Daniel Decker appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition from the Hamilton County Criminal Court, where he was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life without parole. He argues that the court erred in several respects regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Decker contends: 1) the court improperly placed the burden on an expert witness to provide thorough opinions at trial; 2) it incorrectly admitted a letter he wrote to his trial counsel post-conviction; 3) it should have recused itself; 4) it failed to recognize that he met the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance; 5) it did not assess trial counsel’s performance under the Cronic standard; and 6) it neglected to address all issues he raised in his denial order. After reviewing the record, the appellate court found no errors and affirmed the lower court's decision. The underlying facts of the murder involve Decker calling 911 on August 9, 2001, to report an assault at his home, where his grandmother, Judith Decker, was later found deceased. Evidence indicated inconsistencies in Decker's claims of a forced entry, as there were no signs of such and he had visible injuries at the scene.
The petitioner sustained superficial wounds to his arms and neck and exhibited blood on his hands and around his nose. During a search of his home, officers found a washing machine filled with clothing and linens that had been stopped mid-cycle. The petitioner was taken to the police station for questioning due to suspicious behavior and inconsistencies observed at the crime scene. After being advised of his Miranda rights, he waived them and provided a detailed statement, admitting to calling 911 to "cover up" the incident.
Initially, the petitioner claimed an argument with his grandmother escalated, resulting in her slapping him. He stated he picked up a knife and cut himself, threatening suicide if she continued to criticize him. He then described a physical altercation where he used a fire poker on his grandmother, ultimately leading to her death. The petitioner indicated he struck her "probably fifteen" times in the head, with varying accounts of the events leading to her fatal injuries.
He later admitted to attempting to clean the scene, including washing the fire poker and his clothing in the washing machine. At trial, the Hamilton County Medical Examiner, Dr. Frank King, testified that the victim died from severe blunt head trauma due to homicide, with injuries severe enough to fracture bones in the face and skull and damage the brain.
Injuries to the victim were consistent with multiple strikes from an object exerting force similar to a baseball bat. Dr. King noted the victim's skull was completely crushed, preventing him from determining the exact number of blows. The injuries were concentrated in the center and slightly to the right side of the face, with additional blunt force trauma to the mouth area. Dr. King opined that the victim's head remained stationary during the attack, indicated by the lack of varied injury patterns. He suggested the victim was likely unconscious or asleep, supported by blood spattering on the comforter and the absence of defensive wounds on her forearms.
Mary Beth Catanzaro, a juvenile court referee in June 2001, testified about a hearing where she warned the petitioner of potential commitment to state custody if he did not comply with home behavior expectations. Mark Wells, a case manager for Hamilton County Juvenile Court, described his interactions with the petitioner and victim, including a behavior contract addressing the petitioner's behavioral issues. Wells observed the petitioner’s arrogant behavior during a birthday dinner on July 25, 2001, which escalated into an argument over an inheritance.
The petitioner testified about living with the victim at 4113 Sunbury Drive. He acknowledged his disrespectful behavior and a written agreement to improve it. On August 9, 2001, feeling unwell, the petitioner called his grandmother for help but resisted going to the hospital. Upon her return, she expressed dissatisfaction with his lack of chores. Following a physical altercation, the petitioner admitted to self-harm with a knife and breaking a window, claiming the victim followed him into the living room after he was slapped, at which point he tripped and fell.
The petitioner recounted an altercation with the victim, stating she attacked him first, leading him to push her away and later strike her with a fire poker after a series of events where he felt threatened and overwhelmed. After the initial confrontation, he claimed to have acted under the influence of "voices in his head," which prompted him to return to the victim and repeatedly hit her, not knowing how many times he struck her. Following the incident, he expressed fear and attempted to clean the scene, including the fire poker, and lied to the police about an intruder.
Two psychologists testified about the petitioner's mental health. Dr. Michael Schmits evaluated him and found him competent to stand trial but diagnosed him with significant psychiatric disturbances, including a psychotic disorder characterized by hallucinations. Dr. Pamela Auble also assessed the petitioner, diagnosing him with multiple disorders, including chronic post-traumatic stress disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
Ultimately, the jury convicted the petitioner of first-degree murder, and during sentencing, they imposed a life sentence without the possibility of parole after considering aggravating and mitigating factors.
In State v. Daniel Andrew Decker, the petitioner appealed his conviction, which was affirmed by the Criminal Court of Appeals, with no subsequent application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. On March 30, 2007, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during the appeal process and alleging that trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal or inform him of his withdrawal. An amended petition was later filed after the appointment of post-conviction counsel. A hearing took place in September 2008, where the post-conviction court granted the petitioner a delayed appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, but post-conviction counsel failed to file the application on time. An oral motion for an extension was granted, but the Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed the application as untimely on May 26, 2009.
