The Court of Appeals of Tennessee addressed the case of David Byars and Elizabeth Byars, M.D. against Randy Frazier and Jeff Kelley, with the appeal stemming from a trial court ruling that dismissed the plaintiffs' claims based on GTLA immunity. The appellate court identified a factual question regarding whether the defendants acted within the scope of their employment when they communicated with the plaintiff’s teaching supervisor and ordered the destruction of surveillance video tapes. Consequently, the court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims related to slander, false light, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium, while affirming the trial court's decision in other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The background provided detailed Mr. Byars’ reputation and the circumstances surrounding a verbal altercation on January 21, 2011, involving Mr. Byars and his family during a cheerleading practice at Westview High School. The court emphasized that, in evaluating the complaint, all factual allegations must be presumed true.
Father slipped on a slick cardboard poster while moving backward in a gymnasium, causing him to fall onto a mat. After regaining his footing, Father attempted to confront Mr. Byars, who was leaving the gym. Tensions escalated as Stepmother shouted at Mr. Byars, who responded aggressively. Father then physically confronted Mr. Byars, pinning him against a railing, while Sister attacked Mr. Byars from behind. Mr. Byars pleaded for release, which eventually occurred when Stepsister intervened. Following the incident, Mr. Byars was suspended as a cheerleading coach. Although Mr. Byars admitted he deserved discipline for his earlier behavior, he claimed that Director Randy Frazier and Assistant Director Jeff Kelley acted tortiously regarding their communications about the incident. Mr. Byars stated that the incident was recorded on surveillance footage, which Frazier and Kelley reviewed. Father confirmed to Frazier that he had merely slipped and was not attacked or injured by Mr. Byars, nor did he miss work due to the incident. However, Frazier later described the incident differently, claiming Father was injured by Mr. Byars. This narrative was contradicted by witness Patsy Duncan, who after viewing the tape believed Frazier's account to be inconsistent with what was recorded.
Lisa Taylor’s daughter, a cheerleader, reported that Father simply tripped over a mat during an incident. Following Ms. Taylor's request, she met with Mr. Frazier and Mr. Kelley at the Weakley County Board of Education Office, where she shared her daughter's account. In contrast, Mr. Frazier and Mr. Kelley claimed that Mr. Byars had attacked Father. Another witness, Kim Kirby’s daughter, stated that during an argument with Sister, Mr. Byars stomped on Sister’s cell phone; when Father intervened, Mr. Byars resisted, causing Father to slip and fall. Ms. Kirby and her husband later viewed the incident's videotape and found no evidence of Mr. Byars throwing Father to the ground.
After Ms. Kirby informed Mr. Frazier of this finding, Frazier, Kelley, and attorney Sam Jackson held a conference call with Father, threatening him with termination if he did not collect and destroy all video copies of the incident. Frazier sent an email confirming their conversation, instructing Father to ensure no one viewed the video without his permission and to destroy any copies by noon that day, with disciplinary action for non-compliance. Mr. Kelley, acting on Frazier's instructions, reportedly pressured Mr. Byars to delete the video from his hard drive.
On February 2, 2011, Frazier banned Mr. Byars from Westview property without permission, contacting the Martin Police Department to request his arrest for any violations of this ban, implying a threat to the school environment. To counter false statements by Frazier, Mr. Byars emailed former colleagues on February 4, 2011, after which Frazier blocked Mr. Byars’ email account to suppress the truth.
