State of Tennessee v. Andrew Hayes

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2010-02641-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; August 6, 2012; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Andrew Hayes appeals his felony murder and aggravated robbery convictions from Shelby County, asserting errors in the trial court's admission of evidence, denial of a motion to suppress his statements to police, sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, and incorrect jury instructions. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirms the trial court's judgments. The case revolves around the August 2007 beating death of victim Danny Harris, whose remains were found in October 2007. Key testimony was provided by Janice Jefferson, known as 'Snow,' who lived with Hayes and detailed the living situation at the time, including the involvement of Sarah Lucas and her mother Tammy Vance. Jefferson noted conflicts involving Vance and Harris, including Vance’s claims of abuse by Harris and her possession of a handgun and a truck belonging to Harris, which she attempted to sell while he was in rehab. The testimony established a context for Hayes's involvement in the incidents leading to the charges against him.

Snow directed Ms. Vance to sell the victim's gun and later became concerned about the sale of the victim's possessions, prompting her to contact the police. On Halloween, Snow met the police at a Mapco store, where they surrounded Ms. Vance in the victim's truck. Snow informed the officers about items Ms. Vance exchanged for rent and permitted them to search the Depass Street residence. During cross-examination, Snow stated she had never seen the defendant with any of the victim's possessions and had no knowledge of his involvement in the murder. She also noted that the defendant had no prior relationship with Ms. Vance or Ms. Lucas before their move to the Depass Street residence.

Sarah Lucas moved into Snow's residence in August 2007 due to dissatisfaction with her previous living conditions. She described the victim as a nice man and recounted an incident where Ms. Vance arrived at her home bleeding from a head injury, claiming the victim had struck her. Lucas testified that Ms. Vance later gave her boyfriend a DVD/TV combo and brought a large TV to Snow's residence, raising suspicions about their ownership. Lucas learned of the victim’s murder when police questioned her due to her pawning a DVD/VCR belonging to the victim, which she claimed was done at her mother’s request with the victim's consent. 

Lucas stated her motivation for testifying was to clear her name after Ms. Vance implicated her in the murder, which she attributed to Ms. Vance's unstable mental state. She confirmed that Ms. Vance was imprisoned for the murder and claimed to have no knowledge of the defendant's involvement. Additionally, Lucas acknowledged that the prosecutor resolved her outstanding warrants for drug possession and prostitution prior to her move to Texas in 2008.

Ms. Lucas acknowledged traveling to Arkansas for an identification card but denied accompanying the victim and Ms. Vance. She mentioned that Ms. Vance sought to stay with her in August 2007, claiming she did not want to be alone. Ms. Lucas was unaware of any personal relationship between Ms. Vance and the victim. Leslie Kinnard, an employee at Woodchase Apartments, testified that she was asked to verify the victim's residency due to unpaid rent. After finding no response to her knocks and observing furniture inside the apartment, she proceeded with eviction procedures. On October 26, 2007, Kinnard, accompanied by sheriff’s deputies, discovered the victim deceased in his apartment after following standard eviction protocols. Deputy Stanley Gibson observed signs of possible tampering with the bedroom door when he entered and confirmed the victim's body was present. 

On October 31, 2007, Officer Milton Gonzalez initiated a traffic stop on the victim’s vehicle, driven by a white female who identified herself as 'Tammy,' claiming to be the victim's girlfriend. The vehicle was towed, and she was arrested. Officer John Pasley testified that Ms. Vance was also arrested at the Mapco station. Snow and Ms. Jefferson approached Pasley, indicating they had items belonging to the victim, which they believed might be of interest to police. Following them to their home, Pasley retrieved a TV, a cell phone, and a journal belonging to the victim. He contacted homicide detectives to collect the evidence. Subsequently, Pasley transported Ms. Lucas and her boyfriend to the police station and sought to locate Wayne Bobo. The next day, he and Sergeant Nelson met with John Watkins, known as 'Big John,' who was in a wheelchair and allegedly had sold the victim’s handgun. They successfully recovered the weapon from him.

Agent Richard Howard from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms confirmed that a Sig Sauer .40 caliber handgun found by Officer Pasley belonged to the victim, purchased on October 31, 2000. MPD Crime Scene Investigator Jeffrey Garey described the victim’s condition upon arrival at his apartment, noting he was severely decomposed with flies and maggots present. Garey collected various items from the scene, including a Sigarms gunbox, mail, a loaf of bread, bloodied materials, and bedding. He also documented potential blood spatter and prints on walls and carpets.

