Eric D. Wallace v. Arvil Chapman, Warden

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2012-00749-CCA-R3-HC

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; November 8, 2012; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Eric D. Wallace filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contesting the validity of his indictment for attempted first-degree murder, claiming it was improperly amended to include a factual basis for aggravated assault. He also argued that the judgments and sentences for felony murder and attempted first-degree murder were void and sought the dismissal of the felony murder conviction, asserting that the victim was not killed recklessly during the underlying felony. The habeas corpus court denied the petition summarily. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the lower court’s judgment under Rule 20, indicating that Wallace's claims did not warrant relief, having previously been addressed in earlier proceedings. Wallace, previously convicted in 1995, had unsuccessfully pursued multiple post-conviction relief and habeas corpus petitions before this appeal.

Relief from a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a legal question subject to de novo review with no presumption of correctness. Under both the U.S. and Tennessee Constitutions, convicted individuals have the right to seek habeas corpus relief, but Tennessee laws define this right narrowly. Habeas corpus petitions are intended to challenge void judgments, which occur when a court lacks jurisdiction or authority, or when a defendant's sentence has expired, as opposed to voidable judgments that require additional proof of invalidity.

The petitioner challenges his indictment for attempted first degree murder, claiming it was improperly amended to include elements of aggravated assault. He argues the trial court erred in allowing this amendment based on a pending appeal in a related case, asserting a lack of jurisdiction. Additionally, he contends that the amendment introduced a new offense, which he argues violates procedural rules. However, errors in amending the indictment are not grounds for habeas corpus review; such a petition can only contest the validity of the indictment itself if it is so defective that it deprives the court of jurisdiction. The petitioner’s indictment has previously been addressed in other habeas corpus proceedings, establishing the validity of the current indictment.

Indictments are deemed sufficient under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-13-202, adequately informing the petitioner of the charges for preparation. The petitioner failed to demonstrate any defects in the indictments, rendering this argument meritless. Additionally, the petitioner contested the inclusion of "aggravated assault elements" in the amended indictment for attempted first-degree murder, asserting that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(b) did not permit such amendments. Previous rulings from earlier habeas corpus appeals have already addressed these issues. The petitioner’s reliance on Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 42 (a) and (b) is incorrectly placed, as prior cases affirm that surplus language in an indictment does not render it defective, and the aggravated assault language is considered surplusage rather than a new offense.

The petitioner also argued that his sentences for felony murder and attempted first-degree murder contravened Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202 (a)(2) and thus should be void. However, the petitioner did not provide legal authority or arguments to support this claim, resulting in a waiver of the issue. Even if not waived, the sentences imposed were lawful; the life sentence for felony murder aligned with statutory requirements at the time of the offense, as did the fifteen-year sentence for attempted first-degree murder. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief regarding the validity of his indictments or his sentences.

A challenge by the Petitioner regarding the sufficiency of evidence for his felony murder conviction has already been adjudicated. The Petitioner contends that the conviction should be dismissed as the victim was not killed recklessly during the commission of the underlying felony, attempted first-degree murder. This argument is interpreted as a sufficiency challenge, which is not permissible in habeas corpus proceedings, as established in precedents such as Myers v. State and Gant v. State. The court previously determined that sufficient evidence existed to support the Petitioner’s convictions, indicating that a rational trier of fact could conclude that the defendant recklessly shot the victim while attempting first-degree murder. Consequently, the Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this matter. The judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed, as noted by Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins.