George Woodson and Flora Woodson v. MEG Capital Management, Inc.

Citations: 395 S.W.3d 140; 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 656; 2012 WL 4335316Docket: W2011-02513-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; September 21, 2012; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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George Woodson sustained serious injuries from a dog attack on May 20, 2009, involving two dogs owned by neighbors Latasha Cobb and Stanley Bell. Following the incident, which required Mr. Woodson to be hospitalized for 14 days and undergo five surgeries, he and his wife, Flora Woodson, filed a lawsuit on October 1, 2009, against several parties, including MEG Capital Management, Inc. and property manager Dale Green. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting they had no knowledge of the dogs' vicious propensities and lacked control over the premises to mandate the tenants to restrain the dogs.

The trial court granted the defendants' motion, concluding they had control over the property but lacked notice of the dogs' aggressive behavior. The Woodsons appealed, questioning the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals identified a factual dispute regarding the defendants' notice of the dogs' behavior. Consequently, it affirmed the trial court's ruling in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The decision emphasized the standard for summary judgment, requiring that no genuine issues of material fact exist for such a ruling to be granted.

A moving party seeking to shift the burden of production to a nonmoving party must either negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot prove such an element at trial, as established in Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co. It is insufficient for the moving party to merely challenge the nonmoving party’s ability to prove their claim. When the moving party successfully supports their motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show a genuine issue of material fact. Summary judgment is reviewed de novo, with no presumption of correctness, while favoring the nonmoving party and drawing reasonable inferences in their favor. A recent Tennessee statute has reversed the Hannan standard but only applies to cases filed after July 1, 2011; thus, the Hannan standard is applicable in this case.

In the context of landlord liability for injuries caused by a tenant's dog, two criteria must be satisfied: 1) the landlord's knowledge of the dog's vicious nature, and 2) the landlord's retained control over the property sufficient to allow them to require the tenant to remove or restrain the dog. The Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's finding that the Defendants lacked knowledge of the dog's propensities. Defendants contest both the knowledge and the control findings. The appeal examines deposition testimony from Reginald Green, Vice President of MEG, who claimed unawareness of the tenant's dogs prior to an attack and indicated he heard barking during property inspections but never saw the dogs. He acknowledged MEG's responsibility for property maintenance, including the backyard fence, and stated that authorized personnel handle day-to-day maintenance decisions.

Reginald Green inspected the backyard fence of the 1203 Fiber Road property post-attack on Mr. Woodson and claimed it was "in working condition." However, he could not confirm if the inspection occurred before a summer 2009 storm that required repairs, and he later stated his inspection was before Latasha Cobb moved in, prior to the attack. Green was uncertain if any repairs were made after MEG acquired the property but before the attack. 

MEG Property Manager Dale Green testified about his monthly visits to collect rent from tenants Cobb and Bell, during which he observed the dogs approximately ten times. He noted that while the dogs would bark when he arrived, they settled down quickly and did not display aggression. He never saw the tenants with the dogs or discussed them with anyone, only seeing the dogs behind the fence without knowing if they were chained. He could not recall seeing the gate open and had never witnessed the dogs trying to escape.

During the summary judgment hearing, it was acknowledged that the fence's condition at the time of the attack was disputed. Dale Green stated that Cobb and Bell rented the property for about sixteen months and described the dogs as not being large, expressing no fear of them initially, though he later hesitated about putting his hand through the fence. He was surprised to learn of the attack. Dale Green also mentioned that he and Jamison Cooper made repairs to the fence in 2006 but had not repaired it until after the 2009 storm. He admitted to installing metal grates at the bottom of the fence but could not recall the reason for their installation.

Jamison Cooper, who accompanied Dale Green on rent collection visits, confirmed he never saw the dogs inside the house and always saw them behind the fence, noting they barked upon their arrival. Both Dale Green and Jamison Cooper were responsible for property maintenance and addressing any issues that arose during their visits.

The witness confirmed that the dogs would bark when approached at the door but did not exhibit aggressive behavior aside from regular barking. They were observed running up and down the fence, but the witness had never seen them attempt to escape through or under the fence. The witness expressed concern about the dogs' ability to get out and potentially harm someone, aligning with a specific incident in the case. Jamison Cooper testified that when working on the fence, the dogs needed to be secured, either chained up or otherwise restrained, for safety reasons. Both Cooper and another individual, Dale Green, had safety concerns regarding the dogs while working. Cooper emphasized that he would not approach the yard if the dogs were not chained. He later admitted to some confusion about his responses regarding the dogs' status during work on the fence.

