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State of Tennessee v. Tina M. Dixon
Citation: Not availableDocket: M2010-02382-CCA-R3-CD
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; June 21, 2012; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Tina M. Dixon was convicted by a Humphreys County jury for possession of over one-half ounce of marijuana and more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, both occurring within 1000 feet of a school zone. The trial court sentenced her to a total of twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Dixon raised several arguments: 1. The trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress evidence, claiming the attachment order for her arrest was unlawfully issued. 2. She argued that she was not properly charged with the crimes leading to her conviction. 3. She contended that her due process rights were violated because the presiding judge had previously prosecuted her on other charges. 4. She claimed due process was also violated as the prosecuting Assistant District Attorney had previously served as her public defender. 5. Finally, she asserted that the trial court erred in enhancing her sentence. After reviewing the case and relevant laws, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgments, rejecting all of Dixon's claims. The opinion was delivered by Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer, with Judges Norma McGee Ogle and Roger A. Page concurring. The case originated from Dixon's arrest on July 27, 2007, following a writ of attachment related to child support contempt proceedings, which she argued was void. Testimony from Judge Anthony L. Sanders confirmed the legitimacy of the attachment. Officer Hagler served the attachment document on July 27, 2007. Judge Sanders, with twenty-seven years of judicial experience, expressed he had never encountered a sheriff's deputy claiming service of an attachment was unlawful. He emphasized his cautious approach to issuing attachment orders due to potential contempt penalties, such as jail time or fines. Although he lacked specific recollection of the case, Judge Sanders indicated that the attachment was necessary since the Defendant had failed to appear as ordered. The Defendant sought to inspect juvenile records that the State argued were confidential and not subject to subpoena. She contended that the trial court needed access to those records to assess the attachment's validity. Upon reviewing the file, Judge Sanders noted it lacked documentation proving the Defendant was notified of her obligation to appear. He referenced a docket entry from June 3 indicating her absence, which led to a $2,500 attachment bond being issued and a court date set for August 7, 2008. He clarified that there was no record confirming the Defendant had personal knowledge of her required appearance, aside from notification to her attorney. Judge Sanders speculated that the Defendant likely attended the hearing where her court date was established but was not entirely certain. He stated that had she not been present, he would have issued a petition instead of resetting the case. During subsequent questioning, he confirmed no summons was issued prior to the attachment order. Deputy Wesley Hagler testified to receiving the attachment on July 27, 2007, and his role was to locate and arrest the Defendant. While attempting to execute the order at her brother's home, the officers encountered a relative who directed them to the Defendant. Upon identifying herself, the Defendant was informed of the attachment stemming from juvenile court. Deputy Hagler detected the smell of marijuana and called for additional officers, including Sheriff Chris Davis. The Defendant eventually indicated to the officers that drugs were stored in a video camera box, and while Deputy Hagler could not hear the preceding conversation, he inferred that she consented to a search of the residence. The Defendant believed she had given both written and verbal consent for a search. During cross-examination, Deputy Hagler noted that there were discussions suggesting his oath of office was not filed with the Clerk of the Court in Humphreys County, and it was stipulated that none of the Sheriff’s deputies had filed their oaths at the time of the search on July 27, 2007. Deputy Hagler detained the Defendant while Officer Ahne searched the house, where two men were found in a back bedroom. Although Deputy Hagler's report stated he requested consent to search from the Defendant, she denied it initially. Later, after the Sheriff spoke with her, a consent form signed by the Defendant was produced. During redirect examination, Deputy Hagler explained that Officer Ahne's search was for safety reasons. The Defendant, who did not own the house but was the sister of the owner, Jackie Hargrove, requested to speak with the Sheriff. Upon arrival, the Sheriff learned of the Defendant's medical issues and her desire for a quick bond process. The Defendant then offered that the Sheriff could search the premises if he assisted with her bond. The Sheriff claimed he made no prior promises to the Defendant before her consent, but he later contacted the judge about her situation. After consenting to the search, the Defendant led the Sheriff to drugs hidden in a camera box. On cross-examination, Sheriff Davis confirmed that officers