Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. filed a lawsuit against his ex-wife, Katherine Dodge Gribben Warwick, her attorney David W. Noblit, and Noblit's law firm, alleging conspiracy to undermine him and access his separate funds following their divorce. Warwick accused the defendants of fraud on the court, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy, seeking $8 million in damages. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, leading the trial court to dismiss Warwick's complaint, citing statute of limitations and failure to state a claim. Warwick appealed the dismissal, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The court noted the extensive legal history between the parties, including custody disputes and multiple lawsuits following their divorce. The trial court outlined various cases involving the Warwicks, including custody modification petitions, a case involving alleged spyware use, and a criminal case where Warwick was found not guilty of violating an order of protection. A related civil case alleging conversion of property against Noblit was also dismissed.
In the case of Warwick v. Warwick (Docket No. 10-C1-038), the Husband sued the Wife for breach of contract regarding an agreement for her to pay for food charged by their children at a country club, resulting in a judgment against her for nearly $70. Following this, the Husband filed a complaint alleging that after her affair, the Wife and her Counsel conspired against him, committing fraud on the court, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Key allegations included that the Wife and Counsel withheld information about a cause of action related to the Husband’s separate estate, known as the "spyware" case, during their 2008 divorce, failing to disclose it in discovery or depositions. Additionally, the Wife's rights to a book project were not listed as an asset.
The complaint also detailed the filing of a false affidavit by Counsel to obtain a Temporary Restraining Order against the Husband, which included false claims of severe physical abuse, later admitted by the Wife to be untrue.
Furthermore, the Wife violated an Agreed Order from February 25, 2008, by leaving the marital home and unilaterally selecting a counselor for their children. The Wife acknowledged consulting Counsel about these actions but claimed she received no advice regarding the need for court permission.
The Husband asserts that these actions were intended to keep him and the court uninformed, leading to harm and damages, including lost wages, pain, suffering, attorney fees, medical bills, and business income loss. Both the Wife and Counsel denied the claims, with the Wife arguing that many issues were already litigated or barred by the statute of limitations. She acknowledged the Husband's psychological impairment but attributed it to pre-existing conditions rather than any actions by her or Counsel.
Counsel and his law firm raised several affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claim, statute of limitations, collateral estoppel, res judicata, laches, waiver, estoppel, and litigation privilege concerning specific claims. On February 16, 2011, they filed a joint motion for judgment on the pleadings under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03. During the March 2011 hearing, the defendants emphasized that the complaint did not present a valid cause of action and was barred by the statute of limitations, which the trial court confirmed. The court dismissed the complaint, stating that the claims of fraud, abuse of process, and emotional distress were either time-barred or failed to state a claim. Consequently, the civil conspiracy claim was also dismissed due to the lack of an underlying tort. Husband appealed, raising three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by considering matters outside the pleadings without allowing reasonable opportunity for a summary judgment treatment; (2) whether the dismissal under Rule 12.03 was erroneous; and (3) whether the court's ruling on the statute of limitations was correct. The appellate court clarified that a motion for judgment on the pleadings assumes the truth of the complaint's relevant facts but asserts they do not constitute a cause of action. It stated that the determination of whether facts support a claim is a legal question, reviewed de novo, free from presumption of correctness. Additionally, the court noted that if matters outside the pleadings are considered without exclusion, the motion should be treated as a summary judgment under Rule 56, allowing for further discovery.
If a motion claims a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and includes matters outside the pleadings, it is treated as a motion for summary judgment under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. The Husband argues that the trial court improperly considered external opinions related to him and his Wife in its Memorandum Order, claiming this constituted an error in evaluating the motion without adhering to summary judgment rules. However, he fails to identify specifics regarding the attachments that influenced the court's decision. A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12.03 is similar to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12.02(6), focusing solely on the legal sufficiency of the complaint rather than the evidence's strength. The trial court concluded that the claims were legally insufficient or time-barred, accepting the complaint's facts as true. Therefore, it was unnecessary to consider any outside matters, and the record does not support the Husband's assertion to the contrary.
