Shawn Simmons was convicted of first-degree murder by a Lincoln County jury and subsequently sought post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel after his direct appeal failed. The post-conviction court denied his request, and Simmons appealed the decision. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee reviewed the case and found no errors in the lower court's ruling, affirming the judgment.
The incident leading to Simmons' conviction occurred on February 3, 2008, during a Super Bowl gathering at the home of Keith and Jana Buchanan. Tension arose when Simmons confronted Mr. Buchanan about perceived disrespect towards his family. After leaving the Buchanan residence, Simmons was later involved in a confrontation while talking to his girlfriend, Angie Hill. When Mr. Buchanan and others approached to inquire about the situation, a shot was fired, fatally wounding Mr. Buchanan. A witness reported the shooting to 911. The court's opinion was delivered by Judge Roger A. Page, joined by Judges Thomas T. Woodall and Norma McGee Ogle.
Police observed the petitioner walking near the crime scene and noticed his suspicious behavior, including discarding an object onto a building. He was arrested while wearing gloves and was later linked to a .38 caliber revolver found nearby, which forensic tests confirmed was used in the murder of Mr. Buchanan. Evidence also included a gun holster and ammunition found at Ms. Hill's residence, who had not authorized the use of her weapon. The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, and his conviction was upheld on direct appeal.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel for several reasons: replacing original counsel, inadequate preparation, failure to sequester the jury, not filing a motion to suppress evidence, insufficient witness questioning, lack of objections, failure to supplement the record, and not addressing trial publicity on appeal. An amended petition added claims of inadequate investigation by trial counsel, incomplete discovery, and nondisclosure of evidence favorable to the petitioner.
During the post-conviction hearing, the petitioner testified about the frequent changes in his legal representation, expressing dissatisfaction with the timing and adequacy of the trial counsel's preparation. He stated that he met trial counsel two only once briefly before the trial and that trial counsel three had limited engagement as well. Petitioner indicated that he raised concerns to his counsel during the trial, which went unaddressed.
Petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of his trial counsel, alleging several instances of ineffective assistance. He stated that trial counsel two failed to make necessary objections during the trial, despite being informed of potential issues. Petitioner believed that all lawyers should have been coordinated and aware of case details to respond effectively to objections. He was particularly frustrated with trial counsel one’s failure to request that the jury be sequestered after he had asked for it, as he later learned that the jury was not sequestered and that some jurors had read a newspaper article about his case. Although two jurors were dismissed, petitioner felt that allowing the remaining jurors could have compromised their impartiality, and he criticized the lack of thorough questioning regarding potential juror contamination.
Additionally, petitioner claimed trial counsel were ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress his statements to police. He recounted that he invoked his right to counsel during police questioning, yet was still interrogated by a second officer. He contended that this should have led to the suppression of his statements, which he believed could have altered the defense strategy. Petitioner disputed Lieutenant Massey’s testimony regarding a waiver of rights form, asserting he never signed one, and he noted that discovery materials did not contain such a document. Finally, petitioner criticized trial counsel for failing to question a witness regarding his possession of a weapon on prior occasions, which he argued was relevant to countering claims that he stole the gun used in the shooting.
Petitioner claimed he had previously carried the gun in question but did not acquire it for the purpose of committing the murder. He testified that trial counsel failed to contact a potential witness and were ineffective for not objecting to the State's reference to a prior theft charge, which had been dismissed, during the trial. Petitioner expressed concern that referencing this charge during closing arguments could unduly influence the jury's perception. He noted that the State also alleged he had stolen the gun to commit the murder, again without objection from trial counsel.
Petitioner raised issues with the State's failure to disclose all intended witnesses, specifically mentioning Eddie Nance, who was present during jury selection and later testified for the State. Petitioner believed Nance's presence and testimony were problematic, as trial counsel did not object to either.
Additionally, petitioner highlighted that trial counsel inadequately investigated his case, particularly regarding his friend Jamie White, whom he wanted to testify. Petitioner had contacted White on the day of the shooting and learned that White was not actually incarcerated, contrary to what trial counsel had informed him.
Petitioner also criticized trial counsel for not supplementing the record for his direct appeal with transcripts from the preliminary hearing, claiming that discrepancies existed between trial and preliminary testimony that were not considered in his appeal. He asserted that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to file a petition to rehear based on these alleged inaccuracies, despite being advised by trial counsel that such issues could be pursued in post-conviction relief.
Petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel for not raising 'publicity issues' on appeal. Although trial counsel sought a mistrial due to jurors reading a newspaper article, the trial court denied the request. Petitioner noted that trial counsel promised to appeal the mistrial denial but only included it in the motion for a new trial, not in the appellate brief. After reading the direct appeal opinion, he requested trial counsel to file for an extraordinary appeal, but received no response. Eventually, trial counsel informed petitioner of his withdrawal and suggested pursuing post-conviction relief.