MPD Lieutenant Bart Ragland testified that he and Sergeant Parks were tasked by lead investigator Lieutenant Mason to pick up several individuals, including the defendant, who was not considered a suspect at that time. During the initial interview, the defendant's account was inconsistent, raising suspicion about his knowledge and involvement. After providing Miranda warnings, the defendant struggled to read the rights form, prompting Ragland to read it to him, after which the defendant waived his rights at 3:15 p.m. on November 2, 2007. 

Later that day, the defendant implicated Ms. Vance in the victim's murder, stating he had gone to an apartment in Cordova with Ms. Vance and Miguel to retrieve a television. He described discovering the victim’s body and recalled Ms. Vance's reassurance that they would handle the situation. The defendant provided a physical description of the victim and detailed how they removed items from the apartment, which they intended to pawn. He expressed fear of being charged with murder for assisting in moving the television, which contributed to his initial silence about the corpse.

Lieutenant Ragland expressed suspicion regarding the defendant's ability to identify the victim as a white male, given the advanced state of decomposition, which made such identification challenging. During a second interview, the defendant initially admitted to hitting the victim with a steel pipe but later recanted, becoming hysterical and unable to continue the interrogation. Ragland noted that the defendant's changing details raised further suspicion and indicated he was aware of his culpability, leading him to blame others for the murder after his recantation. 

Sergeant Mullins provided testimony that corroborated the defendant's involvement. He recounted that upon interviewing the defendant, the latter described specific details about the crime scene that suggested firsthand knowledge. The defendant admitted to being part of a robbery with Tammy Vance, which escalated into violence during an argument with the victim. He detailed striking the victim multiple times with a pipe and described actions taken to silence him, linking them to the physical evidence found at the scene. However, as questioning continued, the defendant became upset over discrepancies in his account, shifted blame to others while still acknowledging his presence during the murder, and ultimately was taken into custody for further investigation, with officers feeling they had enough evidence to charge him, despite not doing so immediately.

Sergeant Mullins testified that the defendant, after being read Miranda warnings again, admitted to murdering the victim with a metal pipe, striking him on the head seven or eight times while attempting to rob him. The defendant claimed he struck the victim first, while an accomplice, Tammy, suppressed the victim by covering his mouth with a towel. He stated that no blood got on him and that Ms. Vance disposed of the murder weapon in the Wolf River. Mullins, trained in blood stain pattern analysis, noted that blood stains at the crime scene corroborated the defendant’s account, indicating multiple blows to the victim based on six distinct blood stain patterns found on the bedroom wall, floor, and closet door.

Forensic pathologist Dr. Marco Ross conducted the victim’s autopsy, determining the cause of death as blunt force trauma and asphyxia. He found significant skull fractures, a fractured tooth lodged in the right lung, and noted the victim was in a moderately advanced state of decomposition. The victim had an orange towel stuffed in his mouth, obstructing his airway. Dr. Ross identified at least five distinct impacts to the head, resulting in eight lacerations, and noted the presence of ethanol in the victim’s system, likely a byproduct of decomposition. He also removed the victim's pacemaker during the autopsy.

Joel Hunt, an employee in the pacing division at Boston Scientific, testified about the operation of implantable pacemakers and defibrillators. He identified the device removed from the victim as a dual chamber pacemaker that regulates heart rates. Data from the victim’s pacemaker indicated that on August 20, 2007, the victim's heart rate spiked to 205 beats per minute, activating the pacemaker, followed by a surge to 289 beats per minute, which triggered the defibrillator to deliver two shocks. After these events, no further heart activity was recorded, and while he could not determine the exact time of death, he confirmed that all heart activity ceased on that date. 

Dr. Randy Schnell, from the Memphis City Schools Mental Health Center, conducted a psycho-educational evaluation of the defendant, revealing an IQ of 62 in 1992, indicating significant mental delays and consistent with a diagnosis of mental retardation. He stated it was "extremely unlikely" for the defendant's IQ to have increased to normal levels by adulthood, as IQ scores stabilize by age fourteen.

Chawonna Jefferson, the defendant’s girlfriend and mother of their child, testified about their living situation and noted that two women, Ms. Vance and Ms. Lucas, moved in with them in late August 2007. She observed that Ms. Vance had visible injuries upon their arrival. The defendant claimed he had never met the victim, shared details of his limited education and income sources, and described Ms. Vance's injuries when she moved in. He recounted an incident on November 2, 2007, when police brought him and others in for questioning, during which he was informed that Ms. Vance had implicated him in the murder of the victim.