were present before his arrival and that he was unaware if the Defendant received Miranda warnings before consenting. The Defendant testified that her arrest stemmed from a failure to appear in Juvenile Court, claiming she was unaware of the court date or the appointment of an attorney. She acknowledged her previous convictions, and the trial court noted discrepancies in the records regarding her service of a contempt petition related to child support, detailing the timeline of court appearances and attorney appointments leading up to the issuance of an attachment for her non-appearance on July 3, 2007. A person summoned to court is responsible for tracking any rescheduled court dates. The individual claimed a lack of actual knowledge of the proceedings but acknowledged a duty of constructive knowledge, especially since she had legal representation and had been served with a subpoena. The court deemed the issuance of the attachment valid, despite the defendant's attorney noting that the officer had not filed his oath with the county Court Clerk; the court viewed the officer as a de facto officer, and thus, no evidence would be suppressed based on this issue. The court is considering whether the defendant’s initial refusal to consent to a search barred officers from later requesting permission to search. Subsequently, the trial court confirmed that the officers were lawfully present at the defendant's residence under a Writ of Attachment from the Juvenile Court of Humphreys County and had a statutory duty to serve such processes. They obtained valid voluntary consent to search the premises, leading to the overruling of the Motion to Suppress. During the bifurcated trial, Deputy Hagler testified that he and Detective Ahne, engaged in felony drug interdiction, went to the defendant's home to serve the attachment order. Upon entering, guided by a child, they detected a strong odor of marijuana. Deputy Hagler informed the defendant about the attachment order and began the arrest process. After the defendant denied the presence of marijuana, Detective Ahne requested to search the house; the defendant initially refused. While waiting for a patrol unit to transport the defendant, she expressed a desire to consult Sheriff Chris Davis about the search. Deputy Hagler testified that after the Sheriff arrived at the Defendant's residence, he was informed that the Defendant had consented to a search of her property, as evidenced by a signed consent form. Following this, the Defendant led the officers to a back bedroom and indicated that drugs were in her nightstand. The officers discovered several illegal substances, including powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana, along with digital scales and empty baggies. Despite the findings, the Defendant was not arrested on that day. Sheriff Chris Davis recounted that he was called to assist with the situation and was informed by Detective Ahne that the Defendant had requested his presence. Upon reading the consent form to the Defendant, she expressed concerns about her medical issues and bond but ultimately signed the form. The Sheriff encouraged her to cooperate, leading her to indicate the location of the drugs. Special Agent Jennifer Sullivan from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation tested the recovered evidence, confirming the amounts of cocaine and marijuana found. Detective Tony Ahne corroborated the testimonies of Hagler and Davis, noting that the Defendant initially denied consent but later agreed after the Sheriff’s arrival. He also mentioned the discovery of $800 in cash, which was not seized since it was not found near the drugs, making it difficult to prove it as drug proceeds. The jury convicted the Defendant of possessing more than half an ounce of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, and over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. The trial court proceeded with a bifurcated trial to ascertain whether the offenses occurred within 1000 feet of a school zone. Detective Ahne testified that the Defendant lived 595 feet from Saint Patrick’s School, leading the jury to conclude that her offenses occurred within 1000 feet of a school zone. At the sentencing hearing, probation officer John McGranahan presented a report indicating the Defendant had eight prior felony convictions, including burglary and drug-related offenses, and frequently violated probation and community corrections. The trial court considered multiple factors in sentencing, including the presentence report and the Defendant's criminal history. The court classified the Defendant as a range one standard offender for cocaine possession with intent to sell and as a multiple offender for marijuana possession. Enhancements were applied due to her prior criminal behavior and noncompliance with sentencing conditions. The court sentenced her to 20 years for the Class A felony and 6 years for the Class D felony, which will run concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant raised five issues: 1) the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress due to an unlawfully issued attachment order; 2) the charges against her were improper; 3) she was denied due process because the presiding judge had previously prosecuted her; 4) she was denied due process due to the Assistant District Attorney’s prior