Jamison Cooper testified that he did not repair the fence at 1203 Fiber Road during the tenancy of Ms. Cobb and Mr. Bell, nor did he work on the fence while the dogs were present. His previous statements about needing the dogs restrained were hypothetical; he confirmed that he would require any dog to be secured before entering the fenced area for repairs. Cooper indicated that he performed no fence repairs from 2006 until after a summer storm in 2009 and could not recall if he inspected the fence during Cobb's and Bell's tenancy, although he acknowledged it was part of his responsibilities to make necessary repairs if he had found the fence in disrepair.

Plaintiff George Woodson stated he had not seen the dogs prior to the attack and his wife, Flora Woodson, similarly had no knowledge of them living at the property. They lacked information regarding the fence's condition at the time of the attack. Photographs depicting significant disrepair of the fence were submitted as evidence, but the dates of most photos could not be determined, raising uncertainty about whether they were taken before or after the storm. 

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the defendants were aware of the dogs' vicious tendencies. Tennessee courts have addressed the concept of "vicious propensity," emphasizing that the technical status of the defendant (landlord vs. owner) does not affect the analysis. The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Alex v. Armstrong highlighted that both playful and mischievous actions of a dog that could lead to injury are relevant when determining liability, focusing on the dog's actions rather than its intent.

The court determined that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendants had notice of their dog's vicious propensities, despite prior incidents where the dog chased a neighbor and barked aggressively. In the case of White v. Smith, the plaintiff had been attacked by a neighbor's dog and testified that the dog had previously shown aggressive behavior while contained within a fence. Other witnesses acknowledged the dog’s tendency to bark and act aggressively, but none had formally complained to the defendants. The trial court opined that a reasonable person walking by could perceive the dog as vicious, leading to the conclusion that the dog owners should have been aware of this behavior. However, the court also referenced Fletcher v. Richardson, emphasizing that an owner could only be held liable if they knew or should have known about their dog's dangerous disposition. The court noted that prior attempts by the dog to attack or display ill temper could suffice for establishing knowledge of dangerous propensities. In this case, the trial court concluded that the defendants lacked knowledge of their dog's behavior based on the lack of complaints from neighbors and the fact that the plaintiff had never encountered the dogs before the attack. The court stated that landlord liability hinges on knowledge of the dog’s viciousness, and the absence of prior complaints or encounters does not inherently negate the possibility of establishing such knowledge.

MEG employees testified they consistently observed the dogs contained within a fenced backyard and were surprised by the attack on Mr. Woodson. They noted the dogs exhibited behavior, such as running along the fence and barking, particularly during rent collection visits. Jamison Cooper, an MEG employee and relative of a company vice president, later adjusted his testimony regarding the need for restraining the dogs while performing fence repairs, suggesting that such measures were likely taken for safety due to concerns about the dogs’ potential to harm someone. His unrefuted testimony indicated a worry about the dogs escaping and causing injury, a sentiment echoed in Dale Green's deposition, which described the dogs as acting aggressively. The presence of reinforcing metal grates, installed by Dale Green, suggested they may have been added to prevent escape attempts, contributing to the evidence about the dogs’ aggressive tendencies.

The testimony of MEG employees indicates their subjective belief in the dogs' non-aggressiveness; however, their positions could bias their accounts. A reasonable juror might interpret the evidence to support a finding of notice regarding the dogs' vicious tendencies, leading to a conclusion that the plaintiffs could establish this element at trial despite the employees' claims. 

On the matter of "sufficient retained control" over the property, a question of material fact was acknowledged regarding the defendants’ knowledge of the dogs' propensities. The trial court had determined that the defendants retained control sufficient to impose a duty to ensure the dogs were restrained or removed. The defendants contested this, arguing that the lease did not explicitly grant them authority to act against the tenants regarding the dogs, citing case law that emphasizes a landlord's limited rights over leased premises absent explicit terms.

Defendants referenced the case Langford v. Darden, which examined the liability of an absent landlord for a dog attack by a tenant. The court established that a tenant has exclusive possession of leased premises, with the landlord retaining no rights unless expressly stated. In Langford, the landlord was deemed to lack sufficient control due to the absence of a written lease with the tenant. Similarly, in Gilliland v. Pinkley, the court found no written lease or authority for the landlord to control the premises, leading to a ruling that the landlord could not be held liable for the tenant's dog attack.

In the present case, tenants Latasha Cobb and Stanley Bell had a “Lease of Rental Agreement” with MEG that required them to maintain the property and allowed MEG to place a "For Rent" sign upon breach. The lease was silent on pet ownership, which led MEG Vice President Reginald Green and Property Manager Dale Green to assert that MEG had discretion over pet policy. MEG acknowledged its authority to evict tenants for dangerous activities and property damage, including damage to fences. The court concluded that MEG had sufficient control to require Cobb and Bell to manage their dogs, affirming the trial court's finding of control, while also affirming in part and reversing in part previous rulings, remanding the case for further proceedings. Costs of the appeal were assigned to MEG Capital Management, Inc. and Dale Green.