The defendant testified that he had no involvement in the victim's death and initially denied knowledge of the victim's handgun, later admitting to police that he accompanied Ms. Vance and Snow to sell the gun. He described an intense, lengthy interrogation where officers pressured him for hours, leading him to exclaim frustration and ultimately produce a statement he contended was coerced. Although he had no evidence of Ms. Vance's involvement in the murder, he suggested she "probably" killed the victim after she accused him. During the interrogation, officers showed him a live feed of Ms. Vance’s questioning, which influenced his responses. The defendant acknowledged naming several individuals, including Snow, as suspects to deflect attention from himself. He noted this was his first statement in a criminal case and that he had no prior courtroom experience. He raised doubts about the State's evidence, claiming it was solely based on Ms. Vance's accusations and his own coerced statement. He expressed regret for not remaining silent during the interrogation.

Tammy Vance, who pled guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated robbery related to the victim, denied killing him despite their close relationship. She described the victim's poor health and financial struggles, including his intent to file for bankruptcy. On the day of the incident, she recounted a trip with the victim and Ms. Lucas, who had a drug addiction. After an argument over a minor issue at Burger King, they returned to the victim's apartment, where an altercation ensued, culminating in the victim hitting her and causing injury.

Ms. Vance recounted discovering the victim and Ms. Lucas in the victim's bedroom, where Ms. Lucas had allegedly struck the victim multiple times with a hammer and then attacked Ms. Vance. Ms. Vance stated that Ms. Lucas placed a rag in the victim's mouth and later poured kerosene and cleaning substances over him. Under duress, Ms. Vance complied with Ms. Lucas' orders to leave the apartment in the victim's truck, during which Ms. Lucas disposed of the murder weapon. Days later, they returned to the apartment to retrieve items to pawn. Ms. Vance initially implicated Wayne Bobo in the murder but later shifted blame to the defendant after police informed her of his confession. She claimed that her statements against the defendant were false, asserting that Ms. Lucas was the actual murderer. Despite this, she pled guilty to murder charges, expressing a desire to exonerate the defendant to her attorney. During cross-examination, she admitted to cashing the victim’s checks after the murder. The jury convicted the defendant of felony murder and aggravated robbery, leading to a life sentence for murder and a concurrent 20-year sentence for robbery. The defendant's appeal includes claims of errors in denying his motion to suppress statements made to police, the admission of photographs of the victim, insufficient evidence for his convictions, and erroneous jury instructions. A police lieutenant testified that the defendant was read his rights and engaged cooperatively during questioning, never requesting an attorney or indicating a lack of understanding.

Lieutenant Ragland denied pressuring the defendant to provide a specific statement, asserting that the officers aimed to uncover the truth. During questioning, the defendant admitted to visiting the victim’s apartment to assist Ms. Vance in retrieving a television and disclosed seeing the victim's decaying corpse. Following this, Lieutenant Ragland relayed the defendant's statement to Sergeant Mason, who instructed Sergeant Mullins to conduct an interrogation. After this session, the defendant confessed to killing the victim. Lieutenant Ragland firmly stated he did not intimidate the defendant into giving an incriminating statement but acknowledged that he had challenged the defendant's credibility by pointing out inconsistencies in his story. 

Sergeant Mullins testified that he interviewed the defendant based on information from Ms. Vance and stated that when presented with comprehensive details, the defendant admitted his presence at the crime scene and the murder. Although aware of the crime scene specifics, Sergeant Mullins claimed he did not share this information with the defendant. The details of the defendant's confession aligned with the crime scene evidence. However, during the formal statement process, the defendant became confused and began to blame others, including individuals he referred to as "mom" and others involved in the crime, suggesting that they had threatened him and his family. At no point did the defendant request an attorney or indicate a desire to stop questioning. After a period of incarceration, the defendant offered a subsequent statement consistent with his earlier confession. Sergeant Mullins maintained that he did not threaten the defendant or dictate his responses and acknowledged that questioning ceased when it was deemed unproductive. He also confirmed that they allowed Ms. Vance to confront the defendant after he implicated her, noting that he did not disclose all of her statements to him.

Ms. Vance testified that detectives yelled at the defendant and used racial slurs. The defendant claimed he confessed to killing the victim under duress, stating that officers implied he would not be released until he complied. He admitted the detectives offered him food and breaks for smoking but alleged they disclosed crime facts and showed him crime scene photos before his confession. He asserted that he did not receive Miranda warnings until after confessing. During cross-examination, he acknowledged voluntarily traveling to the police station in his vehicle and signing two rights advisement forms. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the confession, concluding that the circumstances indicated an uncoerced decision to speak with law enforcement. The court credited Lieutenant Ragland's testimony that he read the rights form aloud and noted the defendant’s signatures on the waivers and initialed statements. On appeal, the defendant reiterated claims of coercion. The appellate court noted that the trial court's factual findings are upheld unless contrary evidence predominates. It emphasized that credibility and evidence weight are determined by the trial judge, while legal application is reviewed de novo. The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination, requiring confessions to be voluntary and free from threats or improper influence. The totality of the circumstances must be assessed to evaluate whether law enforcement behavior overbore the defendant’s will. The Tennessee Constitution mirrors the federal protection against self-incrimination.