representation of her; and 5) the trial court erred in enhancing her sentence. The Defendant argued that the attachment order was invalid for lacking an allegation of 'willful disobedience,' while the State maintained that it was lawful due to her failure to appear in court for a child support matter. The standard of review for a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in a suppression hearing is established in State v. Odom, which stipulates that such findings are upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. The prevailing party is entitled to the strongest legitimate interpretation of the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it. Credibility of witnesses and weight of evidence are determined by the trial judge, while the application of law to the facts is reviewed de novo by the Court. The defendant must demonstrate that the evidence contradicts the trial court’s findings. The defendant's motion to suppress was based on the claim that the attachment warrant issued against her was unlawful, cited under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102, which outlines the limited circumstances under which courts may issue attachments. Contempt can be civil or criminal; civil contempt enforces compliance with court orders and is remedial, while criminal contempt preserves the authority of the law and is punitive. In criminal contempt cases, guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The juvenile court's issuance of the attachment was not a contempt finding but a show cause order for the defendant to explain why she should not be found in contempt. The juvenile court judge issued an attachment order against the Defendant due to a belief that the Defendant failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. The judge indicated that had the Defendant not been present when the hearing was scheduled, he would have reset it instead of issuing an attachment. Evidence indicated the Defendant was indeed present at the scheduling. The trial court concluded that the juvenile judge acted lawfully in issuing the attachment order. Even if the order were deemed unlawful, officers lawfully entered the residence with consent from an occupant, who also had the authority to permit a search. This consent was independent of any consent provided by the Defendant. Consequently, the trial court correctly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. Regarding the indictment, the Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not setting aside verdicts for charges not explicitly included in the indictment. The indictment alleged possession with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell a controlled substance, yet the jury found the Defendant guilty of attempting to sell and deliver specific amounts of cocaine and marijuana. The State contended that the trial court adequately instructed the jury, and the record confirmed the convictions aligned with the indictment. The jury foreman confirmed the verdicts, which the trial court interpreted as consistent with the charges in the indictment. Despite the Defendant’s counsel suggesting a misunderstanding, the trial court maintained that the jury's intent was to convict the Defendant of the crimes outlined in the indictment, despite not using a formal verdict form. A jury verdict must be expressed in clear and certain language to prevent misunderstandings. Courts have a duty to ensure that a verdict's form and substance are appropriate, rejecting any unintelligible or insufficient verdicts. If a verdict is unclear, the trial court can send the jury back for clarification. In this case, despite the jury foreman's inarticulate expression of the verdict, the trial court concluded that the jury clearly convicted the Defendant of possession with intent to sell drugs based on the context of the jury instructions and circumstantial evidence, such as the presence of baggies and scales. The Defendant also claimed that the presiding judge should have recused himself due to prior prosecution of her for burglary and theft, arguing that his impartiality was compromised. However, the issue was not raised until sentencing, and the State contended that the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to disqualify the judge. The legal standards for recusal require a judge to step down if their impartiality can be reasonably questioned, especially if they have prior involvement in the case. The Tennessee Constitution and relevant statutes support this requirement, stating that a judge who has acted as counsel must recuse themselves unless all parties consent to their presence. The trial court’s decision on recusal was upheld due to lack of a clear abuse of discretion. The Defendant failed to provide evidence of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, offering no specific allegations of impartiality aside from the judge's prior role as a prosecutor in one of the Defendant's earlier convictions. The judge had prosecuted a case involving the Defendant in 1991, which resulted in her guilty plea. There is no indication that the judge remembered this prior case, and the Defendant's counsel only discovered this information shortly before sentencing. During sentencing, the judge considered the Defendant's six prior convictions, including the one he prosecuted, to enhance her sentence based on her