Subsequently, the post-conviction court resumed consideration of the stayed issues. Multiple witnesses, including trial counsel, Dr. Pamela Auble, and two previous attorneys, testified. Trial counsel, appointed after the original attorneys withdrew, discussed his approach to the case, noting he received extensive preparatory materials from prior counsel. He acknowledged the severity of the case and the strength of the State's evidence against the petitioner, who was convicted of murdering his grandmother. Trial counsel emphasized that he engaged in thorough preparation, including working closely with a team and developing a comprehensive mitigation history, while also being aware of the petitioner's difficult upbringing and mental health issues.
Trial counsel aimed to establish that the petitioner lacked the capacity for premeditated murder, utilizing court resources and expert evaluations to support this defense. He engaged with prosecution witnesses, family members, and relied on Dr. Auble, a forensic psychologist, who prepared a report and testified on diminished capacity. Counsel met with Dr. Auble multiple times and emphasized a general preparation method, preferring to discuss the report's key points and potential cross-examination issues rather than detailing direct examination questions, believing this approach was more effective.
Counsel noted that Dr. Auble had not expressed any concerns about her testimony or his preparation methods, considering her a strong witness for the defense. However, a letter from the petitioner after sentencing revealed an admission of premeditated murder, raising counsel's doubts about the authenticity of the diminished capacity defense. He communicated these concerns to the petitioner, insisting on truthful testimony.
Dr. Auble testified that she evaluated the petitioner by reviewing records, conducting interviews, and administering tests, concluding he was competent and not insane but focusing on diminished capacity for defense purposes. Although her initial report was finalized in January 2005, counsel continued to provide materials, leading to a revised report in February 2005. However, Dr. Auble stated she did not discuss her report with trial counsel before the trial and felt unprepared to testify.
Dr. Auble testified regarding her experience as an expert witness in a trial concerning diminished capacity. She stated that while she was aware of the general topic, she felt inadequately prepared by trial counsel for specific testimony. Despite having met with trial counsel multiple times, she believed her testimony failed to effectively convey how the petitioner's mental illness impacted his ability to form intent, as trial counsel primarily focused on the existence of the disease rather than its effects on premeditation. Although she managed to articulate that the petitioner could not form the requisite intent during cross-examination, she felt her explanations were insufficient. Dr. Auble acknowledged she did not communicate her dissatisfaction with her testimony to trial counsel.
Karla Gothard, an assistant public defender, testified about her role in the case. Initially assigned to the juvenile court, she became lead counsel when the case moved to criminal court after the original public defender, Mike Acuff, was called to active duty. Gothard sought several continuances for case preparation but was ultimately removed from the case at the petitioner’s request, a decision that was later appealed. Following her removal, attorney David Barrow was appointed but expressed feeling overwhelmed, leading to the appointment of Hank Hill, who was subsequently removed, resulting in the appointment of trial counsel. Gothard noted the need for both expert and lay testimony to illustrate the petitioner’s mental illness and its impact on intent. She also recalled that Dr. Auble seemed upset on the trial day. David Barrow, another witness, testified about his representation of the petitioner on appeal, specifically addressing issues related to a delayed appeal due to his failure to file necessary documents with the Tennessee Supreme Court.
The petitioner testified that he had multiple attorneys throughout his case, meeting with trial counsel only two or three times and with a paralegal a few times. Although trial counsel discussed options with him, he claimed not to have fully understood them. The petitioner later wrote a letter to trial counsel post-conviction but now asserts it was false, attributing his state of mind at that time to depression and heavy medication. The court found the petitioner did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel and denied the petition. An appeal was filed on September 1, 2009, with the State arguing that the petitioner had not knowingly waived his right to conflict-free counsel. The appellate court remanded the case for a hearing on this issue. At a subsequent hearing on September 20, 2010, the petitioner waived his right to conflict-free counsel and requested continued representation by post-conviction counsel.
On appeal, the petitioner raised six challenges to the post-conviction court’s denial of relief: 1) the burden on an expert witness to present complete opinions; 2) the admission of his letter to trial counsel; 3) the court's alleged bias; 4) the claim that he met the burden of proof under the Strickland standard; 5) the court's failure to apply the Cronic standard to trial counsel’s performance; and 6) the court's failure to address all of his issues. The petitioner bears the burden of proving his claims by clear and convincing evidence. If successful, the court must then assess trial counsel's effectiveness under Strickland v. Washington. The appellate court will uphold the post-conviction court's factual findings unless they are not supported by the evidence, while reviewing legal conclusions de novo, without presumption of correctness. Under the Sixth Amendment, to claim ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must show both deficient performance and prejudicial impact; failing to establish either prong results in denial of relief.
