing error lies with the appealing party. The appellate review is de novo, presuming the trial court's findings are correct unless inappropriate factors are applied, which would negate that presumption. The defendant specifically challenges three of the six enhancement factors used for his sentencing in relation to conspiracy and aggravated robbery, particularly asserting he was a leader in an offense involving multiple participants.

The defendant was found to have allowed the victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty and showed no hesitation in committing a crime that posed a high risk to human life. The trial court correctly applied enhancement factors (2) and (5) for the defendant's conspiracy conviction and the same factors for the aggravated robbery conviction. Despite the defendant's claim of being a passive participant, evidence from the trial indicated that he was a leader in the offenses. This included testimony that he instigated the drug deal, secured the victim's participation, and had possession of the firearm used in the crimes. The victim testified that the defendant allowed further violence after the initial shooting and left the victim to die alone. 

Regarding enhancement factor (10), the defendant argued it should not apply because only the victim's life was at risk. However, the court referenced a precedent, emphasizing that enhancement factors must be applied case-by-case rather than through a blanket rule. The trial court's decision to apply this factor to the defendant’s conspiracy conviction was deemed appropriate based on the specific facts surrounding the crimes.

Conspiracy is defined as an inchoate crime centered on the agreement between individuals to commit a crime, requiring the necessary mens rea, as per T.C.A. 39-12-103. In this case, the defendant’s agreement to kidnap the victim did not inherently pose a high risk to her life. The significant risk arose from the defendant’s decision to allow the victim to be shot until the ammunition was exhausted, a fact distinct from the agreement to commit kidnapping. Thus, the trial judge correctly applied an enhancement factor to the defendant’s conspiracy sentence.

Regarding the application of enhancement factor (10) for aggravated robbery, the Tennessee Supreme Court established in Lavender that its application should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, provided the evidentiary facts for the offense do not overlap with those for enhancement. However, in State v. Reid, it was determined that enhancement factor (10) cannot be used for especially aggravated robbery due to the inherent risk to human life involved. Aggravated robbery occupies a middle ground, and there is no definitive ruling on the application of enhancement factor (10) for aggravated robbery when the only life at risk is that of the victim. Unpublished cases largely suggest that enhancement factor (10) should not apply under these circumstances, as it is deemed inherent to aggravated robbery. The decision on whether to apply the enhancement factor in aggravated robbery cases remains complex, but enhancement factors should be used to adjust sentences based on specific circumstances rather than the general nature of the offense.

Factor (10) applies when the defendant's actions create a high risk to human life and demonstrate greater culpability than the underlying offense. In the case of State v. Lance Sandifer, it was unclear if the facts supporting the enhancement factor were distinct from those establishing the aggravated robbery conviction. The jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, but it was ambiguous whether this finding was based on the use of a deadly weapon or on serious bodily injury to the victim. If the jury based its decision on the display of a deadly weapon, the enhancement factor could be valid; however, if based on serious bodily injury, then the same evidence would support both the crime and the enhancement, making the application of factor (10) potentially impermissible according to Lavender.

Despite these uncertainties, upon de novo review, the court concluded that a remand for re-sentencing was unnecessary, as the trial court had correctly applied other enhancement factors, justifying the defendant's twenty-year sentence for aggravated robbery. The court found this sentence consistent with the Sentencing Act's principles and purposes. The defendant's claim of excessive sentencing, based on his "passive participation," was also rejected, with the court affirming that the trial court had considered appropriate factors in imposing an eight-year concurrent sentence for conspiracy. The trial court's discretion in weighing mitigating and enhancing factors was upheld, confirming that both sentences fell within the appropriate legal range. Ultimately, the judgments of the trial court were affirmed.