history of criminal behavior, a matter of law rather than disputed facts. The objective requirement for recusal was also examined, referencing the need for judges to assess both subjective bias and the appearance of impartiality based on an objective standard. The Defendant argued that the judge's prior involvement as a prosecutor should have disqualified him, particularly since that conviction was factored into her sentence enhancement. However, case law, including State v. Warner and State v. Smith, indicates that recusal is not mandated under such circumstances, especially when the prior case concluded long before the current trial and involved undisputed facts. Additionally, the Defendant asserted that her due process was violated because the Assistant District Attorney prosecuting her had previously served as her public defender in separate burglary and theft charges, which were also used to enhance her current sentence. However, no constitutional or statutory basis for mandatory recusal was established in either case. The conclusion reached is that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on these issues. The State asserts that the absence of evidence showing the prosecutor used or recalled any client confidences during sentencing indicates no prejudice against the Defendant, thus upholding the Defendant’s due process rights. The court concurs, emphasizing that unethical conduct by a prosecutor can infringe on a defendant's constitutional rights and the integrity of the justice system. Tennessee courts reference the Code of Professional Responsibility as established by the Tennessee Supreme Court to guide decisions on disqualification motions, which are reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion may occur if an incorrect legal standard is applied or if the decision is illogical and results in injustice. Appellate courts do not defer to a trial court's interpretation of the Code in disqualification matters. The court outlines a framework for determining prosecutor disqualification, focusing on actual conflicts of interest and appearances of impropriety. It is established that attorneys cannot represent opposing interests if they have previously received client confidences. However, in this case, the prosecutor did not switch sides, and there is no evidence suggesting she recalled her prior role as the Defendant's public defender or used any information from that representation in the current case. The Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly used her prior convictions to advocate for an enhanced sentence, although the facts of those convictions were not disputed. The trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to disqualify the prosecutor and her motion for a new trial on these grounds was upheld, as she did not demonstrate entitlement to relief. Regarding sentencing, the Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously applied enhancement factors, specifically asserting that her previous felony convictions do not justify such enhancement and that her failure to comply with community release conditions is irrelevant to a Class A school zone conviction. The State maintains that the trial court correctly enhanced the sentence. The Court, upon de novo review, emphasizes that the trial court's findings must be presumed correct unless the appealing party demonstrates otherwise. The Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act allows the court to impose a sentence within a specified range if it aligns with statutory purposes and principles. In this case, the trial court classified the Defendant as a Range I standard offender for her Class A felony and as a Range II multiple offender for her Class D felony, with respective sentencing ranges of 15-25 years and 4-8 years. Tennessee law permits sentencing courts to consider specific enhancement factors when determining sentence length. Relevant factors include: (1) the defendant's history of prior criminal convictions beyond those necessary for the appropriate sentencing range, and (8) the defendant's failure to comply with conditions of a community release sentence prior to trial or sentencing (T.C.A. 40-35-114). Enhancement factors that are not essential elements of the offense may be considered if suitable. The trial court is required to document the enhancement and mitigating factors it considered and explain its sentencing rationale (T.C.A. 40-35-210(e)). Post-2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act restrict appeal grounds, eliminating the ability to contest the trial court's weighing of enhancement and mitigating factors (2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 353). While the court cannot review the weighing process, it can assess the application of these factors (T.C.A. 40-35-401(d)). In this case, the trial court correctly applied enhancement factor (1) due to the defendant's eight prior felony convictions and enhancement factor (8) due to multiple violations of probationary and community correction sentences. The defendant's argument against the applicability of factor (8) in a Class A school zone offense was unsubstantiated, and the court concluded that repeat offenders should face harsher penalties. The trial court's sentencing was upheld, and the defendant was denied relief on this issue. The judgments of the trial court were affirmed.