Gerald Lee Powers appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following his 1998 convictions for first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, which were affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. In his appeal, Powers raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including inadequate juror selection, limited voir dire, excessive caseloads, failure to investigate evidence, ineffective handling of expert witnesses, and insufficient witness interviews. He also contends that the trial court erred in jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, and that the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional. The Court of Criminal Appeals thoroughly reviewed these claims and concluded they lack merit, affirming the post-conviction court's decision. The factual background highlights that the victim, Shannon Sanderson, was gambling in Mississippi on the night of her murder, where she won $5,000 before beginning her drive back to Memphis after an argument with her husband.
At approximately 4:45 a.m., Edward Holland awoke to barking dogs and observed Shannon Sanderson near her car, hearing her say "Don’t—don’t," which he assumed was directed at her husband. When he went outside, Mrs. Sanderson was missing, but her car remained. Meanwhile, neighbors William and Anna Dillon were also alerted by the barking; Mr. Dillon saw a figure in a red baseball cap near the car, while Mrs. Dillon heard a scream and saw a car with its dome light on, before witnessing it speed away. Johnnie Rose, returning from work around 4:30 a.m., saw Mrs. Sanderson’s car followed by a dark-colored vehicle resembling a Chevrolet Beretta, which he later identified in a photo as belonging to Powers' wife.
At approximately 6:40 a.m., bus driver Alonzo Jeans noticed a white male backing into an abandoned house's driveway, a location he had never seen anyone approach in his ten years on the route. He later recognized the maroon Beretta in a photograph. By 9:30 a.m., Powers returned home in his wife’s Beretta, wearing the same clothes as the previous night and exhibiting nervous behavior after gambling. He handed his wife a hundred-dollar bill from his winnings and had cleaned her car, which raised her suspicions.
Under questioning, Powers confessed to kidnapping, robbing, and murdering a woman he had followed from a casino, detailing how he abducted her and transported her to an abandoned house. He admitted to stealing her jewelry and $5,000 in cash, disposing of her purse and gun in a river. Powers expressed belief that witnesses would not identify him but sought an alibi from a neighbor, who jokingly agreed to help if he hadn't killed anyone. The following evening, both Powers and his wife saw a news report describing the suspect fitting Powers' description.
Powers left home in his wife’s car after indicating to her that he was visiting his mother in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and mentioned buried money in their backyard. Shortly after his departure, Mrs. Powers contacted the police, suggesting her husband’s potential involvement in Mrs. Sanderson’s abduction but did not disclose his confession. Upon his return a week later, Powers retrieved buried money and informed his wife about the location of Mrs. Sanderson’s jewelry. He also wrote a note expressing dissatisfaction with his marriage.
On May 9, 1996, Shannon Sanderson's decomposed body was found in an abandoned house in Eudora, Mississippi, wearing the same clothing as the night she disappeared, with her jewelry missing. An autopsy revealed she died from a gunshot wound and had sustained facial injuries. Powers was later arrested on May 22, 1996, in Texas after evading a checkpoint and brandishing a knife at an INS agent, who found $1,400 in cash on him. The FBI, after securing Powers’ vehicle, discovered a black wool fiber matching the victim’s clothing.
Mrs. Powers eventually disclosed her husband’s confession to investigators and assisted in recovering Mrs. Sanderson’s jewelry from the B. W Lounge, wrapped in plastic matching that from their home. A surveillance video showed a person resembling Powers following Mrs. Sanderson after she left a casino. Witness Rebecca Coradini testified that she observed a van and Mrs. Sanderson’s car, followed by a maroon car driven by a man resembling her husband. Powers was convicted of aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder. During sentencing, the State presented three aggravating factors, including Powers' prior violent felony convictions and the nature of the murder connected to a kidnapping.
The State introduced evidence of Powers’ prior felony convictions, which included incidents of aggravated assault and robbery. Emily Dodson testified that in 1979, Powers attacked her with a knife and a wrench, resulting in his guilty plea for aggravated assault. Karen Cannon recounted being assaulted by Powers in 1980 while he was holding her at knifepoint; she managed to escape and identified him, leading to another guilty plea for aggravated assault. Captain Sammy Magee detailed Powers’ 1984 robbery and assault of Clyo Griffin, where Powers beat her with an iron skillet and stole valuables, for which he also pleaded guilty. A judgment for Powers’ 1996 conviction for assaulting an INS agent was introduced. Victim impact testimony was provided by Caroline Holland, who described the emotional trauma faced by the children of the murder victim, Shannon Sanderson. The sole defense witness, Powers’ first wife, Pamela Bigelow, spoke to his background and argued that, despite his issues with drugs and alcohol, he exhibited good traits and was never abusive. Ultimately, the jury found sufficient aggravating circumstances to outweigh any mitigating factors, leading to Powers' death sentence for Sanderson’s murder. Following his conviction, Powers filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in 2003, with subsequent petitions and an evidentiary hearing occurring in 2009.
After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the case was continued until February 9, 2009. A motion to disqualify the post-conviction judge was filed by the petitioner’s counsel, citing inattentiveness and bias during the January hearing; this motion was denied. The petitioner sought an appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, which was also denied, allowing the evidentiary hearing to continue. Subsequently, the petitioner applied for an extraordinary appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10, which was denied on March 20, 2009. On April 28, 2009, the post-conviction court issued findings and denied the petition for post-conviction relief.
During the hearing, lead counsel, who had extensive experience since 1976 and had been with the public defender's office since 1995, testified about his role in the case. He managed case investigations and coordinated the defense team, acknowledging a workload exceeding recommended standards. Despite this, he engaged with the petitioner frequently and sought expert assistance regarding crucial evidence that linked fibers found in the petitioner’s car to the victim.