A petitioner must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was below a reasonable standard and that there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different but for this performance. A reasonable probability undermines confidence in the outcome. The Strickland standard applies to the right to counsel under the Tennessee Constitution. Courts emphasize that petitioners cannot use hindsight to criticize trial strategy or tactical decisions made by counsel, provided those decisions were informed and based on adequate preparation.
The petitioner contends that the post-conviction court incorrectly placed the burden on expert witness Dr. Auble to present her opinions at trial, arguing it was trial counsel’s responsibility to prepare her testimony. He asserts that there is no evidence suggesting Dr. Auble had a duty to submit specific evidence to the jury. However, the petitioner waived this argument by failing to cite relevant portions of the record, and there were no statements from the post-conviction court indicating Dr. Auble bore any burden of proof. The issue raised essentially challenges trial counsel's effectiveness in preparing Dr. Auble, which falls under the Strickland standard and will be evaluated later.
Additionally, the petitioner claims that the post-conviction court abused its discretion by allowing a letter he wrote to trial counsel after conviction, which contained a confession of premeditated murder, to be admitted into evidence. He argues this should have been excluded as character evidence.
The trial court has broad discretion regarding the admission of evidence, which is only reversible on appeal if there is an abuse of discretion (State v. Edison). Generally, character evidence is inadmissible per Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b), but it may become admissible if a party "opens the door" to such evidence. In this case, the post-conviction court found that the petitioner’s trial counsel's defensive responses inadvertently allowed the introduction of a letter. The petitioner argued that this was a tactical move by the counsel to open the door, and claimed the court erred by admitting the letter without adequately addressing its relevance. During the hearing, trial counsel acknowledged concerns about the petitioner’s mental health claims and noted that suspicions were confirmed by the petitioner’s subsequent letter. The post-conviction court allowed the letter due to the line of questioning by the petitioner’s counsel, which was initially objected to only on the grounds of relevance. The court indicated that the letter's admissibility could relate to credibility issues. The State contended that the petitioner misapplied the precedent from State v. West, which involved the prosecution improperly seeking to introduce evidence of a defendant's violent character under the guise of credibility attacks, distinguishing it from the current case where the door was opened through the defense’s questioning.
The State initiated a question regarding the defendant's self-perception as a peaceful person and later called a rebuttal witness against him. However, the line of questioning leading to trial counsel’s statements was initiated by the petitioner’s own attorney. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting a letter as the "door was opened" by trial counsel's responses.
Regarding the petitioner's request for the post-conviction court to recuse itself, the court emphasized that recusal motions are at the trial court's discretion and will only be reversed for a clear abuse of that discretion. The Tennessee Supreme Court outlined that appellate courts should not interfere unless the trial court's decision appears illogical or unjust. The right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal is fundamental, and judges should recuse themselves if there is any doubt about their impartiality, or if a reasonable person would question it.
The petitioner argued for recusal based on comments made by the post-conviction court concerning trial counsel's appointment. These comments arose during questioning by the petitioner’s attorney regarding billed hours, with trial counsel explaining that some hours were unpaid pro bono work and that the court had actively sought to ensure the petitioner received optimal representation after issues with previous counsel.
Appellate Counsel raised concerns about potential bias from the trial court, suggesting that the petitioner felt it was necessary to address this issue. The court responded by emphasizing its commitment to ensuring the petitioner received competent legal representation, expressing confidence in trial counsel's qualifications despite not typically taking appointed cases. The court noted its ongoing concern for the petitioner’s rights, indicating that it believed the petitioner had initially received a "raw deal" and that it would intervene if trial counsel had been inadequate.
The court rejected the notion of bias, asserting that its comments reflected a desire to protect the petitioner rather than favor trial counsel. It determined that the statements made did not demonstrate any bias that could question the court’s impartiality, thus finding no abuse of discretion in denying the recusal request. Additionally, it was noted that the post-conviction counsel appeared to agree that recusal was unnecessary.
Regarding the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard, the petitioner contended that trial counsel was unprepared for trial and inadequately prepared a key witness, Dr. Auble, to testify about the petitioner’s state of mind. The petitioner argued this lack of preparation was evident from trial counsel’s fee claim form, suggesting a reliance on previous counsel's work without proper discussion. The petitioner claimed this failure to prepare Dr. Auble was prejudicial, as it was critical to the defense's argument against premeditation.
