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Hurd v. Hodge
Citations: 92 L. Ed. 2d 1187; 68 S. Ct. 847; 334 U.S. 24; 1948 U.S. LEXIS 2765; 92 L. Ed. 1187Docket: NO. 290
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 3, 1948; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the Court's opinion on companion cases related to Shelley v. Kraemer and McGhee v. Sipes, reviewed through certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In 1906, a covenant was established for twenty of thirty-one lots on Bryant Street, prohibiting their rental, sale, or transfer to any Negro or colored person, with a penalty of $2,000 as a lien on the property. This restriction had no time limit and was historically enforced, except for a brief period of occupation by Negroes, who were eventually compelled to leave. The remaining eleven lots in the block were occupied by Negroes for twenty years prior to this litigation. The cases involve seven of the restricted lots. In one case, petitioners Hurd, identified as Negroes, purchased a restricted property from white owners. In another, white real estate dealer Urciolo sold three restricted properties to Negro petitioners Rowe, Savage, and Stewart, while owning three additional lots under the same restrictions. Respondents, owning other restricted properties, sought injunctive relief to enforce the covenants. The District Court consolidated the cases and ruled the deeds to the Negro petitioners void, enjoining the sellers and the Negro petitioners from further transactions, and ordered the petitioners to vacate within sixty days. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed this ruling, with one dissent, agreeing with the lower court's consistency with prior decisions. Petitioners challenged the enforcement of these covenants, particularly on the basis that such judicial action violates the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. The issue of whether federal court enforcement of racial restrictive covenants contravenes the Fifth Amendment has not yet been decided by this Court, referencing Corrigan v. Buckley as a relevant case. The constitutional issue at hand in the case is limited to the validity of private agreements regarding restrictive covenants, not their enforcement by courts under the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. Previous rulings, such as Shelley v. Kraemer, have invalidated municipal ordinances that restrict property occupancy based on race, emphasizing the rights of both white sellers and Black purchasers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners argue that enforcing these covenants in the District of Columbia similarly violates their rights under the Fifth Amendment. However, the Court finds it unnecessary to address this constitutional question, as it concludes that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants is improper for other reasons. Section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, affirms that all U.S. citizens have equal rights to property ownership, which includes the District of Columbia. The statute does not invalidate private restrictive agreements as long as parties adhere voluntarily to their terms. The analysis of whether enforcing these covenants constitutes governmental action requires consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment's objectives, as both the Amendment and the Civil Rights Act were enacted together, sharing similar legislative intent and goals. Members of Congress aimed to embed the guarantees of the Civil Rights Act into the Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment. Support for the Amendment aimed to clarify the constitutional validity of the Civil Rights Act concerning state applications. The relationship between the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment was affirmed in Buchanan v. Warley, where it was stated that the Fourteenth Amendment and related statutes secure a colored man's right to property free from discriminatory state laws. Shelley v. Kraemer established that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state court discrimination in enforcing restrictive covenants. This framework guides the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act in the District of Columbia courts. Congress explicitly prohibits judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants, ensuring all citizens have equal rights to property transactions. The denial of these rights to Negro petitioners by federal courts, which issued orders to vacate properties based solely on race, contradicts the intent of the Civil Rights Act. The ruling emphasizes that the actions taken against Negro purchasers and white sellers violate Congress's protections under the Act and cannot be upheld. Additionally, even without the statute, enforcing restrictive covenants goes against U.S. public policy, which mandates that federal courts must adhere to constitutional principles and precedents. The ruling asserts that allowing federal courts to enforce actions denied to state courts would undermine equal protection rights. Therefore, it is concluded that such enforcement is inconsistent with U.S. public policy, warranting correction by the Supreme Court. The decision is reversed, with Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge not participating in the consideration or decision of the cases. Residential properties in the block are situated on the street's south side, adjacent to a public park on the north side. Petitioner James M. Hurd claims his identity as a Mohawk Indian rather than a Negro. Petitioners argue that enforcing racial covenants violates Section 1978 of the Revised Statutes, which stems from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as U.S. treaty obligations under the United Nations charter. They further contend that enforcement contradicts public policy and is inequitable. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has addressed the enforcement of racial restrictive agreements in several cases, including *Corrigan v. Buckley* (1924) and *Hundley v. Gorewitz* (1942), where the latter refused enforcement due to changes in neighborhood character. The court traditionally avoids ruling on constitutional issues when alternative grounds are available, as seen in cases such as *Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co.* (1946) and *Rescue Army v. Municipal Court* (1947). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 asserts that all individuals born in the U.S., excluding non-taxed Indians, are citizens with equal rights to contract, litigate, own property, and receive equal legal protections, irrespective of race or prior conditions of servitude. This act was later reenacted in 1870, and its principles are reflected in Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes, affirming equal rights and protections for all individuals within U.S. jurisdiction. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted on April 9, 1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment was submitted to the states following its passage by the House on June 13, 1866, after passing the Senate on June 8. Mr. Thayer emphasized that the Amendment incorporated the civil rights principle established by the Act, aiming to ensure equal administration of law and protect fundamental citizenship rights. Mr. Stevens confirmed that this understanding was a primary purpose of the Amendment, shared by both proponents and opponents. Senator Poland asserted the necessity of clarifying Congress's power to enforce foundational republican principles against state violations. Additionally, Section 240(a) of the Judicial Code allows the Supreme Court to review cases from lower courts through certiorari, maintaining similar authority as if the cases were brought by appeal. Various cases, including Muschany v. United States, illustrate this application of certiorari.