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David Kyle Gilley v. State of Tennessee
Citation: Not availableDocket: M2010-02447-CCA-R3-PC
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; October 31, 2012; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
David Kyle Gilley was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison, with the conviction affirmed on direct appeal. Gilley subsequently sought post-conviction relief, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, he argued three points: 1) the State allegedly violated his due process rights by not disclosing favorable evidence related to a witness’s testimony; 2) he claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial; and 3) he requested post-conviction DNA analysis. The appellate court found no merit in Gilley’s claims, determining that the State had provided access to the evidence in question and that his trial counsel's performance was adequate. The court also affirmed the post-conviction court's discretion in denying the DNA analysis request. The judgment of the post-conviction court was thus upheld. The case involved a 2006 investigation leading to Gilley's charge for the 1984 murder of his former girlfriend, with significant evidence including bloodstains and DNA matching Gilley found on the victim’s jeans. The witness observed the victim’s car parked in a different location upon leaving her shift. FBI analysis in 1984 matched mud from the victim’s car to that from the road near the quarry where the victim was found. An eyewitness reported seeing a car resembling the victim’s near the murder site on the afternoon of the crime, noting the driver was a tall, slender male with shoulder-length hair, later identifying the petitioner as the driver from a photo array. Another witness testified that after a keg party with the petitioner, he took her to the quarry, where he ominously referenced the victim, claiming she was his ex-girlfriend whom he had killed, a statement she initially kept secret due to her father's warning. Additionally, the investigation revealed circumstantial evidence linking the petitioner to the murder. Friends and family described his cold demeanor following the victim's death, noting he visited her home the day after the murder, removed personal letters, and made inappropriate advances towards a friend, claiming the victim deserved her fate. During police interviews, the petitioner provided inconsistent statements about his whereabouts and actions around the time of the murder, including an initial claim of having seen the victim the night before and later expressing agitation when questioned about her potential interactions with another man. In a 2000 interview, he denied any sexual encounter with the victim shortly before her death. Circumstantial evidence presented by the State aimed to demonstrate the petitioner's motive, identity, and intent regarding the victim. Multiple witnesses testified about the victim's involvement with other men, which led to the petitioner experiencing jealousy and reacting violently. Six witnesses recounted five major episodes of violence involving the petitioner and victim, noting a consistent pattern: arguments escalated into yelling and physical aggression, often culminating in severe assaults that injured or endangered the victim's life. Notable incidents included the petitioner rolling up his car window on the victim's arm and dragging her down the street, smashing her head against a car window and a school locker, and pulling her hair until clumps came out. Additionally, a college residential advisor testified to witnessing the petitioner physically assaulting the victim shortly before the murder, leading to visible injuries. Other witnesses corroborated that they observed arguments, injuries, and the victim expressing fear of the petitioner. In defense, the petitioner’s brother provided an alibi, while another ex-girlfriend claimed the victim had threatened her and that the petitioner never initiated arguments. A forensic scientist contributed that the jeans found at the crime scene could fit a woman. The petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. He appealed, citing unreasonable delay in prosecution, insufficient evidence, improper admission of character evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), and other claims. On August 13, 2008, the court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied further appeal. The petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition on February 5, 2010, prompting the appointment of counsel due to a colorable claim. During the September 27, 2010 hearing, the lead trial counsel testified about the challenges faced in defending the petitioner due to the long time lapse between the victim's murder and the prosecution. He indicated that the entire law firm assisted in the defense and that an investigative agency was employed to conduct background checks on prosecution witnesses. Although he received "open file discovery," not all witness statements were provided. He filed a pre-trial motion for discovery, specifically for Brady material. The counsel noted that character witnesses were significant to the State’s case and that the prosecution disclosed some, but not all, names. Efforts to interview these witnesses were hampered by outdated addresses. A college police report from 1984 regarding the petitioner was reviewed, but the counsel was unaware that a key potential witness, Mary Hunter Brown, was the same person referenced in the report until her testimony at trial. The counsel attempted to locate other witnesses but was unsuccessful. Notably, testimony from Mary Hunter Brown contradicted earlier testimonies about the incident, specifically regarding the petitioner allegedly hanging the victim over a stairwell railing, a detail absent from both the initial police report and pre-trial testimonies. A witness testified about a document containing handwritten notes from a police officer regarding a pre-trial interview with Ms. Mary Hunter Brown, stating he had not seen this document before and it was not provided during discovery. The petitioner’s lead trial counsel noted that the petitioner had informed police in 1984 about having consensual sex with the victim before her murder and had used a pair of jeans found in her car to clean himself. DNA testing on a stain from the “Rustler” jeans found at the crime scene revealed a mixture of the victim’s and petitioner’s DNA, aligning with the petitioner’s earlier statement. The counsel had considered requesting DNA testing on the jeans but ultimately chose not to, fearing that it could harm their case if it showed the petitioner’s DNA. The possibility of another person's DNA being present could have weakened the prosecution's argument. During cross-examination, the counsel confirmed he asked the petitioner about the jeans, to which the petitioner denied ownership, claiming he found them in the victim's car. The defense had DNA experts who could have conducted tests if requested. The counsel also acknowledged receiving a police report about the incident during discovery and was informed about Ms. Mary Hunter’s potential testimony only a day before it was to occur. Another witness, Mr. Brett Bonham, the former college security guard, stated he had been trained in report filing but could not recall the specific incident from 26 years prior, even after reviewing the incident report he had filed. He affirmed that if he had received information about threats made by the petitioner against the victim, he would have documented it in his report and communicated it to officials. Mr. Bonham stated he was not contacted by either party regarding the case until shortly before his testimony and mentioned he had left his college job around the time of the murder. He currently resides in Beech Grove, Coffee County, after living most of his life in Murfreesboro, Rutherford County, and noted that his phone number was publicly listed. On cross-examination, he admitted to having no independent recollection of the police report related to the incident. Mr. James Gage, the lead investigator for the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office in 1984, testified that two primary suspects were identified in the case, including the petitioner and another man, whose hair matched a sample found in the victim’s vehicle. Gage mentioned he wished to conduct DNA testing on this second suspect but was advised by the District Attorney’s Office against it, believing the petitioner was responsible for the rape. He clarified that he did not have probable cause to arrest the petitioner during his investigation and spent about six weeks on the cold case, concurrently handling other cases. Detective Daniel Goodwin, involved in the investigation starting February 1, 2000, reported receiving new information pointing to a now-deceased third suspect. He collected DNA samples from the suspect's relatives, which eliminated that individual as a perpetrator. Goodwin knew the victim personally and had submitted his own DNA during the investigation. He detailed the findings related to a DNA stain on the victim's jeans, indicating it was consistent with ejaculation rather than use for cleaning. Goodwin also mentioned interviewing a witness, Mary Hunter Brown, before her death, asserting that the interview was not recorded but that police had provided all related materials to the defense. He confirmed investigating the second suspect from Gage's time but found no evidence connecting him to the victim. Detective Goodwin testified about his involvement in the pretrial discovery process, stating that he provided all evidence and materials to the prosecutor for disclosure to the defense. He confirmed that the petitioner’s legal team had access to review the evidence at the District Attorney's Office. Although he believed he might have taken a formal statement from witness Ms. Mary Hunter Brown, he could not locate it. Goodwin also mentioned a pretrial hearing where eighteen witnesses testified about the petitioner’s violent history, leading to individual rulings by the trial judge on witness admissibility. This ruling was appealed by the petitioner to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Detective William Sharp, from the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office, discussed his investigation into the victim's cold case, during which he located Ms. Mary Hunter Brown based on an incident report from March 1984. Sharp interviewed Brown on June 19, 2006, but noted that the incident report did not mention any threats made by the petitioner. He learned of those details later during a subsequent interview. Sharp was unable to find a formal written statement from Brown despite believing he had created one. He confirmed that all pertinent information about the victim's murder was shared with the District Attorney for defense disclosure. Sharp also mentioned sending evidence, specifically "Rustler" jeans, for DNA testing but could not confirm the results. On cross-examination, he indicated that he did not formally interview every witness and was uncertain if he had formally interviewed Brown. His handwritten notes from their conversation, which included references to the petitioner assaulting the victim, were provided to the prosecutor and thought to have been given to the defense. Sharp confirmed that the college incident report referencing the assault had also been disclosed to the defense, and he assisted them in locating the officer who filed the report. He asserted that he believed all relevant information had been turned over to the defense. The final witness in the post-conviction hearing was Ms. Patti Choatie. Ms. Choatie, a serologist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Crime Laboratory, testified about her involvement in a homicide investigation in 1984. She conducted extensive testing on “Rustler” jeans associated with the case, checking for semen and vaginal fluid using an “AP overspray” test. While no fluid was found in the crotch area, semen was detected in eight other locations. She noted that the serology testing process required large samples and destroyed the tested material, which meant the areas where semen was found no longer existed. None of the samples tested were inconsistent with the petitioner’s blood type. On cross-examination, Choatie stated that she had never experienced a failure of the “AP overspray” test to detect semen, and that this test does not identify hair, blood, saliva, or skin cells. She did not test the crotch area since it did not yield positive results and confirmed it remained intact. On redirect, she mentioned that many people had handled the jeans, which could lead to trace DNA transfer, including her own. She concluded that finding skin cells in the crotch area would hold little exculpatory value due to the potential for contamination. Following this testimony, the post-conviction court deliberated and ultimately denied the petition for post-conviction relief on October 15, 2010. The petitioner appealed, raising three issues. The Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act allows for relief if a conviction is found to violate constitutional rights. The petitioner must prove factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence, and the factual findings of the post-conviction court are binding unless the evidence overwhelmingly contradicts them. Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. The petitioner first argued that the post-conviction court incorrectly found the State did not withhold impeachment evidence related to Ms. Mary Hunter Brown’s testimony. However, the evidence did not support this claim. Additionally, the petitioner contended that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective due to inadequate preparation for cross-examination of the same witness. The petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice from alleged constitutional deficiencies and contended that the post-conviction court incorrectly denied his request for DNA testing on the crotch of "Rustler" jeans, which he argued could indicate ownership by someone else. However, previous testing found no semen, and current DNA evidence would not significantly alter the likelihood of the jeans belonging to another individual from 1984. Therefore, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. Additionally, the petitioner argued a violation of Brady v. Maryland due to the State's failure to disclose notes from Detective Sharp concerning testimony from Ms. Mary Hunter Brown. The post-conviction court determined that the petitioner had been given access to the relevant evidence, and the record did not contradict this finding. Under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, defendants must have a fair opportunity to present a complete defense, which includes access to exculpatory evidence. For a successful Brady claim, a defendant must show that: 1) they requested the evidence, 2) it was suppressed by the State, 3) it was favorable, and 4) it was material to the case. The petitioner asserted that Detective Sharp's notes indicated Ms. Brown witnessed him attacking the victim in 1984, which could have been pivotal to the defense. The petitioner alleges that the State possessed certain notes that were not disclosed in response to Brady requests, which he claims would have alerted him to discrepancies in Ms. Hunter Brown’s testimony compared to her prior interview and a report from a university security officer. The petitioner argues that the absence of these notes hindered his defense. He also notes that although police detectives indicated that Ms. Hunter Brown had provided a formal written statement during her interview, such a statement was never found or shared with the defense. However, the post-conviction court determined that the petitioner did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the State suppressed this evidence. The court found that the State had indeed provided the relevant notes and information, which stands unless the evidence strongly contradicts it. Testimonies during the post-conviction hearing revealed limited evidence regarding the alleged suppression. The petitioner's former trial counsel could not confirm the non-disclosure of Detective Sharpe’s notes and acknowledged receiving "open file discovery." On the State's side, detectives affirmed that all materials related to Ms. Hunter Brown’s interview were submitted to the prosecutor for disclosure, and they had no knowledge of any non-disclosure. There was no definitive evidence presented by either party regarding the existence of a formal written statement or the disclosure of handwritten notes. The petitioner bore the burden of providing clear evidence to support his claims, which he failed to do, leading the post-conviction court to conclude that the State had met its disclosure obligations during the open file discovery process. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that Ms. Hunter Brown's testimony was material to his trial outcome. Her testimony, while described as a "pillar" of the State’s case due to its proximity to the victim's murder and its perceived severity, does not significantly alter the case since five other witnesses provided similar accounts of the petitioner’s violent behavior towards the victim. Most incidents occurred within a year prior to the murder, undermining the claim that Ms. Hunter Brown's testimony was uniquely critical. The violence described by her, while severe, was comparable to other testimonies, which included multiple instances of the petitioner’s violent actions, such as dragging and whipping the victim. The petitioner also argued that the circumstantial nature of the State's case heightened the importance of Ms. Hunter Brown’s statement. However, this overlooks substantial direct evidence presented at trial, including DNA, forensic evidence, and a confession to a third party. The Tennessee Supreme Court's recent ruling treats circumstantial and direct evidence equally, negating any claim that circumstantial evidence should elevate the materiality of Ms. Hunter Brown's testimony. The petitioner