Voluntariness of confessions under Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution provides greater protections for individual rights compared to the Fifth Amendment. The key consideration is whether law enforcement's actions overbore the defendant's will, leading to a confession that was not freely made. In this case, the defendant, who was in his late twenties, received Miranda warnings, and despite the lengthy interrogation, there was no evidence of coercion. He was allowed breaks and refreshments, and there was probable cause for his arrest during a 48-hour hold, validating the trial court's decision not to suppress his statements.

Regarding the admission of six photographs of the victim in an advanced state of decomposition, the defendant contended they were more prejudicial than probative. The court upheld the admission, noting that photographs of murder victims are generally admissible if relevant to the case, despite their graphic nature. The relevant evidence rule allows such photographs unless their probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Although the photographs were graphic, the trial court exercised its discretion appropriately, considering that 27 other photographs were excluded and the six admitted were specifically related to injuries noted by the medical examiner, countering the defendant's claim that their purpose was to inflame the jury.

Photographs of a decomposed corpse are not inherently inadmissible in court, and the defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. The defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for felony murder and aggravated robbery, while the State contends that the evidence was adequate. The court's review standard requires consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, determining whether a rational jury could find the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Both direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally in this context, and the court refrains from re-evaluating evidence or credibility assessments made by the jury.

The definition of first-degree murder includes killings committed during a robbery attempt, while aggravated robbery involves the use of a deadly weapon or causing serious bodily injury. The jury found the defendant's pretrial confessions credible, noting his detailed admission of murdering the victim and intent to rob, which was corroborated by evidence at the crime scene and testimony from witnesses who saw the defendant with the victim's belongings. Although a witness testified to an alternative account of the murder, the jury rejected this, leading to a conclusion that sufficient evidence established the defendant's guilt.

Additionally, the defendant conceded he did not object to the jury instructions during the trial or raise the issue in his motion for a new trial. He requests a plain error review regarding the instructions on criminal responsibility for the actions of another, but the State argues this issue is waived and that the defendant has not shown any plain error in the jury instructions.

The defendant has waived his right to challenge the jury instructions due to his failure to object during the trial and not including the issue in his motion for a new trial, as stipulated by Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In Tennessee, issues related to jury instructions cannot be raised on appeal unless specifically stated in the motion for a new trial, and a defendant relinquishes the right to argue any unraised issues. However, appellate courts may consider errors affecting substantial rights at any time, provided the error is "plain" and impacts a substantial right of the accused. The authority to address such "forfeited errors" lies within the appellate court's discretion, which should be exercised only if the error significantly impacts the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has defined a "substantial right" as one that is fundamental to the indictment process, integral to proof of all elements of the offense, and constitutional in nature. Additionally, the court adopted a five-factor test from a previous case to determine if an error qualifies as plain: (1) the record must clearly show what transpired in the trial court; (2) a clear rule of law must have been violated; (3) the accused's substantial right must have been adversely affected; (4) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (5) recognizing the error is necessary for substantial justice. All five factors must be present for an error to be recognized, and if any one factor cannot be established, full consideration of the others is unnecessary. For an error to qualify as "plain," it must be significant enough to likely alter the trial's outcome, and the burden of proving entitlement to relief for plain error rests with the defendant. The constitutional right to a jury trial includes the right to a correct and complete charge of the law, which the trial court is obligated to provide.

In State v. Harbison, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the legal accuracy of trial court instructions, which are reviewed de novo. The propriety of specific jury instructions is a mixed question of law and fact, also subject to de novo review with a presumption of correctness. In this case, the trial court instructed the jury on first-degree murder in the context of a felony but failed to define "criminal responsibility" for the actions of another, despite the jury's inquiry regarding its meaning. The trial court's response indicated that the definition was included in the jury charge, but the printed instructions did not contain this definition. The court concluded that any error from this omission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant was not charged under a theory of criminal responsibility and the jury had rejected testimony suggesting another perpetrator. The court determined that the error did not adversely affect the defendant's substantial rights, and thus, the trial court's judgments were affirmed.