The trial court properly evaluated the motion as a dismissal motion per Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02, and the appeal follows the same approach. The Husband contests the dismissal of his complaint, asserting that his factual allegations are sufficient to establish a cause of action. He emphasizes that dismissal should only occur if no set of facts could support the claim for relief. The Husband claims that his allegations of fraud on the court—asserting that the Wife and her Counsel conspired to withhold assets, submitted false affidavits, and violated agreed orders—constitute grounds for damages. However, the trial court ruled that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 does not create a tort for fraud on the court, which the Husband contests, arguing that the rule allows for relief from judgments based on such fraud but does not limit the power to seek independent relief. The court did not interpret this language as establishing a separate tort of fraud on the court.
A party may seek relief from a court order obtained through fraud, but this does not establish a new tort. Trial judges must adhere to established law rather than create new legal standards. The complaint in question fails to assert a valid claim for fraud on the court. The Husband argues that the issue is novel in the state and urges the court to recognize a "fraud on the court" action under the language of Rule 60.02, which allows relief from a final judgment for reasons including fraud or misconduct by an opposing party. The rule allows motions for relief within a reasonable time, specifically within one year after the judgment. The Husband references Duncan v. Duncan, where post-judgment relief was sought due to alleged fraud concerning the value of a business during divorce proceedings. The court acknowledged that fraud could justify post-judgment relief if the moving party demonstrates clear and convincing evidence of intentional deception. However, the court distinguishes that while Duncan permits relief from a judgment due to fraud, it does not support the notion of an independent tort action for fraud on the court seeking monetary damages. The case of Black v. Black is cited as precedent, where the plaintiff claimed damages based on alleged fraud and coercion related to a marital dissolution agreement, further clarifying the limitations of Rule 60.02 in establishing a tort for monetary recovery.
The suit was filed in chancery court over a year after the final divorce decree was issued in circuit court, with the Wife seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the Husband's alleged misconduct. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Upon appeal, the Court identified the complaint as effectively an independent action to set aside the judgment under Rule 60.02, but determined that the Wife did not establish a claim for fraud necessary to invoke the "savings" provision of the Rule. The Supreme Court affirmed this finding, emphasizing that a motion under Rule 60.02 must be filed within a reasonable time, and no later than one year post-judgment. The Wife’s filing in chancery court, rather than a timely motion in circuit court, precluded her complaint from being considered for relief under the Rule's provisions.
While Rule 60.02 allows for independent actions to set aside judgments for fraud, such actions require "unusual and exceptional circumstances" and demonstrate the existence of extrinsic fraud—defined as deception that affects a party's ability to receive a fair hearing. In contrast, intrinsic fraud relates to issues within the litigation itself. The complaint claimed the Husband fraudulently concealed his assets prior to the execution of the marital dissolution agreement (MDA) and alleged that the MDA was not the product of fraud. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint did not sufficiently establish extrinsic fraud, as required by the savings provision of Rule 60.02, affirming that the allegations conflicted with the MDA's language, which claimed fairness and absence of fraud. Ultimately, the complaint was deemed an independent action lacking the necessary factual basis to support the claim of extrinsic fraud.
Assertions of fraud related to the litigation could have established intrinsic fraud if pursued within one year of the divorce decree under Rule 60.02. However, there were no claims of deception regarding issues outside the case that would have prevented the appellant from receiving a fair hearing. Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the Wife’s complaint aimed to invalidate the final divorce decree and did not meet the savings provision of Rule 60.02. The Black case clarified that while a common law action for fraud is permissible despite the grounds of "fraud upon the court," the claim in this instance was properly dismissed for failing to allege a sufficient cause of action for common-law fraud.
In the current case, the Husband recognized the relevance of Black but contended it was not applicable, arguing that it dealt with "regular" fraud as opposed to "fraud on the court." Despite his technical correctness, the principles from Black remain relevant, allowing relief from judgment under Rule 60.02 within a year of the judgment or through an independent action for extrinsic fraud. The Husband's claim, however, was not timely filed in the divorce court and exceeded the one-year limit. Furthermore, any claims for relief under the savings provision were also inadequate since the allegations concerned issues already addressed in the divorce case.
The Husband suggested that federal courts recognize "fraud on the court" as a valid cause of action, citing cases like Aoude and Cleveland Demolition. However, federal case law does not support a tort action for fraud on the court that allows recovery of monetary damages. Instead, federal courts provide remedies such as dismissing fraudulent suits or overturning judgments obtained through fraud, emphasizing the need for equitable relief rather than tort damages.
Husband's claim of "fraud on the court" lacks supporting authority and is not recognized as a cause of action for damages under Tennessee law. Consequently, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 does not provide a basis for an independent tort action seeking monetary damages for such fraud. The trial court appropriately dismissed this claim under Rule 12.02(6) for failure to state a valid claim.
Regarding the abuse of process claim, Husband alleges that Wife and her Counsel misused the court system to harass him and gain an advantage, culminating in the filing of a "spyware" lawsuit. He asserts that specific actions, such as requesting an ex parte Temporary Restraining Order based on false allegations, improperly seeking an Order of Protection, and withholding the children and their communication devices, constitute abuse of process. Additionally, he claims that the omission of marital assets during property division and the filing of the "spyware" case were intended to deny him an equitable division of the marital estate and to encroach upon his separate estate.
To establish a claim for abuse of process in Tennessee, two elements must be present: an ulterior motive and an improper act in the use of legal process. The court clarifies that simply filing a lawsuit does not constitute abuse of process; rather, the misuse of court power after process has been issued is the critical factor. Although Husband suggests that he has met the pleading requirements by indicating that Wife and Counsel harbored ulterior motives to harass him and drain his financial resources, the court emphasizes that abuse of process pertains to the improper use of judicial authority rather than the initiation of a lawsuit itself.
Allegations against the Wife primarily involve the filing of court documents and initiating a "spyware" lawsuit, which the Husband claims constitutes an abuse of process. However, claims of malicious intent do not inherently prove misuse of process, as the issuance of process must be unjustified for it to qualify as abuse. Actions aimed at coercing the Husband into violating a protective order, leading to his arrest, do not indicate unjustified process issuance. Furthermore, failing to disclose assets during marital property division does not qualify as abuse of process, as it does not engage the court's authority. Consequently, the complaint does not adequately establish a cause of action for abuse of process.
The Husband contends that his detailed 57-paragraph complaint sufficiently supports a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He alleges that over nearly three years, the Wife and her Counsel have relentlessly harassed him, undermined his reputation, and manipulated their children against him. He reports serious emotional and psychological harm, including threats from third parties and false accusations, which culminated in him taking a six-month temporary disability leave from work on medical advice due to the emotional strain.
For an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the conduct must be intentional or reckless, extraordinarily outrageous, and result in significant mental injury. Tennessee law emphasizes that liability arises only from conduct deemed extreme and beyond societal tolerance, as established in relevant case law. The Husband asserts that the Defendants' actions exceed these standards of decency and should be recognized as intolerable in civilized society.
The cited case establishes a high threshold for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Mr. Alexander alleged that Mr. Inman’s conduct, including an affair with Mrs. Alexander and perjury in divorce proceedings, was outrageous. However, the trial court determined that the complaint did not adequately demonstrate "outrageous conduct" as defined by community standards, which must exceed the bounds of decency. The court noted that even if Mr. Inman’s actions were inappropriate, they did not reach the level of being considered atrocious or intolerable, thus failing to meet the necessary elements for such a claim.
Furthermore, the trial court ruled that without an underlying tort, the civil conspiracy claim could not proceed. The elements for civil conspiracy require a common design for an unlawful purpose, an overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy, and resulting injury. The allegations presented were deemed too vague and lacking in material facts to substantiate the conspiracy claim. Since there was no underlying tort supporting the conspiracy, the court concluded that the claim must be dismissed. Lastly, Husband contested the trial court's ruling regarding the timeliness of his claims.
Husband contends that his claims for fraud on the court, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which support his civil conspiracy claim, began accruing with the filing of the "spyware" lawsuit on December 18, 2009. He argues that this lawsuit highlighted these causes of action, resulting in a decline in his mental health and necessitating counseling, thereby making his December 7, 2010, filing timely. The court disagrees, having previously determined that the fraud on the court claim was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim and was also time-barred. The trial court identified that all relevant allegations, except for the spyware case, occurred over one year before the December 2010 filing.
Husband asserts that since he filed his suit within one year of the spyware suit, the statute of limitations should not apply. He further claims that he was unaware of his cause of action until the spyware suit was filed, suggesting that the elements of the conspiracy were not fully apparent to him before that date. However, the court questions whether an intentional tort between spouses constitutes a marital asset and points out that if Husband committed the alleged tort, he would have been aware of the cause of action well before the one-year limit. Thus, the court concludes that Husband's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, affirming the trial court's rationale.
No fraud on the court tort action exists, rendering the Husband's arguments regarding timeliness moot under Rule 60.02 and the filing of the "spyware" case. The trial court determined that the underlying tort claims for abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The court noted that damages from the abuse of process claims are personal injuries, which trigger the statute of limitations from the occurrence of the alleged abuse, not from the conclusion of the related legal action. The court found that the allegations accrued more than a year before the current filing and rejected the idea that the spyware case was a triggering event for the statute of limitations. Both parties argued similarly regarding the intentional infliction claim, but the court concluded that all relevant facts were known to the Husband before the spyware case filing, which does not extend the limitation period. Determining the applicable statute of limitations requires examining the gravamen of the complaint, which focuses on causation for damages. Therefore, the claims for mental anguish and emotional damage fall under the one-year limitation for personal injury actions as specified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104.
The statutory limitation for personal injury actions in Tennessee is one year, applicable to claims of mental anguish as well (TCA 28-3-104). The husband argues that, assuming the one-year limitation applies, the discovery rule should start the limitations period on December 18, 2009, coinciding with the filing of the "spyware" case. The discovery doctrine allows a cause of action to accrue upon the plaintiff's realization of the injury or wrongful conduct, preventing a cause from being barred before the injury is known (Foster v. Harris, 633 S.W.2d 304, 305).
To determine the accrual of a cause of action, the discovery rule posits that it accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the injury resulting from the defendant's conduct (Steinbrunner v. Turner Funeral Homes, Inc.). The rule applies only when the plaintiff is unaware of having a right of action and cannot be expected to discover it; it does not allow for waiting until all effects of a tortious act are known (Potts v. Celotex Corp.).
The husband claims his injuries from the defendants' conduct date back to early 2008, but these injuries only became apparent with the filing of the "spyware" suit. His complaint indicates that the alleged abuse of process occurred between April 2008 and October 2009, with the "spyware" suit marking a pivotal moment. The husband asserts that the series of allegedly harassing actions, including false allegations and violations of a divorce agreement, did not constitute a standalone cause of action but only together became actionable with the lawsuit's filing. The Tennessee Supreme Court has noted that personal injury suits can be filed more than a year after the injury, as long as they are initiated within a year after the injury is discovered or should have been discovered (McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co.).
The trial court determined that the filing of the "spyware" lawsuit did not activate the statute of limitations. This conclusion is upheld, as Husband, being the perpetrator, would have always been aware of the grounds for the suit. His claim that he only recognized the Defendants' tortious actions and associated injuries in December 2009, when he experienced emotional distress leading to his job departure and temporary disability, is unconvincing. The court noted that the alleged harassment and abuse by Wife and Counsel had been occurring since at least early 2008. Consequently, by December 2009, Husband had already sustained injuries, independent of the spyware suit. As a result, the claims for abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred by the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury torts. The trial court's rejection of Husband's argument that the "discovery rule" delayed the accrual of the cause of action until the spyware suit was filed is affirmed. The judgment is upheld, with costs of the appeal assigned to Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr., and the case is remanded for the collection of costs.