did not prove that the post-conviction court's finding regarding the disclosure of Brady material was erroneous, nor could he show the materiality of the information in question. Consequently, the petitioner’s assertion that the post-conviction court erred in denying his Brady claim is rejected. Additionally, he claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but this assertion is also denied. Two key allegations against the petitioner’s counsel include inadequate preparation for Ms. Mary Hunter Brown's cross-examination and failure to call a campus security officer as a rebuttal witness regarding the victim's dormitory assault. The document emphasizes the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, which requires that a petitioner demonstrate both deficient performance of counsel and resulting prejudice to their defense. To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Additionally, claims of ineffective assistance cannot rely on hindsight and must demonstrate that any errors had a reasonable probability of changing the trial's outcome. The court reviewed the petitioner's claims and determined that he could not prove prejudice, as Ms. Hunter Brown's testimony was largely redundant to that of five other witnesses who provided similar accounts of the petitioner’s behavior towards the victim. Thus, even if counsel's performance was deficient, the lack of distinctiveness in Ms. Hunter Brown’s testimony meant that it was unlikely to have influenced the trial's result. Therefore, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was denied, as the petitioner failed to establish the necessary elements for relief. The petitioner argues that the post-conviction court incorrectly denied his request for additional DNA analysis on the “Rustler” jeans linked to his case. Under T.C.A. 40-30-303, individuals convicted of certain serious offenses can request post-conviction DNA testing if specific conditions are met. The criteria outlined in T.C.A. 40-30-304 require that: (1) there is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if the DNA analysis provided exculpatory results; (2) the evidence still exists and is suitable for testing; (3) the evidence has not previously undergone the requested DNA analysis; and (4) the request is aimed at proving innocence rather than delaying justice. The critical factor in this case is whether a reasonable probability exists that exculpatory DNA results would have affected the prosecution's case. The definition of “reasonable probability” indicates that it must be sufficient to undermine confidence in the conviction. Courts should assume DNA analysis will yield exculpatory results and evaluate these results in the context of the trial evidence. Although the post-conviction court acknowledged the petitioner's failure to specify the appropriate code section for testing, it concluded that he did not meet the necessary standards under either section. The petitioner contends that DNA analysis from the jeans will not show his genetic material but will reveal that of an unknown donor. Experts for the State determined that the jeans in question were worn by someone near the victim at her time of death. The petitioner claims that finding another individual’s DNA inside the crotch of the “Rustler” jeans would contradict the State's case and support his explanation that his DNA was present due to using the jeans after sex with the victim the night before her murder. The post-conviction court ruled that the petitioner did not demonstrate that any exculpatory results would create a reasonable likelihood of avoiding charges or conviction, citing sufficient evidence from the trial to uphold the conviction even if other DNA were present. For court-ordered DNA analysis to be meaningful, any DNA found would need to be in the form of semen, sperm, or vaginal secretions, as these would imply someone else wore the jeans before the murder. However, prior tests on the jeans for such secretions returned negative results. The petitioner acknowledges this but requests testing for other DNA types like hair, saliva, or skin cells. Nevertheless, finding such DNA would not reasonably suggest the jeans were worn by someone else in 1984, given the jeans' extensive handling and storage over the years, which likely resulted in third-party DNA transfer. Blood evidence, while less likely to be found in that location, would only exclude the petitioner if found alongside vaginal secretions, which have already been tested and found absent. Past examinations for blood evidence in the jeans have yielded no results. The petitioner has not provided a credible theory indicating that favorable DNA results would have lessened the likelihood of his prosecution or conviction for the victim's murder. It is acknowledged that even if another individual's DNA were found on the "Rustler" jeans, it is improbable that the State would have dropped the case or that the jury would have acquitted the petitioner. The petitioner’s DNA was discovered on the outside of the jeans, and his claim of wiping himself on them after consensual sex with the victim is undermined by inconsistent statements made during police interviews. This inconsistency suggests that both the prosecutor and the jury would likely dismiss his explanation as conveniently fabricated given the other evidence presented. The State's case included eyewitness accounts, forensic and DNA evidence, a confession from a third party, and testimonies regarding the petitioner’s violent history with the victim. Despite the petitioner’s post-conviction representation's efforts to discredit the witnesses, the jury ultimately sided against him on these credibility issues. The post-conviction court correctly determined that the requested DNA testing would not have changed the trial's outcome, leading to the conclusion that the petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of different results had exculpatory DNA analysis been conducted. Therefore, the denial of the petitioner’s request for DNA analysis by the post-conviction court is upheld.