Mr. Byars alleges that in January and February 2011, Mr. Frazier communicated false information about an incident to multiple individuals, including Gath Meeks and Gordon Morris, which led to widespread rumors that Mr. Byars had violently attacked his father in front of students. On April 15, 2011, Frazier erroneously informed Dr. Doster that Mr. Byars had filed a lawsuit against the Weakley County Board of Education. This misinformation harmed Mr. Byars' reputation, leading to public ridicule and mistrust. Despite opportunities to retract his statements, Frazier refused. On April 28, 2011, Mr. Byars and his wife filed a lawsuit against Frazier and Jeff Kelley for slander, false light, obstruction of justice, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of spousal consortium. The complaint argued that the defendants acted outside their employment duties with the Weakley County Board of Education. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, claiming immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. On July 14, 2011, the trial court granted the motion, ruling that the defendants acted within their official capacity, thus providing them immunity for slander, false light, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. The court also dismissed the obstruction of justice claim, stating it does not exist in Tennessee law, and consequently dismissed the loss of spousal consortium claim. The plaintiffs appealed, questioning whether the trial court erred in determining the defendants were acting within the scope of their employment. The appeal does not contest the dismissal of the obstruction of justice claim, nor did the court address other arguments from the defendants' motion regarding the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' claims.
A question of fact exists regarding whether the Defendants acted within the scope of their employment when they communicated with Plaintiff’s teaching supervisor, interacted with named individuals, and ordered the destruction of surveillance video tapes. As a result, the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims—slander, false light, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium—related to these actions is reversed. The trial court's decision is affirmed in all other aspects, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
The excerpt outlines the standard of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12.02(6), emphasizing that such a motion assesses the legal sufficiency of the complaint based solely on its pleadings. A defendant admits the truth of relevant allegations while claiming they do not establish a cause of action. The court must interpret the complaint liberally, accepting factual allegations as true but not legal conclusions. A motion to dismiss should only be granted if the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would entitle them to relief, and the trial court's determination is reviewed de novo.
The trial court had previously dismissed the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, asserting that Defendants were immune from claims based on the GTLA, which removes immunity for injuries caused by employees' negligent acts within the scope of employment, except in cases involving specific torts. The appeal's central issue is whether the Plaintiffs provided sufficient factual allegations to support their claim that the Defendants’ actions were outside the scope of their employment, which would negate GTLA protection. Generally, whether an employee is acting within the scope of employment is a factual question, but it can become a legal question when the facts are not in dispute and do not allow for conflicting conclusions. The GTLA does not define "scope of employment."
Determining whether an employee acted within the scope of employment requires a detailed factual analysis without a definitive rule. The Restatement (Second) of Agency sections 228 and 229 outline that an employee's actions fall within the scope of their employment if they align with the tasks they were hired to perform, occur within authorized time and space, are motivated at least in part by a desire to serve the employer, and if they involve force, it is not unexpected by the employer. Conversely, actions are outside the scope if they differ significantly from authorized conduct or occur outside the permitted time and space, or are insufficiently motivated by a purpose to serve the employer.
In this case, the facts are largely undisputed due to the motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs allege that after an incident, parents and grandparents of cheerleaders sought explanations from the Defendants, who were acting in their official capacities during business hours. The trial court found that the Defendants operated within their official roles. The Plaintiffs also base their slander, false light, and defamation claims on actions taken by Mr. Frazier, including contacting law enforcement and making alleged false statements to various individuals. For the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, they cite threats regarding video destruction and blocking Mr. Byars' email.
The court concluded that Mr. Frazier was acting within his employment scope when requesting Mr. Byars' arrest for trespassing and when blocking his email access. However, the Complaint does not provide enough detail to ascertain if Mr. Frazier's other communications were within the employment scope, particularly regarding the context and authorization of those discussions with other individuals. A factual question remains concerning whether the Defendants acted outside their employment scope when ordering the destruction of surveillance video tapes.
Plaintiffs' Complaint reveals conflicting conclusions regarding whether Defendants acted within the scope of their employment when they communicated with Mr. Byars’ teaching supervisor, interacted with certain individuals, and ordered the destruction of surveillance tapes. This presents a factual question that cannot be resolved as a matter of law. Consequently, the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for slander, false light, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The trial court's decision is affirmed in all other respects, and the costs of the appeal are assigned to Appellees Randy Frazier and Jeff Kelley. The court does not address the dismissal of the obstruction of justice claim, nor does it opine on the merits of additional grounds for dismissal raised by Defendants that the trial court did not address.