Petitioner discussed jury instructions with trial counsel, specifically requesting a 'curative instruction on intent, premeditation, and deliberation,' arguing that proper instructions would clarify that the murder was unplanned and could lead to an acquittal or a lesser charge. During cross-examination, petitioner acknowledged trial counsel's representation started after the case was bound over to the grand jury and affirmed receiving a letter about a change in representation.
He noted trial counsel's prompt action when discovering that four jurors had encountered the newspaper article, leading to questioning of the jurors. Two jurors had only read the headline, while two admitted to reading the article and were excused. The trial judge repeated admonitions against reading outside materials.
Petitioner argued that his statement, which aligned with a self-defense theory, contained prejudicial information about his past and should not have been admitted. He admitted that he had not seen the State’s supplemental witness list or the subpoena for a key witness until the post-conviction hearing, despite discussing prior altercations with that individual during jury selection. Petitioner criticized trial counsel for not disclosing his habit of carrying a firearm, claiming this could have influenced jury perceptions. He also stated that his girlfriend's testimony regarding the weapon being taken that day was uninformed.
The petitioner’s girlfriend was uncertain about the timing of when he acquired a gun but knew who had it if it was absent. The petitioner discussed with trial counsel the possibility of leaving town before the shooting and mentioned phone conversations with Jamie White, though he was unaware of White's criminal background, despite having previously been incarcerated with him. The petitioner acknowledged that he did not mention White in his pro se post-conviction relief petitions and never informed the trial judge about any issues with trial counsel or his desire for White to testify.
Petitioner reviewed jury instructions regarding premeditation, deliberation, and intent, and confirmed that trial counsel requested a special jury instruction on self-defense, which was granted. Trial counsel one was the lead attorney, assisted by trial counsel two and three. He had multiple consultations with preliminary counsel and met with the petitioner five or six times, some in jail and others at the courthouse. Trial counsel two was relatively new to the public defender's office and primarily observed the trial and cross-examined witnesses for record purposes.
Regarding jury sequestration, trial counsel one consulted with local investigators and felt there was insufficient community bias to warrant it. He denied explicitly stating to the petitioner that he would seek jury sequestration but noted that four jurors had read a newspaper article about the case. He informed the judge, questioned the jurors, and requested a mistrial. In hindsight, he would have sought jury sequestration. Trial counsel one did not file a motion to suppress the petitioner’s statement, believing it was self-serving yet supported the claim of self-defense, as it described an attack by multiple individuals that led to the shooting.
Trial counsel one acknowledged knowledge of the petitioner’s criminal history and anticipated that if the petitioner testified, this history would be presented at trial. He believed that the petitioner’s statement could be used to introduce his testimony without formally admitting prior convictions. Counsel discussed concerns about a potential witness, Angie Hill, who would testify that the petitioner often carried a weapon, and sought to avoid this evidence being presented to the jury. Although the petitioner faced a felony possession of a handgun charge, it was dismissed at the general sessions level. Counsel did not object to the mention of a theft charge related to the weapon since a defense witness indicated that the petitioner took the gun without permission during the incident.
Mr. Nance, a witness added to the State’s list, was not discussed with the petitioner, as counsel focused on the original witness list. Counsel had personal interviews with the petitioner and his girlfriend, while investigators handled other witness interviews. Although the petitioner sent a letter requesting the inclusion of a preliminary hearing transcript for the appeal, counsel declined, believing it would not be beneficial. He initially considered raising a publicity issue on appeal due to jurors potentially reading about the case but ultimately deemed it frivolous after research. Counsel did not recall any requests from the petitioner for a rehearing.
Discussions included special jury instructions, with a focus on self-defense. Counsel decided to present both self-defense and alternatives of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, asserting the petitioner received a fair trial. On cross-examination, counsel recognized that while sequestration could lead to juror dissatisfaction, the trial judge provided thorough instructions to the jurors about their conduct during the trial.
Trial counsel one testified that he met with the petitioner about five times, noting additional meetings and investigations occurred without the petitioner. He described the petitioner as cooperative and believed he understood the case and witness testimonies. Counsel acknowledged the petitioner’s guilt in killing the victim, framing the defense around self-defense, second-degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter. He felt the defense was well-prepared for trial, with no surprises, and expected witness testimonies.
Preliminary counsel represented the petitioner initially and had more than five meetings with him. She detailed that her meetings at the courthouse lasted around twenty minutes, while jail meetings extended beyond an hour. She confirmed that the charge of being a felon in possession of a handgun was dismissed at the preliminary hearing, and other charges were bound to a grand jury. After her removal from the case before trial, she conferred with trial counsel, sharing information gained from her preparation and interviews with the petitioner’s girlfriend and family. She clarified that she did not promise the petitioner she would represent him at trial.
Trial counsel two, who joined the case a few weeks before trial, met with the petitioner one or two times alongside trial counsel one and three. He was present for parts of the trial, primarily to assist other counsel and gain experience. He stated he was adequately prepared and familiarized himself with the case, despite not recalling any specific requests from the petitioner regarding jury sequestration.