The testimony of the petitioner’s wife, Sharon Powers, posed significant challenges, as she had knowledge of the petitioner’s confession and was not excluded from testifying despite counsel’s requests. On the eve of her testimony, counsel received surveillance tapes from the prosecution that were initially described as inaudible. Upon review, he found the tapes contained usable statements that could have aided in cross-examining Sharon, but the transcript was not available until after her testimony. This miscommunication hindered counsel's ability to effectively challenge her statements during the trial.
Lead counsel acknowledged the petitioner's biracial background, noting his Taiwanese mother and ten years spent in Taiwan, as well as his lack of knowledge about his biological father. Counsel recognized the potential benefit of consulting an expert on the challenges faced by biracial children in Taiwan. He identified Pamela Bigelow, the petitioner's first wife, as the sole witness at sentencing, who testified about the petitioner's strained relationship with his mother. Despite efforts to contact her, the mother declined to testify, even with transportation arranged. Counsel faced challenges in gathering background information, specifically regarding the petitioner's stepfather and maternal family issues, and he did not investigate the petitioner’s upbringing in Taiwan due to logistical constraints.
Counsel expressed regret for not having an expert testify about the petitioner's low self-esteem and personality issues. He was unaware during the trial that a key state witness had been hypnotized to recall details, which he would have used to challenge her credibility and inconsistencies regarding the assailant's description. Counsel did not utilize juror questionnaires, as he had only requested them in extraordinary cases and could not recall their use prior to the trial. He acknowledged that not all defense challenges were utilized and that his motion for individual voir dire was denied. Some jurors had prior exposure to media coverage of the case, but he did not pursue further motions, feeling the circumstances did not warrant it. The petitioner had input on jury selection, and counsel would have acted on any requests to dismiss jurors. Additionally, he noted that jurors often had their own experiences with crime, and the trial judge was accommodating regarding juror breaks.
The jury's willingness to work late was affirmed by lead counsel, who also noted that Brian Maher reported the victim expressed a desire for divorce shortly before her death; however, Maher's testimony was excluded from the trial. Attempts to cross-examine the victim's husband regarding Maher's statement were blocked by the court. Lead counsel acknowledged the challenges in the petitioner’s case, particularly due to the petitioner’s confession to his wife, which led to the discovery of the victim’s jewelry, and his arrest in Texas after assaulting a federal officer. Additionally, a witness saw a vehicle matching the petitioner's description leaving the crime scene. Despite the petitioner consistently denying involvement in the murder, the defense pursued the theory of a third-party perpetrator, though the trial court deemed the evidence insufficient for the jury’s consideration.
During the petitioner’s intake evaluation, he disclosed a gambling problem and substance abuse but did not mention family issues except for not knowing his biological father. When asked about past trauma, he denied any, leading counsel to believe a psychological expert would not have been necessary. Conversations with the petitioner and his mother did not indicate a need to interview family members in Taiwan. The petitioner had a history of academic success and athletic involvement, making it unlikely that a narrative of cultural victimization would hold credibility. The petitioner opted not to testify during the trial. In the penalty phase, the defense faced significant aggravating factors, including prior convictions for assaulting multiple female victims, with no statutory mitigating circumstances to argue, relying instead on nonstatutory mitigation. Co-counsel, who supervised the capital defense team, confirmed a good relationship with the petitioner and noted the complexity of the case due to multiple jurisdictions, which limited their preparation time before indictment.
Co-counsel provided background on the petitioner, born in Taiwan in 1954 and arriving in the U.S. at age ten. Although he underwent substance abuse treatment while incarcerated at Parchman Prison, he denied having substance abuse issues. Described as reserved and closed-off, co-counsel did not explore the petitioner’s early life as it seemed irrelevant to the case. The petitioner’s stepfather's whereabouts were unknown, and he had not seen his mother since 1995. Co-counsel noted the petitioner had no mental illness history, only depression and feelings of entrapment, and emphasized that the case's legal issues were more significant than his social history. The defense recognized the petitioner’s visits to casinos but argued that potential compulsive gambling would not mitigate the seriousness of his crime, which involved killing a significant casino winner. Co-counsel acknowledged that expert psychiatric testimony could have supported some mitigating factors but expressed concern over the strong aggravating factors present in the case. The overwhelming evidence suggested the petitioner was viewed as a predator. She mentioned using the phrase about the petitioner’s physical stature in closing arguments to suggest he might not match the perpetrator’s description from casino footage, aiming for jury nullification. During cross-examination, she reiterated the absence of reported substance abuse issues and clarified that the petitioner’s federal records indicated minimal alcohol consumption and past experimentation with drugs, contradicting any claims of addiction. Co-counsel explained that they did not seek funds to investigate the petitioner’s cultural background due to a lack of apparent need and the challenges in obtaining such funding. She characterized the case's factual allegations as damaging, making it difficult to appeal for jury sympathy given the substantial evidence against the petitioner.
The petitioner’s case lacked sufficient self-reporting to develop adequate mitigation, despite his good academic performance and a seemingly successful assimilation into American life. The petitioner opted not to testify. William Pearce, a retired supervisor from the North Carolina Bureau of Investigation, was asked to assess the FBI's laboratory examinations. He noted the necessity of lab notes for a complete evaluation and indicated that some analyses conducted under Special Agent Christopher Hopkins' supervision may have lacked clarity. Pearce highlighted inconsistencies between Hopkins' trial testimony and his report, emphasizing that he would have advised the defense to address these discrepancies. During cross-examination, Pearce confirmed that Hopkins' testimony suggested a higher certainty than what his report conveyed.
