Darryl Thompson v. Sate of Tennessee

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2011-02139-CCA-R3-PC

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; August 1, 2012; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Darryl Thompson appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his post-conviction relief petition following a guilty plea to second degree murder, a Class A felony, under a negotiated agreement that resulted in a forty-year sentence as a Range II offender. Thompson argues that his plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily due to ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically claiming that his attorney failed to adequately inform him of the implications of pleading outside his offender range. The Court, after reviewing the record, affirms the post-conviction court's judgment. 

The facts of the case involve the homicide of Jared Collins during a robbery. Witnesses reported that Thompson and another individual, Reginald Adkins, confronted Collins in a market parking lot, where Adkins shot Collins in the back after they stole money from him. Thompson admitted his involvement in the robbery during police questioning. Initially charged with first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, Thompson accepted a plea deal for second degree murder, resulting in the dismissal of the robbery charge. The trial court ensured Thompson understood the plea agreement and his rights during the guilty plea hearing.

The petitioner acknowledged during court proceedings that he was pleading outside his sentencing range for second degree murder, which had a maximum of twenty-five years for a Range I offender. He was informed that if he went to trial and was convicted of felony murder, he could face a life sentence. The petitioner expressed understanding of the plea agreement and satisfaction with his trial counsel at that time. Subsequently, he filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, claiming his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 

At the post-conviction hearing, the petitioner stated he accepted the plea because trial counsel suggested a forty-year sentence was appropriate for his situation. He later learned that the correct range for a Range I offender was fifteen to twenty-five years and claimed he would have opted for a trial had he understood this. He testified that trial counsel did not clearly explain the felony murder law or the possible sentencing ranges. The petitioner also referenced the impact of Ms. Birdwell's conviction on his decision to accept the plea.

Trial counsel countered, asserting he discussed all relevant evidence, the law of criminal responsibility, potential outcomes, and the implications of pleading outside the sentencing range with the petitioner. He believed the plea was a strategic decision and that the petitioner understood the compromise. The post-conviction court ultimately found no ineffective assistance of counsel and deemed the plea knowing and voluntary, denying relief. The petitioner has since appealed, arguing that the court erred in its conclusion due to trial counsel's failure to adequately inform him of his sentencing range and its consequences.

The evaluation of a guilty plea's knowing and voluntary nature requires determining whether it represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among available options, as established by the U.S. Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford. This assessment involves examining the totality of circumstances, which includes factors such as the defendant's intelligence, familiarity with criminal proceedings, representation by competent counsel, and the reasons behind the plea, such as avoiding harsher penalties from a trial.

After a guilty plea is entered, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are relevant only if they affect the plea's voluntariness. To succeed in such claims, a petitioner must prove that counsel's performance was below the standard of competence required in criminal cases, following the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington: demonstrating deficient representation and resulting prejudice. Specifically, in the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, had it not been for counsel's errors, they would have opted for a trial instead.

While a petitioner cannot benefit from hindsight or challenge reasonable trial strategies, such decisions must be made with adequate preparation. The determination of deficient performance and potential prejudice involves mixed questions of law and fact. Appeals regarding the trial court's factual findings are made under a de novo standard, with a presumption of correctness unless contradicted by substantial evidence, whereas legal conclusions are reviewed purely de novo.

In a detailed ruling denying relief, the post-conviction court found that the petitioner claimed ineffective assistance due to a lack of advice regarding the plea's nature and consequences, asserting that his plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily due to a lack of understanding.

Petitioner acknowledged discussing his case, including his confession and video evidence, with his counsel, indicating awareness of the State's case against him. Despite this, he claimed he did not discuss a defense and believed his sentence was excessive after conducting his own legal research. Trial counsel testified that he had discussed felony murder and criminal responsibility with Petitioner, advising that accepting a plea deal was the better option based on the evidence. He informed Petitioner that pleading to a lesser included offense of second-degree murder required pleading out of range to a 40-year sentence. The court found trial counsel's testimony credible and noted that the plea hearing transcript contradicted Petitioner’s claims of ignorance regarding the plea's nature and consequences.

During the plea colloquy, the court explained the waiver of sentencing range and outlined the potential punishments, confirming that Petitioner understood he was pleading out of range for a lesser conviction. Petitioner contested the post-conviction court's conclusions, arguing his trial counsel misled him about sentencing. However, the court did not find Petitioner credible and upheld trial counsel's account, stating that Petitioner had been properly advised. The court emphasized the importance of Petitioner’s sworn statements during the plea hearing, which undermined his post-conviction claims. Furthermore, Petitioner was aware of the conviction of his co-defendant for a more serious charge and had cited this in his decision to accept the plea. Ultimately, the post-conviction court concluded that trial counsel was not ineffective, and that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The denial of post-conviction relief was affirmed.