Illinois Ex Rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty.
Docket: 90
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 8, 1948; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Black delivered the Court's opinion addressing the state's authority to use its public school system for religious instruction, considering limitations imposed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The appellant, Vashti McCollum, a resident, taxpayer, and parent of a child enrolled in Champaign public schools, initiated a mandamus action against the Champaign Board of Education. She contested the legality of a program allowing religious teachers from private groups to instruct students during school hours, asserting it violated constitutional provisions.
Illinois law mandates compulsory education for children aged seven to sixteen, with specific allowances for private or parochial schooling. The Board of Education initially moved to dismiss the petition, claiming McCollum lacked standing, but the court denied this motion. The Board later acknowledged that religious instruction occurred during school hours for consenting pupils, who were temporarily excused from secular classes.
The Board argued that the program did not violate the State or Federal Constitution. After reviewing evidence and making findings, the court denied the mandamus petition, concluding the program was constitutional. The State Supreme Court affirmed this decision. McCollum then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction. The appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the State Supreme Court's judgment did not question the validity of any state statute, as the religious instruction program lacked express statutory authorization. However, the State Supreme Court found that the program was permissible under existing Illinois statutes, thereby implicating state law validity per 28 U.S.C. 344(a). The motion to dismiss based on McCollum's alleged lack of standing was also deemed meritless.
The appellant's motion is denied due to her failure to adequately present her constitutional challenge to the state program in the State Supreme Court, despite express rulings from both state courts on the matter. Key undisputed facts include the formation of the Champaign Council on Religious Education in 1940 by members of various faiths, which was permitted by the Board of Education to offer religious instruction classes to public school students in grades four to nine. Participation in these classes required parental consent, and while the council employed the religious teachers, they were subject to oversight by the school superintendent. Classes, conducted separately by religious leaders, took place in public school facilities, but students opting out of religious instruction were not released from their secular studies. The arrangement effectively used taxpayer-supported school resources for religious purposes, illustrating an integration of the state's compulsory education system with religious instruction, which violates the First Amendment as interpreted in Everson v. Board of Education. This precedent establishes that neither state nor federal governments can endorse or aid any religion, compel attendance at religious services, or levy taxes to support religious activities, emphasizing the principle of separation of church and state.
Disagreement exists regarding the interpretation of facts and the application of the First Amendment to the Illinois religious education program. Respondents argue that the First Amendment was intended only to prevent government favoritism among religions, not to prohibit impartial governmental support for all religions. They challenge the precedent set in the Everson case that the “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the court rejects these arguments, asserting that allowing state aid to religious groups does not equate to governmental hostility toward religion and that the First Amendment supports a separation that permits both religion and government to function independently.
The Illinois program utilizes public school resources to support religious education, which the court views as a violation of the separation of church and state. The case is reversed and remanded to the State Supreme Court for further proceedings. The appellant raises concerns about the program's validity, citing potential bias favoring certain Protestant groups, coercive participation pressures on students, and prior censorship of religious teachings through administrative controls over participating teachers and faiths. The court, however, finds it unnecessary to address these specific arguments given its ruling. The admission process for religious classes involves written requests from parents, with students released from secular activities to attend these classes during designated times.
Certain cards are distributed to obtain parental permission for children to attend religious instruction courses, facilitated by the school district's superintendent, principals, and teachers, with costs borne by the council of religious education. The distribution process does not disrupt the regular duties of school employees. The State Supreme Court noted that teachers for these religious classes are not public school teachers but require approval from the superintendent. The trial court determined that any religious group seeking to use public school facilities must apply to the superintendent, who will assess the practicality of such instruction. The local school board president indicated that both Protestant and Catholic groups would be given equal opportunities for classroom space, contingent on the approval of their teachers by the superintendent. Testimonies highlighted the backgrounds of the Protestant teachers involved, and a system for tracking student absences, akin to other classes, was described. A dissenting opinion from four judges emphasized that the issue cannot be framed as legal discrimination, noting that any state aid to religious instruction is constitutionally prohibited. The dissent argued that the Constitution mandates a complete separation of church and state, prohibiting any public funds from supporting religious activities, regardless of the scale of such appropriations.