Mark McDaniel, from Brewer Detective Agency, testified that the agency, while investigating the victim's case for her husband Robert Sanderson, could not find the case file due to a policy of file destruction after five years. Jessica Peevy, a legal assistant, noted that she transcribed a hypnosis video, confirming that a DVD created from it was an accurate reproduction, with only a five-minute inaudible segment at the beginning. Dr. Murray Smith, an internal medicine and addiction specialist, evaluated the petitioner in 2004 and 2008, observing significant mood changes and depression by 2008. He reviewed records documenting the petitioner’s extensive substance abuse history and noted the petitioner’s lack of interest in treatment during evaluations at Parchman Prison and Terre Haute Federal Prison.
Poly-substance abuse is prevalent among individuals attempting self-medication to alleviate anxiety and anger. Dr. Smith reviewed a July 13, 1999, evaluation from the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution, which indicated a high chemical abuse scale for the petitioner. He conducted a discussion with Drs. Cheng, Copper, and Kenner, who provided insights into the petitioner’s family history, revealing that several uncles had issues with alcohol and gambling, including one who introduced the petitioner to beer at a young age. The petitioner immigrated from Taiwan to the U.S. at age ten and began using alcohol and marijuana at fourteen, later escalating to significant levels of use, including intravenous methamphetamine and cocaine, as well as solvent exposure from factory work. His alcohol consumption led to blackouts and memory loss.
Dr. Smith noted that the petitioner’s first wife, Pamela Bigelow, was unaware of his substance abuse due to her strict religious beliefs, and his addictions contributed to their divorce. The petitioner developed a gambling addiction after being unable to work due to back problems in 1994, spending extensive time in casinos and using drugs and alcohol. Dr. Smith attributed the petitioner’s addictions to the emotional trauma of losing his mother and being separated from his grandmother during childhood, which created a deep-seated need for female companionship and led to self-medication with substances during stressful times. The petitioner has been married four times and had an affair, with Dr. Smith identifying a fear of loss as a significant factor in his behavior.
Genetic predispositions to addiction were noted, as was the petitioner’s history of being short-tempered and feeling alienated in both Taiwan and the U.S., which contributed to his substance use as a coping mechanism. On cross-examination, Dr. Smith revealed the petitioner claimed gambling was his occupation and denied using substances while working at the casino during the murder. He also stated that his alcohol use had decreased from 1992 to 1996 but refused to discuss his criminal charges with Dr. Smith. Dr. Smith diagnosed the petitioner as a gambling addict based on his continued casino attendance despite poor performance.
The State's lead counsel, involved in the petitioner's case, testified about evidence received from the FBI, acknowledging uncertainty regarding the timing of its receipt and its status post-trial, noting that the trial file would have transitioned to storage. She recalled a request from Sharon Powers for her diary but was unsure if it was returned. Melinda Patillo, a civilian supervisor at the Memphis Police Department Property and Evidence Room since 1998, testified that several pieces of evidence requested by the defense, including a comforter, firearms, hair samples, and various personal items, were unaccounted for. She explained that a federal investigation led to temporary closure of the evidence room, complicating evidence location, and acknowledged involvement from other law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, in the case.
Additionally, Wanda Getz provided background on the petitioner’s family, detailing her brother Ronnie Powers' relationship with the petitioner’s mother, Cindy, whom he met while stationed in Taiwan. Ronnie described his early relationship with Cindy, indicating he supported her financially while she worked as a bar girl. Initially introduced to the petitioner as her nephew, Ronnie later learned he was her son and implied he would adopt him when they moved to the U.S., though he never formally did. After relocating, they lived with Ronnie’s family, where initial interactions were strained, particularly between the petitioner and Ronnie's nephew, Terry.
The petitioner initially struggled with English, speaking only a few words and becoming frustrated with communication barriers. Enrolled in the fifth grade by Ronnie, the petitioner became fluent in English within two years. Although he faced some bullying at school, Ronnie believed it was related to race, despite not witnessing any incidents. Cindy, the petitioner’s mother, had limited English proficiency and faced ongoing difficulties understanding the language. Prior to marrying Cindy, she informed Ronnie that she was twenty-seven years old and the petitioner was ten, claiming the petitioner’s father, an American G.I., died in a plane crash.
Ronnie described his marriage to Cindy as lacking affection, noting their relationship with the petitioner was more akin to friendship due to their close ages. The petitioner excelled in athletics, particularly in track and field. Ronnie did not attend the petitioner’s high school graduation, and he believed Cindy did not either. The petitioner began dating his first wife in high school and married her during his senior year. Ronnie suspected some underage drinking during camping trips but did not have concrete evidence.
Cindy was described by Ronnie as the household disciplinarian, using physical punishment early on but later resorting to verbal discipline. She had a volatile temper, which sometimes manifested in public outbursts. Ronnie worked multiple jobs and attended school after returning to the U.S., leaving him little time for family. After several years, Cindy began working outside the home, though her communication with her family in Taiwan diminished over time. Cindy provided significant financial support to her family while living in Taiwan and expressed distrust of Ronnie’s family. Additionally, she had a gambling habit, often losing money but continuing to play.
Ronnie stated he was not contacted by the petitioner’s defense team in 1998, but he would have testified at the trial if asked, expressing that he still cared for the petitioner. Dr. John Franklin Copper, a professor with expertise in Asian cultures, testified that cultural shame affects the adjustment of Asian individuals in the U.S., leading to behavioral challenges. He conducted interviews with the petitioner, Ronnie, and Cindy.