The post-conviction court denied the petitioner's claims of ineffective counsel, highlighting that the defense counsel had adequately investigated the case and understood the relevant issues. The petitioner argued that his counsel failed to sufficiently investigate facts, relied on previous counsel’s work, and did not communicate effectively with Dr. Auble to challenge the premeditation charge or present mitigating evidence, including the petitioner’s family history of mental instability. While the petitioner implied he suffered prejudice from this alleged ineffectiveness, only one specific instance of prejudice was described.
The court found that counsel was aware of the petitioner’s account of events, Dr. Auble’s clear opinions on malingering and premeditation, and the petitioner’s personal and family history. The defense was articulated as second-degree murder, which did not necessitate proof of premeditation, and the counsel successfully differentiated it from other defenses, like insanity. Evidence of the petitioner’s mental illness was presented, which had been misunderstood and untreated at the time of the offense.
Dr. Auble had opportunities to clarify her diagnoses during the trial, and while she later deemed her testimony inadequate, her failure to promptly communicate these concerns suggested she initially did not share this view. The court noted that her trial testimony did not provide any new insights compared to her post-conviction hearing. Counsel's interpretation of the petitioner’s history as not relevant to premeditation was consistent with Dr. Auble’s report, which based her opinions on objective measures. The court concluded that Dr. Auble had ample opportunity to provide additional information if specific pre-offense events were relevant to her opinions.
Evidence of premeditation was deemed sufficient by the Court of Criminal Appeals, which found no clear evidence of ineffective counsel or resultant prejudice. The petitioner claimed inadequate counsel meetings prevented him from fully understanding his defenses, but he did not specify his lack of comprehension or its impact on his choices. The Court determined there was no deficiency in counsel's performance. The petitioner’s argument that alternative counsel would have approached the defense differently was not persuasive, as trial counsel testified to feeling adequately prepared to challenge premeditation. The preference of Dr. Auble for a detailed preparation method was not a requirement for effective trial preparation. Strategic decisions, including witness selection and cross-examination methods, are within the purview of defense counsel. The Court found no fault in trial counsel's lack of in-depth discussions with previous attorneys, particularly since he had access to their materials. Trial counsel had discussions with key witnesses and utilized his staff effectively, maintaining ultimate responsibility for case preparation. The petitioner incorrectly relied on trial counsel's billing to suggest inadequate preparation, as counsel did not bill all hours worked, viewing it as a pro bono opportunity. The record indicated trial counsel made diligent efforts in a challenging case. Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the post-conviction court failed to apply the Cronic standard, asserting that trial counsel did not adequately challenge the premeditation element, but this claim was not substantiated.
Trial counsel did not utilize Auble, a qualified individual, to effectively challenge the prosecution's case of premeditation or in mitigation. The Cronic case established a presumption of prejudice in certain scenarios of ineffective assistance of counsel, absolving the petitioner from proving the elements outlined in Strickland. These scenarios include: 1) complete denial of counsel at a critical stage, 2) failure of counsel to meaningfully challenge the prosecution's case, and 3) situations where the likelihood of any lawyer providing effective assistance is minimal. The petitioner argued that trial counsel entirely failed to challenge premeditation but the evidence did not support this claim. The Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. Cone clarified that for Cronic to apply, counsel’s failure must be complete, while the petitioner only indicated a lack of challenge at specific points. Therefore, the distinction between Strickland and Cronic is significant. The record shows that the petitioner was not denied representation throughout the trial phases, leading the post-conviction court to rightfully apply the Strickland standard. Consequently, the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Additionally, the petition claimed that the post-conviction court did not address three issues, including whether the trial court erred by not appointing a second attorney.
Trial counsel's effectiveness was questioned on three grounds: failure to seek a continuance, inadequate investigation of defenses and witness location, and improper challenge to the admissibility of the petitioner’s police statements based on mental health history. The petitioner argued that the post-conviction court did not adequately address these issues as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b), which mandates that courts provide findings of fact and conclusions of law on all grounds presented.
However, the transcript indicates that one issue regarding the appointment of a second attorney was withdrawn due to lack of legal support, meaning the court was not obliged to consider it. Regarding the second issue, the court acknowledged the claim about insufficient investigation and reliance on prior counsel but concluded that the petitioner failed to present evidence of other defenses or witnesses, thus waiving this claim.
On the third issue, concerning the challenge to the admission of statements based on mental health, the court noted that the petitioner did not provide evidence to support this claim and that trial counsel did raise mental health considerations in the motion to suppress. As there were no records presented to contradict the post-conviction court’s findings, it upheld the decision to deny post-conviction relief. The ruling was affirmed by Judge John Everett Williams.