Trial counsel three, assigned to the case before trial, relied on information from trial counsel one and preliminary counsel without interviewing witnesses. He confirmed trial counsel one was the lead attorney and acknowledged trial counsel two’s involvement in voir dire and witness discussions but did not remember discussing case discovery or jury instructions with the petitioner.
Petitioner’s trial counsel did not recall the petitioner’s seating arrangement during the trial but indicated he would have assisted with any questions. Counsel was uninvolved in the appeal process. Jamie Lamont White, Jr., a long-time friend of the petitioner, testified about a conversation on the day of the shooting, where petitioner sought advice to avoid a situation with his girlfriend. White intended to assist petitioner but was distracted by news of the shooting. He expressed willingness to testify but faced communication issues with the trial counsel’s office, ultimately assuming his testimony was unnecessary. White also disclosed his relationship to one of petitioner’s co-defendants and concerns about his own legal issues impacting the credibility of his testimony.
The post-conviction court considered the evidence and concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate deficient performance by trial counsel or show any resulting prejudice. Consequently, the court denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner appeals this denial, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed in a post-conviction claim, the petitioner must prove constitutional rights were violated, with the burden of proof resting on them to establish factual claims by clear and convincing evidence. Appellate courts do not reevaluate witness credibility as that is the trial court’s responsibility, and findings of fact from the post-conviction court are upheld unless proven otherwise.
Conclusions of law are not presumed correct on appeal, particularly regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which are reviewed de novo. The Sixth Amendment and Tennessee Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant effective counsel, effective from the initiation of adversarial proceedings, which includes the issuance of an arrest warrant, preliminary hearings, or grand jury indictments. Issues not raised in an appellate brief are considered waived, following Tennessee procedural rules.
To succeed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate that the attorney's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Deficiency is established by showing that the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing norms. Counsel must provide reasonably effective assistance and ensure the defendant is not deprived of a substantial defense due to ineffectiveness.
Appellate review of counsel's performance requires consideration from the perspective of counsel at the time, avoiding hindsight bias. To show prejudice, the petitioner must establish a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for the counsel's errors, which undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.
Petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney's performance was deficient enough to deprive him of a fair trial, which calls into question the reliability of the outcome. To be eligible for post-conviction relief, both deficient performance and resulting prejudice must be established. If either prong is not met, the court need not evaluate the other.
Petitioner claims ineffective assistance due to trial counsel's failure to call Jamie White as a witness, arguing that White's testimony would have supported his self-defense claim. At the post-conviction hearing, White indicated that he was contacted but received no follow-up and thus did not pursue being a witness. However, White's own criminal history and lack of presence at the scene significantly undermined his credibility. His testimony, which merely related to an altercation discussed by petitioner, was already included in petitioner's statements to authorities. Consequently, there was no reasonable probability that White's testimony would have altered the trial's outcome. Petitioner did not demonstrate that trial counsel's decision not to utilize White's testimony constituted ineffective assistance or that he suffered prejudice as a result.
Additionally, petitioner asserted ineffective assistance due to the replacement of preliminary counsel with other attorneys who allegedly met with him infrequently. Evidence showed that preliminary counsel was only assigned at the general sessions level, while trial counsel one was the lead attorney for the circuit court. Trial counsel and their assistants testified to having multiple meetings with petitioner and coordinated with preliminary counsel. Although petitioner preferred preliminary counsel, this preference does not inherently indicate ineffectiveness in replacing counsel. Moreover, trial counsel's adequate preparation and collaboration with preliminary counsel further negate claims of deficiency or prejudice stemming from this change.
Petitioner contests trial counsel's decisions regarding jury sequestration, objecting to the prosecutor's use of dismissed charges at trial, and the failure to suppress his statement to law enforcement. Trial counsel testified that he discussed jury sequestration but deemed it unnecessary, citing potential negative impacts on jurors. The post-conviction court concurred, ruling that the petitioner did not demonstrate any prejudice from the lack of sequestration, especially since only two jurors read a newspaper article about the trial, and those jurors were dismissed.
Regarding the prosecutor's use of evidence related to a dismissed theft charge, the court found the testimony about the petitioner taking the murder weapon relevant to intent and premeditation. Trial counsel opted not to object, considering it a tactical decision, which the court upheld as reasonable.
Lastly, concerning the failure to suppress the petitioner’s statement to the police, the post-conviction court noted that the petitioner was read his Miranda rights and that questioning ceased once he requested an attorney. There was no evidence of coercion during the interrogation, and trial counsel aimed to use the statement to present a self-defense theory without subjecting the petitioner to cross-examination.
In conclusion, the court affirmed the post-conviction court's judgment, finding no errors in the trial counsel's performance or in the decisions regarding jury management, evidentiary objections, or the handling of the petitioner’s statement.