The petitioner was generally open during his interview with Dr. Copper but struggled to recall details about his life in Taiwan. He mentioned his school experiences, including skipping classes and facing punishment, and denied experiencing discrimination in Taiwan, claiming he only faced racial prejudice in the United States. Dr. Copper disagreed, citing his own experiences in Taiwan and suggesting that the petitioner would have faced discrimination due to his mixed race, exacerbated by his mother's association with an American soldier, leading to derogatory comments from neighbors. Dr. Copper believed the petitioner skipped school due to harassment from peers.
Elizabeth Benson, a legal investigator for the public defender's office, worked on the petitioner's case amidst a heavy caseload. She gathered background information but could not recall if she had interviewed the petitioner's mother or other family members. The petitioner, born in Taipei, did not have a cultural expert consulted by the defense. Benson noted that the petitioner admitted to having a gambling problem but did not report issues related to drug addiction or family adjustments. She documented the petitioner's use of marijuana and alcohol but did not specify any treatment. The petitioner denied involvement in the victim's murder, and while Benson could not remember the frequency of the defense team's meetings, she confirmed they reviewed the case monthly. On redirect, Benson acknowledged the petitioner's prison medical records indicated significant alcohol use and moderate drug abuse, which she provided to the defense attorneys, alongside records showing he had gotten into trouble while intoxicated.
The petitioner began drinking alcohol occasionally at the age of six or seven, escalating to heavy use by twenty or twenty-one. He also reported using approximately half an ounce of marijuana weekly. Benson, presumably a member of the defense team, indicated that information about the petitioner’s depression would have been communicated to his attorneys. Ralph Nally, a legal investigator for the Shelby County Public Defender’s Office, testified about his role in the petitioner’s case, which included interviewing witnesses and reviewing evidence. He met with the petitioner multiple times but could not confirm if he spoke to any witnesses. Nally stated that the defense team was concerned about the petitioner’s relationships with women, which was discussed during a marital privilege hearing, and they considered the cultural aspects of his life, though Nally could not recall discussions about obtaining a cultural expert.
Dr. Chien-Hung Rocco Cheng, a cultural expert and Director for Prevention and Early Intervention Services, provided insights into the petitioner’s background after interviewing his family and acquaintances in Taiwan. He described the petitioner’s childhood home as small, dark, and lacking basic amenities. The petitioner’s mother, Cindy Powers, supported her large family from a young age due to poverty and family circumstances, including her father’s abandonment. She worked various jobs, including in a tea house and later a bar, to provide for her siblings.
Dr. Cheng testified that Cindy, who provided financial support to her family, experienced significant emotional distress from engaging in a stigmatized profession in Chinese society, facing rejection and discrimination. Cindy had three children, relinquishing her second child for adoption due to financial constraints. The petitioner, the youngest child, was exposed to gambling and alcohol issues within the family, as his half-brother struggled with these problems and several relatives had similar tendencies. Cindy's work in Taipei led to the petitioner being raised by his grandmother, who was nurturing and loving.
Dr. Cheng highlighted the societal stigma against biracial children in 1950s Taiwan, suggesting that Cindy was unprepared for marriage to Ronnie or for relocation to the U.S. The petitioner’s transition was abrupt and traumatic, particularly the separation from his grandmother. In the U.S., he faced language barriers, a new identity, and isolation, feeling like an outsider in both Taiwan and America. Despite excelling academically and adjusting quickly to English, Dr. Cheng noted that emotionally, the petitioner continued to struggle, indicating long-term emotional damage affecting his interpersonal relationships.
Dr. William D. Kenner, a psychiatrist, evaluated the petitioner and interviewed family members, including the petitioner’s first wife, Pamela Bigelow, who reported no physical violence from him. Kenner reviewed allegations of domestic violence made by Sharon Powers, the petitioner’s wife at the time of a murder, and suggested her testimony lacked credibility due to her troubled past, including abusive relationships and multiple marriages. He noted that the context of her history should have been explored during cross-examination, implying that her claims of victimization might be questionable.
Sharon selected the petitioner as a pen pal while he was imprisoned, later becoming his romantic partner and eventually marrying him. She appreciated his intelligence and the respect he garnered from both guards and inmates, indicating he was well-organized and positively regarded in a challenging environment. Dr. Kenner noted that Sharon claimed to be "very much in love" with the petitioner, contrasting her past relationships where she was dominant. However, she faced financial difficulties, reportedly stealing money from him. The petitioner characterized Sharon as insecure and struggling with parenting, which he attributed to her history of severe abuse that hindered her ability to provide a nurturing environment.
Dr. Kenner described Sharon as jealous, though she denied believing the petitioner had been unfaithful. In contrast, a third party indicated that Sharon was the one who engaged in flirtatious behavior. Dr. Kenner assessed that Sharon did not exhibit the typical traits of a domestic violence victim, lacking trauma-related symptoms, and emphasized the importance of having a domestic violence expert during the trial to clarify whether such violence occurred.
Dr. Kenner provided insights into the petitioner's childhood, noting multiple factors that negatively impacted his development: he was raised by his grandmother while his mother lived abroad, experienced physical abuse from an uncle, faced chronic stress due to his mixed-race background, and had a troubled relationship with his emotionally unavailable mother, who was a sex worker. He suggested that the petitioner's healthy development was disrupted when he was removed from his grandmother's care. Dr. Kenner concluded that the petitioner's brain development was abnormal due to significant traumas, including feelings of loss and cultural displacement, compounded by issues with substance abuse and unresolved emotional struggles stemming from his early life experiences.
