The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed a summary judgment in favor of Joel Porter, Jr. and others (Appellees) against Joe Burnette and his sons (Appellants), who alleged invasion of privacy and civil conspiracy. The court found that the Appellees were invitees and did not exceed their invitation, despite having ulterior motives. The Appellants failed to demonstrate that the Appellees’ actions were objectionably unreasonable or highly offensive, which are required for an invasion of privacy claim. Additionally, the court ruled that without an underlying tort, a conspiracy claim could not stand. The case involved allegations that Maurie Baker and Ben Ferguson infiltrated the Burnette family to gather information for custody litigation stemming from an affair between Joe Burnette's wife and Joel Porter, resulting in a child. The original complaint was filed in April 2008, with an amended complaint following in October 2008, but the Appellees denied the allegations.
On November 2, 2009, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Appellants could not substantiate their invasion of privacy claim for three reasons: (1) only Maurie Baker and Ben Ferguson entered the Mississippi and Burnette homes, negating claims against other defendants; (2) the Burnettes lacked ownership of the Mississippi home, precluding a privacy invasion claim regarding it; and (3) Baker and Ferguson were invitees in the Burnettes' home, which exempted them from invasion of privacy liability. After Appellants opposed the motion, the trial court granted summary judgment on August 17, 2010, citing grounds outlined in a May 10, 2010 Letter Opinion that addressed both the invasion of privacy and conspiracy claims per Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. The Burnettes appealed, questioning the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment. The appellate court's review of the trial court's ruling is de novo, with no deference to the trial court. The moving party must demonstrate the absence of genuine material fact issues and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, which can be achieved by either negating essential claim elements or showing the inability of the non-moving party to prove such elements. If the moving party meets this burden, the onus shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of genuine factual disputes. The court evaluates evidence favorably to the non-moving party and determines the materiality of any factual disputes relevant to the summary judgment motion.
A disputed fact is considered material if its resolution is necessary to address the substantive claim or defense related to the motion. A genuine issue arises when a reasonable jury could potentially favor one side over the other. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the established facts and legal interpretations lead to one reasonable conclusion. The appellate review indicates that while some factual disputes exist, the material facts are undisputed, leaving only a legal question regarding the Appellants' claims of invasion of privacy and/or civil conspiracy.
Tennessee law recognizes four types of invasion of privacy, including unreasonable intrusion upon another's seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, unreasonable publicity of private life, and publicity placing someone in a false light. The Appellants’ claim specifically pertains to intrusion upon seclusion, a concept notably categorized by William Prosser as a primary privacy tort. Such intrusion involves physical encroachment into a person's private space or affairs, and must be deemed highly offensive by a reasonable person, not merely by the subjective feelings of the plaintiff. The standard for assessing this intrusion aligns with that of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Tennessee courts have acknowledged that unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion can constitute a tort. In relevant cases, the courts referenced the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which asserts that intentional intrusion is subject to liability if it would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Additionally, liability exists only if the intrusion occurs in a private space or concerns that the plaintiff has maintained as private. Intent is a crucial element for this tort, as outlined in the Restatement.
The Restatement definition of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion requires the plaintiff to establish three elements: 1) an intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise; 2) upon the plaintiff's solitude or private affairs; and 3) the intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Jurisprudence, such as in Mauri v. Smith and other cases, underscores the necessity of demonstrating an intrusion linked to the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy. To prove this, the plaintiff must show both a subjective expectation of privacy and that this expectation is objectively reasonable.
For instance, in Danai v. Canal Square Associates, the court ruled that a business tenant's expectation of privacy in a discarded letter was unreasonable, as she had relinquished control over it, making it accessible to others. The inquiry into whether an invasion of privacy is objectively reasonable follows a subjective expectation of privacy. In Hart v. Seven Resorts, Inc., liability for invasion of privacy requires intentional intrusion that is highly offensive.
In a specific case involving Maurie Baker and Ben Ferguson, although they were invited into the plaintiffs' homes, their ulterior motive to gather damaging information could complicate the assessment of invasion of privacy. Generally, consent negates the possibility of an invasion of privacy claim, as established by legal principles.
Consent to the invasion of privacy serves as a defense against claims for damages related to such invasions. This concept is referred to as a "waiver of the right to privacy." Case law demonstrates that explicit or implicit consent can negate claims of intrusion, as seen in a ruling involving a medical laboratory where the owner's prior invitation to strangers indicated a lack of reasonable expectation of seclusion. However, expectations of privacy are strongest in one’s home, and mere invitation does not always constitute a waiver if it was not given freely.
The voluntariness of consent is critical; it must be free from duress or coercion to be valid. The Burnettes' consent is questioned due to potential deception that exploited their trust, suggesting it may not have been genuinely voluntary. Legal principles state that consent obtained through substantial mistakes or misrepresentation is ineffective. There is limited case law on whether consent acquired by fraud negates a privacy expectation, particularly in Tennessee, but guidance has been drawn from other states. Federal courts have historically tied privacy expectations to the Fourth Amendment, emphasizing that such expectations must be reasonable to warrant protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Fourth Amendment cases cited, such as California v. Ciraolo and Katz v. United States, clarify the reasonable expectation of privacy that individuals have. In scenarios where a defendant gains access to a plaintiff's private space through misrepresentation, such as in People v. Lucatero, the California Court of Appeals upheld the lawfulness of an officer's entry into a home under false pretenses, provided the officer acted within the scope of consent given for viewing the property. Similarly, in State v. Ferrari, police officers who posed as prospective buyers observed illegal activity without violating the defendant's privacy rights since their actions conformed to expectations of a genuine buyer. The analysis indicates that consent, even when obtained through deception, waives privacy rights as long as the individual's actions do not exceed the limits of that consent. Additionally, in false light invasion of privacy claims, consent must be comprehensive and not exceeded for it to serve as a valid defense. The general principle is that consent to a tortious act is limited to actions substantially similar to those consented to, as highlighted in the cited cases.
In *Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television*, the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that a permitted entrant can become a trespasser by exceeding the scope of consent, but mere trespass does not automatically constitute an invasion of privacy. The court highlighted that for an invasion of privacy claim to be valid, there must be actions beyond just a fraudulently obtained invitation, such as physical intrusion into private spaces or unauthorized surveillance of private affairs. In this case, Maurie and Ben, who had gained access to the Burnettes' home, did not exceed the areas they were invited to, nor did the Burnettes withdraw their invitation while they were present. Therefore, the court found no evidence of invasion of privacy through intrusion of seclusion.
The court also addressed the Appellants' claim of conspiracy, stating that a civil conspiracy claim requires an underlying tort. Since there was no established invasion of privacy, the conspiracy claim failed as well. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, with costs of the appeal assessed against the Appellant, Joe Burnette, individually and as next friend of Joshua and Jacob Burnette.