The petitioner faced significant challenges in childhood, including language barriers and bullying in Murfreesboro, leading to intense emotions such as rage, fear, resentment, and shame. Dr. Kenner diagnosed the petitioner with developmental trauma disorder, highlighting symptoms like emotional dysregulation, confusion, and disorganized thinking. Despite these struggles, he described the petitioner as intelligent and conscientious, striving for respect and achievement. During cross-examination, Dr. Kenner noted the petitioner's refusal to discuss the victim's murder and suggested that witnessing the victim's gambling success triggered feelings linked to the petitioner's traumatic upbringing, particularly his mother's lifestyle. The petitioner followed the victim to her home, kidnapped her, and subsequently killed her, later confessing to his wife and fleeing to Texas where he was apprehended.
James Simmons, an experienced criminal defense attorney, testified about the importance of lay witness testimony in death penalty cases. He emphasized the need for personal connections with such witnesses, suggesting that he would have investigated the petitioner’s childhood in Taiwan and consulted relatives and teachers. Simmons believed expert testimony could clarify how early childhood experiences shape personality traits, which could be critical in understanding the petitioner's behavior and its connection to his criminal actions.
Simmons emphasized the critical importance of preparing for voir dire during jury selection, particularly in understanding jurors' views on mitigation theories in light of the case's severe circumstances. He would have specifically inquired whether jurors could consider mitigation for a petitioner with prior convictions for three aggravating assaults alongside first-degree murder. He identified two key areas requiring individual voir dire: the crime's publicity and jurors' attitudes towards the death penalty, asserting that this approach was necessary to prevent jury pool contamination.
Simmons noted that initial client interviews were often unproductive, necessitating significant time investment to build rapport. He regarded a client's social history as foundational for thorough mental health investigations and advocated for employing cultural experts when clients came from different cultural backgrounds to contextualize their formative years. He stressed that adequate time devoted to mitigation investigations is crucial, warning that insufficient time leads to inferior outcomes.
By 1998, Simmons observed a shift towards a team-based approach in capital cases, where each team member was expected to thoroughly investigate their area of expertise and maintain frequent communication. On cross-examination, Simmons admitted he was unfamiliar with the petitioner’s specific case and had not consulted the defense team. He acknowledged that each case is unique, requiring tailored approaches by attorneys.
In rebuttal, the State's lead prosecutor testified that she was unaware of a videotape of a hypnosis session involving one of the State's witnesses until shortly before the post-conviction hearing, having discovered it in the police department's evidence room.
The applicable law for post-conviction relief states that a petitioner must demonstrate that their conviction or sentence is void or voidable due to a constitutional rights violation, bearing the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. The post-conviction court's factual findings receive substantial deference unless evidence overwhelmingly contradicts them, and appellate courts do not reweigh or reevaluate evidence on purely factual issues.
Review of a post-conviction court's application of law to facts is conducted de novo, without a presumption of correctness, as established in Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) and affirmed in Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tenn. 1998). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims, which involve mixed questions of fact and law, are also reviewed de novo, granting a presumption of correctness only to the post-conviction court's factual findings, per Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 458 and Burns v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). The right to effective counsel is protected under both the U.S. and Tennessee constitutions (U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9).
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice, following the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) two-prong test. The deficient performance prong requires showing that the counsel's errors were so severe that they fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. A strong presumption exists that counsel's conduct was reasonable, and courts typically do not second-guess strategic choices unless they stem from inadequate preparation. The prejudice prong is satisfied by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the trial's outcome would have been different.
The petitioner claims ineffective assistance during all trial phases, including voir dire. He asserts that trial counsel employed ineffective questioning techniques that failed to reveal juror biases. However, the State counters that the petitioner cannot identify any biased juror who was seated due to these alleged deficiencies.
The petitioner claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to their failure to question jurors regarding potential biases related to issues such as bi-racialism, violence against women, and mental health. Specifically, the petitioner argues that trial counsel should have further probed a juror who worked as a charge nurse at a juvenile psychiatric facility about her experiences and beliefs concerning disturbed children and mental illness. The post-conviction court found no prejudice from this alleged deficiency. Additionally, the petitioner asserts that another juror's connection to a missing uncle, whose circumstances mirrored the case, warranted further questioning. The court determined this claim lacked merit since the juror asserted he could remain impartial and had no knowledge of the details surrounding his uncle's situation.
The court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge this juror for cause, as the juror’s assurances of impartiality negated the need for such a challenge. Even if a peremptory challenge had been used, the petitioner did not demonstrate any resulting prejudice. The post-conviction court agreed that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice based on the Strickland test, as he did not provide evidence of biased jurors being seated. His claims regarding the voir dire process were deemed speculative and without merit. The petitioner also contended that counsel inadequately conducted a "death qualification" of jurors, but the State argued that the record shows counsel engaged in sufficient questioning to ensure a fair and impartial jury.
The post-conviction court determined that the petitioner’s claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase were without merit. During jury selection, trial counsel effectively communicated the concepts of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, allowing jurors to understand their roles in determining whether the death penalty was warranted. The court noted that the trial court and prosecutor also provided guidance on how to weigh these circumstances, clarifying that the State bore the burden of proof to establish that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating ones beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the post-conviction hearing, the petitioner failed to present substantial evidence to support claims of juror confusion about mitigation, nor did he provide testimony from jurors indicating any misunderstanding. Consequently, the court found no reasonable probability that a more thorough explanation from counsel would have altered the jurors' decision regarding the death penalty.
Additionally, the petitioner argued that counsel should have appealed the denial of individual voir dire to assess juror knowledge of the case. The post-conviction court rejected this argument, stating that counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue it, and even if they were, the petitioner could not demonstrate resulting prejudice. The court concluded that the record supported these findings, and thus, the petitioner was not entitled to relief on either claim.
The petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request alternative methods of questioning jurors beyond a motion for individual voir dire. However, the petitioner does not specify what alternative methods could have been used or how they would have impacted the case, nor does he demonstrate any resulting prejudice. Therefore, this claim is deemed meritless.
Additionally, the petitioner argues that counsel should have objected to misleading statements regarding the burden of proof for mitigating evidence and questioned jurors about their willingness to sign a death verdict. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel were not ineffective, as the jury received proper instructions from the court, which jurors are presumed to follow. Consequently, the petitioner has not established any prejudice from counsel's inaction.
The petitioner also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his request for individual voir dire. The court ruled this claim meritless, emphasizing that collective juror examinations are standard practice and that individual voir dire is not a requirement in capital cases. The petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to appeal this ruling or that the trial court erred.
Lastly, the petitioner contends that the trial court limited counsel’s ability to rehabilitate jurors, thus infringing on his right to a fair and impartial jury. He claims that the court's directive for counsel to be more succinct hindered thorough rehabilitation efforts.
The post-conviction ruling determined that the claims regarding the trial court's statements and counsel's performance lacked merit. The trial court's comments aimed to clarify the unique aspects of serving on a capital jury, and since potential jurors were not present during these comments, they did not prejudice the case. The court emphasized the necessity of order during voir dire, affirming its role in the process.
Regarding the claim of counsel’s excessive caseload creating a conflict of interest, both lead and co-counsel denied this assertion. The post-conviction court concluded that their caseloads did not impede their ability to represent the petitioner effectively. Both attorneys had significant experience in capital litigation. Co-counsel, supervising a capital defense team, and lead counsel, handling multiple homicide cases, stated that while they may have wished for more time, their workloads did not hinder their performance. The court found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the alleged excessive caseload.
Additionally, the petitioner argued that counsel should have objected to the extended court hours, which sometimes lasted until after ten o’clock in the evening. However, trial counsel reported that while they worked late, they did not consider the hours excessive, noting that the trial court had consulted the jury about their willingness to continue. The post-conviction court upheld that this claim was also without merit. Overall, the court supported its findings with the record and testimony, denying the petitioner relief on these claims.
The Court determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice due to counsel's inaction regarding trial hours and is not entitled to relief on this basis. The petitioner did not provide evidence from the record to support claims of prejudice. Regarding the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to undercover tapes of witnesses Margaret York and Sharon Powers, it was found that trial counsel received the tapes shortly before trial, with the court refusing a delay for transcription but arranging for the Public Defender’s Office to transcribe them. The transcripts were not available until after Powers had testified. While counsel heard a statement on the tapes that could have been used to challenge Powers' credibility, the Court noted that this statement had minimal impact when considered alongside other evidence presented at trial. The post-conviction court acknowledged potential shortcomings in counsel's handling of the tapes but concluded that any ineffectiveness did not result in significant prejudice to the petitioner. The only relevant statement was deemed insufficient to undermine trial results given the broader context of the testimonies.
The court concludes that the petitioner is not entitled to relief on the basis of his claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner contends that his trial counsel's failure to investigate surveillance tapes resulted in a poor presentation of evidence, which he argues could have been enhanced in 1998. The State counters that the post-conviction court correctly found that any statement from Powers would have had minimal value during cross-examination, given the strength of the evidence against the petitioner. Additionally, the petitioner claims that trial counsel should have used a letter from Sharon Powers that described their marital relationship to challenge the marital privilege ruling. The State responds that the letter was in federal custody during the trial and asserts that even if it had been available, it would not have changed the court's ruling. The post-conviction court found that the issues raised by the defense were adequately addressed in trial arguments and that the potential evidence would have been cumulative rather than a new revelation. Consequently, even if counsel had been ineffective, the petitioner failed to show any resulting prejudice. The court supports the post-conviction court's determination on both issues.
The petitioner claims ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call a fiber analysis expert to counter Special Agent Hopkins' testimony about a fiber found in the petitioner’s car that matched the victim's clothing. The State argues that the petitioner did not demonstrate that trial counsel's actions were unreasonable, noting that defense counsel consulted with a fiber polymer chemistry expert to prepare for cross-examination. The post-conviction court found the claim without merit, as the expert testimony supported Agent Hopkins' findings, with only minor disagreement regarding the certainty of the comparison. Consequently, the court concluded that even if the expert had been called, the petitioner failed to show prejudice from counsel’s decision.
Additionally, the petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for not adequately presenting a third-party defense, focusing on the victim's troubled marriage and potential motives of her husband and former partners. The State responded that the petitioner did not present key witnesses, undermining the claim. The post-conviction court determined that evidence regarding Brian Maher lacked relevance concerning motive, and testimony regarding Brett Musekamp did not establish a motive to kill. While Robert Sanderson's testimony was found relevant, the court deemed its probative value outweighed by potential jury confusion. The overall findings support the post-conviction court's conclusions, denying relief on these claims.
Mark Burchfield’s testimony was deemed admissible by the Court, but the trial court's exclusion was ruled harmless. Consequently, any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related to this issue did not demonstrate prejudice, thus denying relief. Regarding Sharon Powers, the petitioner argued that his counsel's motion to employ a psychologist to support his claim of marital privilege was deficient, lacking specifics about the expert. The State asserted that the trial court denied the request not due to deficiencies, but because it saw no specific need for expert testimony on the matter. The trial court reasoned that the issues regarding the marital relationship could be sufficiently addressed by the court itself and through evidentiary presentations without expert involvement. Lead counsel attempted to clarify the necessity of expert testimony, arguing that community standards should inform the court's judgment, but the trial court maintained that public policy considerations could be effectively argued by counsel without the need for multiple experts.
The trial court determined that expert assistance was not essential for the motion at hand, indicating that the lack of a specific expert mentioned in the request for funds did not lead to the denial of the motion. Trial counsel informed the court about a referral for an expert from Midtown Mental Health but had not retained one yet. The court clarified that the timing of the motion was not a reason for denial, suggesting that an expert could prepare in a short timeframe without delaying the trial. The court found no evidence of prejudice to the petitioner due to counsel's actions, noting that even with a specific expert's name, the court would likely have still denied the request for assistance.
In support of the claim for expert testimony, psychiatrist Dr. William Kenner testified regarding the nature of domestic violence, categorizing the abuse described by Sharon Powers as "male controlling interactive violence." He characterized the abuser as a "macho bully" who uses just enough violence to maintain control, and noted that such men typically have a patriarchal view of family and often come from backgrounds where violence is normalized. Dr. Kenner contrasted this type of batterer with those who are sadistically violent, stating that the women involved are usually not severely traumatized or in fear for their lives. He reviewed the petitioner’s marital history and found no prior domestic abuse complaints or a history of abuse in his previous relationships. Furthermore, he concluded that Sharon Powers did not appear to be victimized and suggested she might be emotionally volatile.
Dr. Kenner characterized Sharon Powers as a "very damaged woman," casting doubt on her abuse claims. He acknowledged testimony from Margaret York about bruises on Sharon's legs and Misty Moore’s account of Sharon emerging from a bedroom in tears, with visible bruises. However, Dr. Kenner suggested these marks were likely the result of consensual sadomasochistic behavior rather than abuse. He deemed Misty’s testimony unreliable due to her pregnancy and need for her mother’s support, implying she might have fabricated details to bolster Sharon's case.
Dr. Kenner further analyzed Sharon's marital history, noting her four previous marriages, two with alcoholics and two with abusers, and her choice to engage with the petitioner while he was incarcerated. He described her as an insecure "drama queen" seeking attention and posited that her profile aligned with someone who could invent abuse claims. He remarked that women sometimes fabricate domestic violence allegations for strategic advantages.
Despite the potential testimony Dr. Kenner could have provided, the court concluded it would not have significantly influenced the trial's outcome, as the trial court had already found the testimonies of Sharon and Misty credible and recognized the relationship as tumultuous. Consequently, the petitioner failed to demonstrate any grounds for relief based on this claim. The court affirmed the post-conviction court's conclusions, finding ample support for them in the evidentiary hearing testimony.
The supreme court affirmed that the marital privilege did not apply in this case, validating the trial court's decision to permit Sharon Powers' testimony. The court found no error in the trial court's use of the Adams factors to assess whether Powers' communications with her husband were privileged, concluding that the evidence supported the trial court's findings, thus rendering the marital communications privilege inapplicable.
Regarding the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the mitigation phase, he argued that his attorneys failed to address his prior violent convictions against women and did not seek expert mental health assistance to explain his actions. However, the post-conviction court deemed these claims meritless, stating that trial counsel made strategic decisions based on what they perceived as potentially prejudicial information. The court noted that there was no indication that mental health issues existed, as confirmed by the defense team. It also highlighted that any diagnosis presented during the trial was of an unrecognized disorder, unlikely to be funded for evaluation. Moreover, the petitioner did not demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the lack of further mental health evaluations or by not contacting additional mitigation witnesses beyond his mother. As such, the court concluded that the claims of ineffective assistance were unfounded and the petitioner was not entitled to relief.
Counsel's failure to contact James Ronald Powers, the petitioner’s stepfather, is argued as a significant oversight. Powers’ potential testimony could have aided in the mitigation case, but lead counsel noted that they expected the petitioner's mother to provide similar details; however, she declined to testify at the last moment. The court ruled that even if this constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner was not prejudiced due to the strong aggravating circumstances presented in the case.
The petitioner also claimed that trial counsel did not investigate the first ten years of his life, which the post-conviction court dismissed. Testimony from the defense team revealed awareness of the petitioner’s early life in Taiwan and substance abuse issues. They planned to use the petitioner and his mother’s testimony for mitigation but both opted out before the trial. Concerns about overstating the cultural impact and maintaining jury credibility were cited, as well as an assessment that the petitioner did not exhibit significant mental health issues requiring further evaluation. Records indicated some depression but lacked independent verification, leading counsel to forgo additional mental assessments and expert testimony from Taiwan, believing that funding and court authorization would be unlikely.
Ultimately, the court determined that, despite the potential benefits of additional mitigating evidence, the overwhelming aggravating factors meant that the petitioner could not demonstrate a reasonable probability that a jury would find the balance of circumstances against the death penalty. The court referenced relevant legal standards from Strickland and Goad in support of its ruling. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that trial counsel’s failure to engage necessary experts, including cultural, addiction, and psychological specialists, constituted ineffective assistance.
Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to present important testimony from several experts during the sentencing phase, which could have provided mitigating evidence. Specifically, he cites the testimonies of Dr. John Franklin Copper (cultural expert), Dr. Chien-Hung Cheng (multi-cultural psychology expert), Dr. William Kenner (psychiatry and child psychiatry), and Dr. Murray Smith (addiction expert). Dr. Smith indicated that the petitioner has addictions to alcohol and gambling, potentially leading to brain damage from early substance abuse and toxic exposure. Dr. Copper highlighted the discrimination the petitioner faced in Taiwan due to his biracial background and his mother's profession, noting communication difficulties stemming from cultural changes in Taiwan. Dr. Cheng elaborated on the unique struggles immigrant families face with language and culture, emphasizing the stigma associated with the petitioner's background and the trauma of leaving his grandmother, who was a significant maternal figure. Although some expert evidence could have aided in mitigation, the post-conviction court determined that the strength of the aggravating evidence was substantial. As a result, it concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict had this testimony been presented, thus denying relief based on this claim.
Ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase is central to the petitioner's claim, focusing on several alleged deficiencies. The petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to develop a coherent sentencing strategy, did not interview his stepfather, James Ronald Powers, neglected to investigate his early childhood in Taiwan, and did not retain expert witnesses for mitigation purposes. The post-conviction court found that the petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice from these failures, particularly regarding the stepfather's testimony, which was deemed of limited value. Although Powers’ testimony could have aided the mitigation case, the court noted that the defense anticipated similar information from the petitioner’s mother, who ultimately did not testify. Given the strong aggravating factors in the case, the court determined that any deficiencies in counsel's performance did not result in prejudice to the petitioner.
Additionally, the court addressed the failure to request funds for expert witnesses, including a psychologist and addiction specialist. Despite the petitioner's claims of counsel's awareness of his substance abuse, gambling issues, and cultural dislocation, the court concluded that counsel was not ineffective for not securing these experts. The petitioner asserted that their involvement would have provided more substantial mitigation evidence, potentially outweighing the aggravating circumstances; however, the court ultimately ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to relief based on these claims.
Counsel failed to establish a particularized need for expert services from Professor Copper, Dr. Cheng, or Dr. Kenner, despite potentially sufficient evidence to support a request for a specialist in addictions. At the time of the trial, courts were generally reluctant to grant funding for such experts. The defense team opted against presenting evidence of the petitioner’s addiction due to concerns that the risks outweighed the benefits, given that the only supporting evidence was from the petitioner’s prior incarceration records. Furthermore, even if counsel's performance was ineffective, the petitioner did not demonstrate any resulting prejudice. To challenge a death sentence on these grounds, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the outcome would have differed based on the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, referencing Strickland v. Washington.
The court outlined several factors for assessing alleged prejudice regarding the failure to present mitigating evidence, including the nature and extent of the available evidence, whether similar evidence was presented, and the strength of the aggravating factors. The record supported the conclusion that the petitioner did not meet this burden.
Regarding jury instructions on reasonable doubt, the trial court's instruction was challenged by the petitioner for differing from the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions. The petitioner claimed trial counsel were ineffective for not objecting, arguing this violated his due process rights. However, the state contended that this issue was waived since it was not included in the post-conviction relief petition, a position the court agreed with.
The petitioner also claimed prejudice due to the State's alleged suppression of exculpatory evidence, specifically a videotape of the hypnosis of Anna Dillon. The State countered that the petitioner did not demonstrate that the tape or a written statement existed in its possession or that it was material to the defense.
Dillon provided exculpatory statements under hypnosis, describing the perpetrator's car as a medium to dark gray and the individual as a white male with short dark curly hair and a straight nose. The petitioner, who is Asian with dark hair and owned a burgundy car, claims that revealing the hypnosis tape would have generated reasonable doubt among jurors regarding Dillon’s statements. In response, the State argues that it did not suppress the hypnosis tape, that Dillon's statements were less credible than her trial testimony, and that they were not materially significant. The post-conviction court found meritless the claim that the State improperly suppressed the tape, noting it was not known to the State at trial and was conducted by a private investigative firm. The court also questioned the materiality of the tape and highlighted the strong evidence against the petitioner at trial.
Additionally, the petitioner argued that certain evidence, including various items stored in the police property room, could not be located. However, the court noted that these items were available at trial and their loss occurred post-conviction, thus not violating the petitioner’s fair trial rights per the precedent set in State v. Ferguson. The court concluded that the petitioner could not presume the lost items were exculpatory.
Finally, the petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the post-conviction court, claiming the judge exhibited bias and lack of attentiveness during the proceedings, including during Dr. Murray Smith's testimony, and expressed frustration about the case.
The State contends that the petitioner’s claims of bias do not indicate any improper rulings or subjective bias from the judge, emphasizing that the court has consistently acted to advance the case despite delays. The post-conviction court found no reasonable basis to question its impartiality and determined that the case should proceed. It stated that the record does not reflect biased rulings against the petitioner and concluded that automatic recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 3E, was unnecessary, confirming the court's lack of prejudice against the petitioner.
Regarding the petitioner’s argument about ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the 1998 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-13-204(c) during sentencing, the State asserts that the petitioner has not shown prejudice. The Tennessee Supreme Court had previously ruled the trial court erred in applying the amendment but found the error harmless since the evidence was admissible to establish aggravating circumstances without affecting the sentencing outcome. Although the post-conviction court acknowledged that counsel was ineffective for not objecting, it ruled that the petitioner did not demonstrate any resulting prejudice from this inaction.
Evidence indicated strong aggravating circumstances and weak mitigating circumstances. The petitioner claimed that the death penalty contravenes both the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions, arguing it violates equal protection rights, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, infringes on the fundamental right to life, and that the indictment was unconstitutional for lacking the aggravating factor. He also asserted violations of international law and the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. However, these claims were previously addressed and rejected on direct appeal, as established in Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-106(h) (2010) and various Tennessee Supreme Court cases. Additionally, the chancery court upheld the constitutionality of Tennessee's lethal injection protocol. Consequently, the court affirmed the denial of the petition.
